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INTRODUCTION BY THE GENERAL EDITORS
We are happy to present Volume 12 of the Asian Yearbook of International Law.
The Asian approach to international law continues to make its presence felt in diverse
international law fora: from trade to environment to human rights. Its distinctive
approach as reflected in state practice is increasingly coming to be recognized. At
the same time, it is worth noting, the Asian approach to international law has much
in common with those of Africa and Latin America; together, these approaches
constitute the Third World approach to international law.
This was at first articulated by Asian and African scholars, judges, and states from
the middle of the previous century. The approach stressed the contribution of Third
World states to the evolution and development of international law, the need to respect
the fundamental principles of international law, such as the sovereignty of states and
non-use of force, and the need for modern international law to take cognizance of
the needs and interests of Third World peoples in order to transform these into
universal international law.
In recent years, this early Third World scholarship in international law has been and
is currently being critically assessed by a new generation of Third World scholars
who explicitly go by the name of TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International
Law). Similarly to its earlier incarnation, it does not represent a unified approach
to international law; the best description is of Third World approaches to international
law. Diverse ideological strands are a part of the new Third World approach: liberal,
post-colonial, feminist, socialist, and so on. If there is a common unifying factor it
is the critique of mainstream international law scholarship from the perspective of
the interests of Asian, African, and Latin American peoples. While the north-south
divide is a crucial element of this approach, it also takes into account the need for
an inter-civilizational approach to international law.
TWAIL is the outcome of conversations held between scholars from the ThirdWorld
in the mid-nineteen-nineties. It soon acquired a collective presence. The first TWAIL
conference was organized at Harvard University in 1997; a second at York University,
Canada, in 2001, and a third most recently at Albany, the US, in April, 2007. Scholars
from Asia, Africa, and Latin America gathered at these conferences to consider a
range of issues of international law, from the most theoretical to the most concrete.
ix
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These conferences, among their other aspects, reflected on the strengths and
weaknesses of the first generation of Third World scholarship in international law.
As regards weaknesses, there is a view emerging that colonialism is more central
to the story of international law than had previously been recognized. Similarly, it
is felt that the earlier generation of Third World scholarship failed to take into
consideration “international law from below”.
The overall thrust is towards making international lawmore inclusive of and relevant
to the concerns of Asian, African, and Latin American peoples. The development
of TWAIL is of significance as the Asian approach to international law can evolve
by learning from the experiences of the other regions that have had to confront
Eurocentric and hegemonic international law (as can others from the Asian approach).
We hope that in these contexts the Asian Yearbook of International Law can make
an important contribution in the shaping of a new international law that will help
to usher in a peaceful and just global order.
The General Editors
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ARTICLES

MARITIME TERRORISM AND SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE*
Mary George**
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11),1 terrorism, and as far as this paper
is concerned maritime terrorism,2 has been added to the list of crimes that fall within
the prescriptive and criminal enforcement jurisdiction of states, collectively referred
to as criminal jurisdiction in this paper. Maritime terrorism may be committed on
coastal land; on the coastal shelter belt; in the interface between land and sea; on
offshore islands, reefs, or upon low-tide elevations; on lighthouses; on offshore
* The original version of this article was presented as a paper entitled “Maritime Security Challenges
in the Straits ofMalacca and Singapore” at the International LawAssociation, British Branch Spring
Conference, hosted by University College London and the School of Oriental and African Studies
in central London, “Tower of Babel, International Law in the 21st Century: Coherent or Compart-
mentalised?”, 3-4 March 2006.
** Associate Professor Datin Dr., Faculty of Law, University of Malaya.
1 See Sterba, P. James (ed.), “For a brief history of terrorism”, Terrorism and International Justice
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 2, 1-27 where the author says, “The terrorism of
9/11 is something new and different”. Sterba recognizes that states can commit terrorist acts as well,
see Sterba, ibid. 206-228. On Brierly’s critique of Vattel on the use of force and on freedom and
human rights of the enemy, see Carty, Anthony, “Chapter 4: The terrors of freedom: the sovereignty
of states and the freedom to fear” in Strawson, John (ed.), Law after Ground Zero (Portland, Oregon:
The Glasshouse Press, 2002), at 44-56. See also Cook, L. Martin, “Ethical issues in counter-terrorism”
in Okerstrom, Dennis (ed.), Peace, War and Terrorism (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2006), at
199-204, where the author discusses considerations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello and the moral
status of an adversary. See also Charlesworth, Hilary, Valerie Epps and P. Michael Schraf, “Inter-
national legal implication: Teach–in on terrorism*: September 20, 2001”, 8 New Eng Int’l & Comp
L Ann (2002), at 81, where these Professors held discussions on the 9/11 events within a week of
the tragedies.
2 See Raymond, Catherine Zara, “The threat of maritime terrorism in the Malacca Straits” in 4/3
(February 9, 2006) TerrorismMonitor, Global TerrorismAnalysis, see http://jamestown.org/terrorism/
news /article.php?articleid=236986, accessed on 14/9/2006; Rommel, C. Banloi, “Maritime terrorism
in South-East Asia: the Abu Sayyaf threat” (58) 4, Naval War College Review (2005) (on line).
Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 12 (B.S. Chimni et al., eds.)
© 2007 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in The Netherlands, pp. 3-30.
3
4 Asian Yearbook of International Law
installations; on the sea-bed, slope, or rise of the continental edge or margin; in the
common heritage of mankind; on gas pipelines or cables; under the seabed; on
structures under the seabed or in the airspace above the sea, or even in outer space
above the airspace above the sea. In simple terms, terrorism at sea may take place
in any maritime zone from internal waters to the outer edge of the exclusive economic
zones, or outer edge of the continental shelves or on the high seas. Maritime terrorism
has many manifestations, for example, ships have been deliberately hijacked, run
aground or blown up by explosives, and passengers and crew have been threatened
and killed. If a Strait state is to examine and control criminal activities at sea, it needs
to be conferred with express criminal jurisdiction under the 1982 LOSC. The Inter-
national Maritime Organization (the IMO) has adopted three international conventions
for the suppression of maritime terrorism. These Conventions cover neither issues
of state responsibility nor international judicial intervention, but focus on domestic
criminal enforcement. The maritime conventions and protocols that address maritime
terrorism are as follows:
1. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation 1988;
2. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Activities Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 1988, and
3. 2005 Amendments to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA)
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 and its Related Protocol.
The author argues that in order to enforce the provisions of the 2005 SUA
Protocols certain amendments have to be made to Part III on Straits Used for Inter-
national Navigation of the 1982 LOSC as it does not confer sufficient criminal
jurisdiction upon Strait states. This demonstrable lack of imperative criminal enforce-
ment jurisdiction in Part III is unlike its correlative for coastal states in Article 27
of Part II on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, where Article 34 (2) of Part
III states that “the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the States bordering the Straits is
exercised subject to this Part and to other rules of international law”. The reference
to “other rules of international law” is, inter alia, a reference to the general principles
of criminal jurisdiction, the most powerful of which are the territorial and protective
principles: the ‘effects’ doctrine. Article 34(2) as currently worded is unsupported
by enforcement powers in the rest of the provisions of Part III and lacks an imperative
direction from states; it has, rather, a precatory tone in meeting the challenges of
maritime terrorism and the nuclear radiation of the oceans. The precatory nature
derives from an expression of desire as manifested in Article 34, above. Under these
circumstances, Strait states face an unduly heavy burden in defending the regime
of transit passage. Given that criminal enforcement jurisdiction as currently stated
in Part III of the 1982 LOSC is insufficient to meet the challenges ahead, this paper
offers an alternate solution to the defending of the freedom of the oceans for all.
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The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own
way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to
obtain it.
- John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1859
The jurisprudential basis for attacking terrorism (the arguments of the utilitarian
and the Kantian notwithstanding) is that terrorism is an exception to the general views
on utilitarianism, freedom of speech and freedom of religion; it is a total violation
of human rights and the dignity of persons. It deserves a special kind of treatment
as it stems from a desire to use terror in the attempt, conspiracy or accomplishment
of an act or omission which amounts to an offence. States need to study several areas,
cited below, in the area of maritime terrorism and maritime security challenges.
However, this paper does not aim to answer all of the following questions:
(i) Is maritime terrorism any different from other crimes?
(ii) What form of punishment should be meted out to these criminals?
(iii) What sort of reform is envisaged for these criminals?
(iv) Can the terrorist be separated from, say, the money-launderer?
In simple terms, where one individual or a group of individuals from one state
or a group of states intends and knowingly plans and conspires to an attack using
terror in any form on the citizens of the same state or a group of states in the further-
ance of their unlawful objective, they have committed terrorism. It is direct abuse
of the concept of liberty. A jurisprudence of the liberty of actions with no impedi-
ments is a veritable minefield. No one has the right to infringe the peaceful co-
existence of a people or of a state. Liberty is that sphere of activity within which
the law is content to leave one alone. This is lawful liberty. Liberty is good and some
licence in a liberty for the regulation of civil society is acceptable when tempered
by law, yet liberty without impediments when used by terrorists is tantamount to
the instant genocide of the people and to the demolition of the state and its institu-
tions. The peaceful co-existence of a people includes, among other factors, the
recognition and enforcement of constitutionally guaranteed human rights that include
the right to peaceful co-existence. When terrorists infringe this right of the peaceful
co-existence of states and their populations, they commit an unlawful act. These
unlawful acts are offences and have to be given a name, a definition, and a procedural
content at international law in the form of a treaty for both legal and political action
to be taken by the international community, a horizontally shared responsibility
followed by a supporting element of national law. The right we have to live in peace
and security is dependent upon the state’s providing us with this blanket of security.
Terrorists such as perpetrators of genocide have taken a liberty with no impediments
to their terrorizing humankind, governments, and institutions alike for whatever
reason. Their high degree of autonomy to determine and pursue their own ends has
to be stopped where this infringes the right and liberty of the next citizen. Any form
of state or official approval, connivance, indifference, impotence or acquiescence
is wrong under the law of nature, anchored as it is in liberty.
With the dawn of the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts
of Nuclear Terrorism, the regime of Straits used for international navigation needs
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to be re-visited as the Convention considers it an offence to commit terrorism with
nuclear materials.3 This Convention recognizes the traditional principles of territorial,
3 The United Nations GA Resolution and Conventions on terrorism are as follows: The UNGA
A/RES/49/60 at its fiftieth session adopted a Declaration entitled “Declaration on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism” which called for closer co-operation among states to combat
terrorism and crimes closely connected with terrorism. The latter comprise drug trafficking, unlawful
arms trade, money laundering, and the smuggling of nuclear and other potentially deadly materials.
This Declaration condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable
including those which jeopardize the friendly relations among states and peoples and which threaten
the territorial integrity and security of states. Paragraph 3 provides that:
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group
of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable,
whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious
or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them;
UNGAA/RES/51/210 adds an Annex to the aboveDeclaration, namely, Declaration to Supple-
ment the 1994 Declaration onMeasures to Eliminate International Terrorism. It states, among others,
that terrorists should be tried within the state, or extradited. In the case of those who seek asylum,
their terrorist activity should not be considered a political issue whereby the asylum seeker is
pardoned for his criminal terrorist activity. States are urged in paragraph 3 to deal with terrorists
in conformity with national and international law, including international standards of human rights,
before granting refugee status. This status should not be used as a ruse to perpetrate further terrorist
activities. Even those awaiting asylum applications may not avoid prosecution for their terrorist
activities. States with experience in dealing with these issues are reminded of the importance of
sharing their information regarding the terrorists, their movements, support and weaponry, investiga-
tion procedures, and the prosecution of terrorist acts.
For UN Anti-terrorism Conventions, seeUN Publication: UNITED NATIONS Office on Drugs
and Crime, Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols (New
York: United Nations, 2004) and the United Nations, International Instruments related to the
Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism (New York: United Nations, 2004). Some
recent conventions to control terrorism are the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997
(UNDoc. A/RES/52/164, Annex), the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999 (UN
Doc. A/RES/54/109, Annex), and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, 2005.
Article 5 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997
compels States Parties to adopt such measures as are necessary, including “domestic legislation,
to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of this Convention, in particular where they are intended
or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular
persons, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature and are punished by penalties consistent
with their grave nature”. Article 1 of this Convention lays down definitions of “State or Government
Facility”, “Infrastructure facility”, “Explosive or other lethal device”, “Military forces of a state”,
“Place of public use” and “Public Transportation System”. Article 3 stresses that the Convention
does not apply where the offence is committed within a single state, the alleged offender and the
victims are nationals of that state, the alleged offender is found in the territory of that state, and
no other state has a basis under the Convention to exercise jurisdiction. Besides territorial jurisdiction,
quasi-territorial jurisdiction on board ships and aircraft, nationality, and passive personality juris-
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quasi-territorial, nationality and passive personality jurisdiction as it applies to ships
and aircraft. The unlawful and intentional possession, making and using of damaging
radioactive material are punishable under Article 2 (1). The criminal liability in
Article 2 (1) extends to any person who unlawfully and intentionally possesses
radioactive material or makes or possesses a device with the intention to cause death
or serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or to the environment;
or intentionally uses radioactive material or damages a nuclear facility in a manner
which releases or risks the release of radioactive material with the intention of causing
death or serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or to the environment;
or compels a natural or legal person, an international organization or a state to do
or refrain from doing an act. Similarly, threats and demands also constitute offences.
Attempts and accomplices are punishable as acts furthering criminal activity. However,
where the geographical scope of the offence coincides with the nationality jurisdiction
of both the perpetrator and the victim and no other state can exercise jurisdiction,
that constitutes a case of territorial jurisdiction, where the Convention does not apply.
The Convention urges states to enact laws that counter nuclear terrorism both within
and beyond their territories.4
diction, the Convention also recognizes jurisdiction based on domiciliary laws where the offence
is committed by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of that State.
The 1999 International Convention For the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism makes
it an offence for a terrorist by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, to provide
or collect funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to
be used, in full or in part, to carry out the acts within the scope of the Convention. Other offences
include death, serious bodily injury to a civilian or the intimidation of a population, or the compulsion
of a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing an act.
4 Some other international conventions on terrorism:
The UN conventions on terrorism deal with terrorism in the airspace, on land and at sea are
as follows:
The Tokyo Convention on Offences Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963, see UNTS, vol. 704,
No. 10106; The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, see UNTS,
vol. 860, No. 12325; The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation 1971, see UNTS, vol. 974, No. 14118; The Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 1973, see UNTS, vol. 1035, No. 15410
(not discussed here); The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979, see UNTS,
vol. 1316, No. 21931 (not discussed here); The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material 1979, see UNTS, vol. 1456, No. 24631 (not discussed here); Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation 1971, see ICAO Doc
9518, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation 1988; and Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 1988, see UNTS, vol. 1678, No. 29004.
Under these Conventions, criminal jurisdiction is based in traditional international law on the
territorial principle; the quasi-territorial principle in so far as it relates to ships and aircraft registered
in the particular state; the nationality principle; the passive personality principle, and the protective
principle. Jurisdiction is linked to the location of crime. While states are given enforcement juris-
diction, they are encouraged to adopt prescriptive jurisdiction; through extra-territorial jurisdiction
under their Penal Codes to conclude extradition treaties with states making terrorist offences
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extraditable, granting asylum where necessary; determining refugee status and the application of
human rights and humanitarian rights of such refugees. The duty to prosecute and punish the terrorist
is paramount. To do this a state needs both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. The state
is a holder of both a right and a duty. First, a state can obtain the necessary enforcement criminal
jurisdiction only if it is a Contracting Party to the Convention. Ratification plays a major role as
in other treaties and the Conventions are again dependent on a minimum number of ratifications
for entry into force. These Conventions are also subject to the “forces” of reservation and denunci-
ation, which will determine the success or failure of a Convention. Second, it is important to
remember that only actions that instil terror fall under the definition of terrorism. Thus, for instance,
if a terrorist pollutes the atmosphere of an aircraft cabin and causes the death of 400 passengers
on that plane, there is no element of terror involved and the offence does not fall under terrorism.
It is a loop-hole under the present definition. The term “territory” has to be understood under general
international law; for maritime purposes, it has to be understood under the provisions of the 1982
LOSC. The determination of the territory is critical for the exercise of jurisdiction. Thirdly and
finally, the traditional immunity accorded to military, customs and police services, which has perhaps
worked very well so far, may just prove to be the Achilles heel of the entire operations.
For instance, to give effect to the quasi-territorial jurisdiction of a state under the Tokyo
Convention on Offences Committed on Board Aircraft 1963, the state has to be a Contracting Party
to the Tokyo Convention and the aircraft to be one of a Contracting State. The recognized offence
is provided in Articles 1 and 2 which deal with offences against penal law; acts which, whether
or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property
therein or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board. The Convention applies in respect
of offences committed or acts done by a person on board any aircraft registered in a Contracting
State, while that aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the high seas or of any other area outside
the territory of any state.
Article 2 provides that without prejudice to the provisions of Article 4 and except when the
safety of the aircraft or of persons or property on board so requires, no provision of this Convention
shall be interpreted as authorizing or requiring any action in respect of offences against penal laws
of a political nature or those based on racial or religious discrimination.
It is only the state of registration of the aircraft that is competent to exercise jurisdiction. This
includes criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. There are some recognized
exceptions encapsulated within Article 4 that permit a Contracting State which is not an aircraft
registered state to exercise (1) protective jurisdiction where the offence has an effect on the territory
of that state; (2) the nationality principle where the offence has been committed by or against a
national or permanent resident of such state; (3) the principle of quasi-territorial jurisdiction where
the offence consists of a breach of any rule or regulation relating to the flight or manoeuvre of
aircraft in force in such state, and (4) subject-matter jurisdiction where the exercise of jurisdiction
is necessary to ensure the observance of any obligation of such state under a multilateral international
agreement. The aircraft commander is under pressure to determine whether, subjectively or objective-
ly, he has reasonable grounds to believe that someone on his aircraft is about to commit an offence
aboard. Twelve instruments of ratification are required to bring it into force.
Some of the weaknesses of the Tokyo Convention remain unchanged in The Hague Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970 and the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971. To begin with, the Preamble
of The Hague Convention in no uncertain terms provides that “for the purpose of deterring such
acts, there is an urgent need to provide appropriate measures for punishment of offenders.” The
Act recognizes that the act in question is an offence under Article 1 whereby any person who on
board an aircraft in flight unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation,
seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or is an accomplice
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of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act commits an offence.
The material scope of the Act extends to aircraft in flight as mentioned in Article 3. Every
Contracting State undertakes to make the offence punishable by severe penalties (Article 2). When
a person has been taken into custody, the concerned Contracting State has a duty to inform on the
state of the registration of the aircraft, the state of the nationality of the detained person and any
other State interested in the detention of such person of such custody (Article 4). States are bound
to give the greatest measure of assistance in these criminal matters (Article 10). This Article also
provides that the law of the state requested shall apply in all such cases. Extradition is recognized
in these matters in Article 8 and the Council of the ICAO is to be informed of all such information
(Article 11). The Convention requires a mere ten ratifications to enter into force.
The Montreal Convention of 1971 applies to offences against aircraft, too, and considered that
there was an urgent need to provide appropriate measures for the punishment of offenders. It
introduced the mens rea of intention into the definition of the offence against civil aviation. In
Article 1 it states that any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally:
a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely
to endanger the safety of that aircraft;
b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable
of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight;
c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or
substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it
incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight;
d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if any such act
is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or
e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safety of an
aircraft in flight.
Attempts are punished as much as accomplices. The material scope of the Convention covers
aircraft in flight and aircraft in service as stated in Article 2. The idea of imposing severe penalties
is again retained in Article 3. Contracting States who are about to try the offender are required to
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature
under the law of that state (Article 7). The jurisdiction of a Contracting State is widened under this
Convention for it extends to territorial jurisdiction, quasi-territorial jurisdiction, and domiciliary
jurisdiction which covers both permanent residence and principal place of business requirements
(Article 5). Articles 5 and 8 are inter-connected, as Article 8 states that for purposes of extradition
between the Contracting States, each offence is to be treated as if the occurrence had been committed
in all of the territories of the states required to establish jurisdiction under Article 5. This Convention
is dependent on ten ratifications for it to enter into force.
The 1971 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation also considers in its Preamble that for the purpose of deterring such
acts, the offenders must be punished. As this Protocol extends its coverage to the airport, the
definition of the offence is given in Article II as stated below:
Article II:
Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally, using any device, substance
or weapon:
a) performs an act of violence against a person at an airport serving international civil aviation
which causes or is likely to cause serious injury or death; or
b) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an airport serving international civil aviation
or aircraft not in service located thereon or disrupts the services of the airport, if such an act
endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport.
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States are required to regulate, de-regulate and re-regulate crimes occasionally
within their states. Today crimes of maritime terrorism are added to this list. Terrorists
are not punished under the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions I to IV.
Terrorism is a criminal offence for which states that once bore no responsibility for
terrorists in their territories should now bear state responsibility, the rationale being
that criminal acts undermine collective national security.
2. CONVENTIONS ON COUNTER-MARITIME TERRORISM
Piracy and armed robbery were the main human threats at sea for a long time.5
Pirates were not considered as terrorists but as stateless persons on the high seas
who marauded certain passing ships for private gain and were subject to the rules
of international law.6 Armed robbers were subject to municipal laws. A new offence
was added to this list: the offence of maritime terrorism. The genesis of maritime
terrorism in recent times can be traced to the nineteen-eighties, when there was a
great deal of concern when ships were hijacked, run aground or blown up, passengers
and crew killed or kidnapped and cargo lost. In November 1985, the Fourteenth
Assembly of the IMO considered a proposal by the US that measures regulating the
prevention of such unlawful conduct should be adopted. In this context, the IMO
General Assembly in Resolution A. 584(14) noted:
[W]ith great concern the danger to passengers and crew resulting from the increasing
number of incidents involving piracy, armed robbery and other unlawful acts against or
on board ships, including small craft, both at anchor and underway.
Various provisions such as Article 1(4) (Tokyo), Article 3(2) (Hague), and Article 4(1) (Montreal),
all state that the Conventions do not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police services.
5 There is a great deal of literature on the subject of piracy, the Achille Lauro case, and maritime
terrorism as follows: seeHalberstam,Malvina, “Terrorism on the high seas: the Achille Lauro, piracy
and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety” 82 AJIL (1998), at 269–310; Barrios, Erik, “Casting
a wider net: Addressing the maritime piracy problem in South-East Asia” 28 Boston College
International and Comparative Law Review (2005), at 149–166 where he raises an interesting
argument that there is another definition of piracy before UNCLOS that States in South-East Asia
may apply and that maritime terrorism falls within the latter. At para. 157 of this work, this author
writes: “Towards a more historically accurate piracy framework”. Another author, Goodman, laments
that no one is using international law to suppress piracy in Goodman, Timothy H., “Leaving the
corsair’s name to other times: How to enforce the law of the sea piracy in the 21st century through
regional international agreements”, 31Case W Res Int’l L (1999), at 139-168; for gaps in the current
law on piracy see Bornick, Brooke A., “Bounty hunters and pirates: Filling in the gaps of the 1982
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”, 17 Fla J Int’l L (2005), at 259 – 275.
6 See Dubner, Barry Hart, “Human rights and environmental disaster – two problems that defy
the ‘norms’ of the international law of the sea piracy” 23 Syracuse J Int’l L & Com (1997), at 1
where Dubner argues that piracy and terrorist attacks have similarities, but their goals are different.
For instance, a terrorist or pirate attack leading to oil or chemical spills could result in disastrous
consequences moving up the entire food chain.
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Thus the offences of piracy, armed robbery and maritime terrorism became inter-
twined to some extent with their criminal elements. The locus for maritime terrorism
is very wide, while piracy is still an offence on the high seas and armed robbery
a municipal crime. In December 1985, the UNGA called upon IMO “to study the
problem of terrorism abroad or against ships with a view to making recommendations
on appropriate measures”. The Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO issued a
circular MSC/Circ. 443 on Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers
and Crews on Board Ships; it required governments, port authorities, administrators,
ship-owners, ship masters and crews to take appropriate measures to prevent these
unlawful acts.
By November 1986, taking the grave concerns of the international community
into consideration, the Governments of Egypt, Austria and Italy proposed that the
IMO prepare a convention on the topic of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime
navigation to provide for a comprehensive suppression of unlawful acts committed
against the safety of maritime navigation which endangers innocent human lives,
jeopardizes the safety of persons and property, and seriously affects the operation
of maritime services.
2.1. 1988 SUA and Protocol
About two years later, in March 1988, the Rome Conference adopted the 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (1988 SUA). The provisions of the 1988 SUA were then applied to the
1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. This Protocol was adopted on 10 March
1988 and it entered into force on 1 March 1992.7
The 1988 SUA and the Fixed Platforms Protocol were adopted in response to
the 1985 hijacking of the Italian flag cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, and the murder
of an American passenger. The main objective of the Convention was to ensure that
appropriate action was taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships.
These included the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against persons on board
ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship which were likely to destroy or
damage it. The terms of the Convention obliged Contracting Governments either to
extradite or to prosecute the alleged offenders. It was a combination of several
provisions developed in the past in dealing with aerial hijackings. The Convention
required states to penalize the seizure of a ship; damage to a ship or its cargo likely
to endanger its safe navigation; the introduction of a device or substance likely to
endanger the ship, endanger its safe navigation by serious damage to its navigational
facilities, or by communicating false information and injuring or killing any person
in connection with the commission of the offences under the general conventions
against terrorism. Attempts and participation are also punished. These conventions
7 SeeWitten, Samuel M., “The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings”,
92 AJIL (1998), at 774-781.
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and protocols are applicable to non-Strait states and land-locked states under the
subjective territorial principle, personality or passive personality or protective prin-
ciples of general international law.
The 1988 SUA differs from the offence of piracy and armed robbery in that the
rationale of the 1988 SUA Convention was to ensure the safety of navigation and
to punish those responsible for abusing the safety of navigation. The Preamble
expressed deep concern at the world-wide escalation of acts of terrorism in all of
its forms which endangered or took innocent human lives, jeopardized fundamental
freedoms and seriously impaired the dignity of human beings. The material scope
of the Convention covered ships, a term defined in Article 1 as a “vessel of any type
whatsoever not permanently attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically supported
craft, submersibles, or any other floating craft”. This Convention did not apply to
a warship, or to a ship owned or operated by a State when used as a naval auxiliary
or for customs or police purposes. An abuse of navigation occurred where a ship,
its passengers or cargo were endangered. Thus, where any person under Article 3
unlawfully and intentionally seized or controlled a ship by force, or threat, or intimida-
tion; or performed an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act was
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or destroyed or damaged a ship
or its cargo such that it was likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
placed or caused to be placed on a ship a device or substance likely to destroy that
ship, or caused damage to that ship or its cargo which endangered or was likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or destroyed or seriously damaged maritime
navigational facilities or seriously interfered with their operation, if any such act was
likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or communicated information which
he knew to be false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or injured
or killed any person in connection with the commission or the attempted commission
of any of the above offences: that person is said to have committed an offence.
Paragraph 2 of Article 3 punishes an attempt and an abetment of the above
offence. Accomplices of persons who commit these offences are also punished. Any
person who threatens, with or without a condition, aimed at compelling a physical
or juridical person to do or refrain from doing any act also commits an offence if
that threat is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship in question.
The geographical scope of the Convention, spelled out in Article 4 (1), covers
ships navigating or scheduled to navigate in waters beyond the outer limit of the
territorial sea of a single state or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent
states. This shows that the Convention is not applicable to ships in the middle of
the territorial sea of a state. “The lateral limits of its territorial sea” refers to the outer
boundary of the territorial sea with the contiguous zone boundary. However, Para-
graph 2 claims the territorial jurisdiction of a State Party when the offender or alleged
offender is found in that State’s territory. This small problem of interpretation could
be set aside as matters are further clarified in Article 6 where each State Party is
mandated to legislate upon territorial jurisdiction in its territorial sea, extra-territorial
or quasi-territorial jurisdiction for ships flying its flag, personal jurisdiction over its
nationals and other stateless persons who habitually reside in that state, and passive
personality jurisdiction where the national of that state is a victim of an offence.
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Attempts are equally punishable. Acquisition and rescission of such jurisdiction must
be notified to the Secretary General of the IMO. The Convention recognizes the
municipal criminal jurisdiction of a State Party to the Convention.
States Parties have to ensure that their criminal procedure codes, the laws of
evidence and extradition laws have suitable provisions in this regard. States Parties
are under an obligation to prevent preparations in their respective territories. The
Secretary General of the IMO has to be informed of all legal and extradition pro-
ceedings.
Neither the 1988 SUA and Protocol referred to Straits used for international
navigation.
2.2. 2005 SUA Protocols
The 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol were amended during a Diplomatic
Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties held from 10 to 14 October 2005.
The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention was adopted on 11 October 2005. They
are conveniently referred to as the 2005 SUA Protocols.8 The amended Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation will
enter into force ninety days after the date on which twelve States have signed it
without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval, or have deposited such
an instrument with the Secretary General. The amended Convention will enter into
force only after the 2005 Protocol has entered into force. These two treaties have
significant non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and ship-boarding provisions. They
are meant to plug the loopholes in the fight against terrorism as follows:
The SUA Protocol provides the first international treaty framework for combating and
prosecuting individuals who use a ship as a weapon or means of committing a terrorist
attack, or transport by ship terrorists or cargo intended for use in connection with weapons
of mass destruction programs.
The SUA Protocol also establishes a mechanism to facilitate the boarding in
international waters of vessels suspected of engaging in these activities.
The new non-proliferation offences strengthen the international legal basis to
impede and prosecute the trafficking ofWMD, their delivery systems and related
materials on the high seas in commercial ships by requiring states parties to
8 See UNTS, Vol. 1678, No. 29004. See “United States Supports New Protocols Directed Against
Use of Ships in Terrorism and Proliferation ofWeapons of Mass Destruction” in 100/1 AJIL (2006),
at 224-227. See also “Contemporary practice of the United States relating to international law:
international oceans, environment, health and aviation law” edited by John R. Crook, where he
outlined President George W. Bush’s New US Maritime Security Strategy intended to “prevent
the maritime domain from being used by terrorists, criminals, and hostile states to commit acts of
terrorism and criminal or other unlawful or hostile acts against the United States, its … allies, and
friends.” Ibid. 222.
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criminalize such transport. These transport offences are subject to specific know-
ledge and intent requirements that ensure the protection of legitimate trade and
innocent seafarers. The non-proliferation offences are consistent with existing
international non-proliferation treaties, and the SUA Protocol explicitly provides
that the rights, obligations and responsibilities of states under international law
– including the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) – are not
affected.
The new counter-terrorism offences criminalize the use of a ship or a fixed
platform to intimidate a population or compel a Government or international
organization, including when: (1) explosive, radioactive material or a biological,
chemical or nuclear weapon is used against, on or discharged from a ship or fixed
platform; (2) certain hazardous or noxious substances are discharged from a ship
or fixed platform; or (3) any other use is made of a ship in a manner that may
lead to or causes death, serious injury or damage. The SUA Protocol also crim-
inalizes the transport of fugitives who have committed an offence under the 12
UN (counter-) terrorism conventions and protocols.
The ship boarding provisions establish a comprehensive set of procedures and
protections designed to facilitate the boarding of a vessel suspected of being
involved in a SUA offence. Consistent with existing international law and
practice, SUA boardings can be conducted only with the express consent of the
flag state. In addition to eliminating the need to create time-consuming ad hoc
boarding arrangements when facing the immediacy of on-going criminal activity,
the ship boarding provisions provide robust safeguards that ensure the protection
of innocent seafarers.9
2.2.1. Broader range of non-proliferation and counterterrorism offences to be
included in national laws
New Article 2 bis broadens the range of offences included in the Protocol. It
is recognized that the likely targets are the populations of states, governments, and
international organizations. Where a person unlawfully and intentionally intimidates
a population, or compels a Government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act, uses against or on a fixed platform or discharges from
a fixed platform any explosive, radioactive material, or BCN weapon in a manner
that it causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; or discharges
from a fixed platform, oil, liquefied natural gas, or any other hazardous or noxious
substance in such quantity or concentration that it causes or is likely to cause death
or serious injury or damage; or threatens, with or without a condition: this person
commits an offence. (Irreparable loss to the marine environment has been excluded.)
New Article 2 ter covers the unlawful and intentional injuring or killing of any
person in connection with the commission of any of the offences; in attempting to
9 See 100/1 AJIL (2006), at 225.
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commit an offence; in participating as an accomplice, and in organizing or directing
others to commit an offence.
The 2005 Protocol adds a new Article 3 bis to Article 3 of the 1988 SUA Con-
vention. The latter referred to the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against
persons on board ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship likely to destroy
or damage it.
The newArticle 3 bis states that a person commits an offence within the meaning
of the Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally:
1. Intimidates a population, or compels a government or an international organization
to do or abstain from any act:
- Uses against or on a ship or discharging from a ship any explosive, radioactive
material or BCN (biological, chemical or nuclear) weapon in a manner that causes
or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage;
- Discharges from a ship oil, liquefied natural gas, or any other hazardous or noxious
substance in such quantity or concentration that it causes or is likely to cause death
or serious injury or damage;
- Uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage;
2. Transports on board a ship any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is
intended to be used to cause, or is a threat to cause death or serious injury or damage
for the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a Government or an inter-
national organization to do or abstain from doing any act;
3. Transports on board a ship any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon;
4. Transports any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment or material
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a nuclear explosive activity or in any
other nuclear activity not under safeguards pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive safeguards
agreement; and
5. Transports on board a ship any equipment, materials or software or related technology
that significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon,
with the intention that it will be used for such purpose.
Transportation of nuclear material within the terms of the Treaty on Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons is permissible.
Where a person unlawfully and intentionally transports a person who has breached
the SUA Convention or any one of the nine treaties mentioned in the Annex on board
a ship, this person commits an offence; this is also so where a person unlawfully
and intentionally injures or kills any person in connection with the commission of
any of the offences in the Convention. The phrase “in connection with” probably
refers to the furtherance of the crime in question with the accompanying relevant
states of mind such as common intention, common objective, unlawful conspiracy,
and other bases for criminal liability. Other offences include attempts, abetments,
participation as an accomplice, organization and directions to others to commit an
offence, or to contribute to the commissioning of an offence. Corporate and other
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legal entities are also made liable for the commission of an offence within the scope
of the amendments.
2.2.2. Use of force and boarding provisions
A new Article 8 bis in the 2005 Protocol deals with the co-operation and pro-
cedures to be followed if a State Party desires to board a ship flying the flag of a
State Party when the requesting Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship
or a person on board the ship is, has been, or is about to be involved in, the commis-
sion of an offence under the Convention. The use of force is prohibited except under
the following circumstances: when required to protect the safety of officials and
persons on board or where the officials are obstructed in the execution of authorised
actions. Article 8 bis provides for certain safeguards such as not endangering the
safety of life at sea, ensuring that human dignity is preserved and human rights law
observed, taking due account of the safety and security of the ship and its cargo,
ensuring that measures taken are environmentally sound, and taking reasonable steps
to ensure that ships are neither unduly detained or delayed.
2.2.3. Extradition, criminal procedure and evidence
A new Article 11 bis states that none of the offences should be considered for
the purposes of extradition as a political offence. New Article 11 ter recognizes
certain exemptions to extradition and thus states that the obligation to extradite or
afford mutual legal assistance need not apply if the request for extradition is believed
to be have been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account
of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion or gender,
or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position
for any of these reasons.
A new Article 12 bis covers the conditions under which a person who is being
detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of one State Party, may be transferred
to another State Party for the purposes of identification, testimony or otherwise
providing assistance in obtaining evidence for the investigation or prosecution of
offences.
3. THE INADEQUACIES OF PART III OF THE 1982 LOSC
Part III of the 1982 LOSC has several inadequacies as regards combating maritime
terrorism and for criminal enforcement jurisdiction in dealing with nuclear radiation
and associated terrorist challenges of the oceans. The material, geographic and
personal scope of the offence of maritime terrorism needs to be re-assessed in the
context of the 1982 LOSC. For instance, there is a difference between the geographic
scope of, respectively, maritime terrorist offences, and piracy. Terrorist conventions
are adopted at the international level yet have no universal jurisdiction. Piracy differs
in that it attracts universal jurisdiction where the offence is committed for a private
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end. The personal content again is markedly different. For an offence such as piracy,
the pirates are regarded as hostis humanis generis, are denied nationality and are
subject to universal jurisdiction. Since terrorists are not denied nationality and are
not regarded as hostis humanis generis, they could be regarded as being of a “higher
rank” than pirates. This should not be the case; it is submitted that the laws of piracy,
extrapolated from the 1982 LOSC, could be mutatis mutandis applied to the offence
of maritime terrorism on the high seas. Terrorism on the high seas deserves a different
definition while at least the same status as piracy on the high seas. If the criminality
is bench-marked against the use of ‘terror’, then under such an approach, piracy and
armed robbery would also be considered terrorist activities. Warships and aircraft
should exercise over maritime terrorists such universal jurisdiction as that exercised
over pirates under the 1982 LOSC. Armed robbery, which does not fall within the
definition of the 1982 LOSC, would fall, too, under the definition of a terrorist
activity and consequently would need to be regulated by national Penal Codes and
extra-territorial offences legislation. All attempts, abetments and conspiracies directed
against the subjects or objects of international law, that is, against States, ships and
their cargoes and crew, are punishable. The resources of the seas and oceans within
a national jurisdiction are State property and as such ought to be subject to the
doctrine of public trust. Where resources are shared between States, then concurrent
jurisdiction and joint surveillance over maritime terrorist activities should be adopted.
In adopting a policy against maritime terrorism, it would be necessary to re-examine
the legal validity of maritime and air-defence identification zones that extend right
up to the high seas boundary, an otherwise prohibited activity under the rules of
general international law and the law of the sea. Over the high seas, regional states
may agree upon a treaty, a practice in which some states engage in the context of
fisheries, the provisions of which could address the exercise of criminal enforcement
jurisdiction by the concerned states. As a global constitution for the oceans, it is a
failure on the part of the Convention that it does not deal with these issues.
The 2005 SUA Protocols require criminal enforcement jurisdiction on the part
of Strait States as the range of offences have been broadened, the use of force
recognized and extradition, criminal procedure and evidence introduced. To achieve
these frightening goals under a sense of impending gloom, certain amendments need
to be made to the 1982 LOSC.
3.1. Amendments to the 1982 LOSC
The 1982 LOSC needs to be amended in several respects to enable states to
enforce the provisions of the 2005 SUA Protocols. These amendments are abbreviated
as (A) in the following Articles of the 1982 LOSC. Besides the amendments, Strait
states and flag states need to conclude a Compromissory Statement to Part III of
the 1982 LOSC to confer express criminal enforcement jurisdiction on Strait states
that would even in denial respect the transit rights of ships. There are nine amend-
ments to be discussed, the first of which is addressed at Article 100 (A) which should
read as “Duty to co-operate in the prevention, reduction, control and elimination of
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terrorism – All States shall co-operate to the fullest extent possible in the prevention,
reduction, control and elimination of terrorism on the high seas or in any placewithin
or outside the jurisdiction of any State”. The second amendment is directed at Article
101 (A): definition of maritime terrorism – The definition of maritime terrorism is
based on the 1988 SUA and its 2005 Protocol insofar as it is a comprehensive
definition in comparison to the other international conventions on terrorism and at
Article 101 (A2): definition of nuclear terrorism – The definition of nuclear terrorism
is per the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
The third amendment is with regard to Article 102 (A): Terrorism by a warship,
government ship or government aircraft – The acts of terror as defined in Article
101(A) committed by a warship, government ship or government aircraft are also
acts of terrorism. The fourth amendment deals with Article 102 (A2): Terrorism by
a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied – The
acts of terrorism, as defined in Article 101(A) committed by a warship, government
ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship
or aircraft are assimilated to acts of terrorism committed by a private ship or aircraft
and with Article 103 (A):Definition of a terrorist ship or aircraft – This definition
is also to be based on the international conventions on maritime and nuclear terrorism.
The fifth amendment is related to Article 104 (A2): Retention or loss of the nationality
of a terrorist ship or aircraft – A ship or aircraft retains or loses its nationality once
it has become a terrorist ship or aircraft. The fifth amendment focuses on Article
105 (A): Seizure of a terrorist ship or aircraft, universal jurisdiction – On the high
seas, or in any place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a
terrorist ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by terrorism and under the control
of terrorists, and arrest the persons on board. The courts of the State which carried
out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine
the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft and persons, subject to the
rights of third parties acting in good faith.
The sixth amendment is directed at Article 106(A): Liability for seizure without
adequate grounds – Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of maritime
terrorism has been effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure
shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft
for any loss or damage caused by the seizure. The seventh amendment relates to
Article 107 (A): Ships and aircraft which are entitled to seize on account of maritime
terrorism – A seizure on account of maritime terrorism may be carried out only by
warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable
as being on government service and authorized to that effect. The eighth amendment
deals with Article 108 (A2): Criminal Jurisdiction of States in the suppression of
maritime terrorism – Where the offence of maritime terrorism has taken place under
the 1988 SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocol, and in the case of nuclear terrorism
under the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, the State with territorial, quasi-territorial, nationality, and passive personal-
ity criminal jurisdiction in the matter shall take the necessary action as stipulated
under these conventions as ratified by the States Parties. Finally, Strait states would
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need guidelines for the use of force besides the traditional argument of “no choice
of means and no moment for deliberation.”
3.2. Compromissory Statement
Part III of the 1982 LOSC deals with the regime of transit passage in Straits
used for international navigation. The drafting history of this Part as stated in
UNCLOS III records that this was a regime fought for by developed states; it is a
priceless regime. The nature of transit passage requires ships to pass through the
Straits without impediments from Strait states. In the Straits, the flag state has four
duties:
1. to proceed without delay through or over the Strait;
2. to refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of Strait states;
3. to refrain from non-transit activities; and
4. to comply with other relevant provisions of Part III.
Of these four duties, the only topic that comes somewhat close to the topic of
terrorism is the reference to the “use of force” by the flag state against the Strait
state. There is a difference here between the 2005 Protocols on Terrorism and Part
III of the 1982 LOSC. Under the 2005 Protocols the Strait state is empowered to
use force against terrorists. Under the 1982 LOSC, the flag state is required to refrain
from the use of force against the Strait state. The only provisions on the threat or
use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence
of a state are found in Articles 19(2)(a), 39(1)(b) and 301. Besides this reference
to the “use of force” no further mention is made of it. Under the 1982 LOSC, Strait
states do not have the necessary criminal enforcement jurisdiction over flag states.
The 1982 LOSC was concluded before the international conventions on terrorism
were drafted. The involvement, active or passive, of warships, aircraft, or government
vessels of any non-commercial type, that engage in maritime terrorism lies beyond
the scope of the SUA Convention or Protocol. The provisions of Articles 29 to 32
of the 1982 LOSC focus on warships.
The material scope of the unlawful acts under the 1988 and 2005 SUA Protocols
are far beyond the scope of Part III of the 1982 LOSC. As the mainframe constitution
of the oceans, Part III must endorse the criminal jurisdiction of the Strait state in
matters of maritime terrorism. New Article 8 bis of 2005 emphasizes co-operation
between states, yet does not provide for universal jurisdiction. Even some measure
of the use of force is permissible under Article 8 bis for the safety of officials and
persons on board. However, under Part III of the 1982 LOSC, such use of force by
both the flag state and the Strait state will jeopardize transit passage.
Maritime criminal jurisdiction must be exercised subject to Part III of the 1982
LOSC and to general principles of public international law. There has to be a balanc-
ing act, an act of accommodation, an adjustment between the right of transit passage,
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the duty of due diligence of Strait states, and the overriding need to control terrorist
activities and to control the irradiation of the seas. An exercise of domestic maritime
criminal jurisdiction could interfere with the right of transit passage of ships under
Part III of the 1982 LOSC. Thus, “this Part” has to be reconciled with “other rules
of international law”. Such a reconciliation has not been made in Part III of the 1982
LOSC, whereas it has in its counter-part in Part II as stated above. These arguments
are centred on the fact that the exercise of maritime criminal jurisdiction by Strait
states under Part III of the 1982 LOSC is not adequately provided for under the
Convention; secondly, that maritime criminal jurisdiction referred to in Article 34(2)
is not supported by the rest of Part III; and finally, Strait states and user states need
to arrive at a “Compromissory Statement on the Exercise of Maritime Criminal
Jurisdiction by Strait states and User States in the Regulation of Transit Passage in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.”
When counter-maritime terrorism conventions are implemented by Strait states,
the regime of transit passage will be suspended. To balance the right of transit passage
and criminal enforcement jurisdiction, a set of seven other considerations need to
be addressed, as follows:
(1) the adoption of a Statement of Guarantee that will uphold the Freedom of Naviga-
tion, the Safety of Navigation, and the Duty of all user and Strait states to
safeguard the marine environment of the Straits in this nuclear age;
(2) the conduct of marine scientific research in the Straits given the range of new
and deadly pollutants;
(3) the examination of the exercise of pre-emptive criminal jurisdiction and criminal
enforcement jurisdiction of Strait states, and the standard and basis of liability
of the offence of terrorism;
(4) the examination of the feasibility of adopting universal jurisdiction for cases of
maritime terrorism on the high seas;
(5) the re-examination of the role of warships and government ships in terrorism
given their traditional immunity;
(6) the adoption and establishment of Air Defence Identification Zones on the EEZ/
high seas boundaries of Strait states; and finally
(7) the security implications at the ASEAN level.
4. THE OBLIGATIONS OF STRAIT STATES UNDER THE 1982 LOSC
Given the exceptionally broad range of offences and extraordinary provision on
the use of force among other new developments, the varied obligations of the Strait
state to uphold safe navigation is unduly burdensome, as they relate to the due
diligence duty to uphold and maintain a safe and orderly Straits without suspending
or hampering the right of transit passage of ships. This is translated in Article 42(1)
as a requirement to uphold the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime
traffic; to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution; to adopt regulations relating
to fishing vessels; the prevention of fishing, including the stowage of fishing gear,
and to legislate in matters of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws. Where
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loss or damage is caused to a Strait state by a warship, or any vessel, ship or aircraft
entitled to sovereign immunity, the flag state bears international responsibility for
that loss or damage. This is stated in Article 42(5). This in effect means that the ship
or aircraft can inflict an injury on the Strait state for which the flag state bears
international responsibility. This provision makes little sense, standing alone, and
in the context of maritime terrorism. However, since no amendments have beenmade,
it remains an obligation of the Strait state to uphold navigation even in the face of
such a threat.
4.1. Mens rea and actus reus of terrorism
It is a general principle of criminal law that the actus reus of an offence must
coincide with the mens rea, expressed in the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea.How should the actus reus andmens rea of terrorism be viewed and weighed?
Acts of terrorism could be considered the equivalent of an offence against the state
such as treason, and made an absolute liability offence, where even private thoughts
can give rise to a criminal action. Mere actus reus of a slight degree of danger should
be sufficient to attract punishment. Similarly, mens rea would also be punished. As
the offence of maritime terrorism is unlawful in its very nature and condemned by
the international community, the regime of strict liability cannot apply: strict liability
usually applies in cases where the conduct sought to be regulated is either generally
lawful and the offence is less serious, as in the case of a traffic offence; more serious,
as in the case of operational or accidental oil pollution by vessels, or where the
offence is less serious and consequently punishable, too.10 What would prove diffi-
cult for the Strait state would be the rehabilitation of the terrorist, that is, upon pain
of punishment, what kind of person should the terrorist become? How should the
terrorist handle future actions?What should the new influences be?Would the terrorist
weary the state by his importunity? The terrorist in pursuit of his goal may commit
various types of crimes such as crimes against the state, property crimes, crimes
against morality, against the public order and other regulatory crimes. The Strait state
would be obliged to rehabilitate the terrorist.
4.1.1. Radioactive pollution and injunctions
Radioactive pollution should also be considered a maritime crime as it will lead
to the unsustainable development of the marine environment, and a violation of the
rights and interests of state parties and stakeholders. Above all, such pollution is a
direct infringement of the rights of the coastal populations that depend on the sea
10 This discussion has been influenced by the following works: Ratnapala, Suri and Moens GA,
Jurisprudence of Liberty (Sydney: Butterworths, 1996), at 6-13; Simon, Thomas W., Law and
Philosophy (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2001) for discussion on Berlin, Isaiah, “Two Concepts of Liberty”
(1969), 219; Hospers, John, “What Libertarianism Is” (1974), 217; Bergmann, Frithjof, “On Being
Free” (1977), 225.
22 Asian Yearbook of International Law
for their livelihood. This sort of pollution requires a reconsideration of the powers
of ITLOS to grant provisional measures that are more in the nature of a quia timet
or mandatory injunction to prevent radioactive environmental degradation.
In the light of the above discussion, the exercise of maritime criminal jurisdiction
has to be balanced by the respect by Strait states for several international rules,
namely, firstly, to ensure that there is no safe haven for terrorists; secondly, that
jurisdiction is based on the registration of aircraft or ships or on territoriality; thirdly,
that jurisdiction is based upon the nationality of the alleged offender; fourthly, that
jurisdiction is based upon the protection of other specified interests and, finally, that
jurisdiction is required to be maintained for extradition or prosecution once an alleged
offender is present. Strait states are under an obligation to conduct an inquiry, to
report findings, and to advise of intent to exercise jurisdiction. Where Strait states
do not prosecute the alleged offender, there is an obligation to submit for extradition.
Similarly, the elements of knowledge and intent, and the bases of participation in
crimes, need to be defined by states parties, for example, where Strait states intend
to assist each other in criminal matters. Other matters that need to be looked into
by Strait states that intend to establish jurisdiction under the extradition treaties are
the nature and type of extraditable offences, extradition clauses, and exceptions to
be made on grounds of political offence and discriminatory purposes. In a civilized
society today the perpetrators of genocide are awarded their basic human rights; so
too is the case with the terrorist. The first-generation human rights of the terrorist
to communicate and to fair treatment cannot be ignored. Strait states also need to
consider whether the offenders are worthy of being deemed refugees, where the status
and a common understanding of the implications of such a move need to be under-
scored by the states. In one sense, such overly great care is taken in the name of
human rights that it seems almost an abuse of a right.
Strait states have to incorporate and transform the international rules on counter-
terrorism into municipal law enactments, such as merchant shipping regulations, penal
codes, criminal procedure codes, laws of evidence, and extradition treaties where
grounds of political asylum and grounds of refugee status are sharply defined. The
Strait state may now have a duty to provide piloted armed riding crews on behalf
of the state, exercise the rights of hot pursuit, and adopt an integrated approach to
maritime governance where the state can introduce new Strait state maritime terrorist
control and enforcement jurisdiction. In the exercise of maritime criminal jurisdiction,
the state may also be required to ensure container tracking and apply advanced
technology to ensure the safety of the cargo being transported. Such an activity may
also fall under the civil jurisdiction of states.
Besides, regarding the drafting of municipal laws on counter-maritime terrorism,
Strait states need to sort these by degree of civil and criminal wrongs and political
issues: abuse of shipping and navigational standards, maritime terrorism, armed
robbery and piracy, radioactive marine environmental pollution, and the economic
and biological waste of living and non-living resources. Strait states also need to
evaluate the destruction of living resources such as marine parks, aquaculture and
animal husbandry at sea, and of non-living resources such as offshore oil and gas
installations and the abuse of fishing rights. The loss of intellectual property rights
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in marine scientific research needs to be quantified in socio-economic terms and
assessed under the biodiversity list test. Strait states need to come to terms with the
current law that a terrorist who abuses the human rights of other citizens of the world
will if convicted be guaranteed his human rights in the conduct of a fair trial, with
adequate legal representation, and in detention.
4.1.2. Pre-emptive criminal jurisdiction
There is no provision in Part III as a whole that confers pre-emptive criminal
protective jurisdiction to the Strait state to prevent loss or damage. Even the provision
on regional co-operation in Article 43, which has been criticized as being a hortatory
call, fails to cover the duty to adopt protective criminal jurisdiction in terrorist
situations when upholding a safe Strait. Does this mean that, should such terrorist
acts occur in the Strait, the Strait states will be exempt from state liability or, on
the contrary, be held liable to the international community for irresponsible conduct?
The customary international law provision is found in the Corfu Channel Case,11
which states that no State must knowingly allow injuries to be inflicted upon flag
ships in its territorial sea.What is the alternative where the above-mentioned Compro-
missory Statement is not adopted, the 1982 LOSC not revised, and where the
injunctive powers of the ICJ/ ITLOS are limited? The alternative, it is submitted,
is that as the Corfu Channel standard is non-beneficial to Strait states, this could
result in a breach of and thus endangerment of international peace and security.
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR STRAIT STATES
When the provisions of the SUA Convention and Protocol on maritime terrorism
are extrapolated and applied to Part III of the 1982 LOSC, the following conse-
quences, both positive and negative, arise. These prompt amendments to the 1982
LOSC.
5.1. Definition of a ship/warship
The definition of a ship proffered in the 1988 Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation has to be adopted by
the 1982 LOSC as there is, currently, no definition of a ship under the Convention,
even though a warship has been defined in Article 29. The 1988 Convention’s
definition states that a ship is a “vessel of any type whatsoever not permanently
attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically supported craft, submersibles, or any
other floating craft”.
11 ICJ Reports 1949, at 4.
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The weakness of the 1988 Convention is that it excludes warships. The 1982
LOSC recognizes the role played by a warship in the offence of piracy, yet the 1988
Convention applies neither to a warship, nor to a ship owned or operated by a State
in a terrorist activity.
5.2. Due diligence measures
The due diligence measures that Strait states need to implement are found in
Article 3 of the 1988 Convention. Due diligence means, inter alia, the ability to
command sufficient means of acquiring knowledge of unlawfulness and of intention,
seizure of ships, definitions relating to terms such as “control”, “force”, “threat”,
“intimidation”, “violence”, endanger safe navigation”, “destruction”, “damage”, and
“BCN weapon or device or substance”, to name but a few.
This Convention states that any person who unlawfully and intentionally seizes
or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of
intimidation; or performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship, if that
act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or destroys a ship or causes
damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of
that ship; or places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a
device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or causes damage to that
ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that
ship; or destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously
interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation
of a ship; or communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endanger-
ing the safe navigation of a ship; or injures or kills any person, in connection with
the commission or the attempted commission of any of the offences mentioned above:
that person is guilty of an offence under the Convention.
Attempts and abetments are also considered as offences. In the same vein,
conditional or unconditional threats aimed at compelling a physical or juridical person
to do or refrain from doing any act, where that threat is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of the ship in question, amount to an offence. Accomplices, too, are
considered as offenders.
5.3. Beyond scope
Part III of the 1982 LOSC does not address the issue of maritime terrorism or
nuclear terrorism as provided for in the International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Ships navigating within and outside Straits used for
international navigation are beyond the scope of the 1988 Convention. Article 4 (1)
of the 1988 Convention covers ships navigating or scheduled to navigate in waters
beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single state or the lateral limits of
its territorial sea with adjacent states. Paragraph 2 claims territorial jurisdiction of
a State Party when the offender or alleged offender is found in that state’s territory.
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Article 6 requires states to legislate upon territorial jurisdiction in its territorial sea,
extra-territorial /quasi-territorial jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over nationals and
other stateless persons who habitually reside in that state, and passive personality
jurisdiction where the national of that state is a victim of an offence. Offshore oil
and gas installations in the northern end of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore may
be beyond the scope of the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Activities
Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. As this
Protocol is an extension of the 1988 SUA Convention to offshore oil and gas fixed
platforms there is a possibility that it does not cover the oil and gas platforms in
the northern end of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, as Part III of the 1982
LOSC does not deal with this matter. Should the Strait states bordering the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore ratify the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol or should
they instead ratify the 2005 SUA Protocols?
5.4. The 2005 SUA Protocols
Straits used for international navigation come under the regime of the 2005
Protocol to the SUA Convention. The 1982 LOSC may require a revision in the nature
and meaning of transit passage, and the nature and types of actions that Strait states
may undertake to ensure the safety and freedom of navigation frommaritime terrorism
and nuclear terrorism. This in turn would have implications for the temporary sus-
pension of transit passage. For instance, new Article 2 bis broadens the range of
offences included in the Protocol such as the intimidation of a population, or compel-
ling a Government, or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing
any act as unlawful. Similarly, the use of any explosive, any radioactive material
or a BCN weapon against or on a fixed platform or discharged from a fixed platform
that cause death or serious injury or damage also constitutes an offence. When an
oil, gas or other chemical platform is attacked and death or serious injury or damage
is caused, this too amounts to an offence.
New Article 3 bis of the 2005 Protocol does not limit its application to the area
of the territorial sea. Therefore, it could apply to terrorist actions within the regime
of Straits used for international navigation. A perpetrator or offender under the
Protocol is a person who unlawfully and intentionally intimidates a population, or
compels a government or an international organization to do or abstain from any
act and uses against or on a ship or discharging from a ship any explosive, radioactive
material or BCNweapon in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious
injury or damage. There are several other examples of actus reus mentioned in the
Protocol, as discussed supra.
The transportation of any person who has breached the SUA Convention or any
of the nine treaties mentioned in the Annex; the transportation of any explosive or
radioactive material, or any BCN weapon, or any equipment, material or software
or related technology that significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or
delivery of a BCN weapon and transport by a ship for the above purposes, are all
considered as offences.
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Article 43 of the 1982 LOSC has to undergo a revision in this context and make
a mandatory call for regional and sub-regional co-operation. Similarly, the position
on use of force has to be endorsed in the 1982 LOSC. In this context, the 1982 LOSC
also lacks provisions incorporating Article 8 bis of the 2005 Protocol which strives
to uphold the freedom of navigation, respect for international human rights laws and
the safety of life at sea, and marine environment law. It states that where a state,
upon certain reasonable grounds of suspicion that an offender or potential offender
is on board a ship, requests another State Party to board such a ship, then the flag
state has to co-operate in this matter. If such co-operation is not forthcoming, then
the State Party has to communicate such intent to the Secretary General of the IMO
if the flag state does not respond within four hours. The use of force is permitted
under very limited conditions.
The general basis of action to combat maritime and nuclear terrorism has to be
endorsed in Part III, 1982 LOSC, and cognizance of this fact must be taken so that
corresponding amendments may perhaps be introduced into the 1982 LOSC.
Finally, it is submitted that Strait states may need to study the gaps, inconsist-
encies and overlaps in their bilateral and multilateral treaties, and their current laws
then to reconsider the following offences, their elements, and the relevant institutions
as the offences may arise separately or concurrently, as enumerated below:
1. Piracy as traditionally understood under public international law, over which
warships of states could exercise universal jurisdiction which today could also
be termed as a form of piracy with terrorism;
2. Armed robbery which is subject to municipal law;
3. All attempts, abetment and conspiracies in the commission or omission of the
above offences;
4. The mens rea of intention that could be difficult to prove in municipal courts;
5. The basis of liability which may be sole, joint or several;
6. The nature of extra-territorial enforcement jurisdiction of the relevant agencies
involved in the suppression of terrorism, and
7. The attacks, attempts, abetments or conspiracies directed against subjects and
objects of international law and under the 1982 LOSC and against all resources
and properties of states in the seas.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined maritime terrorism and maritime security challenges
facing Strait states bordering the Straits of Malacca and of Singapore. The emphasis
was on maritime conventions on counter-terrorism, namely, the 1988 and the 2005
SUA Conventions and Protocols. Under the 2005 Amended SUA Convention and
Protocol, the term “terrorism” has been broadly defined as all acts that terrorize people
or the State. Embedded in this definition lies the inducement of fear or terror that
violates the territorial integrity or sovereignty, or sovereign rights, or jurisdiction,
or political independence of the subjects and objects of international law. Equally
embedded in this definition are all acts of commission or omission that are terrifying
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in nature and/or content whether they be completed offences or attempts. Abetments
and conspiracies are also to be punished. This means that terrorism at various stages,
whether committed on land or at sea or in the interface between land and sea; or
on offshore islands, or reefs or low tide elevations; or on light-houses or on offshore
installations; or on the seabed; or on the continental slope may be punished. It also
covers gas pipelines or cables placed on the continental shelf. Unfortunately, it does
not include terrorism on the continental rise. It does not cover the seabed of the
common heritage of mankind, or in the airspace above the high seas. As mentioned
at the outset, terrorism at sea may take place in any maritime zone from internal
waters to the outer edge of the exclusive economic zone, or the outer edge of the
continental shelves or on the high seas. The point to be remembered is that no
criminal enforcement jurisdiction has been vested in Strait states by the 1982 LOSC.
Terrorism on the high seas deserves a different definition yet, mutatis mutandis, the
same jurisdictional status as piracy on the high seas. To give effect to the concept
of terrorism in these maritime zones, corresponding basic framework provisions need
to be included in the 1982 LOSC, given that the Convention was concluded before
the 1988 SUA was introduced. As a concept, the term “terrorism” should cover not
only acts that induce fear or terror in the minds of a person or against the body of
a person or which violate the integrity or stability of an international organization
or other legal entity or which violate the territorial integrity or sovereignty or sover-
eign rights, or political independence of the subjects and objects of international law,
but also cover acts that use terrorism to acquire property or gain or perpetuate an
idea or philosophy.
6.1. Psyche
The motive, personal opinion or reason behind the terrorist attack should serve
only towards achieving an understanding of the psyche of the terrorist. The basis
of liability has to be established, for terror may be inflicted for a variety of reasons
such as religious differences, political or ideological or institutional purposes or for
reform of any body, charitable or non-charitable, or for public or private purposes
or for private ends. The standard and basis of liability for terrorism has to be deter-
mined at municipal law. Purpose or motive, although irrelevant under the Conventions,
will need to be proved when the mens rea of intention is proven before the local
courts. At the municipal level, perhaps, and not at the international level, it matters
whether terror was inflicted for religious, or political, or ideological or institutional
purposes or for the reform of any body, charitable or non-charitable, or for public
or private purposes or for political agenda or for private ends.
The offence of terrorism has the potential to be considered the equivalent of an
offence against the state such as treason, and made an absolute liability offence. In
such a case mere mens rea would be sufficient, where even private thoughts can
give rise to a criminal action. Terrorism should not be based on strict liability because
terrorism is an unlawful act. In a strict liability regime as in the 1969 CLC or 1992
CLC Conventions for vessel-sourced oil pollution, the regime of strict liability is
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adopted as a quid pro quo measure between a victim of oil pollution who will find
it hard to prove liability against an oil industry, on the one hand, and the liability
of the industry, on the other, which would be capped where it would otherwise face
unlimited damages.
With the dawn of nuclear terrorism, several old offences now receive fresh
consideration. While the motives for the offences are different, the fact that terror
is induced in the mind of the victim makes these old offences terrorist in nature,
too. The proof of mens rea could be difficult unless the terrorist admits voluntarily
to his state of mind, in a manner that may be adopted by the court. The basis of
liability, sole or joint and several, is a detail that municipal law-makers have to
manage. Similarly, they have to undertake revision of their respective Penal Codes,
taking into account the extra-territorial nature of the offence, the provisions of the
criminal procedure code and the laws of evidence. Issues concerning the punishment
of offenders, the treatment of offenders and the trials of offenders; the international
human rights of terrorists and pirates; their habeas corpus rights; legitimate expecta-
tion rights; the right to counsel, and other administrative law rights would all have
to be reviewed at the municipal law level. It would also require Strait states to
reconsider ratification of those treaties that have not yet been ratified.
As an exception to the general rule on the retrospective applicability of criminal
laws, terrorist criminal law may be applied retrospectively for the reason that laws
should be made to apply over activities that pierce the heart of collective security.
The following definitions of “terrorism” and “terrorist” are submitted in this paper:
Terrorism means all acts of commission or omission against any person, natural, legal
or juridical, that are terrifying in nature and/or content, whether they are actual, con-
structive, or imputable, committed in any space under sovereign domain or in res
communis or in the common heritage of mankind or in the common province of mankind,
whether successful or unsuccessful or complete or incomplete.
Anyone who participates in such an activity ought to be considered a terrorist.
The motive, personal opinion or reason of the terrorist may serve as a guide to
understanding the action or omission of the terrorist and, most importantly, the mind
of the terrorist.
Given all of these developments, the 1982 LOSC has to state the broad framework
of criminal enforcement jurisdiction of the Strait state in Straits used for international
navigation. Similarly, the right of private security companies to provide armed riding
crews for protection, the right of hot pursuit, and the adoption of an integrated
approach to maritime governance are areas that need to be considered, and perhaps,
necessary amendments may have to be made to the 1982 LOSC and then to municipal
legislation. Other detailed considerations for Strait states would be the exercise of
civil jurisdiction on board flag states that consist of container tracking, and the
adoption of new technology for cargo safety. The exercise of criminal (and, for that
matter, even civil jurisdiction) has to be expressly stated in the context of Straits
used for international navigation. It may be timely that a new trust fund at the UN
level for counter-terrorism expenses and counter-terrorism forces are set up to enable
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Strait states to uphold the safety of the Straits and to guarantee the right of transit
passage as they strive to bring the problem of maritime terrorism under their con-
trol.12 As men, women and also minors may be involved in the offence of maritime
terrorism, the use of the relevant pronoun should be borne in mind.
The universal condemnation of terrorism by the global community expressed
in the UNGA resolutions and treaties and the adoption of the lex specialis maritime
treaties for the suppression of terrorism may serve to prove that the terrorism has
been condemned and outlawed; a fortiori condemnation of maritime terrorism has
attained the status of jus cogens or at the very least represent the opinio juris generalis
juris of states and thus amount to an obligation erga omnes at international law. It
is true that a minimal number of ratifications are required to bring these into force;
the diplomatic conference concluding the SUA Protocols were well attended by the
member states of the IMO. If this argument is accepted, then it makes for a com-
pelling case that a Compromissory Statement be adopted. Achieving the status of
jus cogens or opinio juris generalis juris does not override the need for an alternative
solution, as propounded in this paper.
At the sub-regional level, it would be necessary for Malaysia, Indonesia and
Singapore to adopt, as a subset of the respective national oceans policy, the harmon-
ization of laws and policies relating to maritime terrorism and maritime security
challenges in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.13 We need a Compromissory
12 Bacon, Francis and Brian Vickers, The Major Works including New Atlantis and the Essays,
Oxford World Classics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 377 said: “A just fear of
imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of war”. The security concerns
within ASEAN range from international to municipal. The issues concerning security measures
revolve around strategic alliances between developed and developing states, our position in non-
alignedmovement, military to military ties within ASEAN, and internal security and stability within
States. There are many other issues that we in ASEAN need to explore such as enhanced diplomacy
where peace is sometimes referred to as the period in between wars. We also need to examine and
consolidate our positions on the ratification of UN Conventions and other maritime treaties by
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and other ASEAN members. These international treaties will
have to be incorporated or transformed into municipal law and the regional stance on co-operation
and data centres adopted and established. In addition, the role of the coastguard, marine police,
warships, and the budget for defence needs reconsideration.
13 For summary of Indonesian legislation related to Anti-Terrorism, seeUnited Nations Legislative
Series, National Laws and Regulations on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism,
Part II (A-L), (New York: United Nations, 2005), at 292-293 and for the laws of Malaysia and
Singapore on Anti–Terrorism seeUnited Nations Legislative Series, National laws and Regulations
on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism, Part II (M-Z), (New York: United
Nations, 2005), at 2-4 and 270- 272 respectively. See also Sittnick, TammyM., “State responsibility
andmaritime terrorism in the Strait of Malacca: Persuading Indonesia andMalaysia to take additional
steps to secure the Strait” 14 Pac Rim L & Pol’y (2005), at 743 where the author makes an argument
that Malaysia and Indonesia have failed to take further steps to improve security and that Indonesia
and Malaysia have breached their duty under international law to prevent terrorism as they are
required to patrol and permit cross-border patrols. See also Dahlvang, Niclas, “ Thieves, robbers
and terrorists: piracy in the 21st century”, 4 Regent J Int’l L (2006), at 17 where the author accuses
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Statement that is adopted by Strait states and user states reconciling enforcement
criminal jurisdiction and transit passage rights under the 1982 LOSC. The alternative
to the Compromissory Statement could be globally unacceptable: the suspension of
transit passage without permission. In order to carry out criminal enforcement juris-
diction for the control of terrorism, the time has come for stretching the financial
resources of the nations to further protect the resources of the seas as states re-align
themselves under the principle of protective jurisdiction in a nuclear age. As Aristotle
once said: “A common danger unites even the bitterest of enemies” or if we may
extrapolate from Benjamin Franklin, who said on the signing of the US Declaration
of Independence: “We must all hang together, or assuredly, we shall all hang separate-
ly.”14
Indonesia of demonstrating a lack of commitment to fighting terrorism even after the Bali Bombings
of October 2002.
14 Aristotle, Greek Philosopher (384 BC – 322 BC) at http://www.giga-usa.com/gigaweb 1/quotes2/
quautaristotlex001.htm, visited site on 28 November 2006; Franklin, Benjamin, US statesman and
writer, (1706–1790), Remark 4 July 1776 at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, quoted
in Ben Franklin Laughing, Zall PM (1980), The Columbia World of Quotations (NewYork: Columbia
University Press, 1996), Entry No. 23009, replying to John Hancock’s remark that the revolutionaries
should be unanimous in their actions. See also http://www.bartleby.com/100/245.21html, visited
site on 28 November 2006 for Bartlett, John, Familiar Quotations, 10th Ed, 1919, Entry no: 3949.
For all aspects of ASEAN and National Security Strategy, see Paper by Tun Abdul Razak, Mohd
Najib, Minister for Defence (as he then was), Towards a Comprehensive National Security Strategy,
delivered on 26 September 2000, Hotel Nikko, Kuala Lumpur.




This article raises a question concerning the ongoing UN Security Council reform
and global security, which is: Can global security be realized by increasing the
number of permanent members of the Security Council from the present five to fifteen
or more? The present author argues that changing the number of the permanent
members in the Security Council does not help to ensure global security. It is claimed
that the Security Council per se was created as a neo-colonial superstructure after
World War II, and in this structure it is apparent that the UN member States have
surrendered their position to the Security Council, conferring power and privilege
on the permanent member States.1 Under the aegis of the principle of equal yet
differentiated responsibility, the economically and militarily weak member States
of the UN have become subordinate to powerful States; as a result, weaker States
are in a colonized situation whereby they are unable either to determine what consti-
tutes threats to peace and security on their own terms and conditions, or their genuine
concerns are not taken into full consideration by the more powerful States in deter-
mining global security and social justice. Since the Security Council is empowered
to determine threats endangering international peace and security, and to respond
to such threats including through the military use of force, the position of the perma-
nent members of the Council has not only become that of both judge and jury; they
are, furthermore, acting as both legislator and administrator. There is also no inter-
national legal arrangement for the judicial review of the actions of the Council. In
such a situation, it is obvious that the individual interests of the powerful member(s)
prevail over the general international community interest in the decision-making of
* Doctor of Laws, Stockholm University, Sweden, and Research Fellow at the Department of Law,
Stockholm University, Sweden: Teaching the legal aspects of the Trans-boundary Water Basins
(Masters Course of Environmental Law Across State Borders) and currently running a research
project “Global Climate Security and Modernization of International Law”.
1 It is well known that the United States and (the former Soviet Union) Russia would not have
accepted the creation of the United Nations without the veto privilege.
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the Security Council. Consequently, the Security Council has not only failed in
reaching consensus to carry out the primary responsibility conferred upon them, but
has also lost its legitimacy to represent the international community of nations. The
principle here is that any national or international legal authority can surrender its
legitimacy when it fails to fulfil commitments and/or the mandated responsibility.
The present author recognizes that since the vested economic and military interests
of powerful State(s) may constitute constraints to common global security, these issues
are relevant to discussion in international law; it is further suggested that as long
as the existing international economic and military disparity remains, global security
through the existing or an enlarged Security Council may not be realized. As there
is a serious concern expressed in the UN reform agenda about the interest of the
world’s peoples,2 it is recommended that the whole idea of global security be per-
ceived and implemented in consistency with threats involving international socio-
economic, political, and environmental issues, rather than national security threats
as perceived by individual States.
As an alternative to the official UN reform agenda, a Super General Assembly
should be established, consisting of the democratic member States of the existing
UN General Assembly. The proposed Super General Assembly could be an appro-
priate body of the UN to generate international law and order, especially by separating
the current dual functioning of the Security Council as both legislator and administra-
tor into discrete entities. In addition, instead of allowing the Security Council to act
as judge and jury, the role and functions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
need to be strengthened through the universal recognition of the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court. The present author recognizes that the overall arrangement of
the UN is a legitimate international endeavour. However, there is no doubt that the
UN needs to be enhanced as a third-generational international institution.
Readers will find the main question posed at the beginning of this article discussed
along with suggestions in the following order: initially, a short description of the
2 The UN Secretary General proposed a reform strategy to the General Assembly on 25 March
2005, giving equal weight to development, security, and human rights. He urged Member States
to establish a Peace-Building Commission to help countries make the transition from war to lasting
peace, including a Democracy Fund to provide funding and technical assistance to countries seeking
to establish or strengthen their democracy. The Secretary General has also recommended a system
of Councils, covering (a) international peace and security, (b) economic and social issues, and (c)
human rights. Among these, the first two of these Councils already exist and the third, as suggested
by the Secretary General, is the creation of the Human Rights Council, which he suggests should
be smaller than the present Commission; the newCouncil should be “elected directly by a two-thirds
majority of the General Assembly.” As regards the Secretariat itself, the Secretary General has
acknowledged that it must be made more flexible, transparent and accountable in serving the priorities
of Member States, and the interests of the world’s peoples. Following the Secretary General’s report,
the UN General Assembly released, on 5 August 2005, a third draft outcome document for the
forthcoming World Summit, aiming to strengthen the UN, recognizing the freedoms from want
and fear as well as the freedom to live in dignity. See Press Release SG/SM/9770, GA/10335, ORG/
1438, based on the text of the UN Secretary General’s statement to the General Assembly, in New
York on 21 March 2005.
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“Official Reform Agenda” of the UN will be given, followed by a discussion on the
existing UN “Security Council Regime”. There is also a thorough discussion of vital
issues entitled “Security onWhose Terms?”. The article further provides an alternative
proposal to the official UN reform agenda, entitled “A Third-Generational Inter-
national Institution”, which is elaborated under the following subheadings: “A Third-
Generational Super General Assembly (3G Assembly)”; “A Third-Generational
International Court (3G Court)”; and “Implementation of International Law”. The
article concludes with suggestions.
2. OFFICIAL REFORM AGENDAS
Marking the UN’s sixtieth anniversary in September 2005, more than 150 heads
of State and government signed a deal to re-shape the world body in order to meet
the challenges of the twenty-first century. This was done in consideration of a reform
strategy proposed by the UN Secretary General in the General Assembly.3 A few,
yet important, outcomes of the summit meeting are as follows: 1) The Protocol of
the summit meeting obliges intervention in cases of genocide, acknowledging that
there is an international responsibility to protect people from genocide, war crimes
and ethnic cleansing; 2) Terrorism is condemned “in all its forms and manifestations,
committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes”. However, the meeting
failed to settle on a definition of terrorism. 3) The goals to combat global poverty
are reaffirmed. The final document of the summit meeting decided to establish a
new Peace-Building Commission to help countries make the transition from war to
peace and to set up a new powerful Human Rights Council,4 replacing the Human
Rights Commission. Modalities, powers and functions of the proposed institutions
are the matter of negotiations among States.
In his reform strategy, the UN Secretary General has urged Member States to
make the Security Council more nearly representative of the international community
as a whole, based on the geo-political realities of the present time. He has suggested
that the Security Council should make clear “in a resolution, the principles by which
it intends to be guided when deciding whether or not to authorize the use of force”.
Apart from the proposal to increase the number of permanent members in the Security
Council, the UN’s reform proposals include changes in the Council’s procedures and
working methods, such as regular rules of procedure, a greater number of public
meetings, and other steps to render the Council more transparent and accountable.
These issues require no changes in the UN Charter and can be implemented by a
3 Ibid.
4 The UN General Assembly has voted overwhelmingly to create the Human Rights Council (170
members of the 191 of the General Assembly voted, and only three abstained). Israel, the Marshall
Islands and Palau joined the US in voting against the motion. The (47-member) UN Human Rights
Council will replace the (53-member) UNHuman Rights Commission. The new council will comprise
members who are elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the General Assembly.
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decision of the Council itself. However, an amendment to the Charter is required
in order to increase the number of permanent members on the Security Council.
2.1. Comments on the official agenda
The above-mentioned changes and proposed changes in the reform strategy of
the UN Secretary General are important yet, in my opinion, do not go far enough
in order to ensure global security threatened by political, economic, resource- and
environment-related conflicts at local, national and international levels. In the absence
of substantial and overall changes in the UN system, particularly the need for the
existing international system of rule of power to be replaced by the rule of law, the
serious problems of the world cannot be resolved. These problems are threatening
global security and resulting in social injustice, including an increase in poverty, a
decline in human dignity, and human rights violations inflicted not only by the world’s
dictatorial regimes but also by democracies.5
From the few successes and the many failures of the UN activities one can draw
the conclusion that “social justice” is a precondition for durable “peace” and that
a lack of management of the international legal order is leading to “global injustice”,
a source of major conflicts and thus destabilizing global security.6 The political
problem of the present world is that there exists a worldwide domination by a handful
of States, in terms of military, economic, and technological strength. The economic
problem, combined with political and legal problems, is that there is over-exploitation
of the world’s resources – the accumulation of wealth by a few, resulting in the
deprivation of basic living conditions of others, and unsustainable development –
which in turn threatens common security in terms of resources and environment.
Therefore, there is a need for the UN reforms to focus on the core issues such
as the establishment and management of an international rule of law, as opposed
to the existing order of power through domination; proper observation of the rules,
as opposed to the selective respect of rules; and compulsory peaceful settlement of
international disputes by adjudication or arbitration, as opposed to optional judicial
settlement. In addition, the UN reforms need to focus on the fundamental question:
how the very idea of security is conceived as well as implemented. Unlike a mono-
lithic discourse of normative national security, global security needs to be imple-
mented in consistency with resource, environment and climate securities.
5 While the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, was ousted by the intervention of the United States
and its allies, it is nevertheless dictatorial for anyone to wage war against anyone without the
collective decision of the UN Security Council. Even if dictators may indeed be toppled by force,
there are still many dictators in the world.
6 For example, the end of apartheid in South Africa provided a sense of justice not only to the
people of South Africa but also to the world community, just as the end of slavery and decolonization
provided a sense of justice to the world. Foreign occupations or dominations still remain a source
of conflicts in the world.
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3. SECURITY COUNCIL REGIME
The international institutional order, established by the UN in 1945, recognizes
sovereign equality of States based on the respect of international law, but this inter-
national order has also established a hierarchy of five permanent members of the
Security Council. More often than not, the interests of these States influence the
international order. The five permanent members of the Security Council, i.e., the
United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, and Russia, have a special yet
undemocratic position in the decision-making process. The Security Council, consist-
ing of fifteen members (five permanent and ten non-permanent elected by the UN
General Assembly for two years), is responsible for the maintenance of international
peace and security. The Security Council is supposed to represent the international
community and fulfil its obligations on behalf of the community, as stated in Article
24 of the Charter:
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer
on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security
Council acts on their behalf.
Article 24 has conferred the powers of the Security Council; however, its legit-
imacy to act on behalf of the international community is an unresolved issue of
international law. An unsuccessful attempt was made to overcome issues concerning
the lack of representation and legitimacy of the Security Council by amending Article
23, which enlarged the membership from eleven to fifteen. This amendment does
not seem to have helped either to establish legitimacy or to create appropriate repres-
entation of the community of nations in the Council since there is an ongoing dis-
cussion about enlarging the Council. It is conformed by suggestions made by the
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to make the Security Council “more representative
of the international community as a whole, based on the geo-political realities of
the present time”.
According to Article 41 the Security Council may decide what measures involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. All Members
of the United Nations are obliged, in Article 43(1), to observe the Security Council
decisions in order to maintain international peace and security.
3.1. Judge and jury as well as legislator and administrator
When it comes to the question of the determination of threat and security accord-
ing to Article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council is authorized to determine the
existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression. The Council
is held responsible for making recommendations or deciding what measures to take
in order to restore international peace and security. This means that the Council has
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the power to act as a jury in determining threats, and also the responsibility to act
as a judge in taking action.
In addition to this dual role, there is another legal absurdity that, on the basis
of Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council is acting not only as legislator and admin-
istrator, but also as a court, determining the financial liability of the adversary party,
i.e., in the case of Iraq’s intervention in Kuwait the Council determined the financial
liability of Iraq.7 This exercise seems clearly to be against the general principle of
law: not to be judge of one’s own actions, as well as to distinguishing the different
roles of jury and judge.
3.2. Global dictatorship or tyranny of vetoes
There is yet another legal problem arising out of the principle of equal but
differentiated responsibility: the decision making in the Security Council is clearly
dictatorial, resulting in international lawlessness,8 if not the tyranny of Orwell’s
Animal Farm.9 Despite the fact that Article 27 of the Charter was amended, providing
that “decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven) and on all other matters by an
affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven), including the concurring votes
of the five permanent members”, it must be noted that the five permanent members
are empowered to void any Security Council resolution, irrespective of the supporting
majority. This is known as veto power, exercised when any permanent member enters
a “negative” vote; an abstention vote allows the measure to pass. The veto power
has virtually undermined the strength and authority of the UN Security Council.
Among the permanent members of the Security Council, the US is the most
powerful at the moment, and either dominates the decision-making process in the
Council, or simply ignores the defined rules of the Charter.10 In the present inter-
national order where vested national interests are vital, it is understandable that the
US is able to use or misuse the UN. The US also dictates the reform agenda, the
UN being financially dependent upon the United States.
7 Harper, K., “Does the United Nations Security Council have competence to act as court and
legislature?”, 27New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1994), at 1-2-157.
8 Sands, P., Lawless World Making and Breaking Global Rules, (London: Penguin Books Ltd.,
2005).
9 George Orwell’s Animal Farm is an allegory of betrayal, power and corruption. When the
downtrodden animals of Manor Farm overthrow their master Mr. Jones and take over the farm
themselves, they imagine it is the beginning of a life of freedom and plenty. But as the cunning,
ruthless élite among them starts to take control, the other animals find themselves hopelessly ensnared
as one form of tyranny is gradually replaced by another. Orwell, G., Animal Farm (London: Penguin
Books Ltd., reprint, 2003).
10 The United States is often criticized for using its veto power at the Security Council in favour
of Israel.
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3.3. Where is the Security Council heading after Iraq?
The invasion of Iraq, and its regime change, by the US and the UK without
authorization from the Security Council illustrates how powerful States act or are
likely to act in order to defend their interests. The role of the other permanent
members of the Council, since 1991, in the case of Iraq indicates how they will be
acting or reacting in similar scenarios in the future, yet there remain a few questions
unanswered: What would have happened if France had been the invader of Iraq
without the consent of the Security Council?; What could have been the reaction
of the US against France in such a case?; Would the UK and the other pro-invasion
States have supported the French invasion on Iraq had the US been in opposition
to France? Will the norm and practice established by the US and the UK in the case
of Iraq allow Russia or China to take unilateral action at their will? Answers to these
questions are important when shaping a reformed Council prepared to take collective
security actions. Where we go from Iraq is a challenge to the collective security.11
3.4. Does the international community of civilized nations exist?
In a society of civilized nations, which is often claimed to exist, one has to ask
why only rich and powerful States should be eligible to become permanent members
of the Security Council.
As opposed to the mandate of Article 24 of the Charter, the permanent members
of the Security Council have clearly used their positions as a neo-colonial super-
structure, exercising military powers rather than establishing democratic norms. Being
the inventors and proliferators of nuclear weapons, the permanent members of the
Council are responsible for creating a nuclear balance of terror. In addition, they
are the largest producers and traders of conventional weapons, fuelling armed conflicts
in many regions of the world – itself indeed a threat to global security. Militarily,
technologically and economically, the permanent members of the Council are them-
selves the world’s competing powers and are concerned about their respective spheres
of influence in order to control resources and other people’s lives. They are also
industrial powers responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases, leading to a global
climate change resulting in global environmental insecurity. The States aiming to
become permanent members of the Council, e.g., Japan, Germany, Brazil, India, and
perhaps South Africa (and the European Union), are also industrial States contributing
a major share to global environmental harm. None of the economically poor and
militarily weaker States are seeking permanent membership of the Council. Some
poor States are being labelled as “failed States” and are therefore the target of control
and domination, if not intervention, by powerful States.
11 Jacobsson, M., “The use of force and the case of Iraq”, in Amneus, D. and K. Svanberg-Torpman
(eds.), Peace and Security Current Challenges in International Law (Lund, Sweden: Studentliteratur,
2004), at 373-407.
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Over the past sixty years, with the enormous power and wealth of the permanent
members of the Security Council, they could and should have resolved many of the
world’s problems, especially by promoting an international legal order. Instead, the
Security Council itself has become a source of rather than a solution to the problems,
mainly because of the lack of consensus deriving from their vested interests. Given
their dominant positions in the Security Council, none seems in favour of a more
democratic UN, which would entail their relinquishing their power of veto. As the
Security Council reform process in itself seems complex, one might wonder what
legitimacy the Security Council would have if the reform did not take place as is
aimed for, and if an expansion of the permanent members failed.
Criticisms of legitimacy seem strongest where the Security Council purports to
speak for the global community in making declarations and imposing sanctions on
States. However, some critics of legitimacy look rightly beyond the Security Council’s
decision-making process and beyond whether the Security Council is merely acting
in accordance with its legal competence. Thomas Franck suggests that it is important
to see whether or not the Security Council acts in accordance with general principles
of fairness.12 He argues that there must be determinacy, consistency and coherence
in a rule-based system. In addition, a deeply common-sense question is: How can
a few powerful States represent the whole international community of weak and
under-developed States whose interests are incompatible with the interest of the
permanent members? This is a challenging legal and political question to be answered
appropriately for the establishment of the twenty-first century international legal order
to take place.
4. SECURITY ON WHOSE TERMS?
The present international security order, which has its roots in the 1648 Treaty
of Westphalia, recognizes the sovereign equality of States as the basis of international
law. This de facto legal order has been operating with no central authority enforcing
it directly, but has been indirectly imposed based on a balance of power. According
to the balance of power theorists, whether it is the issue of resource sharing or peace
and security, the international order is maintained not through international law or
organizations, but by virtue of détente, by which the ambitions of one power are
moderated by the countervailing power of its counterparts.13
The author suggests that the balance of power mentality, even in its present form,
is essentially neo-colonial, under which States struggle for control over territory in
order to control the resources within that territory. Instead of the balance of power,
12 Franck, T, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1990);
Franck, T, “Legitimacy and the democratic entitlement”, in Fox, Gregory H. and Brad R. Roth,
Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
13 Kissinger, for example, is one of the staunchest supporters of the balance of power theory. See
Kissinger, H., A World Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Era (London:
Gollancz, 1974).
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it is asserted that peace and security can best be guaranteed by international law and
organizations through the establishment of a meaningful international institutional
order built upon consent and respect for such laws. The author believes, in line with
the institutionalists and critical security studies’ view, one must cultivate a more
questioning attitude towards the whole framework. This questioning must cover not
only why States quarrel over resources, but also the ways in which peace and security
are implemented and conceptualized.14 In contrast to the fixed knowable world of
the realists,15 and in line with the post-Modernist interpretation of reality, the author
would subscribe to the principle of coexistence. In philosophical terms, it emphasizes
the creative instincts of States or individuals seeking to share the earth’s resources,
rather than seeking primarily to satisfy one’s own wants. An integrated approach
to international law and institutions, it is being suggested, should be used to define
global security, the rule of law and social justice. The main facts supporting these
arguments are as follows.
4.1. Colonial tendencies of powerful States
The first fact is based upon the legacy of States’ struggles for power to control
over territory and its resources, an integral part of the history of nation-States. The
history of colonial control over the world’s natural resources is clear: “from 1815
to 1914 European direct colonial domination, especially by Britain and France
expanded from about 35 per cent of the earth’s surface to about 85 per cent of it”.16
Writing in the nineteenth century in support of colonization, Westlake argued that
the “regions of the earth designated as uncivilized ought to be annexed or occupied
by advanced powers.”17 The struggle for control over territory in order to control
the resources remained the historical legacy of colonial times. In the present world,
this is illustrated through China’s occupation of Tibet, India’s annexation of Sikkim,
Israel’s occupation of Palestine, and the recent US-UK occupation of Iraq. The
14 In general, there seem to be three schools of thought on security: 1) the traditionalists (also known
as the normative), who wish to maintain a largely military focus; 2) those moving beyond the
traditionalists, who wish to broaden the range of issues on the security agenda; 3) the proponents
of critical security studies, who wish to cultivate a more questioning attitude to the whole framework
in which security is not only conceptualized, but how it is initiated. Among these three schools
of thought there may be both overlapping and contradictory ideas. However, there is a growing
awareness among experts for the necessity to rethink the concept of security. See Buzan, B, “Re-
thinking security after the Cold War”, 32 NJIS (1997), at 5-28.
15 The political science approaches are as follows. While the Realists see a fixed and knowable
world, the post-Modernists see the possibility of endless interpretations of the world around them…
there are no constraints, no fixed meaning, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no financial
structure or limits of history… there is only interpretation… History itself is grasped as a series
of interpretations imposed upon interpretations – none primary, all arbitrary (see Baylis, J., Globaliza-
tion of World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), at 193-211, 205).
16 See more in Edward Said’s Orientalism (London: Penguin Books Ltd., reprint, 2003), at 41.
17 Westlake, J., The Principles of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1894).
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consequence of this legacy is that direct control by the advanced powers over the
less-advanced States has been transformed into a broad social and economic influence.
This transformation can be seen in the establishment of the UN Security Council,
which has assumed the responsibility of representing the whole international commun-
ity in terms of maintaining peace and security. The five permanent members adopted
this role. The UN Charter dealt with the colonial issues through the Trusteeship
Council, recognizing the right of self-determination. At the same time, the Security
Council seemed to serve the same functions and perpetuate the essence of the colonial
superstructure. As a result, even as the Trusteeship Council was actively promoting
the decolonization of Africa and Asia, the power of the advanced powers was trans-
formed into a more sophisticated means of social control.18 These spheres of influ-
ence of the permanent members of the Security Council were vividly illustrated by
the ColdWar and its continuation of resource competition and control over the newly
independent developing States.
At the Bandung Conference in 1955, the newly independent States held a confer-
ence defining the principles of peaceful coexistence among States and of remaining
non-aligned in the Cold War. Almost all of these decolonized States (especially in
Asia) had achieved self-determination, but economic and political independence from
the former Western empires was incomplete. Yet again, they were forced to confront
a configuration of powers that demanded acquiescence, in the new bipolar Cold War
form, from either the United States or the Soviet Union. By the early 1990s the
United States had emerged as the unipolar power in terms of political and economic
influence, backed up by military might. However, from the perspective of the decolon-
ized States, the interests of the other four permanent members of the Security Council
still dominate their resource management decisions.
4.2. Unequal powers and treaties
The second fact supporting my arguments is that power differentiations among
States determine the terms of treaties. The UN Charter itself illustrates this recognition
of the privileges of power assumed by the permanent members of the Security
Council. This is dramatically highlighted by the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). Instead of prescribing the complete elimination nuclear weapons, the
NPT recognized the privilege of the “Nuclear Club“, that is, for those States that
already had nuclear capabilities to possess weapons of mass destruction. The fact
that the NTP denied the access of only some States to these weapons shows the power
differentiation that permeates most, if not all, aspects of international issues. Clearly,
if the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were the true aim of the treaty,
it would first have focused on the elimination of all existing weapons and simul-
18 The Trusteeship Council administered the UN’s trust territories. The Council suspended its
activities in 1994 when the last of the trust territories, Palau, in the south Pacific, became inde-
pendent. The Council, made up of the five permanent Security Council members, have agreed to
meet as required.
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taneously restricted all other states from acquiring such weapons. If there were to
be a truth-in-labelling law applied to the NPT, it should have been entitled the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (to States the Nuclear Club Does Not Trust) Treaty. As well, the
hesitancy of the ICJ to make an outright pronouncement on the legality or illegality
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons19 suggests that the judges are inclined to
abide by the status quo and the wishes of the Nuclear Club.
4.3. Neo-colonial trade and economic order
The third fact supporting my arguments is that the present-day multinational (or
transnational) corporations are the new faces of the old colonial instruments of
economic control, serving the same functions as did the Dutch, French, Portuguese
and British East India companies until the nineteenth century. Those who perceive
these new faces differently have only to examine in whose interests treaties establish-
ing international trade and financial institutions were negotiated: those of rich or poor
States. The new trade and economic order and the multinational corporations are,
according to critics of neo-liberal economics, the new rulers of the world,20 nourished
by the rich and advanced powers and backed by their economic and trade institutions,
i.e., the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. This means that a powerful State can
easily wield undue influence over its weaker counterpart. In this unequal partnership
between the rich/advanced and poor/less advanced, it is obvious that the advanced
powers reap most of the benefits. Furthermore, there is the degradation of the environ-
ment from the extraction of resources and its adverse impact on the local populations,
mostly by displacement.21 As was the case in colonial times, there may be an insigni-
ficant percentage of the local population benefiting from these multinational com-
panies’ activities. Overall, however, the present global economic order, in which States
seem essentially no longer to have actual borders, labour and income are subject
mostly to global managers’ governance. In this inevitable process of economic
privatization, there is direct intervention in the affairs of developing countries by
advanced powers, through structural adjustment programmes and the like. In such
a situation, the prospect of economic self-determination is, for the developing States,
grim.
Every step towards economic development, especially industrial development,
has consequences that include social and economic injustice, and environmental
19 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
8 July 1996, General list No. 95. “Had the ICJ focused on the applicability of general principles
of international law, it may have reached a conclusion more consonant with common sense and
natural law: namely, the illegalities of the threat or use of nuclear weapons”. See Mahmoudi, S.,
“International Court of Justice and nuclear weapons”, 66 Nordic Journal of International Law (1997),
at 77-100.
20 Pilger, J., The New Rulers of the World (London/New York: Verso, 2003).
21 Roy, A, The Greater Common Good, see <http://www.narmada.org/gec/gec.html> (accessed 10
December 1999).
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degradation. This holds true irrespective of distinctions between developing countries
past or present, e.g., nineteenth-century Britain as compared with twentieth-century
India. For more than 150 years, economic development models have rotated around
two paradigms: free market capitalism, and centrally planned socialism. Both are
predicated on extracting the maximum use from natural resources and expanding
the frontiers of science to facilitate consumption.22 In the process of the deification
of economic development, priority is given to the exploitation of shared natural
resources over their protection, prime examples being the lack of political will among
many States to implement the 1997 Kyoto Protocol of the 1992 Climate Change
Convention. Parallel to this are the phenomena of economic development aid, which
serves as an instrument to maintain the status quo in favour of the advanced
powers.23 Similarly, fora for adjusting the rules of economic co-operation and inter-
national trade are often used as a cover to secure advantages for States or blocs of
States, while restricting the trade of other States via threats of retaliatory tariffs
barriers; one of many examples is that the arms trade is not included in the nego-
tiation under the auspices of the WTO,24 and another is the failure of negotiations
concerning agricultural subsidies in the developed world and the impact of this failure
on developing States.25
4.4. Recognition of sub-state entities
The fourth fact is the need for recognition of sub-state rights, specifically, the
community rights of people with regard to their resources and the environment in
which they live. The sub-state groups are the human communities that mediate
between an individual and States. Over the course of the past thirty years, community
rights have been recognized by international law in the areas of both human rights
and environmental protection. It is noteworthy that the UN Johannesburg Summit
(building on earlier works of the Stockholm 1972 and Rio de Janeiro 1992 Summits),
for all its limitations, revealed an ongoing concern; its detailed declarations on matters
dealing with the environment, famine, the gap between advanced and developing
22 See, for example, McIntosh, M., et al (eds.), Corporate Citizenship (London: Financial Times,
Pitman Publishing, 1998), at 96.
23 Hans J. Morgentahu, in his book Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Fifth Edition, Revised, 1978) explains the way in which powerful
States are concerned to keep the status quo intact against any change threatening their establishment;
how one government supports another with bribes in the name of aid [to maintain the status quo],
but beyond that he is doubtful that activities such as economic aid have a useful purpose though
such beneficiaries belong to the hopeless group of “bum and beggar nations”. See Nobel, J.,
“Morgenthau’s struggle with power: The theory of power politics and Cold War”, 12 RIS (1995),
at 61-85.
24 Arms trade constitutes the major share of the world trade, yet it does not fall within the purview
of the WTO.
25 WTO Ministerial talks at Cancun, December 2003.
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countries, health and human rights, suggest the emergence of a collective theme of
community rights.26
Unlike nation-States, sub-state community relationships with nature have been,
and still remain, generally cooperative. This factor emphasizes the themes of commun-
ity rights, e.g., the water rights of indigenous populations, and the rights of minorities,
women, and children. At this point it is absolutely necessary to make a distinction
between the interests of the communities of people (whom the state claims to re-
present) and the policy of States (which more often than not contradicts these said
interests), i.e., the community interests and national interests.27 Treaties concluded
by States are ostensibly negotiated based on the interests of their respective constitu-
ents. However, the politics of the earth’s resource use allocation frequently becomes
enmeshed with other contentious issues, aggravating tension between neighbouring
countries. The struggle for power and competition for resources between States over
various issues28 leads to the issue of the earth’s resources being framed as one of
competing national interests.29 The fact that there is a growing trend towards wider
participation in the policy-making process of international watercourse use and
environmental protection30 points to the existing gap (albeit narrowing) between
the so-called national interest and community interests and, at the very least, that
there are fundamental failings in a particular state’s democratic system.
4.5. Global security based on equity and social justice
Finally, it is suggested that global security must be viewed and implemented in
constituency with equity and social justice. This needs to be seen in connection with
issues that dominate the security agenda of the international community (i.e., rights
of access to food and safe water, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human
rights, the protection of the environment, and necessity for economic development,
as well as security and protection against terrorism), including States, sub-States
communities and individuals. In guiding a way to the world peace, it is rightly
asserted that:
There can be no social justicewithout reducing the cost of arms; no disarmamentwithout
a peaceful method of settling irreconcilable disputes among States; no court without
binding authority to resolve such disputes until States agree to give it necessary power;
26 The UN Summit held in Johannesburg in 2002. See http://www.johannessburgsummit.org/.
27 Zinn, H.A.,A People’s History of the United States (NewYork: Perennial Classics HarperCollins
Publishers, 2001).
28 See, for example, Morgenthau, n. 23.
29 In Egypt, for example, watercourse-related data are classified as a national security issue. See
Goldenman, G., “Adapting to climate change: a study of international rivers and their legal arrange-
ment”, 17 Ecology Law Quarterly (1990), at 741-802.
30 Ebbesson, J., “The notion of public participation in international environmental law” 8 Yearbook
of International Environmental Law (1997), at 51-97.
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no need for an international army if there is no international court; no consent to judicial
determinations until there are common norms of international behaviour; no agreements
on norms until nations with different values develop mutual confidence and a will to
compromise in order to enhance the security and the well being of all peoples. Progress
must be made in all areas if effective international law enforcement is to become a
reality.31 (Emphasis added)
This is a key approach to international law and international legal order, in that it
aims at the well-being of all peoples by securing an order of social justice. This,
in essence, illustrates the interconnection between cause and effect, with emphasis
on the root reasons rather than on the consequences. For instance, a state striving
for security through military power will acquire stockpiles of arms, which may trigger
an arms race among rival powers. The end result is that the original goal of security
has been undermined in the process. Thus, of all the problems of the present world,
the prevalence of military power positions32 dictating treaty terms is the main
hindrance to fair international resource sharing. Because of this, treaty negotiations
between riparian States and the terms of treaties between those States are often not
based on their actual needs.33 This omission points to the need for a fundamental
questioning of the military/arms-based security of States. Indirectly, this issue was
addressed by the 1972 UN Declaration on Human Environment. Whether the signa-
tories to (and those who drafted) the Declaration’s Principle 21 were aware of it or
not, the legality of the international sale of arms can be challenged. Principle 21
provides for States the sovereign right to exploit natural resources within their
territory. At the same time, it prohibits States from causing damage to the human
environment of other States. By implication, the use of natural resources by a given
state to produce arms (and the sale of those arms to other States), ultimately results
in damage to the human environment, regardless of the stated purpose of such arms,
for instance, for national defence. In addition, funds spent on arms are clearly sub-
tracted from those spent on fulfilling basic human needs. According to one analyst,
the combined military budgets, for example, of all of the South Asian countries in
one year are equivalent to the sum needed to provide basic living costs for the entire
world’s population.34 In this context of misuse of resources, the key to global secur-
ity is the rethinking of military science (i.e., the challenging of the use of science
for destructive purposes) and the need for conversion of military industries to civilian
use.35
31 Freencz, B., Enforcing International Law A Way to World Peace, A Documentary History and
Analysis (New York: Oceana, 1983), at 493.
32 Principle 21 seems to be aimed at complete disarmament; see Principle 21 in Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/
14.
33 See, for example, treaties between the United States and Mexico, between Egypt and Sudan,
between China and the lower Mekong basin States, or between India and Bangladesh.
34 Stark, A., “Från bombfronten-ingetnytt”, Svenska Dagbladet, 3 June 1998, at 16.
35 Barnby, F., New Statesman and Society, 31 January 1992, at 14-16.
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The call for mutual confidence and a will to compromise can be interpreted as
relevant to a form of shared resource management that is based on social justice.
In particular,mutual confidence stems from the perception of common norms govern-
ing the behaviour of States.36 This ideally leads to the negotiation of treaties based
on actual needs. Under these conditions, the will to compromise among States would
emerge, and the foundation for the rule of law can be established.Within this founda-
tion, there can be equality before the law and equal protection of the law in the true
sense.
5. A THIRD-GENERATIONAL INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION
A third-generational global democratic institution is essential in order to establish
a system of international justice, democratic peace and global common security. The
League of Nations, established after World War I, was a first-generational inter-
national organization which allowed its Member States to use war to settle inter-
national disputes in certain circumstances.37 However, in no case did the League
impose sanctions on those States instigating war.38 During the time of the League
international conflicts were mostly over the territory of States. These were the classic
or first-generational conflicts. The failure of the League is often linked to its failure
in preventing the outbreak of World War II. Nonetheless, regarding the judicial
settlement of dispute, the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ), presently known as the ICJ, is one of the important achievements of the
League. This is the most civilized method of establishing peace and securing justice.
However, the compulsory jurisdiction of the court has not yet been established.
The UN, established after World War II, represents a second-generational inter-
national organization, facing not only second-generational conflicts, e.g., conflicts
of ideologies, sphere of influence, and control of raw materials, but also third-
generational conflicts creating global insecurity, i.e., global warming, increasing
poverty, the depletion of environmental resources, and international terrorism. Various
forms of injustice are breeding disorder, which is in turn creating violence at local,
national, and international levels, finally leading to global insecurity. The existing
methods of international dispute settlement are for the most part “ad hoc and
36 For example, one of the common norms of international behaviours may be to treat others as
you would have them treat you, as opposed to ‘you must do what I say, not what I do’.
37 Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, including amendments in force, published
by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, at 7.
38 Poeggel, W., and E. Oeser, “Methods of diplomatic settlement” in Bedjaoui, Mohammed (ed.),
International Law: Achievement and Prospects (Paris: UNESCO, 1991), at 534.
46 Asian Yearbook of International Law
opportunistic with little adherence to the rules or procedures provided in the Charter,
or even in the rules of procedure.”39
Dissimilarly to the Covenant of the League, the UN Charter prohibits the use
of force, recognizing territorial sovereignty and integrity, and the political inde-
pendence of States. Intervention in the affairs of States is prohibited. However,
according to the UN Charter, the use of force can be justified in the cases of self-
defence and the collective use of force by and through the decision of the Security
Council. The main reason for the Security Council to fail to fulfil its responsibility
from the very start is that it suffered from the Big Brother syndrome.40 Subsequently,
it was handicapped by the power politics between the two super-powers, i.e., the
two Big Brothers: the United States and the Soviet Union. After the fall of the Soviet
Union, the Security Council became interventionist, acting as a supra-national author-
ity and exercising power as an international executive, legislative, and judicial
authority.
Under the UN Charter, the legality of the supra-national behaviour of the Security
Council is highly controversial.41 A series of sanctions and wars against Iraq has
also been highly controversial, raising doubt about the character and purpose of
conflict resolution by the UN. The need for an effective global institution is perceived
by all Member States, in preventing and resolving third-generation conflicts. The
bitter reality regarding the UN reform, as explained by the former UN Secretary
General Boutros Boutros Ghali, is that Member States do not know what they really
want from the UN: “as a forum just to talk about international problems or an
institution to solve the problems of the world”.42
5.1. A 3G General Assembly
The UN General Assembly is the best-represented body that could be developed
as an international consensus-building body, responding to global challenges, and
it could be empowered as a multilateral (binding) treaty-making body. The Assembly
could also be a centre for conflict prevention and post-crisis settlement, given the
present trend of often referring conflicting issues among States to the General Assem-
bly. It should, however, be noted that not all of the Member States of the General
39 Eagleton, C., International Government (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1957), at 519.
Eagleton was one of the members of the draft committee of the UN Charter. Although his book
was published in 1957, his arguments are still valid since there are no changes in ad-hocism and
non-adherence to law in international dispute settlement.
40 Big Brother is Watching You (war is peace, freedom is slavery, ignorance is strength, two and
two make five, god is power). SeeOrwell, G., Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin Books, Martin
Secker and Warburg Ltd., 1989).
41 Harper, K., “Does the United Nations Security Council have the competence to act as a court
and legislature?” 27 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1994), at 103-
157.
42 Boutros Boutros Ghali talking with the former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, in a
BBC television programme called “Search For Peace”, prepared by Douglas Hurd (1997).
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Assembly have democracy. It is, therefore, proposed here that a Super General
Assembly (3G General Assembly) should be established out of the existing General
Assembly; each State’s membership and voting strength would be based on democratic
credentials.43 Based on the minimum criteria, such as multiparty democracy, a free
press, an independent judiciary, and the rule of law, the ICJ could help to define
democracy when and if needed. No State would have the power of veto in the General
Assembly of democratic States, and its resolutions would be binding rather than
merely advisory, provided that those resolutions are approved by a two-thirds majority
of the Member States. This arrangement could be expected to be helpful for the
democratization of internal politics of the Member States; also, to enhance the
principle of sovereign equality and international legitimacy. One can argue against
and oppose the above proposed status of the Assembly as an international parliament,
yet the fact remains that the Security Council is already behaving as such: however,
without a mandate. Therefore, it would appear more logical to authorize the Assembly
to perform the legislative function, and the Security Council, the executive function.
5.1.1. Models of 3G General Assembly
A model for third-generation organizations proposed by some experts suggests
the creation of several separate authorities in different functional areas along the lines
of the International Sea-bed Authority, designed to regulate deep sea-bed mining.44
Another model can be the Antarctica Treaty Regime. For example, Articles X and
IV of this latter treaty impose obligations on third States. According to Article X,
each of the contracting parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with
the UN Charter, such that no one party engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary
to the principles or purposes of the present treaty.45 Yet another model can be the
further development of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), borrow-
ing from the International Labour Organization (ILO) model, to provide the legislative
outcomes for international agencies. The ILO networks provide labour dispute
settlements between employers and employees (including governments), which is
an instructive model of direct involvement of non-governmental organizations in
setting standards.46
43 Here the term “Member States having democracy” means those States which have at least a
multiparty democracy, a free press, an independent judiciary, and the rule of law: in other words,
no military or other dictatorships such as absolute monarchies.
44 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, UNDoc.A/CONF.62/
112, reprinted in 21 ILM (1982), at 1261.
45 See, 402 UNTS 71; The treaty entered into force on 23 June 1961.
46 Palmer, G., “New ways to make international environmental law”, 86 AJIL (1992), at 259-283.
His model is as follows: 1) AGeneral Conference comprising all members is to be convened annually
and more often if the Governing Council so decides. The conference shall consist of four representat-
ives from each member; two shall be government delegates and the two others shall represent
business and environmental organizations, respectively; 2) The Governing Council is to consist
of forty people: twenty representing government, ten representing business, and ten representing
environmental organizations; 3) The ability of the conference to set international environmental
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It is important to note that the independence, legitimacy and impartiality of a
third-generational global organization will be questioned – just as the role and position
of the Security Council is often questioned regarding conflict resolutions. This
question mainly arises in connection with the respective financial contributions of
certain countries, and in particular the dependency of the UN on the US. Article 19
of the Charter provides that:
A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial
contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount
of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the
preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such aMember
to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of
the Member.
In a reformed Article 19 it could be stated that a financial obligation of the
members of the third-generation international institution must be recognized. A logical
option in this regard is that Member States should contribute a proportion of their
annual defence budget for the management cost of the third-generation international
organization. The rule of economic liability towards such an organization needs to
be based on a wise assumption, i.e., the higher the financial contribution to a third-
generation international organization, the better the national and global security. Such
a contribution would help to promote common security, thereby building a more
sophisticated form of international security. This could be the thrust of the common
security concept. However, it raises a fundamental question as to how to build a
global order.
A need for a standing military force would be anticipated within a third-genera-
tional international organization, as it is realistic to assume the lawful use of force
regulations by a two-thirds majority of the vote cast by delegates present. The regulations would
become binding without further action. There would also be provision for recommendation to be
made to members; 4) A Director-General and staff of the International Environmental Office, to
have explicit international responsibilities for educating people about global environmental problems
and what they can do to help; 5) The office to have defined functions for gathering information
and monitoring compliance, including verification of compliance with the regulations; 6) A thorough
preparatory process, in which there is ample notice, thorough scientific and technical preparation,
and consultation before regulations are made; 7) Formal provision for authoritative and widely
representative scientific advice and papers to be available to the organization; 8) Detailed require-
ments for nations to report annually on action taken to implement agreed regulations. The environ-
ment and business representatives would be required to report separately from governments; 9)
Provision for any member to be able to submit complaints regarding non-observance in respect
of any other member to the International Environment Office; 10) Discretion of the Council to refer
such complaints to a Commission of Inquiry for a full report. The Commission shall consist of three
appropriate experts of recognized impartiality and be chaired by a lawyer. The Commission is to
make findings of fact and rule on the steps to be taken to deal with the complaint and the time
by which the steps must be taken. Refusal by governments to accept these findings are to be referred
to the full conference; 11) Authority for the council to recommend measures to the conference to
secure compliance when it is lacking.
UN Security Council Reform and Global Security 49
in certain circumstances. Thus, instead of trying to assemble a multinational rapid
response contingent under the existing system, a quite lengthy and complex process,
some experts have proposed that the UN needs a standing force to intervene in
trouble-spots around the world. One proposed solution is to put together a contingent
of professional soldiers.47 The democratic General Assembly could suggest to the
Security Council where and how the force could be deployed. However, such a
proposal raises challenges that many governments are reluctant to confront.
In addition to the task to define global threats and appropriate responses, a 3G
General Assembly needs to concentrate on both the prevention of conflict and
alternative conflict resolution.
5.1.2. Conflicts prevention
Regarding the prevention of international conflicts, the UN Charter offers guidance
on how to use an early-warning information system to prevent the development of
disputes. The preventive measures provided in the UN Charter are as follows.
The primary responsibility for prompt and effective action in the maintenance
of international peace and security as well as consistent vigilance of conflict situations
rests with the Security Council.48 The UN Secretary General has the responsibility
for bringing any matters of international conflict to the attention of the Security
Council.49 The General Assembly may also discuss any questions relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security.50 The General Assembly may call
the attention of the Security Council to situations likely to endanger international
peace and security,51 and the Security Council may take provisional measures for
dispute prevention.52 Similarly, the ICJ may indicate interim measures.53 All of
these measures provided under the Charter may be used even for the so-called ‘global
watch’.54 So far, none of the above-mentioned measures seems to have been used
in a timely or adequate manner.
Although the set of preventive measures is a farsighted arrangement of the UN
Charter, neither of its organs seems to be accountable for their execution, nor have
the Member States given a clear mandate or funds for the implementation of such
47 Brian Farrel, a military historian, and Christopher Lingle, an economist, wrote “Gurkhas could
do the job” in International Herald Tribune, stating that the UN needs a minimum of 5,000 standing
force, and the most suitable troop could be the Gurkhas, particularly since with the return of
Hongkong to China in 1997, they will no longer be required in the British army. The Kathmandu
Post (20 October 1994) republished the article, resulting into an interesting discussion, see <http://
library.wustl.edu/~listmgr/tnd/0067.html>(accessed 28 February 2006).
48 Article 34 of the UN Charter.
49 Article 99 of the UN Charter.
50 Article 11(2) of the UN Charter.
51 Article 11(3) of the UN Charter.
52 Article 40 of the UN Charter.
53 Article 41 of the ICJ Statute.
54 Ramcharan, B., The International Law and Practice of Early-Warning and Preventive Diplomacy:
The Emerging Global Watch (Dordrecht/Boston: Nijhoff, 1991), at 22.
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measures. It has often been pointed out that the UN does not possess the necessary
means, mandates and mission capacity to prevent the outbreak of hostility leading
to devastating conflicts. Therefore, there is a need for a conflict prevention strategy,
by which early warning systems could be improved through more effective, inter-
nationally co-ordinated efforts, while taking into account the economic and social
root causes of the conflict. In order to avoid or prevent any conflict, it is necessary
to understand the source of the conflict and design a process to deal with this source.
For example, conflicts generated by data disagreement should be dealt with as soon
as they arise. Conflicts of interest involve value differences or relationship issues;
therefore, the psychological needs of the parties should to be addressed. In this
situation, there is a dual function for the peace makers or peace keepers: one is to
identify the cause of the conflict, and the other is to use appropriate alternative
measures to prevent it.55
5.1.3. Alternative Conflict resolution
“Negotiate the interests rather than the positions.” This is the concept of the
Alternative Conflict Resolution (ACR). Attention to the traditional methods of
diplomatic negotiation is given to the bargaining powers of the parties rather than
to the actual needs of their respective populations. A study illustrates several benefits
of using a combination of dispute resolution and decision analytical techniques to
structure negotiations of environmental disputes. The interests of disputing parties
are expressed in terms of a utility model, in which specific objectives with measurable
criteria are used to evaluate how well alternative actions satisfy the goals.56
The ACR techniques are intended to facilitate consensus decision-making by
disputing parties, thereby avoiding legal or administrative proceedings to resolve
disputes. Some characteristics of this group of techniques include: 1) focusing on
the underlying interests of the disputing parties, rather than on their bargaining
positions; 2) using creative thinking to dovetail dissimilar interests, preferences,
capabilities, risk tolerances, and to change disputes from being zero-sum games to
situations with the potential for joint gains; 3) appealing to jointly-accepted objective
standards for appropriating gains, and 4) requiring consensus among parties for
decision, rather than majority rule.57 The concept of public involvement in dispute
resolution is another form of ACR, and may be used to prevent disputes, resolve
55 Priscoli, J., “Public involvement; conflict management and dispute resolution in water resources
and environmental decision making”, 3-2/3 Water Nepal (1993), at 43-58.
56 Maguire, L., “Resolving environmental disputes: a framework incorporating decision analysis
and dispute resolution techniques”, 42 Journal of Environmental Management (1994), at 31-47.
57 These techniques are based on a socio-psychological approach rather than a purely judicial
approach. An independent mediator is often used to direct the process of dispute resolution. The
ACR techniques have been applied to policy disputes involving waste facility siting, national forest
planning, and regulation of pesticides, among many others. All of the ACR techniques promote
creative thinking and compromise, but they lack a formal structure for identifying critical sources
of disagreement in complex disputes; here, decision analysis could provide a structure.
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them at earlier stage, or settle them prior to formal litigation. ACR involves six
important concepts of public involvement, namely: 1) to build credibility; 2) to
identify public concern value; 3) to develop consensus; 4) to keep parties informed;
5) to produce decisions, and 6) to enhance democratic practice. Within ACR, policy
makers and the public have different roles from their traditional roles.58 Conflicts
are classified along non-traditional lines.59
In order to find a solution to the above-mentioned cause of conflict, the following
steps could be taken. Firstly, one must understand the source of the conflict then
design appropriate public involvement and conflict management processes. Secondly,
negotiation with an open mind and without any predetermined solution needs to take
place. Thirdly, one must isolate extremes, such as the use of force or litigation.
Fourthly, negotiation should be conducted around interests rather than around posi-
tions. Fifthly, durable settlement depends on at least three dimensions: procedural,
psychological, and substantive satisfaction. Finally, it is necessary to employ tech-
niques which help parties to talk directly with one another. It must be realized that
negotiation of interest is not an easy task. Some conflicts need adjudication and others
may require the use of force. The objective of ACR should not be to isolate adjudica-
tion, but to find settlement at an earlier stage.
5.1.4. Creative thinking
ACR requires creative thinking. It is impossible for all parties to think alike, but
to act collectively in combating conflict and ensuring global security is possible. All
problems may not be solved at once, yet a start would be made if States could agree
on a common code of behaviours. This means that the perception of States may not
be changed, while their role may be regulated. One of the major weaknesses in
international conflict resolutions is the absence of consensual support for a trans-
national code of behaviour, such as that of ‘do unto others as you would wish them
to do unto you’. The prevention and settlement of third-generation conflicts mentioned
above relates to third-generation rights and remedies — the collective human right
to a human environment of sustainable development, which implies the right to life.
At present, there are many serious threats to common security created by com-
peting power interests of States. The terror of the arms race and trade among States
is still a vital issue to be resolved. In addition to this, there is at present a threat to
environmental security, which cannot be achieved within the prevailing power interests
of States. At the same time, a lasting settlement to any resource-related conflict cannot
58 In doing so, all policy makers are considered not as one entity, but include elected, administrative
officials of various types. The public is defined as the both formally organized and informally
organized, and directly and indirectly affected public.
59 It is generally understood that many of the international conflicts are based primarily not on
fact, but on values. The types of conflict are: 1) conflicts of data; 2) interest conflicts, or 3) conflicts
of value differences. In most resource disputes, the primary cause of the conflict is rarely data. It
is more likely to be caused by differing values, interests or, possibly, relationship issues.
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be found without environmental security. Thus, it is absolutely necessary to adopt
the common security approach, and to take a step towards international dispute
prevention rather than conflict resolution. There may be several options and a number
of ways in which to ensure global security. First and foremost is the conversion of
military industries to civilian purposes;60 second is the building of trust and confi-
dence among States; third is the exchange of views and dialogue rather than confron-
tations and, last but not least, there is the priority of the common interests of human-
ity, rather than each State’s pitting its national interests against others’.
5.2. A 3G Court
The contemporary world is (dis)organized in such a way that, from a legal point
of view, States are independent of each other and have no actual authority over each
other. Each State maintains its own courts and prescribes its own laws, often in
isolation from other States. Unless bilaterally or multilaterally bound to each other
by treaty to settle disputes or enforce judgments, States, especially powerful ones,
often behave as if they are free selectively to recognize and enforce international
judgments. States, in order to attain their political ends, place conditions, based on
satisfaction of national interest, when acquiescing to international regulations.
The existing means and techniques of dispute settlement and conflict resolution
can be viewed as two ends of a continuum, at one end being adjudication, i.e.,
arbitration and international courts, and at the other end being the possibility of the
Security Council to use force as a means of securing international peace on the terms
and conditions of the most powerful permanent member of the Council. In the field
between the two ends of the continuum fall different kinds of non-judicial dispute
settlement options like diplomatic negotiations or good offices.
Regarding the means of adjudication, the ICJ is an international institution with
the necessary competence for the settlement of disputes61 including disputes related
to natural resources shared or solely owned by states, but the Court is able to entertain
a case only when the parties to the case have given their consent.62
60 Bamby, F., New Statesman and Society, 31 January 1992, at 14-16.
61 Jennings, R.Y., “The United Nations at fifty: The International Court of Justice after fifty years”,
89 AJIL (1998) , at 493-505.
62 GA Res.51/229, Annex (21 May 1997), UNGADoc.A51/869. According to Article 33(5) Subpara-
graph (i) to (vi) of the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, a compulsory fact-finding Commission may be requested under paragraph 1(b), which
provides that unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the fact-finding shall be conducted by a fact-
finding Commission established in accordance with paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of this article.
See http://www.un.org/law/cod/watere.htm.
According to Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the States which
are Parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation,
the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: (a) the legal interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would
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A growing demand for a separate independent international environmental court
led in 1993 to the establishment of the Environmental Chamber by the ICJ.63 This
chamber resolved Naura v. Australia, settling on the payment of compensation by
Australia, the UK and New Zealand; and the Chamber has also decided the Hungary
v. Slovakia case.64 In addition, the International Criminal Court has been established.
The problem is that the Court has still not been recognized by the US.65
These examples exhibit that international judicial entities are capable of resolving
third-generation disputes, provided that cases are referred to the court. However, it
must be noted that the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ has not been universally
recognized.
5.2.1. Implementation of international law
As there is no international public prosecutor to bring charges against States for
the breach of law, the dispute settlement through the ICJ depends upon the balance
of power and interests of States. In this scenario, the actors or subjects of international
law often become divided, and vested interests prevail over human concerns and
considerations of justice. An effective reaction of the international community to
a conflict threatening international peace may be available only when the interests
of the major powers, i.e., the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, are
at stake.
In a conflict situation where the economic interests of the major powers compete,
reactions are often divided. As a result, the UN in general, and the Security Council
in particular, either ends up acting as an interventionist or remains inactive when
it comes to conflict resolution. Lack of action is, in effect, an action, which appeases
although this may not be intentional. Within this power scenario, there are obvious
risks of a powerful State exercising pressure on a weaker one and thereby bypassing
the law.
5.2.2. Forced implementation: more problems than solutions
The use of force is often said to be the last resort of the enforcement of inter-
national law. In this context, international law is currently facing a challenge. States
involved in the invasion of Iraq seem to have taken the view that dictators, especially
those involved in nuclear proliferation and/or supporting international terrorism, can
be overthrown by the use of force. Despite the fact that no weapons of mass
destruction were found and no link between the Iraqi regime and international
terrorism has been established, the invading States are still suggesting that the dicta-
constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be
made for the breach of an international obligation.
63 Jennings, loc. cit., n. 61, at 493-505.
64 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case, 1997, ICJ Rep.1997, at 1-72.
65 Lack of recognition of this court by the most powerful members of the international community,
the United States, illustrates the problems in establishing a third-generational organization.
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torial regime can be overthrown. There are also many States opposing such a view,
taking a more legalistic approach to the enforcement of international law by preferring
criminal prosecution against terrorists instead of the military use of force. The problem
of the use of force for the enforcement of international law is that the military force
can be used against a powerless, non-permanent member of the Security Council.
There is no possibility that force could be used against a militarily powerful State.
This is where the problem lies with the balance of power theory of international
politics and the existing legal rules of the use of force. As to the non-compliance
with the law by powerful States, the international public opinion may have very little
impact, serving sanctions in response to the violation of international law.
When States behave in an uncivilized manner, leading to the violation of inter-
national law, what measures can be taken for the implementation? Is criminalization
of international wrongdoing an option? Even if it be so, one has to be sure whether
or not a deterrent theory of law and punishment works. These are vital issues of
jurisprudence; actual implementation of international law depends upon the civilized
behaviour of the State leaderships.
5.2.3. Voluntary compliance of international law
Voluntary compliance with international law is a civilized manner of its applica-
tion to achieve legal justice, and global public opinion is a decent sanction of the
law, influencing States’ behaviour. The international legal system is built upon the
principles of consent and reciprocity. International lawmaking through treaty or
customary practice is based on the voluntary consent of States and adjudication is
based upon the principle of reciprocity. By voluntary agreement, States may choose
any avenue of international dispute settlement available under international law,
including diplomatic (negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, good offices,
Article 33 of the UN Charter) and adjudication, as well as arbitration. States may
also enforce international judgements voluntarily. When and if necessary, States
themselves impose sanctions upon each other, as there is no supranational authority
to enforce international law. Enforcement of international law through the Security
Council is also based on the consent rule. There are various kinds of sanctions
available under international law, including so-called smart sanctions. However, the
important question is: who uses sanctions against whom? It is vital to have a clear
legal understanding about when and how to use sanctions.
As actors of international law, States usually comply with international rules
through self-interest. Compliance with a vast number of international rules, covering
socio-economic, technical and cultural activities among States, illustrates the observa-
tion of international law. The interdependency of States as well as the ongoing
interaction between various sub-States’ communities are facts of global life, and
suggests that there is observation of international law. There are, however, problems
in the enforcement of international law concerning cross-boundary activities, including
the enforcement of environmental regulations.
In the cyber age of fast communications, it must be realized that the world’s
public opinion is increasingly becoming an instrument that serves as sanction of law.
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When there is a violation or lack of compliance with the law, States face criticism
from the international community through the mass media, requiring a proper reply
and justifications. More often than not, States attempt to justify their actions, arguing
that they are indeed upholding the law. The lack of legal justification is condemned
not only by affected parties but also by the world public opinion. States do not want
to face such condemnation, which means that the international public opinion serves
as a sanction for a breach of the implementation of international law.
Some governments comply with the world public opinion, and others defy it and
therefore become constraints for the enforcement of the law. This means that imple-
mentation of the law also depends upon the political ideology of the country’s
leadership of the time. It is generally assumed that a democratically elected leader
would listen to the world public opinion more closely than would a dictator.
At a time when the UN system is under consideration for change, the creation
of a Super General Assembly of democratic States can be a futuristic solution to
the problems facing international law, empowering the Assembly and guiding appro-
priate sanctions for the enforcement of international law on a case-by-case basis.
This would help not only to enhance the system of legal justice, but also to establish
social justice.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS
The Security Council has become a non-functional organ of the UN partly because
of an absurd legal arrangement of it both as a legislature and a court, and partly
because of a tendency towards unilateral intervention taken by a few powerful
permanent members of the Council, such as intervention by the US and the UK over
Iraq. Because of this particular intervention the legitimacy of the Council has been
severely undermined. Since the credibility of the determination of global threats and
appropriate responses to threats by the permanent members of the Council is question-
able, global security cannot be realized by the enlargement of the Security Council.
Instead of enlargement, a Super General Assembly needs to be created and
empowered, and the ICJ needs to be strengthened. The separation of powers between
the proposed Super General Assembly, the Security Council and the ICJ is vital for
the establishment of the rule of law. This means that the transformation of the UN
into a third-generational international institution is becoming increasingly important
with the emerging notion of trans-boundary States, sharing sovereignty across State
boundaries.
It is not that State boundaries are disappearing and national security has become
irrelevant, but that important changes are taking place, such as an increase in global
social movements and a growth in the recognition of a global common interest of
social justice. All of these factors are transforming the classic national interests into
one global interest. This development is taking place among global common masses,
rather than on an inter-governmental level. Therefore, it is essential to strengthen
a bottom-up approach to security in consistency with all kinds of threats (nuclear
weapons and terrorism, genocide, famine, poverty, civil wars, and global climate
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insecurity created by unsustainable development), and not just with regard to selected
threats defined by the powerful States. Global security should not only be left to be
defined on the terms and conditions of the powerful permanent members of the
Security Council; enforcement actions should not be left to their will. Given the
background of problems as presented above, the following suggestions need to be
taken into consideration although they may be controversial.
Instead of reforming the UN Security Council, which is unlikely to be reformed,
it is appropriate to establish a Super General Assembly of democratic States with
the power only to generate an international legal order. The member States of the
General Assembly should be obliged to provide a compulsory progressive economic
contribution to the UN at a fixed proportion of their yearly defence budget. The voting
power and methods of the proposed Super General Assembly can be resolved through
negotiation.
The role of the ICJ should be strengthened, especially through recognition of
the compulsory jurisdiction and a unilateral right of States and sub-state entities to
bring cases to the ICJ. The establishment of regional branches of the ICJ should be
considered.
Extend the jurisdiction of the ICJ to entertain public interest litigations. Particular-
ly in cases where there is a denial of justice or where a State judicial system fails
to ensure basic human rights, the sub-State communities should be entitled the right
to judicial remedy by and through the ICJ.
Enforce the ICJ’s decisions, when and if needed, through the use of sanctions
and force, with a majority decision of the proposed Super General Assembly, for
which the existing Security Council will be obliged to fulfil its primary responsibility
through the use of force. This will be a test of the will of the permanent members
of the Council as well as demonstrating on whose terms security is perceived and
for what purpose force is used.
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
CO-OPERATION, CO-EXISTENCE, AND CO-INVOLVEMENT
Jaemin Lee*
The Security Council is more than a political power tool. It is an organ with important
responsibilities derived from the Charter. The authority of the Council will not be
diminished, but enhanced, if it accepts that its decisions are not above the law. There
is no contradiction between the rule of law and international peace and security.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Through diplomatic fluctuations, expansion of the United Nations Security Council
(“Security Council”) is finally being discussed at the various entities of the United
Nations as a part of the general effort to reform the world body.2 In this process,
the issue which attracts the keen attention from member states, as is well known,
concerns whether to expand the number of permanent members from the current 15
to 24, and, if so, whom to include.3 It appears that Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil
are the most likely candidates for the new Security Council. It is regrettable, however,
that this important effort fails to reform the United Nations in general; the Security
Council in particular fails to focus on a more fundamental issue that would significant-
ly affect the future of the United Nations and the Security Council: how to create
a mechanism to apply international law to the actions of the Security Council in order
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lessons from Lockerbie?”, 10 EJIL (1999), at 547.
2 BBC, “Annan urges sweeping U.N. reforms”, BBC News World Edition (21 March 2005).
3 Chambers, Madeline, “Talks on U.N. Security Council expansion to continue”, Reuters (25 July
2005).
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to enhance “rule of law” within the operation of the Security Council. This crucial
issue seems to be missing in the current debates at the United Nations
As the role of the Security Council has dramatically expanded after the demise
of the Cold War confrontations,4 so has international concern for and criticism of
the role of the Security Council. Many countries, especially those in the ThirdWorld,
view the Security Council as an apparatus that implements the strategies and plans
of a few permanent member countries in order to uphold their national interests,
especially in the case of the United States, rather than to maintain international peace
and security. The criticism of the Security Council basically boils down to the claim
that the most important entity of the United Nations fails to pay adequate attention
to the basic norms of international law; it attempts to address international issues
only from the political perspective. The proposition that the United Nations and the
Security Council are subject to the norms of international law as provided in the
Charter of the United Nations (“Charter”) is not refuted. What is not clear, however,
concerns who or which agency has the authority to check and determine whether
a particular action of the Security Council is consistent with international law. This
“uncertainty” has caused a great deal of confusion and controversy whenever there
is a legally dubious action adopted by the Security Council. This paper attempts to
address this issue.
This paper concludes that all duly-constituted international courts preserve the
inherent authority judicially to review the consistency of an action of the Security
Council with the applicable norm of international law. Needless to say, the most
important and influential judicial body among various international courts is the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). Henceforth, judicial review of Security Council
actions by the ICJ is the most important topic in addressing this particular issue; the
current paper focuses mainly on the judicial review authority of the ICJ. Although
various domestic courts of member states may judicially review relevant actions of
4 Watson, Geoffrey R., “Constitutionalism, judicial review, and the World Court”, 34 Harv. Int’l
L. J. (1993), at 1; Most of the sanctions by the Security Council based on its enforcement action
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter have taken place since the 1990s, since the Security Council
was revitalized by the demise of the Cold War. The first state against which the Security Council
applied sanctions was Rhodesia in 1965; the next was South Africa in 1977, and all others (including
Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Libya) were sanctioned in the 1990s after the Cold War. See Kirgis,
Frederic L., International Organizations in Their Legal Setting, (St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing
Co., 1993), at 620. One commentator described the advent of the newly charged Security Council
in 1990s as follows. “With a metaphor that, like most metaphors, is not altogether accurate, the
UN Security Council could be described as a whale which, for reasons known and unknown, lay
quietly somewhere on the high seas for most of its life. Some ten years ago, the whale awoke and
turned over once or twice, sending waves to distant shores which, in turn, set in motion the ships
and boats and canoes of legal science. They are still nervously cruising while the whale, as it turned
out, did not really leave its place.” Fassbender, Bardo, “Quis judicabit?: The Security Council, its
powers and its legal control”, 11 EJIL (2000), retrieved from the EJIL website at http://www.ejil.org/
journal/vol11/no1/br1.html, at 1.
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the Security Council in accordance with domestic statutes or constitutions – some
of such reviews may constitute violations of international law if such review is not
consistent with the member states’ obligation under relevant international treaties
including the Charter – the focus here is only on the issue of judicial review by the
ICJ of the actions of the Security Council. Similarly, other international tribunals
may also exercise judicial review in the course of their evaluation of a particular
case. Yet again, however, this is not the focus of the discussion of this paper.
This paper first discusses the fundamental limitations on the Security Council
operation as imposed by the Charter. The paper then enquires into relevant ICJ
precedents and Charter provisions to analyze the relationship between the Security
Council and the ICJ, and to confirm that the ICJ is indeed allowed judicially to review
an action (most notably, the binding resolutions and decisions) of the Security
Council. This paper also notes the unique characteristics of the function carried out
by the Security Council, and fundamental differences between the municipal judicial
system and international judicial system. As such, this paper concludes that a judicial
review by the ICJ should be a harmonious, indirect one, which duly takes into account
these unique aspects of a judicial review mechanism under the current structure of
the United Nations. It then suggests a framework to assist the ICJ in carrying out
its judicial review of the Security Council actions in more effective and reasonable
manner.
2. THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS NOT ABOVE INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LIMIT OF THE SECUERITY COUNCIL’S ACTIONS
Is the Security Council is immune from basic norms of international law? Should
the Security Council be free from the restriction of international law because the
Council carries out such an important function under the Charter? The answer to
these two questions is simple and clear: No. The following discussion proves this.
2.1. The Ultra vires doctrine
Under international law, every international organization, unlike a state, has a
limited international personality with an inherent restriction attached.5 In other words,
international organizations are authorized to operate only to the extent stipulated by
a constitutional instrument explicitly, which is a distinctive trait of international
organizations as contrasted with those of states. If an organization attempts to carry
out an act beyond the authorized boundary in the constitutional document, then it
5 See Malanczuk, Peter, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th Revised edn.
(London: Routledge, 1997), at 93.
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would constitute an ultra vires activity, which is null and void ab initio.6 As a matter
of fact, this is an inevitable, logical conclusion because the power of an international
organization comes only from the mandates from each member state participating
in the international organization; thus, as a corollary, an organization cannot exercise
an authority that has not been delegated in the first place. Meanwhile, no state may
delegate power that the state does not possess originally. In other words, only the
power that lies within the proper boundary of each state can be reassigned to an
international organization, and the organization constituted as such, in turn, has
international personality only within the delegated boundary. An international organ-
ization is created by the “collective accumulation” of individual authorities of indi-
vidual members; therefore, the power or authority of an international organization
could on occasion be greater than that of a member state. Nonetheless, the fundamen-
tal principle still remains the same: the organization does not in the first place possess
the authority which each member does not possess, because it cannot and has not
been delegated.
The United Nations is an international organization established by a treaty: the
Charter. Its power as an organization thus stems only from the Charter precisely as
delegated by eachmember state. As regards the Security Council, however important
a role it may play, it remains simply a sub-organization of the United Nations and,
as a sub-organization, its authority cannot exceed that of the umbrella authority.
Therefore, the Security Council is also subject to the same limitations applicable to
the United Nations. The Security Council is also bound by the Charter.7 Thus, it
is logically self-evident that there is from the outset a limitation upon the actions
of the Security Council.8
As such, there is no logical reason not to apply the theory of ultra vires in the
context of the Security Council operation. It should therefore be remembered, as a
principle fromwhich to start, that whenever the Security Council exercises its power,
this is valid only when performed within the boundaries of the Charter provisions.
Similarly, another inevitable result is that the Security Council does not possess the
power which individual states do not originally own. In other words, unlike tempting
arguments to the contrary, there is indeed a limitation on the actions of the Security
Council under the Charter; consequently, any resolution adopted in violation of the
Charter should be considered null and void as an ultra vires action, at least theoretic-
ally speaking.
It is true, as opponents of this theory strenuously argue, that even if such an
adoption be null and void, there is no entity in the current international society that
6 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, ICJ Rep.1962, at 167-68 (“Neither purposes nor
powers conferred on the U.N. to effectuate the purposes are unlimited.” The Ultra vires doctrine
could apply “when the organization takes action which does not warrant the assertion that it was
appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the purposes.”).
7 Martenczuk, loc. cit., note 1, at 534.
8 David, Marcella, “Passport to justice: Internationalizing the political question doctrine for applica-
tion in the World Court”, 40 Harv. Int’l L. J. (1999) at 81, 113; see Sabahi, Babback, loc. cit., n.
57, at 12.
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can officially pronounce such nullification of the actions of the Security Council or
sanction the Security Council for that matter.9 However, when a social norm is
deemed a law, the lack (or weakness) of an enforcement mechanism or of declaratory
entities does not necessarily stimulate a conclusion that the norm is not law at all.
Its coercive nature is indeed an important factor of law, yet is not always dispositive.
As such, the fact that no entity in the international community can issue an enforce-
able judgment vis-à-vis the Security Council does not lead to the conclusion that
the body is immune from the international law in general and the ultra vires doctrine
in particular.
2.2. Charter provisions
This principle of “limited authority” is also contained in the Charter provisions.
According to the Charter, one of the purposes and principles of the United Nations
is to settle international disputes, and to maintain international peace and security
“in accordance with international law” (emphasis added).10 Articles 1 and 2 of
the Charter also make it clear that all actions of the United Nations must be in
conformity with various international law principles. Therefore, actions of a United
Nations body – including the Security Council – must be in conformity with inter-
national law. Actions of the United Nations bodies violating international legal norms
thus automatically constitute ultra vires activities, as far as the United Nations as
an international organization is concerned, as well as constituting a violation of
applicable substantive international law. Again, theoretically speaking, such inter-
national law-violating ultra vires activities of the United Nations bodies, including
the Security Council, are to be viewed as null and void ab initio, as explained
above.11
Despite this obvious fact, there are commentators who believe that the Security
Council is authorized to carry out its duty without constraint from other international
law principles, mainly based on Article 103 of the Charter, which provides that “the
obligation under the Charter overrides other obligations from other agreements.”12
9 Judge Schwebel mentioned in his dissenting opinion that “the Court is particularly without power
to overrule or undercut decisions of the Security Council determining whether there is a threat to
the peace and what measures shall be taken to deal with the threat.” See Judge Schwebel’s Dissenting
Opinion in the Judgment on Preliminary Objections in theQuestions of Interpretation and Application
of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America, 27 February
1998) (hereinafter, the Pan Am 103 case), found at www.icj.org.
10 See Article 1 of the Charter.
11 Fassbender, loc. cit., n. 4, at 4 (“The decisions of the Security Council are presumed to be legal.
If this presumption is rebutted, an illegal decision is void,” citing Michael Fraas’ statement.).
12 See Judge Schwebel’s dissenting opinion in the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, loc. cit.,
n. 9. (“Security Council resolutions supervene any rights of Libya under the Montreal Convention,
and thus render reliance upon it without object and moot.”).
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They then attempt to combine Article 103 with Article 25 which, in turn, provides
the Security Council with the power to issue a “binding” decision. The outcome of
this combination makes every Security Council resolution superior to obligations
arising from any other treaty or agreement, they argue.13 Stated differently, the
Security Council is entitled to issue a resolution that is in conflict with an existing
international treaty, and that resolution ‘trumps’ the contradictory treaty. A simple
reading of Articles 103 and 25 does seem to lead to such a conclusion.
The more proper analysis, however, requires a more in-depth examination of
the issue as opposed merely to a technical reading of these provisions in the Charter.
Even if Article 103 of the Charter recognizes the superiority of the Charter obligation
over other “treaty” obligations, that provision, just as any other provision in the
Charter, should always be interpreted in harmony with the basic purposes and prin-
ciples of the Charter as defined in Articles 1 and 2. The spirit of Article 103 certainly
is not that “the Security Council can carry out its action even through violation of
international law” thus invalidating the basic principles of the Charter as provided
in Articles 1 and 2.
More significantly than any other factor, the initial hurdle to be cleared in recog-
nizing the superiority of a Security Council action in the context of a combination
scheme of Articles 25-103 is that the action at issue (the resolution) must be a valid
one under the Charter, both procedurally and substantively. In other words, barring
any procedural defect,14 only the actions of the Security Council that have been
performed in conformity with the basic principles of international law (i.e., in accord-
ance with international law, to borrow the wording from the Charter) are given
binding authority under Article 25, and only then are such resolutions eligible for
the superiority consideration under Article 103.
In this regard, there is an important issue to note. Given the fact that Article 103
is introduced to “override” other treaties that impose contradictory obligations on
member states, the term “international law” should be interpreted to mean the set
of international law except the treaty to be superseded by a particular Security Council
action (a resolution). If the term “international law” also includes the international
law as created by the contradictory treaty, the Security Council would never issue
a resolution that contravenes any other international treaty. Certainly, that is not the
purpose of the Charter, either. The Security Council’s resolution should be in con-
formity with the various principles of international law, except with those specific
provisions of a treaty to be overridden by the resolution.
Thus, a proper way of interpreting those provisions would be that Article 103
is operable as a rule of hierarchy only when there is a conflict between a “valid”
treaty, on the one hand, and a “valid” Security Council resolution, on the other. It
is simply untenable to interpret Article 103 in a way that gives the Security Council
the virtually limitless authority to ignore a valid existing treaty even if such an action
undermines the basic principles of the Charter. The ordinary meaning of Articles
13 See ibid.
14 For example, resolutions which have been adopted without concurrent affirmative votes from
the five Permanent Members would fall into this category. See Article 27 of the Charter.
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25 and 103 may, technically, lead to such a conclusion, yet when ordinary meaning
clearly goes against the fundamental principles and underlying purposes of the
Charter, it simply cannot stand.
Article 103 does not mean that the Security Council may execute whatever it
wants regardless of international treaties and agreements;15 it was not designed to
provide the Security Council with a royal immunity. Rather, it should be read to mean
that only those Security Council actions that have been adopted through valid pro-
cedures in furtherance of the Charter objectives may be given such status. Article
103 should not be invoked as a ground to nullify valid existing international treaties
simply because this would hinder the achievement of a particular goal of the Security
Council.
Other aspects of Article 103 further support this conclusion. The obligation under
Article 103 is described as the obligation of “states,” not as the obligation of any
United Nations organ. It could therefore be argued that United Nations bodies such
as the Security Council are not necessarily bound by the Article;16 this in turn means
that, unlike the case with member states, the Article does not require the Security
Council and other United Nations bodies to afford the superior status of the Charter
over a treaty. This would support the proposition that the Security Council cannot
hide behind Article 103 in justifying its violation of existing international law.
At the same time, Article 103 mentions only “treaty.” Thus, it could be argued
that it does not grant superiority over customary international law. When the Charter
mentions international law in Article 1, it does not expressly or implicitly set aside
a customary portion (or any other portion, for that matter) of it.17 Therefore, all
branches of international law are applicable to the member states and to United
Nations organs. Accordingly, states and the United Nations as an international
organization are still bound by customary law (that is, important principles of inter-
national law, such as the equality of sovereign rights) if there exists one applicable
to the specific situation posed, irrespective of Article 103.18 All of these points
15 See Judge Schwebel’s dissenting opinion in the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, n. 9. (“The
terms and drafting history of the Charter demonstrate that the Security Council is subject to the
rule of law, and at the same time is empowered to derogate from international law if the maintenance
of international peace requires.”).
16 Gardam, Judith G., “Legal restraints on Security Council military action”, 17 Mich. J. Int’l L.
(1996), at 285, 304.
17 For example, the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank have implicitly made clear that some
provisions are applicable despite existing contradictory customary international law. For example,
the World Bank can order a variety of measures that may interfere with the national sovereignty
of a recipient state as a quid pro quo of a loan.
18 Professor Franck says that if Libya had accepted a compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36 (2)
of the Charter, and had brought a claim against Great Britain which accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction, unlike the United States, then it could have resorted to general principles of international
law, such as customary law, to demonstrate the violation of its sovereign rights, without having
to limit its claim to the interpretation of the Montreal Convention. If that were the case, he signals,
Libya would have stronger case here. Franck, Thomas, “The “Powers of Appreciation”: Who is
the ultimate guardian of U.N. legality?”, 86 AJIL (1992), at 519, 522.
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collectively stand for the proposition that Articles 103 and 25 combined do not
provide the Security Council with the full immunity to violate international law.
2.3. Positions of the ICJ
Actual practice of the ICJ will shed more light on this issue. The ICJ has indeed
since 1945 exercised judicial review over the actions of the United Nations bodies.
As these were done in an indirect, roundabout manner, it may be called a de facto
judicial review.
The first example came in the Conditions of Admission case in 1948 when the
General Assembly requested an advisory opinion regarding the validity of imposing
additional admission conditions not stipulated in Article 4 of the Charter.19 Rejecting
the consideration of other elements than those provided in Article 4, the ICJ has
recognized that there are legal limits to the powers of the respective United Nations
organs.20 The ICJ reasoned that “the political character of an organ cannot release
it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they
constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment.21 To ascertain
whether an organ has the freedom of choice over its decisions, reference must be
made to the terms of its constitution.”22 This broad language applies not only to
the United Nations admission issue, but also to virtually any other act by a political
organ that arguably runs counter to express conditions imposed by relevant constituent
instruments. Viewed from that perspective, the Security Council, although a highly
political organ, is still subject to the provisions of the Charter, and its actions are
valid only when they are done pursuant to the Charter.23
In 1962, the ICJ issued another advisory opinion pursuant to the General Assem-
bly’s request concerning the burden sharing of the peace-keeping operations in the
Congo and Middle East.24 The question was whether those peace-keeping-related
expenses were the “expenses of the Organizations” as provided in Article 17 (2) of
the Charter.25 In ruling that the expenses are indeed covered by Article 17 (2), the
ICJ provided a meaningful indication recognizing the judicial review authority of
the ICJ.26 Ignoring the General Assembly’s blatant attempt to avoid the ICJ’s review
19 See Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion





24 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion (1962), ICJ Rep. 1962, at 151.
25 See ibid.
26 Ibid.
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in its request for advisory opinion,27 the ICJ held that “it must have full liberty to
consider all relevant data available to it in forming an opinion on a question posed
to it for an advisory opinion,” despite the fact that the General Assembly’s intention
was clearly otherwise.28 In addition, the ICJ further reasoned that “when the Organiza-
tion takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment
of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such
action is not ultra vires.”29 In other words, such a non-ultra vires presumption may
be overcome when a disputed action is not “appropriate for the fulfilment of one
of the stated purposes of the United Nations,” ultimately making the action ultra
vires. One of the stated purposes of the United Nations is to preserve and enhance
international law. If a Security Council action undermines relevant international law,
such an action is not to preserve and enhance international law, hence is not appro-
priate to the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations. The
Security Council action would therefore be an ultra vires activity, and the ICJ would
refuse to accord it legal validity, according to the rationale in the Certain Expenses
case.
This position was also maintained in the Namibia case in 1971.30 South Africa
had been governing southwest Africa (now known as Namibia) under the trusteeship
authorization since the era of the League of Nations. South Africa had applied its
infamous apartheid policy in that region despite international criticism, which
prompted the General Assembly and the Security Council to adopt respective resolu-
tions to terminate the trusteeship.31 South Africa then challenged the resolutions
as ultra vires action, and the Security Council referred the matter to the ICJ for an
advisory opinion. In that case, the ICJ did review the validity of the resolutions and
concluded that they were constituted within the boundary of the Charter provisions.32
Since it was the Security Council itself that asked for advisory opinions in these
cases, one may well argue that the Security Council, not the ICJ, has an inherent
right to engage in a so-called “practical” judicial review of its own actions, using
the ICJ as a judicial advisor. To some extent, such an argument may sound plausible,
but it fails to provide an accurate characterization of the situations involved. This
is because the Security Council has here merely the power to request the ICJ to
provide an opinion: not to make a decision itself. The review is done by the ICJ,
27 France proposed to formulate the request for an advisory opinion in a more direct way, which
was rejected by the General Assembly. That is, the rejected French amendment asked for a two-step
decision whether the General Assembly and the Council had acted ultra vires in authorizing the
expenditure, and then asked for an opinion whether such expenditure lay within the “expenses of
the Organization.”
28 See the Certain Expenses case, n. 24, at 167-68.
29 See ibid.
30 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia notwith-
standing Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion (1971), ICJ Rep. 1971, at 16.
31 See Gross, L., “The South West Africa case: What happened ?”, 45 Foreign Affairs (1966), at
36, reprinted in Kirgis, op. cit., n. 4, at 485-89; See also U.N.GAOR, U.N.Doc. GA/ RES/ 2145
(27 October 1966) and U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. SC/RES/ 276 (30 January 1970).
32 See the Namibia case, n. 30, at 16.
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and it is the ICJ’s judicial review as such. If there exists a fundamental reason prohi-
biting the Security Council from judicially reviewing a Security Council action, a
request from the Security Council should not and could not cure the defect: the ICJ
is performing a step it should not take. On the contrary: the fact that the Charter
explicitly allows the ICJ to provide advisory opinions at the request of the Security
Council indicates that at least the Charter does not impose a fundamental hindrance
to the ICJ’s judicial review. Furthermore, this decision also indicates that as long
as a case is legitimately brought before the ICJ, the United Nations judicial organ
can legitimately review an action by the Security Council which is implicated in the
case. In this instance, the case was appropriately brought before the ICJ through the
request for an advisory opinion by the Security Council.
In furtherance of that logic, the ICJ made another significant stride in the Pan
Am 103 case. There, the ICJ hinted that, if necessary, it could judicially review a
Security Council resolution which violates the Charter or treaty obligations.33 This
is the first contentious case in which the ICJ signalled that it has the power judicially
to review a Security Council action. Given the importance of the case, a brief explana-
tion of the background to the case seems helpful.
Pan Am flight 103 flying from Frankfurt to New York via London was blown
out of the sky over Lockerbie in Scotland on 21 December 1998, killing all 216
people on board, most of them American soldiers returning home for Christmas, and
eleven on the ground.34 Thanks to a three-year-long investigation by American and
British terrorist specialists, sufficient evidence was collected to show that the Libyan
Intelligence Service was apparently behind the explosion.35 Consequently, the United
States and the United Kingdom demanded the extradition of the two Libyan agents
involved for trial in the US or the UK.36 The request was, however, denied by the
Libyan government on the grounds that the request violated relevant international
law.37 The two countries then turned to the Security Council, of which both are
permanent members, asking for its action since the dispute constituted a threat to
international peace and security.38
The Security Council then, under its Chapter VII authority, adopted a series of
resolutions: Resolutions 731 (21 January 1992),39 748 (31 March 1992),40 and 883
(11 November 1993),41 ordering Libya to turn over the requested agents to the US
or the UK governments, and imposing severe economic sanctions when Tripoli refused
33 See the Judgment on Preliminary Objection of the Pan Am 103 case, n. 9.





39 U.N. SCOR, 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (1992).
40 U.N. SCOR, 3036d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992).
41 U.N. SCOR, 3312th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (1993).
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to obey.42 In the meantime, the Libyan government resorted to the ICJ for the settle-
ment of the case,43 citing the jurisdictional provision of the 1971 Montreal Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(“Montreal Convention”) that arguably confers jurisdiction of the dispute on the
ICJ.44 The Convention clearly provides that terrorist attacks against a civilian aircraft,
such as the Lockerbie incident, fall under the jurisdiction of the ICJ,45 and all three
countries were indeed parties to the Convention.46 In addition, there were other
provisions that arguably support the position held by Libya.47 The gist of Libya’s
claim was to enjoin the US and the UK from pressing their claims for the extradition
of two Libyan nationals through the enforcement of the Security Council action,
arguing that it has the legal right not to extradite them under the Montreal Conven-
tion48 and as well under customary law.49
42 The extradition demand is extraordinary in and of itself because under customary international
law, a state has no obligation to extradite its own nationals in the absence of treaty obligations to
that effect. Here, the only treaty obligation for these three states concerned is theMontreal Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (23 September 1971)
(hereinafter the “Montreal Convention”) which aims at punishing acts of terrorism against a civilian
aircraft. See Articles 1, 7, 8 of the Montreal Convention.
43 Libya filed two separate, but virtually identical, applications against the United States and the
United Kingdom respectively on 3 March 1992. See n. 9; see also History of the Proceeding
contained in Press Communique 2000/27 (13 September 2000), retrieved from the ICJ website at
www.icj.org.
44 Article 14 (1) of the Montreal Convention provides that “[a]ny dispute between two or more
Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot
be settled through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If
within six months from the date of request for arbitration, any one of those Parties are unable to
agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the
International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.”
45 See Articles 1 and 14 (1) of the Montreal Convention.
46 The United States and the United Kingdom also acknowledge that Libya has the right and can
claim it under the Montreal Convention. However, they argue that the right is superseded by the
Security Council resolutions. See the Judgment on Preliminary Objections of the Pan Am 103 case,
n. 9, at paras. 37-38.
47 The provisions invoked by Libya in its applications are Articles 1, 5 (2), 5 (3), 7, 8 (2), 11 (1),
and 14 (1) of the Montreal Convention.
48 Libya’s argument runs that: Article 7 of the Convention declares the principle of “aut dedere
aut judicare,” which gives the custodial state of terrorist suspects the choice between extradition
to other requesting states with jurisdiction, or indicting them itself. Furthermore, even if an extradition
obligation arises (say, by not prosecuting the criminals), Libya’s obligation under the Convention
is subject to its domestic law under Article 8 (2) of the Convention that provides “Extradition is
made subject to the laws of the State from which extradition is requested.” Libyan law, furthermore,
as do those of many other states, proscribes the extradition of its own nationals. Accordingly, Libya
arrested the two named suspects and asked, in preparation for the prosecution of the crime, the
American and British authorities to turn over to them the relevant information, as is provided in
the Montreal Convention.
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On the other hand, based upon the vast evidence accumulated by the joint Ameri-
can-British investigation team linking the bombing to the Libyan Intelligence Ser-
vice,50 the US and the UK concluded that the bombing was perpetrated by two
agents of the Libyan Intelligence Service in retaliation for the 1986 US air raid over
Tripoli and Benghazi.51 Despite such cold facts, it is also true that Libya has accu-
mulated significant support in the international community and among international
scholars for its assertion that the Security Council’s backing of the American and
British demands is inconsistent with applicable international law and therefore
infringes on its sovereign rights.52 To outsiders, there was obviously an unambiguous
appearance of a biased decision by the Security Council.53
The principal argument of the US and the UK is that even if Libya has the proper
right to refuse the extradition of its nationals under the Montreal Convention, the
treaty-based right has been negated by the Security Council resolutions under Article
103 of the Charter.54 They further argue that Article 25 requires Libya as a member
state of the United Nations to “accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter,”
Libya first asked for provisional measures, mentioning irreparable harm imminent
from the pending Security Council resolutions; these were rejected by the ICJ.55
In the merit phase, however, while rejecting the long, persistent argument of the
49 Even if there is a sign of a changing trend, traditionally, civil law states do not usually extradite
their own nationals. This principle is usually included in their national law and extradition treaties.
Gilbert, Geoff, Aspects of Extradition Law (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1991), at 95-100.
50 There was irrefutably concrete evidence to ascertain Libya’s involvement in the bombing. For
example, the bomb’s Toshiba timing device was one of twenty delivered to a Libyan official. Zubel,
Eric, “The Lockerbie controversy: Tension between the International Court of Justice and the Security
Council”, 5 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp. L. (1999) at 261.
51 See “France-United Kingdom-United States: Statements calling on Libya to cooperate in investiga-
tions of aerial incidents at Lockerbie and Niger, Announcement by the Lord Advocate of Scotland
on November 14, 1991”, 31 ILM (1992) at 718.
52 See e.g., David, loc. cit., n. 8, at 88; Franck, loc. cit. n. 18, at 520; Teson, Ferrando, “Collective
Humanitarian Intervention”, 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. (1996), at 323; Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, “The
Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in light of the
Lockerbie Case”, 88 AJIL (1994), at 643.
53 This case shows the arguably strong appearance of the impartiality of Security Council’s resolu-
tions: two permanent members are parties to the dispute and one (France) has a strong interest in
the outcome. David, ibid., at 117-18. France has a strong interest in the outcome of the case, because
the French government also indicted six Libyan Intelligence Agents in its domestic courts in absentia
for the bombing of UTA flight 772 over Niger that killed 171 people.
54 See the remarks of David Andrews (representing the US) at the Oral Hearing held on 14October
1997 at the Peace Palace, The Hague, Verbatim Record of the Hearing, para. 1.22; John Crook’s
argument for more details contained in the same document, both retrieved from the ICJ website
retrieved at www.icj.org.
55 Order Denying Provisional Measures, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v.
United States), ICJ Rep. 1992, at 114.
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Washington and London governments that the ICJ had no jurisdiction over a matter
in which the Security Council was exercising its power under the Charter,56 the
ICJ decided in favour of Libya in 1998 by recognizing its jurisdiction over the
case.57
Although the ICJ managed to find technical loopholes allowing it to avoid a head-
on collision with the Security Council58 and the case was subsequently settled among
the three states in 2003 as a result of the diplomatic negotiations and ensuing thaw
among the parties, the Pan Am 103 case presented a striking institutional challenge
to the current United Nations constitutional system.59 Despite heated controversy,60
this case offered clear indication that the ICJ does possess the authority to review
judicially a particular action of the Security Council and in the future the ICJ may
exercise its judicial power over the same issue as that being addressed by the Security
Council.
In the Israeli WallCase in 2004, the ICJ provided the same logic in its discussion
of the jurisdiction of the ICJ and the political nature of the Security Council. In the
case, the ICJ held that it could not accept the view that it had no jurisdiction over
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute over Israel’s construction of a separation wall because
56 Some have argued that the ICJ’s failure to avoid a direct conflict with the Security Council is
reckless and misguided, as it might seriously prejudice the effectiveness of the Council which will,
in turn, lead to the eventual disintegration of the UN. See David, loc. cit., n 8, at 91.
57 This is the Judgment on the Preliminary Objections filed by the US and UK, loc. cit., note 9.
For a brief history of the case: after its application for provisional measures was rejected, Libya
filed Memorials on 19 June 1992; the US/UK filed Counter-Memorials on 31 March 1999; Libya
filed its Replies on 29 June 2000, and Rejoinders from the US/UK were due on 3 August 2001.
The case then remained as pending for about three years until it was finally dismissed, as the three
parties settled it through diplomatic negotiations in 2003. See History of the Proceedings, loc. cit.,
n. 43, at 2; see also the Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), ICJ Rep. 2003,
ordering the case to be removed from the docket of the Court. One commentator opined that this
withdrawal forced the Court “to lose the opportunity to hear the merits of and pronounce itself upon
one of the most controversial issues that it had encountered since its inception.” Sabahi, Babback,
“The ICJ’s authority to invalidate the Security Council’s decisions under Chapter VII: Legal
romanticism or the Rule of Law”, 17 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. (Summer 2004), at 1.
58 The ICJ tactfully avoided the question of the validity of the Security Council’s resolution by
simply noting that Libya’s application to the ICJ pre-dated the adoption of the Council resolution.
See the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, loc. cit., n. 9, at para. 38. However, Judge Sir Robert
Jennings in his dissenting opinion wondered whether the ICJ had sufficiently weighed the gravity
of dealings with a question involving binding and peace-keeping decisions of the Security Council
in so technical, not to say legalistic, a fashion. See his dissenting opinion in the Judgment on
Preliminary Objections. One commentator also characterized the Preliminary Objection ruling of
the ICJ as “extremely cautious.” See Martenczuk, loc. cit., n. 1, at 525.
59 David, loc. cit., n. 8, at 82; Andrews, loc. cit., n. 54, at para.1.3; Franck, loc. cit., n. 18, at 520
(“The similarities of the Libyan case toMarbury extend beyond judicial tactics. Both raise the specter
of political actors exercising powers mala fide and ultra vires and what courts are to do about
them.”).
60 The Lockerbie cases have produced a lively debate on the limits of the Security Council powers,
and on the question of how these limits could be enforced. Martenczuk, loc. cit., n. 1, at 518.
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of the “political” character of the questions posed.61 The ICJ also reasoned that the
fact that “a legal question also has a political aspect does not suffice to deprive it
of its character as a legal question and to deprive the Court of a competence expressly
conferred on it by its Statute.”62 In short, the ICJ indicated that as long as juris-
dictional basis is appropriately ascertained, it should and will exercise its jurisdiction
over a highly political question, including over the actions of the Security Council.
These ICJ precedents collectively support the conclusion that even under the
current Charter scheme the ICJ is empowered to review an action of the Security
Council. As long as requirements for the ICJ’s intervention are met, such as a request
by an eligible United Nations body for an advisory opinion,63 or the existence of
jurisdiction in a contentious case, then the current Charter does not comprise an
obstacle to the ICJ’s judicial review.
3. MORE IN-DEPTH EXAMINATION OF THE CHARTER PROVISIONS:
THE ICJ’S AUTHORITY FORA JUDICIAL REVIEWASA “PRINCIPAL
AND PRINCIPLED JUDICIAL ORGAN”
Despite the lack of explicit wording, there are many relevant provisions scattered
throughout the Charter which, when combined, unambiguously support the judicial
review authority of the ICJ. First of all, it should be noted that the United Nations
system itself does not attempt to give the Security Council an “exclusive” power
even in matters of maintaining international peace and security. Under the United
Nations scheme, the Security Council has only the “primary” responsibility, not the
“exclusive” responsibility, for the maintenance of international peace and security.64
In other words, the Charter does not preclude other principal organs of the United
Nations from deliberating issues of international peace and security: the other bodies
also possess their own respective, even though secondary, responsibilities in maintain-
ing international peace and security.
A good example in this regard appears to be the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution
in 1950.65 When it was proved that the Security Council was sometimes unable
to fulfil its duty under the Charter, as was obviously shown in its dealing with the
Korean War in June 1950, the General Assembly passed a resolution in which the
General Assembly was authorized to take necessary actions in the Security Council’s
61 See Summary of the Advisory Opinion in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestine Territory (9 July 2004) (“Israeli Wall Case”), retrieved from the ICJ
website at www.icj.org, at 4.
62 Ibid.
63 A request for an advisory opinion should also be made by an eligible United Nations organ for
an issue falling under the jurisdiction of the body. Otherwise, it would be subject to an ultra vires
challenge by other states and bodies. See Summary of the Advisory Opinion in Israeli Wall Case,
loc. cit., n. 61, at 2.
64 See Article 24 of the Charter.
65 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. GA/Res/ 377 (V), (3 Nov. 1950).
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stead to maintain international peace and security.66 When its legality was later
challenged in the Certain Expenses case, the ICJ ruled that the General Assembly’s
exercise of de facto enforcement action did not violate the Charter; this was achieved
through holding that the Security Council’s responsibility is only a primary, not and
exclusive, one; the peace-keeping operation performed under this resolution was found
a valid exercise of the General Assembly’s authority under the Charter.67 In other
words, even if the issue was unambiguously about maintaining international peace
and security, the General Assembly could nonetheless deal with the issue if such
an exercise falls within the boundaries of the General Assembly’s independent
authority. Viewed from this standpoint, an argument that all issues having an impact
on international peace and security are exclusively reserved for the Security Council’s
deliberation has no logical ground in the Charter.
Secondly, it follows as a corollary that, as the principal (and principled) judicial
organ of the United Nations,68 the ICJ should have a legitimate power, by necessary
implication, to review “any” legal issues arising from the actions of the United
Nations bodies,69 even if that review inevitably touches upon issues of international
peace and security.70 In the world of globalization in the twenty-first century, it
is hard to imagine a topic totally detached from the issue of international peace and
security, since all aspects interwoven with all others in one way or another. Moreover,
there is no specific substantive restriction on the issues to be dealt with by the ICJ.71
On the contrary: Article 96 provides that “the Security Council may request the ICJ
to give an advisory opinion on any legal question”72 (emphasis added).
Also, Article 12 appears to provide another strong support for the notion that
there is no restriction on the substantive issues dealt with by the ICJ. Article 12 offers
the clear intent of those who framed the Charter that the General Assembly should
refrain from discussing an issue when the same topic is being discussed by the
66 See ibid.
67 Ibid. This position was also confirmed by the ICJ in the Preliminary Objection phase ofMilitary
and Paramilitary Activities In and Around Nicaragua (“Nicaragua Case”), ICJ Rep. 1984, at paras.
91-98.
68 See Article 92 of the Charter.
69 In fact, there are no matters that are, by nature, excluded from judicial review a priori. Fassbender,
loc.cit., n. 4, at 4.
70 Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though
not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being
essential to the performance of its duties. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Services of
the United Nations. Advisory Opinion (1949), ICJ Rep. 1949, at 174.
71 Neither the UN Charter nor the ICJ Statute provides for any restrictions on the freedom of the
ICJ to act. Simma, Bruno (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (New York,
Oxford University Press, 1994), at 403.
72 See Article 96 of the Charter. In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ reasoned that the status as principal
judicial organ allows it to deal with “any legal questions.” It thus stated: “It is for the Court, the
principal judicial organ of the U.N., to resolve any legal questions that may be in issue between
parties to the dispute.” See the Nicaragua Case, ICJ Rep. 1984, at paras. 433-34. The merit of the
case was determined in 1986.
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Security Council. If the framers wanted the same result with respect to the ICJ, they
could easily have included the same or similar language in Chapter XIV of the
Charter because they obviously knew how to deal with such an overlapping juris-
diction situation. An “inference” to apply Article 12 to the ICJ is not appropriate,
either, because a sound argument could be made that there is a clear distinction
between the General Assembly and the ICJ: the former is a political organ, which
basically shares the same character with the Security Council, whereas the latter is
a judicial organ, completely different in nature and applying different standards in
resolving a dispute. A functional division of power between two political organiza-
tions, which is common, cannot be presented, as the only ground on which to curtail
the function of a judicial organ.
Thirdly, the functions of the Security Council and the ICJ concerning the settle-
ment of disputes are exercised independently of one another.73 They apply different
standards: the ICJ has to decide exclusively on the basis of international law under
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute,74 whereas the Security Council has to decide primarily
according to political criteria.75 Treating them as performing fundamentally the same
function would make of the term “principal judicial organ” merely empty words.
There is no point in having a “principal judicial organ” if that organ is deprived of
the power to exercise its judicial power (at least to provide its judicial opinion) over
one branch of the organization, the function of which is the key element of the
organization’s success.76 Furthermore, if the ICJ were compelled to give legal effect
to ultra vires actions of the Security Council, it would lead to paradoxical results,
given the other provisions of the Charter.
Lastly, there are many other less visible yet relevant Articles scattered within
the Charter that provide helpful guidance. Article 36 (3) provides that in making
recommendations, the Security Council “should also take into consideration that legal
disputes should as a general matter be referred by the parties to the International
Court of Justice.”77 Article 92 says that the ICJ Statute “forms an integral part of
the present Charter”, and Article 93 further mentions that all members of the United
Nations become ipso facto parties to the Statute.78 The judges of the ICJ are elected
by joint votes in the General Assembly and the Security Council,79 and the expenses
73 Simma, op. cit., n. 71, at 990.
74 See Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.
75 Simma, op. cit., n. 71, at 403.
76 Judge Weeramantry pointed out in his dissenting opinion in the ICJ’s decision to reject Libya’s
application for provisional measures: “[T]he Court must recognize its role as the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations charged with the task, inter alia, of deciding in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it. The Court acts as a guardian of the Charter
and of international law in international arena, and there is no higher body charged with judicial
functions and with the determination of questions of interpretation and application of international
law.”
77 See Article 36 (3) of the Charter.
78 See Articles 92 and 93 of the Charter.
79 See Article 4 of the ICJ Statute.
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of the ICJ are borne by the UN.80 In addition, the Security Council should endeavour
to ensure that states have recourse to the ICJ to settle their legal disputes.81 Article
94 further expects the Security Council to assist the prevailing party in seeking its
relief as granted by the ICJ when the losing party fails to comply with the judgment
of the ICJ.82 In a nutshell, these Articles all support the argument that the ICJ was
envisioned as having and is entitled to have at least some sort of judicial review
power over the acts of the other political bodies of the United Nations.
In any event, if the framers did want the ICJ to be powerless for the judicial
review purpose despite these provisions, they could probably have inserted un-
ambiguous language to that effect in the Charter. When ambiguous, as here, the
question should be resolved by finding “necessary implication” from construing all
of the relevant provisions with the purposes and principles of the organization in
mind.
As has been clearly indicated by many examples in both domestic and inter-
national governmental structures, there is no inherent obstacle to the exercising by
a political organ and a judicial organ of dual jurisdictions over the same issue as
long as one organ does not undermine the integrity of the other. In other words, the
question should be where the line should be drawn between the authorities of the
two organs such that the balance of power between them is maintained. The exact
location of the line may differ from organization to organization depending upon
the nature of the organization involved, but there must be a line if the organization
were to claim its existence as being based on both the law and on legal principles.
Such being the case, when a case is legitimately brought before the ICJ – that
is, when a proper jurisdiction of the ICJ as provided in the Charter and the Statute
is ascertained – it is the duty of the ICJ to review and settle legal issues when there
is no other ground on which to decline to exercise the jurisdiction. For example, in
a contentious case, there should be mutual consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction among
the parties;83 for an advisory opinion, the request from the General Assembly or
the Security Council to that effect should first be obtained.84 When that condition
is fulfilled, there is no explicit prohibition in the Charter that bars the ICJ from
reviewing the Security Council’s resolution in the course of exercising its jurisdiction
in that particular case.
On the other hand, the lack of coercive power on the part of the ICJ to force
the Security Council to follow the ICJ’s decision does not necessarily support the
conclusion that the Charter framers failed to consider a scheme of judicial review.
Even if an advisory opinion were not binding, and a decision in a contentious case
is binding only upon the parties in that particular case,85 it can nonetheless serve
as guidance in the future action of the United Nations organs, including those of the
80 See Article 33 of the ICJ Statute.
81 See Article 36 (3) of the Charter.
82 See Article 94 of the Charter.
83 See Article 36 of the ICJ Statute.
84 See Article 65 of the ICJ Statute.
85 See Article 59 of the ICJ Statute.
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Security Council and member states. The mere implication of illegality or abnormality
would have as strong an impact as explicit judgment in nullifying the action at
issue.86 Given that which has been experienced and witnessed over the decades since
the creation of the United Nations, such non-binding opinions of the ICJ have pro-
duced almost the same impact on the behaviours of the United Nations and its
members. This has been made possible through the so-called “mobilization of shame”
effect87 or by establishing new customary law. Needless to say, having a coercive
power is an essential element in the administration of law, be it municipal or inter-
national; it is, however, not an indispensable element in recognizing and developing
law, especially in the international law system where, unfortunately, no central
enforcement agency exists as of now.88
4. A HARMONIOUS JUDICIAL REVIEW: A JUDICIAL REVIEWWITHOUT
DIRECT COLLISION
When it comes to the judicial review of a Security Council action by the ICJ,
many observers would be concerned about the possible judicial supremacy of the
ICJ, where the judges’ opinion overthrows a Security Council resolution, as has been
seen in municipal settings. The judicial review, however, does not necessarily have
to be limited to the case of the “judicial supremacy” version, in which the ICJ can
vitiate a Security Council action after a direct petition for review by an individual
state: this was illustrated by Judge Schwebel’s argument in the Pan Am 103 case.
86 Louis Henkin’s eloquent explanation is helpful in this context. He wrote: “It is probably the
case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their
obligations almost all of the time. Every day nations respect the borders of other nations, treat foreign
diplomats and citizens and property as required by law, observe thousands of treaties with more
than a hundred countries.” How Nations Behave – Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd edn. (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1979), at47. This is also confirmed by the compliance record of ICJ
decisions. One commentator reviewed the compliance record of the ICJ decisions since 1987 to
fathom how the state parties respond as a result of the ICJ decisions. The record shows a solid,
although not perfect, compliance by states which have been parties to the respective ICJ procedures.
See generally Paulson, Colter, “Compliance with final judgments of the International Court of Justice
since 1987”, 98 AJIL (2004), at 434; see alsoRen, Kathleen and Cronin-Furman, “The International
Court of Justice and the United Nations Security Council: Rethinking a complicated relationship”,
106 Colum L. Rev. (2006), at 447.
87 See ILO Conventions regarding the functions and authority of the Committee of Experts.
88 Roger Fisher pointed out that an organized force is not essential to the compliance of the law.
He said: “When, in the Youngstown case, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of Commerce
to return the steel mills which the President had ordered him to seize, the Court had no regiment
at its command. But despite the fact that the Supreme Court sitting in Washington had no greater
force at its command vis-à-vis the Government than does the International Court of Justice sitting
at The Hague, the steel mills were returned. The more closely one examines law within this country
and within others, the less significant the element of force.” Fisher, Roger, “Bringing law to bear
on governments”, 74 Harv. L. Rev. (1961), at1132.
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This mode of “direct” judicial review will bind all United Nations organs in all future
cases as in the judicial review by domestic supreme courts of many countries.
It is doubtful, however, whether such system will prove feasible or helpful in
the current decentralized international order composed of independent sovereign
actors. It would indeed be problematic to apply such a “direct” judicial review formula
to the international setting where central legislative, judicial or enforcement mechan-
ism is still lacking. It is not practical for the 15-member ICJ to operate as the highest
entity in the United Nations and the ultimate decision maker for the international
community. Unfortunately, the member states are not ready to accept an international
society in which a judicial organ has the final say in the operation of the United
Nations, nor does the current Charter envision such a judicial supremacy system.89
That will become possible only when a much higher degree of homogeneity and
organization is attained in the future. Unless and until such a point is reached, the
ICJ may consider a variety of “indirect” judicial review whenever it is called upon
to examine or give effect to a Security Council resolution, both in the advisory
opinion situation and the contentious case context.
Even a cautious, indirect approach will still be meaningful as an effective altern-
ative to “direct” judicial review. Mere warnings of illegality or suggestions of altern-
ative options from the ICJ may well serve as a check on the ultra vires or unlawful
activity of the United Nations bodies, including of the Security Council. The ICJ
cannot force the Security Council to take a particular measure in a particular case;
however, the next time the Security Council faces a similar issue, it will be more
likely that the Security Council will pay attention to the Charter principles and
procedures as interpreted by the ICJ. The Pan Am 103 case itself is a good example
of this analogy: although the ICJ decided its merits as based only upon an issue of
technicality, namely, the filing date of the Libyan government, there was a clear
indication that the resolution adopted under the auspices of the US and the UK may
have experienced some legal problems. These two countries and other countries in
similar situations would probably pay closer attention to such issues in any future
case. In that respect, any judicial evaluation by the ICJ of a Security Council action,
equipped with legal terms and standards, will have its own raison d’être.90
89 Apparently, the framers, too, did not want to have this supremacy model of judicial review when
they incorporated Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, which provides that the decision of the ICJ has no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case. Even the supporters
of the judicial review by the ICJ also recognize that, even if there is a review, the issue of whether
the ICJ can strike down or invalidate the Security Council’s measures still remains unresolved. See
Sabahi, loc. cit., n. 57, at 4.
90 Advisory opinions, even non-binding, have far-reaching effect. Simma, op. cit., n. 71, at 979.
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5. HOWTOAVOID IRRESPONSIBLE JUDICIALACTIVISM: SUGGESTION
FOR A TWO-STEP ANALYSIS
Any judicial review by the ICJ, whether “direct” or “indirect,” should not turn
into irresponsible judicial activism. Given the harsh reality of international society
as a highly volatile, decentralized entity, coupled with the urgent need quickly to
tackle vital issues, time is of the essence when the Security Council is faced with
various kinds of international emergencies.91 The judicial review by the ICJ must
not, therefore, hamper the otherwise legitimate implementation of duties by the
Security Council. To filter unbridled judicial activism by the ICJ, a two-step analysis
may be helpful.
The first step is a procedural issue. This concerns whether a particular case has
been brought legitimately before the ICJ. If the answer is in the affirmative, there
should be a presumption that the ICJ’s handling of the case is, including all relevant
actions by the Security Council, reasonable and legitimate, hence not a case of
inappropriate judicial activism. To the extent the ICJ exercises its judicial review
function strictly as based upon the Charter provisions by following the jurisdictional
requirements for, respectively, advisory opinions and contentious cases, such exercise
alone, without more, should not be construed as irresponsible judicial activism by
the ICJ. Stated differently, once the ICJ has legitimate jurisdictional basis for a
particular case and the case involves a legal analysis of the Security Council action,
the ICJ’s review of the action itself should not constitute inappropriate judicial
activism on the part of the ICJ. A party participating in the case may challenge the
ICJ’s decision by arguing that the case has not properly been brought before the ICJ;
an ultimate decision on that issue will, however, probably be reserved to the ICJ
because it is a “jurisdictional” issue where a court has the final say.
The second step in evaluating the ICJ’s judicial review of the Security Council
action to determine whether it is the ICJ’s proper implementation of its duty or its
attempt at improper judicial activism involves substantive issues. In other words,
the ICJ should exercise its prudential judgment in reviewing an action of the Security
Council lest its judicial intervention undermine the integrity of the function of the
Security Council. As such, even if a jurisdictional ground is ascertained, its
“justiciability” needs carefully to be examined in each case in order to ensure that
the ICJ does not exceed its authority. This is especially important where, as here,
the danger of disrupting an international decision-making process through multifarious
voices is much more obvious and the resulting diplomatic impact is farther-reaching
and more expansive.
Despite apparent differences in scope and elements, domestic jurisprudence
dealing with this type of issue will probably offer guidance in this issue. Setting aside
91 In Rwanda, the delay to the Security Council action caused the deaths of 800,000 people in less
than 100 days. See the PBS documentary film on the Rwanda genocide and the failure of the UN
mechanism, broadcast in 1999.
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the traditional paradigm of a dichotomy between international law and municipal
law, it is the time for scholars of international law to offer a creative idea.92
There may be instances where judicial involvement is totally undesirable, and
where judicial process is simply being abused as an excuse to delay a prompt action
of the Security Council.93 At the other end of the spectrum, there may be instances
where the Security Council is simply pushing forward with its decision of which
the illegality, either substantively or procedurally, is manifest on the surface.94 Most
of the cases before the ICJ would lie between these two extremes within the spectrum.
In each instance, therefore, the ICJ will have to locate cases scattered along the
spectrum while keeping in mind that a wider scope of judicial review will probably
distort the Security Council’s enforcement action under Chapter VII, while a narrower
scope of judicial review will make of the ICJ a paper tiger rendered harmless by
the powerful Security Council. A guideline to help the ICJ to navigate through this
labyrinth is thus in order.
If the question of this nature is raised in a US court, the political question doctrine
will firstly come into play in most instances. Although other countries also have a
similar jurisprudence of judicial restraint, the American one seems to have provided
the most organized rationale in this regard. Similar jurisprudence from other countries
will, however, be equally applicable to this analysis. As one American commentator
mentioned, “the political question doctrine is a useful tool for demarcating the
responsibility to interpret the Constitution that is shared by the courts and the political
branches.”95 To the extent that it is believed that the political question doctrine has
successfully assisted the American courts in filtering non-justiciable cases, this
doctrine may be a good candidate for transplant, mutatis mutandis, to the ICJ in this
92 Gardam, loc. cit., n. 16, at 285.
93 Judge Schwebel provides us with a good example: a country having committed an aggression
against its neighbour applies to the Court when targeted by the Council for an enforcement action
under Chapter VII for the purpose of delaying such action. See the Judgment on Preliminary
Objections, loc. cit., n. 9, at 627; Andrews, loc. cit., n. 54, at para. 1.3 (“Libya’s claims are nothing
more than a collateral attack on the decisions taken by the Security Council in its efforts to maintain
international peace and security.”).
94 For example, it is possible that a Security Council decision in fact adjudicates a legal dispute
between the two states. The Security Council therefore operates as a de facto judicial entity in a
particular situation. In this case, it is axiomatic that the ICJ can review and decide on the legality
of such a Security Council decision when the matter duly comes before the ICJ.
95 Mulhern, J. Peter, “In defense of the political question doctrine”, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1988),
at 97. The usefulness of the political question doctrine, as developed in the US jurisprudence, in
addressing these issues is further evidenced by the fact that in the course of the ICJ procedures
the United States has made efforts in addressing the admissibility issue involving highly political
disputes, and that many other states also tend to refer to US arguments on admissibility in one way
or another in subsequent ICJ procedures. SeeGray, Christine, “The use and abuse of the International
Court of Justice: Cases concerning the use of force after Nicaragua”, 14 EJIL (2003), at 869-81.
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process.96 As one commentator suggested, the internationalization of the political
question doctrine may provide the best vehicle for the ICJ to identify those legal
claims with the potential to undermine the integrity of the Security Council.97 Indeed,
the Security Council’s function mainly includes political, diplomatic, and military
components quite similar to those of the executive branch under the American
Constitution,98 and political question jurisprudence is frequently raised in these areas.
It goes without saying that disputes involving questions concerning the legality of
the actions of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII tend to be of a highly
political nature.99 In addition, unlike the U.S. Constitution, where an explicit textual
basis for political question doctrine is absent, there is a textual ground for the ICJ
to refuse to give any legal opinion even if it has an arguable jurisdiction to do so.
Article 65 of the ICJ Statute provides that “The Courtmay give an advisory opinion”,
that is, it has no obligation to comply with the request for an advisory opinion. The
framers might have thought that the ICJ would have to maintain a way to get around
an inappropriate case for a judicial organ.
At any rate, the US court’s approach to political question is well explained by
Justice Brennan of the US Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962).
The elements to be considered by the US Supreme Court in declining to exercise
its otherwise valid jurisdiction are: (i) a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (ii) a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standard for resolving the issue; (iii) the impossibility
of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of any kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion; (iv) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking an independent
resolution without expressing a lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; (v) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made, and (vi) the potential for embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.100
96 As a matter of fact, Judge Sir Robert Jennings also raised this point in his dissenting opinion
in the Judgment on Preliminary Objections. (“The Court should have found that it did not have
jurisdiction in the case; and even if it had jurisdiction, that the Libyan case should have been
dismissed as inadmissible.”); American representative also mentioned the same possibility in the
oral argument. See Andrews, loc. cit., n. 54, at para. 1.3.
97 See David, loc. cit., n. 8, at 82.
98 It may seem appropriate to compare the distribution of the functions of the UN Organizations
among the principal organs with the constitutional separation of powers of the supreme organs of
national governments. Simma, op. cit., n. 71, at 978 ; The multilateral treaty popularly called “the
UN Charter” in important ways resembles the Constitution of the United States, insofar as it
establishes a system for the exercise of designated powers by the two political organs of the United
Nations: the General Assembly and the Security Council. Franck, loc. cit., n. 18, at 520.
99 Martenczuk, loc. cit., n. 1, at 528.
100 Justice Powell of the United States Supreme Court once explained in Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996 (1979), that the issue is fundamentally reduced to the following three questions: (i) Does
the issue involve the resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate
branch of Government?; (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond
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This list does furnish a good starting point for the ICJ’s judicial review analysis.
The Pan Am 103 case may be evaluated by this standard: (i) first of all, a legal issue
is reserved for the ICJ by a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment,”
namely the Charter; (ii) there is a judicially discoverable and manageable standard
to resolve the dispute, namely, the interpretation of the Montreal Convention, and
the customary international law concerning the non-extradition of nationals; (iii) the
core issue in this case is the extradition of the alleged terrorists for a trial, which
is not a policy decision at first glance, but rather a legal one; (vi) pronouncing a legal
opinion on the surrendering of two suspects does not give rise to the level of lack
of respect due the Security Council,101 as an objective evaluation of the dispute
would only enhance the respect for the Security Council; (v) there is no unusual need
of questioning a political decision already made in this case, since, unlike an impend-
ing war, there is no exigency in obtaining custody of the suspects with sufficient
evidence already accumulated, and (vi) as many nations were already doubting the
legality of the Security Council’s demand for extradition, a legal decision had to be
made to clarify the uncertainty, rather than to compound a confusion triggered by
multifarious voices.
All in all, in applying the political question doctrine as outlined above, if the
case had proceeded with more meaningful substantive analyses in Pan Am 103, the
ICJ could have refused to apply the political question doctrine and reached an ultimate
decision in that case. If the ICJ adopts the political question doctrine in a particular
case, this means it dismisses the case without reaching an ultimate decision. The
practical outcome will be the same as a determination of the absence of jurisdiction.
In the Israeli Wall case of 2004, the ICJ engaged in a similar exercise. One of
the issues in the case was whether the ICJ should exercise its discretion and should
thus refrain from exercising jurisdiction in this highly political case. After considering
various aspects of the case, the ICJ concluded that it has jurisdiction to provide its
opinion to the General Assembly, and that there is no compelling reason for it to
use its discretionary power not to give that opinion.102 It appears, however, that
if the ICJ had applied the political question doctrine theory as outlined above, it could
have provided a more reasoned and organized decision on that issue.
Using the political question doctrine and expanding it to make it more appropriate
to the international context, the ICJ will be able to establish its own rule of
justiciability. Through such jurisprudence, the ICJ may decline a judicial review even
if it has the jurisdiction to perform one. This two-step analysis for the ICJ to exercise
judicial reviewwill be able to standardize the process and thus enhance the legitimacy
of the review. The process is summarized in the diagram below.
areas of judicial expertise?, and (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial interven-
tion?
101 Of course, this argument can have the reverse effect: some could argue that the mere taking
of the case in a highly politically charged incident constitutes the lack of respect.
102 See Israeli Wall Case, loc. cit., n. 61, at paras. 43-65.
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6. CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL “RULE OF LAW”
Pascal has stated that strength without justice is tyrannical, and justice without
strength is a mockery; therefore, it is important that the Security Council as an organ
with strength and the ICJ as an organ with justice cooperate with and respect each
other. More importantly, it is crucial to understand that the current Charter does
permit the ICJ to exercise its judicial review authority over the actions of the Security
Council. The Pan Am 103 case provided the ICJ with an important opportunity to
re-focus its attention on the important question of the extent to which the Security
Council functions within the constraints of international law.103 The dominance
of the US and its allies in the Security Council has caused serious doubts among
nations regarding the neutrality of the Security Council’s decision-making process.
If rogue states present a problem, so too does a rogue Security Council. The rationale
that the Security Council can do whatever it deems appropriate appears equivalent
to saying that the Security Council can do no wrong, a statement never to be accepted
in the millennia of the rule of law.104
A judicial review by the ICJ does not have to be a “direct” review as seen in
a domestic legal setting. In fact, the spirit of the current Charter prohibits such a
direct judicial review, given the judicial supremacy of the ICJ and the co-operation,
co-existence and co-involvement of the ICJ and the Security Council in important
world affairs.105 The Security Council and the ICJ exercise their competence and
authority independently and separately.106 The Security Council should not ignore
the ICJ and the ICJ should not hamper the operation of the Security Council in
dealing with emergency issues around the world.
In exercising judicial review over Security Council actions, the ICJ may consider
a two-step analysis. The first is whether the ICJ indeed has jurisdiction in that case,
whether as an advisory opinion or as a contentious case. The existence of legitimate
jurisdiction over a particular case provides the presumption that the ICJ is also
authorized judicially to review all relevant legal issues, even including those related
actions of the Security Council. The Security Council should not lodge a complaint
just because its actions are reviewed by the ICJ. Such “supremacy of the Security
Council” is equally erroneous as is the “supremacy of the ICJ,” and the case pre-
cedents of the ICJ clearly reject such a “supremacy” or “exclusivity” theory. Instead,
103 Gardam, loc. cit., n. 16, at 290.
104 See generally Brownlie, Ian, “The decisions of political organs of the United Nations and the
rule of law”, in Macdonald, Ronald St. John (ed.), Essays in honor of Wang Tieya (London: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, 1994); see Sabahi, loc. cit., n. 57, at 9; Arias, Inocencio, “Humanitarian
intervention: Could the Security Council kill the United Nations?”, 23 Fordham Int’l L. J. (2000),
at 1013-14; Fishman, Andrew K., “Between Iraq and a hard place: the use of economic sanctions
and threats to international peace and security”, 13 Emory Int’l L. Rev. (1999), at 727.
105 See Ren and Cronin-Furman, loc. cit., n. 86, at 460-62.
106 See Fassbender, loc. cit., n. 4, at 4.
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they stand for cooperation, co-existence and co-involvement on the parts of the
Security Council and the ICJ.
The second step relates to a more substantive analysis by the ICJ. Even if the
ICJ duly finds it has jurisdiction in a particular case, if it determines that reviewing
the case and reaching a decision would undermine the basic principles of the United
Nations or the integrity of the Security Council, it should refuse to review the case.
The actions of the Security Council will remain legitimate and stand as such. The
ICJ may consider applying the so-called political question doctrine developed in
domestic jurisprudence as a starting point from which to develop its own standard.
A more activist World Court could, if able to maintain a cautious stance not to
overstep its Charter boundaries, transform itself from a UN backwater into an institu-
tion of major political importance.107 The current efforts at the United Nations to
reform the Security Council may provide an important catalyst towards addressing
this issue more directly; it could include an explicit provision in this respect. The
focus of the current efforts should be how, in the operation of the Security Council,
to enhance the “rule of law” beyond discussions on the number of permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council. As a final note, let me repeat the conclusion of Bernd
Martenczuk:
There is no contradiction between the rule of law and international peace and security.
By promoting the former, the International Court of Justice will contribute to the mainten-
ance of the latter.108
107 See Watson, loc. cit., n. 4, at 33. This will be particularly the case because as time goes by
the ICJ will encounter increasing numbers of cases where relevant states call on the ICJ to review
the legitimacy of the Security Council’s action. See Sabahi, loc. cit. n. 57, at 47.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































THE EROSION OF COMMUNITY RIGHTS TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE*
Naazima Kamardeen**
[T]here would be no plant breeders in long white coats working on experimental farms
if it were not for the prior knowledge gained from rural communities. Indigenous know-
ledge is not only the foundation of modern science in this and many other fields… it
is also what could be described as the reference and referral centre for modern plant
breeding.1
1. INTRODUCTION
The TRIPS agreement (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement) under the World Trade Organization (WTO) regulates the protection
of intellectual property rights by those states that are its members.
The protection of such rights has led to fierce differences of opinion, heated
debates and much name-calling between the nations of the developed world and those
of the developing world. This was very clearly evidenced in the disagreement in the
pharmaceutical sector, brought into focus by the HIV/AIDS epidemic; it called for
swift action by the countries of Africa, where the disease is most prevalent. The
countries could not afford to pay the high prices for the treatment available, and
looked to cheaper generic solutions to help millions of people fight the disease. The
action almost created a rift among the membership, and it was only in the 2001 Doha
Ministerial Conference that the problem was addressed.
The next area where discord is already rife is one with enormous implications
for the future – a future where greater power is found in smaller units. This is the
* This paper shared the Sata International Law Prize 2005 with that of Jaemin Lee, which appears
in this volume.
** LL.B (Hons) (Colombo); LL.M (Georgetown); Attorney-at-Law (Sri Lanka); Lecturer, Faculty
of Law, University of Colombo.
1 Sahai, Suman (ed.), Bioresources and Biotechnology: Policy Concerns for the Asian Region (New
Delhi: Gene Campaign, 1999), at 132.
Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 12 (B.S. Chimni et al., eds.)
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field of bio-technology. It has been regarded as the “newest, most dominant tech-
nology of our times”.2
Section 5 of TRIPS extends patent protection to certain living beings, and asks
members to provide patent or “patent like” protection for such beings. Article 27
(3) (b) qualifies this by providing that members may either grant or refuse patent
protection for plants and animals. However, it also provides that members must
provide patent protection for micro-organisms. Further, it mandates that plant varieties
should be protected by patents or by an effective sui generis system, or by a combina-
tion of both.
Apart from the contentious issue of whether life forms should be patented at all,
one of the inherent problems associated with this area is that the term sui generis
has not been defined. Also, many developing countries such as Sri Lanka have no
effective Intellectual Property systems in place; they do, however, have a large variety
of traditional crops that have been bred and developed by farmers as well as by
public-funded research institutes. These are available in the public domain and do
not “belong” to anyone in particular.3 Conventional notions of property ownership,
modelled along the lines of individual–style ownership, are not appropriate in a field
where community ownership has been the norm. TRIPS will thus create a clash
between concepts of individual ownership, on the one hand, and community owner-
ship, on the other; it will force certain countries to abandon the latter in favour of
the former, or risk forfeiting the right to use the product or process.
This paper will examine the various approaches that could be taken by developing
countries to provide to plant and animal life protection that will conform to TRIPS,
and yet be within the framework of the laws currently in place. The feasibility of
these approaches will be analyzed, with a view to identifying the most effective one.
It will also consider how the rights of indigenous communities can be safeguarded
using TRIPS, as the world moves ever closer to an order based on WTO rules.
2. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
2.1. The WTO and its importance in the field of intellectual property
What we regard today as intellectual property is essentially the product of human
intellect. Its intangible nature has resulted in the remaining unrecognized of its true
worth and unappreciated until relatively recently. Nevertheless, modern humans appear
to have been able to recognize those rights as also being proprietary, and has sought
to safeguard them in almost the same way as a tangible property interest is safe-
guarded: by identifying them, and by providing for a means by which the right-holder
2 Idem, at 122.
3 Gunawardene, Jagath, The Draft Act to Provide Protection for New Plant Varieties (Breeders’
Rights) (Briefing paper published by the Law and Society Trust Colombo under the Regional
Program on Farmers’ Rights to Livelihood initiated by the South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics
and the Environment (SAWTEE), 2003), at 2.
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can, to the exclusion of others, hold and enjoy them.Within this broad area identified
as ‘intellectual property’ lie subdivisions such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
Intellectual property has become as valuable a commodity as a tangible good
or service, hence its importance in world trade. Although there had been prior efforts
to codify and protect intellectual property4 it was not until 1994 that intellectual
property rights were included in any world trade forum. This happened at the con-
clusion of the Agreement on the Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) as part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). After the World Trade Organization
(WTO) succeeded GATT, the obligations under the TRIPS now form part of the
WTO.
The WTO is an organization that embodies the new world order – the rule of
the economically powerful. Members join primarily through self-interest, and the
procedure for the settlement of trade disputes acknowledges the reality of a market-
driven world. In contrast to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the dispute
settlement body of the United Nations, which admits only States as parties to disputes
before it, and the GATT, which allowed a country to “block” an adverse decision,
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO is ruthlessly efficient: it
allows the victor to force the losing party into compliance by threatening to take
retaliatory measures in any sector, not merely in the sector in which the dispute arose.
In order for this to be of any real concern, the threat of the loss of market access
or the tariff barrier (or indeed any other form of punishment) must be significant
enough to frighten the losing party into compliance, and it is submitted that only
countries with enough economic clout can do so. Hence, theWTO remains very much
a rich person’s club.
It has been argued that pharmaceutical and other high-tech industries were behind
the proposal to link Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) to trade in the first place.5
With the growth of technology as an important factor in international competition,
and with the challenge offered by the newly-developing countries, the leadership
of US firms in high-tech areas was eroding. Further, piracy and counterfeiting was
seen to be another reason for a decline in productivity and competitiveness. This
perception caused many of the industrial lobbies, including the software and pharma-
ceutical sectors, to pressure the US government to link IPRs with trade, to ensure
that the sectors could avoid piracy and could also secure high returns on their research
and development.6
With TRIPS falling under the purview of the WTO, it was anticipated that the
rules applying to the WTO would necessarily also apply to the manner in which
members resolved their intellectual property disputes. Since the WTO enjoys almost
4 Namely, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 1883, and the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886. By incorporation, they
now form part of members’ obligations under the WTO.
5 Correra, Carlos M., Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries – The TRIPS
Agreements and Policy Options (New York: Zed Books; 2000), at 4.
6 Ibid.
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world-wide membership, it is apparent that TRIPS is now a force to be reckoned
with. Further, it has proved to be an excellent means by which IPRs can be protected.
However, a closer analysis reveals that the playing field is far from even. Developing
countries’ share in world Research and Development (R&D) expenditures is a mere
four per cent of total R&D expenditure worldwide. Further, it has been estimated
that 95 per cent of all patents granted in the United States between 1977 and 1986
were given to applicants from ten developed countries. Developing countries consti-
tuted less than two per cent.7 Since it is largely the developed countries who are
the major players in the IPR field, it is easy to see whose interests are being safe-
guarded by such measures. As for the success of the TRIPS agreement, it has been
shown that a positive correlation exists between the increase in exports from the US,
and the strengthening of patent protection in developing countries.8
2.2. The TRIPS agreement: a broad overview
The agreement seeks to confer a wide variety of rights on the owners of intel-
lectual property. Of the provisions in TRIPS, Articles 3 and 4 deserve special mention,
and make up the core of the entire agreement. Article 3 calls for “National Treat-
ment”, whereby members must afford to foreigners treatment that is no less favourable
than that which it affords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intel-
lectual property. Article 4 provides, subject to certain exceptions, that any special
privileges granted by a member to any country (Most Favoured Nation, or MFN,
Treatment) will automatically extend to other countries as well. The effect of these
two provisions is to ensure that members do not draft intellectual property laws that
give greater protection to domestic than to external players, and also that smaller
regional groups do not seek compromises among themselves.
2.3. The North-South dimension of TRIPS
TRIPS has been viewed as an agreement that seeks to raise the standards of
protection in developing countries to the level of those in developed countries.9 While
TRIPS has necessitated changes to the Intellectual Property regime of almost every
country, the more drastic changes will have to be made within the laws of the
developing countries, many of which prior to TRIPS had no comprehensive Intel-
lectual Property laws. For some developing countries, TRIPS covers new subject
matter, among them product patents for food, pharmaceuticals, and micro-organisms.10
7 Ibid., at 5.
8 Ibid., at 6.
9 Watal, Jayashree, Intellectual Property Rights in theWTO andDeveloping Countries (Netherlands:
Kluwer Law International, 2001), at 2-3.
10 Ibid., at 4.
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It has been argued that there has been a North-South battle with regard to
TRIPS.11 One of the most obvious factors is the difference in the respective levels
of development of each sector, and the fear of the South that TRIPS will become
yet another tool for Northern supremacy. The battle could also stem from an ideo-
logical difference in the interpretation of what is meant by the ownership of intel-
lectual property. In theWestern world, intellectual property is an extension of ordinary
property, and embodies a private ownership interest. However, in many areas of the
developing world, and especially in indigenous communities, intellectual property
rights are rights claimed by communities as a whole, over their cultural knowledge.12
Hence, it is a community right, as opposed to a private right. This community-owned
entity is therefore incapable of being owned or enjoyed in the same sense that a
private right can, and this remains the chasm between the developed and the devel-
oping worlds.
3. THE KEY AREAS OF THE DEBATE
The two main substantive areas in which the North-South debate will be examined
are the pharmaceutical sector, where an understanding has already been reached, and
the bio-technical sector, where trouble is now beginning to brew. The debate over
the pharmaceutical sector will be revisited for the purposes of establishing a pattern
of facts, then drawing upon those lessons as a suggestion of how (or how not) to
resolve future problems.
3.1. The pharmaceutical industry and its lessons
3.1.1. The WTO and access to medicine
Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement requires each WTO member to make both
product and process patents available for any inventions in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial
application. Further, governments will not be able to discriminate with respect to
the enjoyment of patent rights based on the place of invention, the field of technology,
and whether products are imported or locally produced.13 Article 27 (2) provides
for a few limited instances in which patents may be denied. These include the
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, serious prejudice to the environ-
ment, and also on grounds of public policy and morality. Further, diagnostic, thera-
11 In this paper, the terms “developed countries” or the “North”, and “developing countries” or
the “South” do not necessarily denote geographical dimensions, but are used to define the difference
between those who advocate greater IPR protection and those who do not.
12 Greaves, Tom (ed.), Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples – A Sourcebook (OK,
USA: Society for Applied Anthropology, 1994), at ix.
13 Article 27(1).
88 Asian Yearbook of International Law
peutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of humans and animals may also be
excluded from patentability.14
The effect of all this is to include many fields, among them pharmaceuticals,
as pointed out specifically in the Congress’s Statement of Administrative Action
(SAA) on the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements.15 The TRIPS agreement makes
special provisions for those countries that do not yet have systems of patent protection
in place for the specific areas of pharmaceutical, agricultural and chemical products.
Notwithstanding the concessions allowed in Part VI,16 those members should imme-
diately provide an interim system that permits patent applications for these products
to be filed.17 The date of filing gives priority for application purposes. Further, the
criteria for patentability should be those of the time when the application was filed.18
In addition, the country must provide exclusive marketing rights for a period of five
years after the product receives marketing approval, or until a patent is rejected or
granted, whichever period is shorter.19
The US used these provisions against India, and obtained a decision in its favour,
mandating that India was in violation of its obligations of Articles 63,20 70.821
and 70.922 of TRIPS by not having a valid mailbox system in place.23 As for the
scope of the protection, Article 28 specifies that a patent will give the holder the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing
the product. Hence, for the pharmaceutical industry at least, the agreement is a fool-
proof safeguard.
3.1.2. Developments prior to Doha
Prior to the Doha round, several developing countries had discovered that their
access to medicines to combat the deadliest of diseases was being hampered severely
by TRIPS. This prompted Zambia, on behalf of the African Group, to submit a
request for a new item called Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines to be
placed on the Council’s agenda.24 Accordingly, the Council discussed this matter,
focusing on two main issues, namely, the interpretation of the provisions of the TRIPS
14 Emphasis added. See Article 27(3)(a).
15 H.R. Doc. 103-316, 103d Cong., Sess. (1994).
16 Developing countries are allowed a grace period of a total of five years and least-developed




20 This deals with the transparency obligation, whereby members are required to notify the Council
of any changes they have made in their laws.
21 The “mailbox rule”, ns. 17 and 18.
22 The grant of exclusive marketing rights. See n. 19.
23 See India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/
DS50/R.
24 Document IP/C/M/30, paras. 229-252, discussed in Gervais, Daniel, The TRIPS Agreement:
Drafting History and Analysis, 2nd edn. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2003), at 42.
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agreement to clarify the flexibility that members were afforded, and the relationship
between the TRIPS agreement and affordable access to medicines.25
The Council received two papers on the matter. One was from the EC, and the
other was from a group of developing countries, including the African Group, Brazil,
India, and Sri Lanka.26 The concerns embodied in each paper reflected the concerns
of those countries as representing the North and South. The EC paper suggested that
Articles 30 and 31 be interpreted as narrowly as possible, so as not to curtail the
rights of patent holders except in cases of “national emergency and other situations
of extreme urgency”.27
In contrast, the paper submitted by the developing countries suggested that the
TRIPS agreement provide the “broadest flexibility” in allowing parallel imports and
compulsory licenses. While the EC would have interpreted Article 31 (f) as prohibit-
ing the supply to foreign markets, the developing countries were of the view that
Article 31 (f) did not prevent the grant of compulsory licenses to supply foreign
markets; they also felt that members were free to determine the grounds for granting
compulsory licenses.28
Article 31 does not specifically mention the words “compulsory license”; however,
this is the interpretation that can be drawn from the reading. Further, Article 31
provides for the use of the patent without authorization in cases of “national emerg-
ency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”. It fails, nevertheless, to define
these terms.
Following the discussions, it was agreed that the Council should take a more
prioritized approach to the matter, focusing on the objectives and principles of
TRIPS,as laid out in Articles 7 and 8 of the Agreement. Article 7 specifies that the
[P]rotection and enforcement of IP rights should contribute to the promotion of techno-
logical innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technical knowledge and in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Article 8, which deals with principles, allows members to take reasonable steps
consistent with the TRIPS agreement in order to prevent both the abuse of IP rights
by the holders and the unreasonable restraint of trade, as well as the international
transfer of technology. Two other matters were also identified as being of importance:
25 Gervais, op. cit., n. 24, at 42.
26 Ibid. The complete list includes Barbados, Bolivia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Philippines, Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela.
27 Ibid. Article 30 states that members may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by
a patent, provided that those exceptions do not unreasonably prejudice the rights of the patent holder.
Article 31 provides for the unauthorized use of a patent, subject to a long list of provisions. These
include, in Article 31(f), that such use shall be “authorized predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market of the member authorizing such use”.
28 Ibid., at 43.
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the provisions relating to compulsory licensing, and the provisions relating to parallel
imports.
3.1.3. The South Africa AIDS case
In 1997, South Africa, faced with an HIV/AIDS crisis of epidemic proportions,
drafted a new Medicines Act.29 It gives the Health Minister the powers to override
patent laws in a health emergency. Of particular importance is section 15C, which
empowers the Health Minister to allow compulsory licensing and parallel imports.
Over 39 pharmaceutical companies filed action against the government of South
Africa on the basis that the law violated its obligations under TRIPS.30 However,
after three years, due to “an extremely high amount of international pressure”31 the
case was eventually withdrawn. This incident served to remind the membership that
a workable solution had to be found as soon as possible.
3.1.4. The Doha round and the pharmaceuticals debate
A separate declaration on TRIPS and public health was one of four issues on
the Doha agenda. This separate Declaration32 affirmed what had already been said
in the main agreement, namely, that the TRIPS agreement should be interpreted in
a manner that does not prevent members from taking steps to protect public health.
It recognized “the gravity of the public health problems affecting many developing
and least developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria
and other epidemics”. Veering away from the view that TRIPS was an instrument
for the protection of private rights, it went on to say that “we stress the need for
the WTO agreement on TRIPS to be part of the wider national and international action
to address these problems.”
In paragraph 4 it states that “TRIPS does not and should not prevent members
from taking measures to protect public health…we affirm that TRIPS can and should
be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ rights
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”
It authorized members to use the provisions in TRIPS that provide flexibility for
this purpose. Paragraph 5 identifies some of them as including the rights to grant
compulsory licenses and to determine what constitutes a “national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency”. HIV/AIDS TB and malaria or other epidemics
are considered to be “a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency”.
Two specific tasks were also set out. The TRIPS council had to find a solution
to the problems that developing countries may face in making use of compulsory
29 Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997. ftp://ftp.hst.org.za/pubs/
govdocs/acts/1997/act90.pdf.
30 Reported at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharma-v-sa.html.
31 Ibid., at para. 2.
32 Document WT/MIN(01)DEC/2.
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licenses if they have little or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. They were
required to report to the General Council on this by the end of 2002. In addition,
Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) were given time till 1 January 2016 for the
implementation of the rights related to pharmaceuticals, with the option of postponing
them further.33 LDCs were also exempt at least until 1 January 2016 from the
obligation to provide exclusive marketing rights as provided by Article 70(9).34
3.1.5. Responses to Doha
On 30 August 2003, the General Council adopted the Decision on the Implementa-
tion of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.35 It acknowledges that “exceptional
circumstances exist justifying waivers from the obligations set out in paragraphs (f)
[domestic market use] and (h) [remuneration to right-holder] of Article 31 of the
TRIPS agreement with respect to pharmaceutical products.” It defines “pharmaceutical
product” as including a component required to address public health problems.36
The Decision also sets out the procedure to be followed when importing such
products into the country where it is needed. First, the importing member should
notify the TRIPS Council that it intends to import a specific quantity of a named
drug, and that it lacks the manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. It
should also confirm that it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory licence, where
the pharmaceutical product is patented in its territory.37 Further, the exporting
member should issue a compulsory licence containing certain conditions as to the
amount to be produced, as well as the undertaking that the final destination of the
products shall be only those markets of the members who notified the Council of
their needs.38
The Decision makes provision for adequate remuneration for the products, taking
into consideration their economic value in the importing country.39 Members are
also encouraged to prevent re-exportation of these products.40
Paragraph 11 says that these provisions will be replaced by the subsequent
amendments to the TRIPS agreement, due to begin in December 2003. However,
these amendments have not yet been agreed upon.
When analyzing this decision, and the effect it has upon TRIPS, one realizes
that little has changed. The interpretation sought to be given takes a middle path
33 Document IP/C/25 entitled Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement for Least-Developed CountryMembers for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharma-
ceutical Products.
34 Document WT/L /478 entitled Least-Developed Country Members – Obligation under Article
70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products.
35 WT/L/540.
36 Ibid., para. 1.
37 Ibid., para. 2(a).
38 Ibid., para. 2(b).
39 Ibid., para. 3.
40 Ibid., para. 4.
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between allowing members to issue compulsory licences, and prohibit them from
accessing medicines altogether. However, much remains in the hands of individual
nations and the manner in which they seek to interpret these provisions. The EC,
in their Communication on this decision, issued on 17 November 2003,41 welcomed
the decision and pledged to help to implement it. They stated that “to make the system
really work, members will have to refrain from overly restrictive interpretations of
the decision which could affect its efficiency.” The US issued a statement on para-
graph 6 of the Doha Declaration and TRIPS.42 Although it commences with the
words “we are committed to helping countries that are experiencing public health
crises”, it goes on to take a hard stand on the issue, conceding only the minimal
divergence from TRIPS. For example, it says “Compulsory Licenses are appropriate,
but it must be borne in mind that these are the exceptions, rather than the norm”.
It says that measures should be taken to see that the rights granted under this measure
are not exploited.
The US cannot afford to deviate far from this position, considering that a hard-line
approach was taken when the implementation of the Bill for the Uruguay Round
Trade Agreements was debated before Congress. The SAA contends that TRIPS
mandates that “WTO countries must make patent protection available for essentially
all fields of technology, including pharmaceuticals…”.43 Further, the SAA interprets
the conditions under which members may make unauthorized use of a patented
invention as “stringent”.44 The US took this very attitude in many of the discussions
following Doha, maintaining that the exceptions to TRIPS should be limited to
diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria, and other serious, infectious epidemics.45
It alone opposed the draft of 16 December 2002 proposed by the Council chairman,
arguing that the scope of disease coverage went beyond what was originally agreed
to in Doha.46 This caused considerable delay, as the members realized that US
support was needed if the proposal was to work; they could not proceed without it.
The US was also not amenable to an EU proposal that attempted to list a specific
number of diseases, and provide for a mechanism whereby developing and least-
developed countries could appeal to have further diseases added to the list.47
One of the dangers of having the pharmaceutical industry exert such great
influence over the ultimate outcome is the fact that many of these companies are
based in the Western world. Today, diseases are also polarized in terms of geography,
and the serious, infectious epidemics mentioned exist largely in the developing world.
Having conquered these diseases, the pharmaceutical companies have turned to finding
cures for the more cosmetic problems of those in the developed world. Noting this,
41 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm.
42 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm.
43 Statement of Administrative Action, 7(a).
44 Statement of Administrative Action, 7(b).
45 19 BNA International Trade Reporter (ITR) 2162, 12/19/02.
46 20 ITR 7, 02/13/03.
47 20 ITR 8, 02/20/03.
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the World Health Organization agreed on 28 May 2003 to establish a body to be
responsible for examining the impact of IP rights protection on the development of
new drugs.48 The resolution calls for the collection of data and an analysis of IP
rights, innovation, and public health issues. It will also look into identifying funding
and other incentives for the development of new medicines to fight diseases that
mainly affect developing countries.
This action plan confirms the fact that theWHO has realized that pharmaceutical
companies no longer have the entire world’s health interests at heart. For example,
the resolution noted that, out of a total of about 1,400 new products developed by
the pharmaceutical industry between 1975 and 1999, only 13 were for tropical
diseases and just three were for TB, both endemic in the developing world.49 The
WHO resolution also calls for the newly established body to analyze the “pharma-
ceutical and public health implications of relevant international agreements” such
as TRIPS, so that governments “are able to maximize the positive and mitigate the
negative impacts of those agreements.”50
3.1.6. Concluding remarks
The course of events leading up to Doha, and the subsequent negotiations and
documents that have followed, have displayed only a grudging willingness by all
parties to submit to certain concessions they perceive as being unfavourable to them.
While bargaining and haggling are inevitable parts of any trade negotiation, they
are not a productive means of negotiation on issues of public health, given that these
can have long-term implications. Hence, a hard-nosed attitude will not work optimally
in this area. Further, even though the pharmaceutical sector wields considerable
influence in the deals that are ultimately agreed, the legitimacy of the sector’s concern
is at question, given the data showing that they are really no longer interested in the
diseases that afflict the developing world, where the larger (although poorer) part
of the world’s population lives. Also, the traditional herbs and medicinal plants owned
by communities as a whole are at risk of being patented and used by these companies
as well. The pharmaceutical sector has established for itself an unenviable reputation,
thus the conclusion may easily be reached that it will not strive to use community-
owned herbs and plants in a manner benefiting society as a whole, but will, rather,
attempt to exclude these communities from using them altogether.
It is also interesting to evaluate the approach taken in interpreting obligations
under the TRIPS agreement in the light of the standards advocated by public inter-
national law. According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, treaties
48 20 ITR 23, 05/06/03.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
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[S]hall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.51
When the Doha Declaration, and the events that followed it, are examined, it
would seem as if the member states to the WTO have forgotten this basic premise
of public international law. The haggling over the interpretation of words indicates
that certain countries are unwilling both to interpret these terms in good faith and
to give to them their ordinary meaning, because it does not serve their own selfish
interests to do so. The example of the pharmaceutical sector has shown us that,
instead of “reducing tension by reaching strengthened commitments to resolve
disputes”52 there has in fact been greater tension and less commitment. The pattern
of behaviour, as evidenced by the pharmaceutical industry, does not augur well for
the newer areas in which conflicts still exist, and where the major issues have as
yet not been resolved.
3.2. The patenting of plant and animal life: Article 27 (3) of TRIPS
Article 27(3) of TRIPS specifies those products and processes that are excluded
from patentability. Article 27(3)(b) lists plants and animals other than micro-organ-
isms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other
than non-biological and microbiological processes. However, members are required
to protect plant varieties either by awarding patents or by an effective sui generis
system – or by any combination of these. This means that micro-organisms produced
by humans using inventive methods may be patented, along with processes that are
non-biological and microbiological. The provision comes very close to the fine line
that exists between life and non-life forms. The issues raised by the provision and
its implications cover such areas as the ethical debate over the patenting of life forms,
the definition of the term ‘life forms’ itself, the appropriation of traditional knowledge,
farmers’ rights, and the definition of a sui generis system, to name but a few. The
subsequent portion of the paper will consider each of these issues, as well as the
legal framework within which solutions are being sought.
3.2.1. The definition of life forms: what may be patented
Patent law has drawn a distinction between inventions and discoveries, and has
permitted only inventions to be patented. However, the boundaries of what would
be termed “inventions” have been pushed back by genetic engineering; the result
is that today, it is up to the interpretation given by the particular country that decides
what is patentable or not.53 Such a circumstance leads to various and different
51 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, available at http://www.walter.gehr.net/
wvkengl.html
52 TRIPS Agreement, Preamble.
53 The TRIPS Agreement does not define this term, leaving it to each country to decide.
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standards. Developed nations and entities such as the US, the EU, and Japan grant
patents to substances that are new in the sense that they were not previously available
to the public, as opposed to being new in the sense that they have never existed
before.54 The European Patent Convention provides that even if biological material
has previously occurred in nature, it shall be patentable if it is isolated by means
of a technical process.55 The EU has also passed a Directive on the Legal Protection
of Biotechnological Inventions allowing for the patenting of microbiological pro-
cesses.56 This entails that in certain developed countries, the novelty requirement
is interpreted to mean that “new” is no longer “not pre-existing”, but “novel” in a
prior art sense.57 The interpretation, it is submitted, brings inventions closer to the
realm of discoveries. Hence, with regard to biological materials, it allows for the
patenting of genes, thus giving the right-holder almost limitless rights with regard
to the use of that gene in genetic engineering.58 However, developing nations are
unwilling to go so far. Mexico and Brazil, for example, have excluded the
patentability of all genetic materials. The Brazilian patent law of 1996 denies patents
to living beings or “biological materials found in nature”, even if they are isolated.
This also includes the “genome or germplasm” of any living being.59
It is clear that such divergences in interpretation will only cause more confusion
and division among the WTO membership, as each member seeks to have their own
respective standards upheld. Countries with large R&D sectors that have patented
these micro-organisms are not going to give up the rights that they confer so easily.
For example, it has been noted that patents with regard to cotton, corn, and soybean
are being aggressively enforced and are being used to establish competitive advantage
in the marketplace.60 However, granting patents in this area may actually have a
counterproductive effect as the granting could block innovation and further research.
It has been noted that “patents on genes of wide utilization in agriculture can block
the development of new varieties in clear contradiction to the objectives for which
the (patent) system was designed.”61 These examples illustrate the fact that allowing
the patenting of life forms does not in the long run serve society, but only the short-
term goals of a few interested parties.
3.2.2. Should life forms be patented?
The ethical question as to whether life forms should be patented at all is another
issue, and one with which international trade does not concern itself. Today, many
54 Correra, op. cit., n. 5, at 177-178.
55 EPC, Article 3.2.
56 Article 4. Available at http://www.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/1_213/1_21319980730en
0013002.pdf
57 Ibid.
58 Correra, op. cit., n. 5, at 178.
59 Ibid.
60 Correra, op. cit., n. 5, at 182.
61 Ibid.
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countries would choose to answer the question from a commercial or financial
standpoint, and very few have cited moral or ethical reasons for restricting the
patenting of life forms. TRIPS does provide for exclusion from patentability based
on moral grounds,62 yet again, the interpretation of what constitutes a moral ground
is also left to the discretion of each country. The European Patent Office rejected
the patentability of the Harvard “Oncomouse” based on moral grounds, but this
decision was reversed by its Technical Board of Appeals.63 The patent for the
oncomouse, issued in 1988, was the first transgenic animal patent to be issued. It
must be borne in mind that the animal was to be used in the testing of cancer. It
illustrates that the decisions are also difficult to make, probably due to the fact that
the dividing line between what is moral and what is immoral in this area is becoming
increasingly more blurred.
3.2.3. Farmers’ rights and intellectual property
The debate on the patenting of life forms will reach its most crucial stage in the
area of agriculture and Plant Genetic Resources (PGRs). The next section of the paper
will discuss the importance of PGRs, and the impact of Intellectual Property rights
in this field on the rights of farmers in developing countries, who have traditionally
owned the intellectual rights over the plant varieties that they have developed, within
their communities.
3.2.3.1. The importance of the farmer as a developer of new seed varieties
We are inclined to think of the farmer merely as a person who produces the food
we eat. However, the farmer plays the important roles of grower, breeder, scientist,
and researcher. Farmers do not merely use seeds; they help to conserve and improve
new plant varieties. It has been noted that their activities “ensure crop evolution
whereby new varieties arise through genetic recombinations, mutation and hybridiza-
tion within and between cultivated and wild plant populations”.64 Another important
factor is that many of these traditional crops have been bred, developed, and kept
alive by farmers and are available in the public domain.65 The contributions made
by farmers to the development of plant diversity have been recognized by the Inter-
national Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (IU).66 However, farmers are
62 Article 27(2) states: “Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice
to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is
prohibited by domestic law”.
63 Correra, op. cit. n. 5, at 188.
64 Brush, Steven, Providing Farmers’ Rights through In Situ Conservation of Crop Genetic Re-
sources (Report to the Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, University of California, 1994),
cited in Correra, op. cit., n. 5, at 167.
65 Gunawardene, op. cit. n. 3, at 2.
66 Correra, op. cit., n. 5, at 167.
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frequently not viewed as plant breeders, with the result that another individual or
organization may use the seed that has been preserved and developed by the farmer,
add an inventive step to it, and patent it – with no benefit accruing to the farmer.
Also, the various legal instruments that govern this area send out mixed signals.
While the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has sought to establish rules
on the access to genetic resources and on benefit sharing, UPOV67 has sought to
limit the rights relating to such access. All of these will in turn have an impact on
the way TRIPS is implemented. While plant breeders’ rights seek to restrict access
to certain protected varieties, it has been recognized that freer access is vital if the
world’s food demands are to be met. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
had recognized that PBRs were not incompatible with its objectives of accessing
and using PGRs for food and agriculture.68 UPOV’s previous models had also
allowed this, by permitting the use of protected varieties as the source material for
further variation and the re-use by farmers of saved seeds. Both of these activities
are regarded as important methods of diversity generation. However, the revision
of UPOV, as well as the growing willingness to patent plant materials, has threatened
the concept of free access to these resources.
In the negotiations of the IU, it has been stressed that access to PGRs for food
and agriculture is essential for sustainable agriculture. The IU aims at a system of
“shared access”, whereby those participating in a multi-lateral system will be able
to share in the benefits. There has also been concern that increased IP rights will
make the exchange of this information difficult, if not impossible.69 Accordingly,
certain countries may be unwilling to enter into a shared access regime if the genetic
resources maintained and developed by their farmers and communities are to be
appropriated by foreign companies, who will then patent those resources and prevent
those very countries that supplied the original resources from having access to and
using the protected material. This conflict has been described as follows:
The Third World farmer has a three-fold relationship with the corporations that demand
a monopoly of life forms and life processes. Firstly, the farmer is a supplier of germplasm
to TNCs [trans-national corporations]. Secondly, the farmer is a competitor in terms of
innovation and rights to genetic resources. Finally, the Third World farmer is a consumer
of the technological and industrial products of TNCs. Patent protection displaces farmers
as competitors, transforms them into suppliers of free raw materials, and makes them
totally dependent on industrial suppliers for vital inputs such as seeds.70
3.2.3.2. Bio-piracy and bad faith
67 The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. See the discussion, infra.
68 Resolution 4/89, cited in Correra, op. cit., n. 5, at 168.
69 Correra, op. cit., n. 5, at 170.
70 Shiva, Vandana and Radha Holla-Bhar, “Piracy by patent: The case of the neem tree”, inMander,
Jerry and Edward Goldsmith (eds.), The Case Against the Global Economy and For a Turn Toward
the Local (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996), at 157.
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The current regime of IPR protection of genetic resources is also not equitable. Apart
from the ethical issues already discussed, there are three other factors that merit
consideration: first, a large number of patents have been granted on genetic resources
obtained from developing countries, often without the knowledge and consent of those
who possess these resources. This has led to charges of bio-piracy, which involve
resources that are protected without further improvement. For example, researchers
of Colorado State University were awarded a patent for quinoa without having added
anything to it.71 Further, patents have also been granted for products based on plant
materials and knowledge developed and used by local and indigenous communities,
such as the cases of the neem tree, kava, and turmeric. A patent on turmeric granted
to the University of Mississippi in 1993 was invalidated by the US Patent Office
at the request of India’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.72 Some of
these patents are in direct violation of the laws that govern this area. For example,
it has also been argued that the growing and marketing of “Texmati” or “Texbasmati”
– the basmati grown in Texas – is a violation of the Geographical Indication provi-
sions of TRIPS, as well as a direct violation of the CBD. It violates TRIPS because
it assumes the name of the long-grained, fragrant rice grown in regions of India and
Pakistan. It violates the CBD because it appropriates the ownership rights of India
and Pakistan to the germplasm found in their territories.73
Secondly, some patents have been granted based on the function, and not on the
structure, of the invention. This means that the invention is described on the basis
of what it does, rather than its constituents. The result is a far wider scope than should
be awarded; it restricts access by others to a wide segment of germplasm. For
example, it has been noted that patents have been awarded for any genetic manipula-
tion of cotton, regardless of the germplasm used, as well as a patent awarded to
Lubrizol for sunflower seed, where the exact properties were not set out.74
Thirdly, certain entities have sought to register PBRs for resources that have been
deposited in genebanks and are being held in trust for the international community.
This should not be allowed under any circumstances, as it amounts to theft, pure
and simple. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
has called for a moratorium on granting IPRs on designated germplasm that are held
in CGIAR’s collections in research centres around the world. CGIAR has stated that
such germplasm is held in trust for the world community and therefore should not
be patented by anyone.75
All of these types of activities have increased the fear of developing countries,
many of which are rich in bio-resources, that they will be at the losing end of the
deal if IP rights are enforced and strengthened.
3.2.3.3. The role of patents in restricting access
71 US patent No. 5, 304 718, cited in Correra, op. cit., n. 5, at 172.
72 Correra, op. cit., n. 5, at 172.
73 Sahai, op. cit., n. 1, at 126.
74 Correra, op. cit., n. 5, at 172.
75 Ibid.
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As mentioned before, access to PGRs is necessary for the continuous adaptation
and improvement of plants for food and agriculture. Innovation in breeding activities
takes place in an incremental manner, and is based on the modification of that which
is already in existence. As long as there is access to these resources, the cycle that
has been in place for hundreds of years can continue. The grant of IP rights, however,
threatens to break the cycle and bring it to a complete standstill. According to Article
28 (1) (a) of the TRIPS agreement, patents relating to products confer the right to
prevent third parties who do not have the patent holder’s consent from “making, using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing…” the product. Regarding process patents,
the patentee, while preventing the use of the process, may also prevent the
commercialization of a product obtained directly by that process. Hence, if a process
to produce a plant is protected, the plant so created would also be protected.76
Further, while a patent-holder cannot exercise his/her rights in an area where
the patent is not registered, the presence of a patent can prevent the importation of
products containing the patented invention. Thus, the total exclusion of competitive
products can be effected by the awarding of a patent.77 Such restrictive practices
have resulted in seed companies’ becoming increasingly inventive in their pursuit
of monopolies, and have consolidated in perhaps the greatest threat to world food
security: the creation of “terminator” technology.
3.2.3.4. Terminator technology and farmers’ rights
An invention in genetic engineering, owned jointly by a US seed company, Delta
and Pine Land, and the US Department of Agriculture, was granted a patent in
1998.78 It was dubbed the “terminator” gene. The technology employed is known
as Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTS). This technology prevents the
plant from producing its own seeds,79 or from growing properly unless a particular
chemical is applied.80 The result of terminator technology will be that farmers can
no longer save seeds for the subsequent season, as the life cycle of the seed has been
terminated. The farmer has, furthermore, to use the fertilizer and chemicals advocated
for the particular crop, as the crop will fail to grow or yield the optimum harvest
unless those particular chemicals are applied. The possibilities of this technology
are alarming, to say the least. The concept of a non-germinating seed is perhaps the
worst-case of all scenarios, as it signifies a break in the cycle of life. On a more
commercial level, it will force farmers to be dependent on the seed companies. The
plight of the subsistence farmer in developing nations is even harsher. It is estimated
that in developing nations, the tradition of saving seed from one cropping season
76 Ibid., at 176.
77 Ibid.
78 US patent no. 5,723,765.
79 These are called variety-GURTS or V-GURTS.
80 These are called trait-GURTS or T-GURTS.
100 Asian Yearbook of International Law
to the next, particularly in crops like paddy, is as high as 90 per cent or more.81
Also, once the farmer is dependent on a particular type of fertilizer or chemical, he
has to buy it irrespective of the price.82 The monopolistic situation thus created
serves only to make it harder for the farmer to continue with his livelihood.
There is no justification for GURT technology, save that it will bring economic
benefits to those who own it. Further, GURT technology raises the fear that seeds
incorporating V-GURTs will drift to traditional crops grown in neighbouring fields
and render them sterile. In addition, farmers whose crops are affected by the V-GURT
seeds could also find themselves in unwitting violation of the patent rights of the
holder of the patent for the V-GURTS, even though they did not incorporate the seeds
willingly. There have been reports of expanding V-GURT technology to include
animals and insects. These remain largely unverified.83 In response to public con-
cerns, Monsanto, one of the largest seed companies in the world, announced that
it would not introduce V-GURT technology. However, none of the seed companies
has abandoned V-GURT research; it has, furthermore, been reported that V-GURT
technology is currently being used in the US.
At a more global level, the International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs),
supported by the CGIAR and the Rockefeller Foundation, have decided not to allow
any terminator technology into their breeding material. India has followed, with a
clause in its Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Bill which refuses
protection to seeds and planting materials incorporating GURTs. Nevertheless, GURT
technology remains a potential, and undeniably real, danger.
3.2.3.5. The developing country farmer and the developed country farmer: the
fundamental difference
While GURT technology and the increased awarding of restrictive patents will
affect farmers everywhere, their destructive potential is heightened with regard to
the farmers in the developing world. Unlike farmers in developed nations, who are
supported by subsidies from their governments, farmers in developing nations are
subsistence farmers, and often have no savings to fall back on. Some even incur debt
in order to buy the seed for the current planting season, and repay the debt only when
the crop is harvested. There is no subsidy system to protect them, nor is there social
security. Further, they are now unable to take out bank loans, as many banks will
not lend to farmers on account of the latter’s poor credit history. It is, quite literally,
a suicidal situation.84
3.2.3.6. Farmers’ rights to traditional knowledge: sharing the benefits
81 Sustainable farming systems through traditional plant genetic resources and indigenous knowledge
based practice (2002) Helvitas, Sri Lanka, cited in Gunawardene, op. cit., n. 3, at 2.
82 For a discussion on this point, see Watal, op. cit., n. 9, at 162.
83 Watal, op. cit., n. 9, at 162.
84 In Sri Lanka, for example, the suicide rate among farmers is estimated to be the highest in the
country.
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As mentioned above, a fundamental issue appears to be that concepts of ownership
vary between North and South. Traditional communities have, for long years, practised
the concept of community ownership. This stems from the notion that nature cannot
be owned, and that crop varieties are sacred gifts from the Creator.85 However, today
these communities have been forced to accept a world order where all property must
be claimed and owned. If they are tardy in claiming their rights, they stand to lose
them forever. Among the intellectual property rights held by traditional communities
in their folk varieties are included the rights to the information encoded in their DNA
as well as knowledge about production and use of their folk varieties.86
While it is true that farmers have a right to this knowledge, it is equally true
that bio-technical companies, due to the vast resource bases to which they have access,
are capable of extracting the maximum benefit from such knowledge. However, the
issue seems to be that neither the companies nor the laws to which they subscribe
appear to recognize the need to reward the farmers by sharing with them at least
some of the benefits. As for benefit sharing, it has been noted that very few com-
panies reciprocate towards the farmers by agreeing to share benefits when they are
allowed to access genetic resources or traditional knowledge.87 The other method
for protecting farmers’ rights in this regard is through legislation, the next point for
consideration.
3.2.4. Legal responses to the issue of benefit sharing and the recognition of farmers’
rights
This section deals with the various legal instruments that have attempted to
identify the issues and offer some solutions. As TRIPS ultimately rules, each of these
will be compared with TRIPS to ascertain the level of validity of the principles in
the face of TRIPS.
The TRIPS agreement
The TRIPS agreement is today the single most powerful legal document that
affects both intellectual property and the rights of those who claim them. Interestingly
enough, it contains no provisions that recognize either the concept of community
ownership or the sharing of benefits among various interest groups such as farmers
and breeders. It has been suggested that this might be covered by Article 39;88
however, Article 39 deals with the protection of undisclosed information, and appears
to pertain more closely to trade secrets than to traditional knowledge. A more bene-
85 Soleri, Daniela, David Cleveland et al, “Gifts from the Creator: intellectual property rights and
folk crop varieties”, in Greaves, op. cit., n. 12, at 21.
86 Ibid.
87 Watal, op. cit., n. 9, at 174.
88 For a fuller discussion, see von Lewinski, S. (ed.), Indigenous Heritage and Intellectual Property:
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International,
2004), at 32.
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ficial option seems to be the sui generis protection system advocated by Article 27
(3), which asks members to provide for the protection of plant varieties either through
the granting of patents or by an effective sui generis system, or by a combination
of both. This topic was discussed in Doha, and the following statement was issued
in the Ministerial Declaration:89
We instruct the Council for TRIPS, in pursuing its work programme including under the
review of Article 27.3(b), the review of the implementation of the TRIPS agreement under
Article 71.1… to examine, inter alia, the relationship between the TRIPS agreement and
the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and
folklore, and other relevant new developments… In undertaking this work, the TRIPS
Council shall… take fully into account the development dimension.
However, to date, nothing has been forthcoming along these lines. It must be
borne in mind that the Council has thus far been preoccupied with resolving the issues
in the pharmaceutical sector, and has probably not created the opportunity to start
on this one. Nevertheless, the problem has indeed been identified, and that is as much
as may be expected, at least for the moment.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
The CBD is one of the instruments opened for signature at the Rio Conference;90
it addresses the economic rights and needs of indigenous people. The CBD91 high-
lights two important aspects of the debate: first, it recognizes that indigenous com-
munities are dependent on biological resources. Preambular paragraph 12 mentions
the “close and traditional dependence of many indigenous and local communities
embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources”. Secondly, it recognizes
the concept of benefit sharing. The same paragraph mentions the desirability of
equitably sharing the benefits derived from the use of such traditional knowledge,
innovations, and practices. These are, however, not embodied in the main text, and
are helpful only in shaping the thought process behind the Convention. The operative
section is Article 8(j): it calls for States to respect, preserve, and maintain such
knowledge, and also calls on them to encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits
arising from their utilization.
However, the CBD looks at the issue of benefit sharing from the perspective
of conservation and the sustainable use of biological diversity, rather than from an
intellectual property perspective. This is due to the fact that it is an environmental
treaty, falling under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Program
(UNEP). Further, and more importantly, it is a UN document, subject to the lethargic
and inefficient dispute settlement mechanism of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), which pales in comparison with the razor-sharp DSU of the WTO. WTO
89 Para. 19 of theMinisterial Declaration,WTODoc.WT/MIN(01)DEC/W/1 of 14 November 2001.
90 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, 1992.
91 http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp.
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members know that they will face the risk of retaliation if they fail to comply with
a DSB ruling; UN members need not heed the ICJ ruling since there is no risk of
losing any trading advantages, and may feel obliged to comply only for the sake of
international comity – not as compelling a reason as the loss of trading benefits. Also,
since only States may be parties to any ICJ disputes, it functions less well than does
the WTO, where States have greater responsibility for their trade decisions, and
consequently, for the actions of the private individuals who operate under them.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
In 1998 theWIPO began to analyze the intellectual property aspects of traditional
knowledge; in 2001 it issued a report.92 Apart from this, the WIPO proposes to
provide training workshops in intellectual property for holders of traditional know-
ledge. It also proposes to conduct case studies and pilot projects on the interfaces
between intellectual property and traditional knowledge.93 Since 2000, a special
body, designated the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, has been working on such topics as the development of model
clauses for genetic resource contracts, work on a possible sui generis system for the
protection of traditional knowledge, and the consideration of the Final Report on
National Experiences with the Legal Protection of Expressions of Folklore.94 How-
ever, none of these efforts has as yet yielded any concrete measures in helping to
protect the interests and needs of indigenous and local communities with regard to
their traditional knowledge.95
UPOV
The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, referred
to commonly by the name UPOV,96 seeks to promote plant breeding activities
throughout the world, and to offer incentives for the creation of new and improved
plant varieties. The criteria for protection under UPOV97 involve no inventive step,
nor any showing of usefulness. Rather, they require only that the plant variety be
commercially novel,98 distinctive,99 uniform100 and stable.101
92 WIPO, Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders, 2001,
http://www.wipo.int/globalissues/tk/report/final/index.html.
93 See e.g.,WIPO/UNEP, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the Sharing of Benefits Arising
from the Use of Biological Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge, Selected Case Studies
(Submission to the Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity for consideration
at the Fifth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, held at Nairobi,
Kenya in May 2000).
94 Stoll, Peter-Tobias and Anja von Hahn, “Indigenous peoples, indigenous knowledge and in-
digenous resources in international law”, in von Lewinski, op. cit., n. 88 at 30.
95 Ibid.
96 UPOV is the acronym of the French title.
97 http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/content.htm.
98 UPOV Convention 1991, Article 6.
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Since UPOV asks neither for inventiveness nor for usefulness, the standards are
lower than are those for patent protection. This has been seen as beneficial to
breeders, by allowing them to claim protection for plant varieties that are quite
similar, without making drastic changes in their agronomic traits.102 Further, UPOV
contains the “farmers’ privilege” allowing the farmers to use saved seeds for future
crops. Article 15 (2) permits the Contracting Parties to allow farmers to use protected
varieties, provided that it is for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, and
is the product of the harvest they have obtained by planting. Additionally, UPOV
also allows the “research exemption”103 whereby protected materials may be used
as a basis for developing new varieties. It has been suggested that UPOV provides
the best model of a sui generis system as envisaged by Article 27 (3) (b) of
TRIPS.104 Some scholars argue that there are very few alternatives to UPOV. Since
the establishment of a sui generis system that is actually effective could involve
considerable amounts of time and money, a system beyond UPOV complying with
the effectiveness required by TRIPS is considered “very unlikely”.105 They believe
that UPOV will probably become the global standard left unspecified by TRIPS.106
However, UPOV is not without its own flaws. It differentiates between farmers
and breeders, as evidenced by the “farmers’ privilege” section. This is contrary to
the view taken in traditional communities, of farmers as breeders. If farmers are not
breeders, then that role is presumably adopted by those who commercially exploit
the plant varieties: the seed companies. Since the seed companies do not in order
to secure rights under UPOV have to add an inventive step, it is literally an open
invitation to these companies to appropriate a plethora of rights to themselves, leaving
farmers with very little. Although farmers under UPOV may still be able to grow
and save their seeds, they will be unable to share in the benefits of the commercial
exploitation of the seeds that they have helped to differentiate and to preserve.
These concerns have been raised by developing countries, notably India, which
has a large percentage of subsistence farmers. Of particular importance to them is
the fact that UPOV permits dual protection of plant varieties; it entails that the same
variety can be protected by Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR) as well as by patents.107
It is feared that such a mechanism as PBR will be used to obtain patent protection
for varieties that fail to meet the patent criteria (inventiveness and usefulness). It
is further argued that the UPOV system, which involves elaborate testing and approval
prior to the award of a UPOV certificate, is far too expensive for the average small
99 Ibid., Article 7.
100 Ibid., Article 8.
101 Ibid., Article 9.
102 Hassemer, Michael, “Genetic resources”, in von Lewinski, op. cit., n. 88 at 172.
103 UPOV Convention 1991, Article 15(1).
104 Hassemer, loc. cit., n. 102, at 174.
105 Ibid., at 175.
106 Ibid.
107 Gene Campaign, Why India/Developing Countries Need an Alternative to UPOV (New Delhi,
Gene Campaign, 1998).
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company, farmers’ co-operative or farmer/breeder. This will leave the area of the
market open to the large seed companies who have the financial capability to make
such heavy investments. Such a system, it is argued, will cause the farmers to sell
their varieties for a pittance to the large seed companies, who would in turn exploit
them for huge returns.108
Further, there is dissatisfaction with the way countries have sought to incorporate
UPOV standards into local legislation. Scholars believe that government entities in
developing countries have not incorporated UPOV provisions into local law in a
manner that benefits farmers, while those in developed countries have been able to
extract the maximum possible advantage from such instruments.109 It has also been
noted that in many instances no provisions have been made in domestic law with
regard to rights over crop wild relatives, traditional crop varieties, or newly developed
crop varieties already in the public domain.110 There is no way in which farmers
could be compensated in cases where one or more of these are employed to create
a new variety which would then be protected by a breeder’s right. In such an event,
it could result in the farmer who nurtured the original variety paying a fee for the
use of the derived crop.
It is interesting to note that the proponents of UPOV as a viable alternative to
be used in determining a sui generis system appear to be Western scholars, while
the opposition to UPOV stems from the developing world.111 Part of the problem
seems to be that the developed world cannot conceive of the farmer as being anything
but a farmer. Many may envision the farmer as a village yokel, engaging in the
routine and monotonous task of ploughing the field from morning to night. The
developing world accords the farmer greater respect, and understands that he plays
an important part in conserving and promoting biodiversity. Sahai points out that
[W]e need to overcome the bias that most of us suffer from, that of acknowledging the
research conducted by scientists in white coats working in laboratories of universities
as “Science” and dismissing the complex knowledge systems contained in rustic, rural
communities as something infinitely less and not worthy of acknowledgement.112
3.2.5. Alternative possibilities: CoFab as an option
108 Ibid.
109 Gunawardene, op. cit., n. 3, at 3, highlights the fact that the USA, Australia, and the EU have
incorporated the “farmers’ privilege” as a mandatory right, while the Draft Sri Lankan Act to Protect
New Plant Varieties has relegated it to the position of an option, to be decided by the Minister in
charge of the subject.
110 Ibid.
111 The contributors to von Lewinski’s book are from European nations. Gene Campaign and
Gunawardene are Indian and Sri Lankan respectively. Watal, though originally from India, has been
in the USA for some time. Consequently, her views take a middle path, advocating the pursuit of
Western standards as a matter of necessity, rather than of choice.
112 Sahai, op. cit., n. 1, at 132.
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One of the options that might be considered to fill the vacancy created by the
sui generis requirement is the Convention on Farmers and Breeders (CoFaB).113
This was drafted in New Delhi in 1998, at the initiation of Gene Campaign.114 It
has been proposed as an alternative to UPOV, and is presented as a forum for
implementing Farmers and Breeders’ rights in developing countries. Article 5 specifies
the rights of farmers and breeders; Article 5 (1) proposes that the farming community
be entitled to a fee from breeders every time a landrace or traditional variety is used
for the purpose of breeding or improving a new variety. Article 5(2) proposes that
breeders be entitled to the right to authorize the commercial exploitation of the plant
variety that they have bred. Article 5(4) reserves to the contracting parties the right
to legislate in a manner that increases the scope of the breeders’ rights, especially
with regard to marketing rights.
While CoFaB appears to be the only text that recognizes, and rewards, traditional
communities for their rights over intellectual property, it is also the text with the
lowest amount of influence. It is only a proposed treaty, and has no legal effect
whatsoever. However, it demonstrates the standard that developing countries want
to set, and could be useful in future negotiations on a possible amendment to Article
27 (3) (b) of TRIPS.
3.2.6. Securing rights through contracts
It has also been proposed that contracts, conducted in good faith, are the most
practical answer to the problem of trying to reconcile intellectual property rights of
the formal and informal natures.115 A contract, since it is tailor-made, could address
the issues that both parties think is most important, and specify the rights and obliga-
tions only to the extent to which the parties feel comfortable. However, given the
vast disparity between the parties with regard to economic influence, access to
information and, consequently, all-important bargaining power, this will also fail to
function well, as it will result in the farmers’ suffering the raw end of the deal.
3.2.7. Projections for the future
Bio-technology is the tool of the future. There are vast possibilities for enrichment
in this field; hence, developing nations should ultimately seek to reap the rewards
of bio-technology. Further, if the vast numbers of subsistence farmers in these
countries are to survive in the modern era, it becomes imperative for them to do so.
It has been suggested that developing nations should identify the development of
competitive skills in research in bio-technology as an important policy objective.116
However, given the technological gap between developed and developing countries,
113 http://www.genecampaign.org.
114 An Indian Non-Governmental Agency specializing in Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources
and Indigenous Communities. See http://www.genecampaign.org.
115 Watal, op. cit., n. 9, at 177.
116 Ibid., at 183.
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collaboration, not confrontation, has been offered as the means by which this is to
be achieved. Watal suggests that developing nations open up their IPR laws and allow
for greater protection, while attempting to raise themselves to the standard where
they can conduct independent research, develop sound R&D bases, and implement
a strong IPR regime to protect them.
This line of reasoning ignores a fundamental factor crucial to the debate: that
of occupying the field. By the time developing nations acquire the know-how required
to protect their indigenous knowledge, most of it would no longer be indigenous,
and would probably long before have been patented by the developed world. Also
by that time, the traditional communities that originally owned the knowledge would
find they could no longer apply it. This is particularly true in an era when knowledge
is becoming increasingly ephemeral, and today’s discovery is tomorrow’s waste.
4. CONCLUSION
When compared with the problems that arose with regard to pharmaceutical com-
panies, the bio-technological area seems to be better prepared. While the pharma-
ceutical sector waited until the AIDS crisis arose before they began seeking solutions,
debate and proposals for reform have been going on in the pharmaceutical sector
since the 1990s. Part of the reason may be that entire communities stand to lose their
livelihoods in these largely agricultural nations, hence the threat, as well as the
consequences, are substantial, to say the least. It is true that developing nations must
raise themselves into a position where they too can reap the benefits of bio-techno-
logy. It is, however, also true that developing nations need to protect the wealth of
knowledge they possess until such time as they are able to harness it. While building
up R&D can take years, even decades, developing good legal regimes can be accom-
plished in a relatively shorter time.
It is submitted that, as at least a short-term solution, developing nations should
identify their priorities and enact legislation to protect the local communities and
repositories of Intellectual Property. If government entities lack the requisite know-
ledge, they should work in conjunction with non-governmental entities, which appear
to be far better aware of the thorny issues involved. While TRIPS provides no
adequate protection, the ambiguity of its language (especially that in relation to sui
generis methods of protection) better advantage could have been taken of this factor
by developing nations, who are, after all, free to adopt their method of choice. The
fact that they have not chosen to do so is squarely their fault.
A key question to have emerged is whether discussions on these subjects have
developed far enough for them to be handled immediately in the WTO, or whether
members should wait until technical discussions in the WIPO are resolved.117 The
topic should be addressed before it escalates any further. Traditional communities
117 TRIPS: Reviews, Article 27.3(B) and Related Issues. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
art27_3b_background_e.htm
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have shouldered the burden of maintaining the diversity of the crops that sustain us




LEGAL AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DIMENSIONS*
Ramses Amer and Nguyen Hong Thao**
1. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this study is to examine the progress made in managing
Vietnam’s border disputes. Another purpose is to analyze the challenges that lie ahead
relating to those border disputes that are still unsettled. Both the legal and the conflict
management dimensions of the disputes are addressed and analyzed.
The agreements reached between Vietnam and neighbouring countries are iden-
tified and outlined. The remaining disputes are identified in relation to the nature
of their respective differences. The continuity and changes in the approaches to
dispute settlements are analyzed. The degree of success in managing the border
disputes is assessed. The challenges of managing the remaining unsettled disputes
are discussed.
2. VIETNAM’S BORDER DISPUTES
The following overview of how Vietnam’s border disputes have been and are
being handled is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the border
disputes that have been formally settled through agreements or through joint-develop-
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ment arrangements. These settled disputes are outlined in chronological order accord-
ing to the year in which they were settled or the first agreement was reached. The
second section outlines the unresolved border disputes.
2.1. Settled border disputes
• On 18 July 1977 Laos and Vietnam signed a treaty delimiting their land boundary.
Following the completion of the demarcation process a complementary treaty
was signed on 24 January 1986. On 1 March 1990 an additional protocol was
signed as was, on the same day, an agreement on border regulation.1
• On 7 July 1982 Vietnam and the then People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)
signed an agreement on “historic waters” in the Gulf of Thailand.2 On 20 July
1983 the two countries signed a Treaty on the principles for the settlement of
border problems and an Agreement on border regulations.3 On 27 December
1985 the two countries signed the Treaty on the Delimitation of the Vietnam-
Kampuchea Frontier.4 On 10 October 2005 the two countries signed a Supple-
mentary Treaty to the 1985 Treaty.5
• On 5 June 1992 an agreement was reached between Malaysia and Vietnam to
engage in joint development in areas of overlapping claims to continental shelf
areas lying to the south-west of Vietnam and to the east-north-east off the east
coast of Peninsular Malaysia.6
1 For details on the settlement and demarcation of the land border between Laos and Vietnam see
Gay, Bernard, La nouvelle frontière lao-vietnamienne. Les accords de 1977-1990. Histoire des
frontières de la péninsule indochinoise – 2, Travaux du Centre d’histoire et civilisations de la
péninsule indochinoise publiés sous la direction de P.B. Lafont (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995). See
also a report carried by the VNA News Agency reproduced in British Broadcasting Corporation,
Summary of World Broadcasts, Part Three, Far East, 2975 B/6-7 (19 July 1997) (hereafter “BBC/
FE”).
2 For the full text of the Agreement of 7 July 1982 see BBC/FE/7074 A3/7-8 (10 July 1982). The
text of the Agreement has also been reproduced in an English-language version as “Appendix 2”
in Kittichaisaree, Kriangsak, The Law of the Sea andMaritime Boundary Delimitation in South-East
Asia (Singapore, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), at 180-181.
3 BBC/FE/7393 A3/1 (23 July 1983). See also Quang, Nghia, “Vietnam-Kampuchea border issue
settled”, 4 Vietnam Courier (1986), at 8-9.
4 For reports from Vietnam and the PRK announcing the signing of the Treaty and for details see
BBC/FE/8143 A3/1-3 (30 December 1985). See also Quang, loc. cit., n. 3, at 8-9.
5 “PM Khai holds talks with Cambodian counterpart”. From the website of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Vietnam (http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns05101140825)
(accessed on 23 October 2005)
6 Information derived from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia (http://
www.kln.gov.my/). See also Amer, Ramses, “Vietnam and its neighbours: the border dispute
dimension”, 17 Contemporary Southeast Asia (1995), at 306 (hereafter Amer, “Vietnam and its
neighbours”). See also Nguyen, Hong Thao, “Joint development in the Gulf of Thailand”, 7-3
Boundary and Security Bulletin (1999), at 79-88 (hereafter Nguyen, “Joint development”); and
Nguyen, Hong Thao, “Les délimitations maritimes concernant le Vietnam: accords conclus et
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• On 9 August 1997 Thailand and Vietnam reached an agreement delimiting their
continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) boundaries in a disputed
area in the Gulf of Thailand to the south-west of Vietnam and to the north-east
of Thailand.7
• On 30 December 1999 China and Vietnam signed a Land Border Treaty settling
the land border dispute between the two countries.8
• On 25 December 2000 China and Vietnam signed the Agreement on the Delimita-
tion of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves
in the Gulf of Tonkin settling their maritime boundary disputes in the Gulf.9 On
the same day the two countries signed an agreement on fishery co-operation in
the Gulf of Tonkin.10 On 29 April 2004 the two countries signed the Supplemen-
negociations en cours”, in Le Vietnam et la mer, ouvrage coordonné par Monique Chemillier-
Gendreau (Travaux du colloque organisé les 16 et 17 juin 2000 par l’Association d’Amitié Franco-
Vietnamienne) (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2002), 53-56 (hereafter Nguyen, “Les délimitations”).
7 BBC/FE/2996 B/4-5 (13 August 1997). See also Nguyen, Hong Thao, “Vietnam’s first maritime
boundary agreement”, 5-3 Boundary and Security Bulletin (1997), at 74-79 (hereafter Nguyen,
“Vietnam’s First”); Nguyen, Hong Thao, “Vietnam and Thailand settle maritime disputes in the
Gulf of Thailand”, 2 The MIMA Bulletin (1998), at 7-10; and Nguyen, “Les délimitations”, loc.
cit., n. 6, at 51-53.
8 “The Land Border Treaty” was announced to have been officially signed at Hanoi on 30 December
1999. See “Viet Nam, China sign land border treaty”, Vietnam News Agency (VNA) (30 December
1999). From the website of Vietnam News Agency (http://www. vnagency.com.vn/Asp/Readnews4.
asp?FileN=frac3012.020) (accessed on 31December 1999); and, “Signature du traité sur la frontière
terrestre Vietnam-China”, Agence vietnamienne de l’information (AVI) (30 décembre 1999). From
the website of Vietnam News Agency (http://www.vnagency.com.vn/asp/Tthoisuf4.asp?stq=2)
(accessed on 31 December 1999). See also “Vietnam, China sign land border treaty”, 146 News
Bulletin (31 December 1999). From the website of Nhan Dan (http://www.nhandan.org.vn/english/
19991231/index.html and http://www.nhandan.org.vn/english/19991231/bai-news6.html) (accessed
on 27 January 2000).
9 The “Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental
Shelves in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf” (name used in Vietnamese sources at the time of signing)
was officially signed on 25 December in Beijing. See “Viet Nam, China sign joint statement for
comprehensive cooperation” (25 December 2000). From the website of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs ofVietnam ((http://www.mofa.gov.vn:8080/…/6279f8d7fcf98966c7269c10028184c?) (accessed
on 28 December 2000). See also “China, Viet Nam sign agreements”, 44(2) Beijing Review (11
January 2001), at 9-10. The full text of the Agreement has been reproduced in two recent studies.
See Zou, Keyuan, “The Sino-Vietnamese agreement on maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf
of Tonkin”, 34 Ocean Development and International Law (2005), at 22-24 (hereafter Zou, “The
Sino-Vietnamese”); and Nguyen, Hong Thao, “Maritime delimitation and fishery cooperation in
the Tonkin Gulf”, 34 Ocean Development and International Law (2005), at 41-44 (hereafter, Nguyen,
“Maritime delimitation”).
10 For details on the fishery agreement, see Zou, Keyuan, “Sino-Vietnamese fishery agreement
for the Gulf of Tonkin”, 17 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2002), at 127-148.
For broader studies on both agreements see Nguyen, “Les délimitations”, loc. cit., n. 6, at 67-74;
and Nguyen, Hong Thao, “The Gulf of Tonkin: A case study of dispute settlement”, in Askandar,
Kamarulzaman (ed.),Management and Resolution of Inter-State Conflicts in Southeast Asia, (Penang:
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tary Protocol to the Agreement on Fishery cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf and
the Regulations on preservation and management of the living resources in the
Common Fishery Zone in the Gulf of Tonkin.11
• On 11 June 2003 Vietnam and Indonesia signed an agreement on the delimitation
of their continental shelf boundary in the area to the north of the Natuna
Islands.12
2.2. Unsettled border disputes
• Despite the agreements of the 1980s between Cambodia and Vietnam the periods
of tension since the 1990s relating to the border disputes displayed that there
was still a need to address their border disputes.13 The agreement Supplementary
Treaty to the 1985 Treaty has settled the land border dispute; however, the
maritime disputes are still awaiting resolution.14
• Between Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam there is a multilateral dispute relating
to an area of overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand.15
• Between Malaysia and Vietnam the major dispute relates to Vietnam’s sovereignty
claim to the whole Spratly archipelago, which overlaps the Malaysian claim to
Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network, 2003), at 207-214 (hereafter Nguyen, “The Gulf of
Tonkin”).
11 “Viet Nam, China ink deal on fisheries in Tokin Gulf” (1 May 2004). From the website of the
Vietnam News Agency (http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/2004-04/30/Stories/07.htm) (accessed
on 1 May 2004). See also “Protocol on China-Vietnam agreement on fishery cooperation in Beibu
bay signed”, From the website of the People’s Daily Online (English version) (http://
english.people.com.cn/2004004/30/eng20040424_142001.html) (accessed on 4 October 2004).
12 For information about the recent agreement with Indonesia see “Vietnam-Indonesia boundary
agreement benefits regional stability”, in 1306 News Bulletin (27 June 2003). From the website
of Nhan Dan (http://www.nhandan.org.vn/english/20030627/index.html and http://www.nhandan.
org.vn/english/20030627/bai-news3.html) (accessed on 22 December 2003).
13 The agreements between Vietnam and Cambodia reached in the 1980s remained not recognized
by all parties within Cambodia for most of the 1990s. New bilateral talks on the status of the borders
between these countries have been initiated towards reaching a solution to the outstanding disputed
issues. This has thus far resulted in the Supplementary Treaty of October 2005 relating to the land
border. Therefore, in the context of this study the maritime disputes between Vietnam and Cambodia
are not considered as resolved and they are listed among the as yet unsettled disputes.
14 For details on the disputes between Cambodia and Vietnam relating to the land and maritime
areas see Amer, Ramses, “The border conflicts between Cambodia and Vietnam”, 5(2) Boundary
and Security Bulletin (1997), at 80-91 (hereafter Amer, “The border conflicts”); and Amer, “Vietnam
and its neighbours’, loc. cit., n. 6, at 299-301. For information on the maritime dispute see also
Nguyen, “Les delimitations”, loc. cit., n. 6, at 59-63.
15 For an overview of the maritime conflicts and co-operative agreements in the Gulf of Thailand
see Prescott, Victor, The Gulf of Thailand (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA),
1998). The area is currently included in the JDA between Malaysia and Thailand, but is recognised
by the two countries as claimed by Vietnam (Amer’s discussions with officials in Bangkok in
December 1998, April 1999, and November 2000).
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the southern part of the archipelago.16 These parts of the Archipelago are also
claimed by China and partly claimed by the Philippines.
• Between the Philippines and Vietnam there is a dispute in the South China Sea
where Vietnam’s sovereignty claim to the whole Spratly archipelago overlaps
the Filipino claim to the major part of it.17 These parts of the Archipelago are
claimed by China and also partly claimed by Malaysia.
• Between China and Vietnam the overlapping sovereignty claims to the Paracel
and Spratly archipelagos are still unresolved. The same applies to China’s claims
to historical waters within the so-called dotted line to the east of the Vietnamese
coast in South China Sea.
• Between Brunei Darussalam and Vietnam a potential overlapping claim to the
200-mile EEZ could emerge if the two countries began to assert such claims over
islands and reefs both claim in the South China Sea.18
3. BETWEEN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND TENSION
3.1. The 1970s
The developments since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 show that during
the latter half of the 1970s Vietnam and Laos reached agreements relating to their
land border with the demarcation being finalized in 1986. A closer look at this process
shows that before 1945, the two countries were different administrative parts of
French Indochina. After gaining independence in 1954 the two countries opted to
recognize the colonial administrative limits as boundaries. In June 1956, when the
Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Laos visited Hanoi, the two
sides agreed to open negotiations on boundary demarcation. The wars in Laos and
Vietnam prevented such negotiations prior to the 1970s. During the 1970s negotiations
the two countries agreed to use the colonial administrative lines drawn on the
1:100,000-scale map of Bonne printed by the Indochina Geography Institute in 1946.
In essence, Laos and Vietnam agreed to apply the uti possidetis principle in the
process of demarcating their land border. The negotiations resulted in the two agree-
ments of 1977 and 1986. Laos and Vietnam utilized the principle of uti possidetis
even before that principle became universally accepted through a decision by the
International Court of Justice in 1986. In other words, the two countries made a
16 Amer, “Vietnam and its neighbours”, loc. cit., n. 6, at 305-306; Prescott, J.R.V., The Maritime
Boundaries of the World (London and New York: Methuen, 1985), at 218-222 (hereafter Prescott,
The Maritime Boundaries); and Valencia, Mark J., Malaysia and the Law of the Sea. The foreign
policy issues, the options and their implications (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (ISIS Malaysia), 1991), at 54-66.
17 Ibid., at 54-66; Amer, “Vietnam and its neighbours”, loc. cit., n. 6, at 306-308; and Prescott,
The Maritime Boundaries, op. cit., n. 16, at 218-222.
18 Valencia, op. cit., n. 16, at 48-50 and 66-67.
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contribution to the development of international law.19 Officially, the two countries
did not refer to any border dispute between them, yet the outcome of the demarcation
process demonstrated that some differences existed and were resolved in the nego-
tiation and demarcation processes.20
3.2. The 1980s
During the 1980s there were the agreements between Vietnam and the then PRK
in 1982, 1983, and 1985. No progress was made in negotiating the border disputes
with member-states of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or
with China. The Cambodian conflict prevented progress to the extent that no talks,
apart from those with Indonesia and Cambodia, on border issues took place between
Vietnam and its other neighbours for the duration of the Cambodian conflict 1979-
1991.
3.3. The 1990s
3.3.1. Members of ASEAN
The 1990s witnessed considerable progress in negotiations. A joint development
agreement (JDA) was reached with Malaysia in 1992 over an area of bilateral dispute
in the Gulf of Thailand. The process of negotiations between Vietnam and Thailand
eventually resulted in the agreement on maritime boundaries of 1997 over the areas
of bilateral dispute in the Gulf of Thailand. In 1995 Vietnam and the Philippines
agreed on a ‘code of conduct’ to be observed by the two countries in the South China
Sea.21 More notable progress during the 1990s was the initiation of trilateral talks
between Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand relating to an area of the Gulf of Thailand
where the claims of the three countries overlap. These talks were made possible by
the maritime boundary agreement between Vietnam and Thailand in 1997.22
In the case of the JDAwithMalaysia, both Vietnam andMalaysia made unilateral
claims to the continental shelf in the 1970s. The then Republic of Vietnam (South)
(ROV) did so in 1971, and Malaysia in 1979; they thus created an area of overlapping
19 Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), ICJ Rep. 1986.
20 For details on the settlement and demarcation of the land border between Laos and Vietnam
see Gay, op. cit., n.1.
21 Amer, Ramses, “Expanding ASEAN’s conflict management framework in Southeast Asia: The
border dispute dimension”, 6 Asian Journal of Political Science (1998), at 46.
22 Amer, Ramses, “Conflict management within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN): assessing the adoption of the ‘Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia’”, in Askandar, Kamarulzaman (ed.), Management
and Resolution of Inter-State Conflicts in Southeast Asia (Penang: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies
Network, 2003), at 117-118.
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claims. The 1992 JDA implied that Malaysia agreed to nominate the Petroliam
Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS) and Vietnam, the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation
(PETROVIETNAM) to undertake, respectively, the exploration and exploitation of
petroleum in the “Defined Area” and to enter into appropriate commercial arrange-
ments. Four years after the conclusion of the commercial arrangement, on 29 July
1997, the first petroleum was extracted from the Bunga Kekwa field.23
In the case of the agreement with Thailand it can be noted that the Gulf of
Thailand is a semi-enclosed sea, long but narrow, with an average width of 215
nautical miles. Therefore, based on the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS) the whole Gulf is subject to the juris-
dictional claims of coastal states up to 200 nautical miles. Both Vietnam and Thailand
made unilateral claims to the continental shelf in the early 1970s. The ROV did so
in 1971 and Thailand in 1973, thus creating an area of overlapping claims. Each
country failed to take into account off-shore features along the coast of the other
country when making these claims. In addition, overlapping claims to EZZ led to
problems with illegal fishing.24 In 1992 negotiations were initiated and after five
years the two sides agreed to settle both the continental shelf and EEZ disputes
through delimiting a single maritime boundary. The agreement of 9 August 1997
reaffirms the tendency to using a single boundary for both the continental shelf and
the EEZ in zones that extend for a distance of less than 400 nautical miles between
opposite coasts. It is also of relevance in the context of the effects on islands of the
international law of maritime delimitation. In the case of Vietnam it was the first
agreement on maritime delimitation.25
3.3.2. China
Following full normalization of bilateral relations between China and Vietnam
in November 1991, the border disputes caused a fluctuating level of tension during
the 1990s. In order to address this situation the two countries developed a system
of talks at the expert, governmental, and high levels to deal with the tensions and
with the border issues as such. Talks at the expert level were initiated in October
1992. The talks at the governmental level began in August 1993, and the twelfth
round of talks was held in December 2005.26 Talks at both levels led to a notable
decrease in tension by the end of the decade, and also to the agreement on a Land
23 Nguyen, Hong Thao, Le Vietnam et ses différents maritimes dans la mer de Bien Dong (Mer
de Chine méridionale) (Paris: Edition A. Pédone, 2004), at 99-108.
24 For an overview of the interplay of negotiations and tension in the period 1992-1995 see Amer,
“Vietnam and its neighbours”, loc.cit., n. 6, at 309-311.
25 For more detailed analyses, see ibid., at 88-99 and 107-108; and Nguyen, “Vietnam’s first”, loc.
cit. n. 7, at 74-78.
26 The twelfth round of talks was held in Hanoi on 8-10 December 2005, “Viet Nam, China to
complete landmark demarcation in 2008”, From the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Vietnam (http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns051212154021) (accessed
on 9 January 2006).
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Border Treaty at the end of 1999 that entered into force on 6 July 2000 when the
two countries exchanged documents relating to the ratification of the agreement in
Beijing.27 The talks on the Gulf of Tonkin were also well underway by the end
of the decade. In late 2000, the two countries signed the Agreement on the Delimita-
tion of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in
the Gulf of Tonkin.28 This agreement entered into force on 30 June 2004 when the
two countries exchanged documents relating to the ratification of the agreement in
Hanoi.29 The ratifications proceeded; the entry into force of the agreement was made
possible by the completion of the talks on an additional protocol to the agreement
of fishery co-operation signed on the same day in December 2000 as was the bound-
ary agreement. Agreeing on the protocol constituted a prerequisite to proceeding with
the ratification of the maritime boundary agreement.
However, talks on the so-called “sea issues” (South China Sea – East Sea,
according to Vietnam), initiated in November 1995 and with the tenth round of talks
held in June 2005,30 have made very little progress. This is due in part to disagree-
ment over determining the issues to be included in the agenda, with Vietnam pushing
for the inclusion of the issue of the Paracels, on the one hand, and China insisting
that this topic should be excluded, on the other. Nevertheless, the level of tension
relating to the disputes in the South China Sea has been considerably reduced since
1999 – a trend that has continued to prevail into the subsequent millennium.31
The negotiation process relating to the land border dispute did not, despite regular
rounds of talks of the joint working group, change significantly in frequency before
1998; however, during 1999 the joint working group on the land border met on four
27 The joint working group on the land border dispute held sixteen rounds of talks from February
1994 to the signing of the Land Border Treaty in December 1999. For details about the talks as
well as the ratification process in 2000, see Amer, Ramses, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach to
Managing Boundary Disputes, 3(5)Maritime Briefing (Durham: International Boundaries Research
Unit, University of Durham, 2002)), at 13-31. (hereafter Amer, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach)
28 The joint working group on the Gulf of Tonkin dispute met seventeen times from March 1994
to the signing of the Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and
Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin in December 2000. For details about the talks and the
context in which they took place, seeAmer, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach, op. cit., n. 27, at 11-34
and 50-58.
29 “Vietnam, China exchange documents ratifying Tonkin Gulf demarcation agreement”. From the
website ofNhanDan (http://www.nhandan.org.vn/english/news/010704/domestic_vietnamchina.htm)
(accessed on 19 July 2004). See also “Two China-Vietnam Beibu Gulf agreements take effect”.
From the website of the People’s Daily Online (English version).
(http://english.people.com.cn/200407/01/eng20040701_148157.htm) (accessed on 3 October 2004).
30 The tenth round of talks on “sea issues” was held in Beijing on 21 and 23 June 2005. ”Vietnamese
and Chinese experts hold talks on sea issues”. From the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Vietnam (http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr04087104143/nr040807105001/ns050627151155) (accessed
on 24 July 2005).
31 For more details on the management on the border disputes between China and Vietnam, see
Amer, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach, op. cit., n. 27 and Amer, “Assessing Sino-Vietnamese rela-
tions through the management of contentious issues,” 26 Contemporary Southeast Asia (2004), at
328-345 (hereafter Amer, “Assessing Sino-Vietnamese”).
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separate occasions, and each round lasted at least two weeks on any of these. This
increase in the number and in the duration of the rounds of talks can be attributed
to the political pressure to reach a common understanding and to provide the political
leaders with the basis on which to sign a treaty.32
Reaching an agreement was by no means a simple task given the geographical
characteristics of the border areas: these encompass both mountainous terrain, not
easily accessible, and other parts including rivers – which present their own sets of
issues to be settled. Other difficulties are posed by the movement of border markings
and activities carried out by the population and local authorities in the border area.
This was clearly shown in incidents and the resulting tension in late 1997 and early
1998.33 Also, the military clashes along the border during the second half of the
1970s – in particular, in connection with the Chinese attack on Vietnam in February
and March 1979 – had left some areas in dispute along the border. Among the more
notable such areas were some 300 metres between the provinces of Guangxi and
Lang Son, which prevented the re-opening of the railway between the two countries
during the first half of the 1990s. An agreement was eventually in February 1996
reached to do so.34
As the Treaty encompassed no demarcation, such a process had to be carried
out. Consequently, the two countries established a Joint Committee for the demarca-
tion of the land border. It held its first meeting in Beijing between 19 November
and 1 December 2000. The Joint Committee would focus on the demarcation of the
border and on the planting of “landmarks”.35 The first “single marker” was “planted”
on 4 January 2002.36 The on-going demarcation process between China and Vietnam
is expected to be finalized in 2008 “at the latest”.37
In August 2002 Vietnam published the text of the Treaty, although it included
no maps.38 In September of the same year, Le Cong Phung, a Vice-Foreign Minister,
gave additional information about the Treaty. He outlined the background to the
negotiation process, the process itself, and the mechanisms and principles used in
32 For details see Amer, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach, op. cit., n. 27, at 26-29.
33 For details see ibid., at 22-24.
34 For details see ibid., at 9 and 16-17.
35 BBC/FE/4016 G/3 (6 December 2000). Report carried by the website of the Voice of Vietnam
(in Vietnamese). See also “Viet Nam and China meet on borderline demarcation”, Vietnam News
Agency (VNA) (1 December 2000), From the website of the Vietnam News Agency, (http://
vnagency.com.vn/Asp/Readnewse4.asp?Filn=) (accessed on 2 December 200).
36 “First single marker planted on Vietnam-Chinese border line” (4 January 2003). From the website
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam (http;//www.mofa.gov.vn:8080/Web%20 server/
ForeignPolicy.nsf/f6f55a44edc7e3b4c7) (accessed on 4 April 2003).
37 “Viet Nam, China to complete landmark demarcation in 2008”. From the website of theMinistry
of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam
(http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns051212154021) (accessed on 9
January 2006).
38 The full text of the Land Border Treaty without maps has been published as “The Land Border
Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China”, in Công
Báo / Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, No. 41 (25 August 2002), at 3- 16.
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settling disputed areas along the border. The core disputed areas – referred to as
“Areas C” – encompassed 164 areas covering 227 km2. Of these areas some 113
km2 were defined as belonging to Vietnam, and around 114 km2 as belonging to
China. Le Cong Phung stated that the outcome of the negotiations “conformed” with
principles agreed upon and in so doing they ensured “fairness and satisfaction for
both sides”.39
The negotiation process relating to the delimitation of the Gulf of Tonkin with
regular rounds of talks of the joint working group differed little in frequency on a
yearly basis up to 1999. The developments during 2000 showed that an increase
occurred, with six rounds of expert-level talks held during that year, in March, May,
June, September, October-November, and late November, respectively, as compared
to only one round of talks during the whole of 1999.40
The core issue in the negotiations be settled in the Gulf of Tonkin revolved around
the principle to be applied in order to divide the Gulf. In this context the impact of
islands was of importance, in particular, the Vietnamese-controlled Bach Long Vi
Island. The first question was whether or not it qualified as an island according to
the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (1982
UNCLOS). If it did, as was argued by Vietnam, then it was entitled to full maritime
zones and – more importantly – the extent of the effects and thus impact it would
have on the tracing of a line of equidistance if this principle were applied in the Gulf
of Tonkin. An assessment of the agreed coordinates indicates that the impact of Bach
Long Vi was not ‘valued’ fully in the delimitation. However, it was partly ‘valued’
as it was awarded a quarter of the impact, i.e. 15 nautical miles.41
Another potentially complicating factor in the negotiations was the status of the
Sino-French Agreement of 1887. Vietnam would probably have favoured using it
to delimit the Gulf of Tonkin since it would generally be to her own advantage. China
would have opposed using it and argued that the 1887 Agreement was intended only
to determine administrative control over the islands in the Gulf.42 The agreement
reached indicates that if the status of the Sino-French Agreement of 1887 was brought
up during the negotiations, both sides eventually agreed that it would not have an
impact on the delimitation of maritime zones.
The agreed co-ordinates indicate that the two sides reached an agreement on a
line of equidistance after having settled their differences relating to the question of
39 The Vice-Minister also gave a detailed response to the accusations by overseas Vietnamese that
the Vietnam had given up large areas of land to China. He refuted the accusations as “untrue and
groundless”. For details, see “Vice-Foreign Minister on Vietnam-China land border treaty”, 9(97)
Vietnam Law & Legal Forum (2002), at 21-23.
40 For details, see Amer, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach, op. cit., n. 27, at 31-35.
41 Nguyen, The Gulf of Tonkin, loc. cit., n. 10, at 210-213.
42 For an argument along similar lines having parallels with the Brevie Line drawn in 1939 in the
Gulf of Thailand, see Zou, Keyuan, “Maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin’, 30
(3) Ocean Development and International Law (1999), at 238-240.
Vietnam’s Border Disputes: Legal and Conflict Management Dimensions 121
how islands should have an impact on the delimitation, in particular Bach Long Vi
Island.43
The maritime boundary agreement over the Gulf of Tonkin reaffirms the Viet-
namese position of using a single line for both the continental shelf and an EEZ in
an area at a distance of less than 400 nautical miles between opposite coasts. The
Boundary Agreement is also relevant from the following perspectives: the effects
of islands, both coastal and outlying (Bach Long Vi); the role of low-tide elevations
in delimitation; the issues of the outlet of a boundary river; and the question of a
closing line for the Gulf.44
The agreement on fishery is an example of a twin-step solution for settling fishing
disputes and delimiting an EEZ. The EEZ can be divided, yet the application of the
fisheries regime can be delayed in order to minimize economic dislocation for states.
In the case of the Gulf of Tonkin, the regime of the EEZ as regards fisheries will
be applied only after four years for the Transitory Fishery Zone and fifteen years
for the Common Fishery Zone.45
3.3.3. South China Sea
In the context of the multilateral dispute relating the Spratly archipelago and the
broader issue of the situation in the South China Sea, Vietnam is actively involved
in the ASEAN-China dialogue. The most tangible outcome of that dialogue was the
signing of the “Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea” (DOC)
on 4 November 2002, during the Eight ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
The DOC is seen as an important step in the process aiming at establishing and
agreeing on a ‘code of conduct’ in the South China Sea. The parties concerned
undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means,
without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and
negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally
recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.46
In this context, the agreement between the Chinese National Offshore Oil Com-
pany (CNOOC) and the Philippines National Oil Company (PNOC) on 1 September
2004 on the seismic survey of the South China Sea is of interest.47 The area of the
43 For more detailed analyses, see Amer, IBRU; Nguyen, “The Gulf of Tonkin”, loc. cit., n. 10,
at 207-214; Nguyen, “Maritime delimitation”, loc. cit., n. 9, at 25-44; and, Zou, ‘The Sino-Viet-
namese’, loc. cit., n. 9, at 13-24.
44 For more details, see Nguyen, “Maritime delimitation”, loc. cit., n. 9, at 28-30.
45 For more details, see Nguyen, “Maritime delimitation”, loc. cit., n. 9, at 30-32.
46 Nguyen, Hong Thao, “Vietnam and the code of conduct for the South China Sea”, 32 Ocean
Development and International Law (2000), at 105-130. See alsoNguyen, Hong Thao, “Declaration
on parties’ conduct in South China Sea (the East Sea) – a step towards the establishment of the
code of conduct for the region”, 9(99), Vietnam Law & Legal Forum (2002), at 19-21.
47 The official announcement of the agreement was made by the Philippines on 6 September 2004
(“RP-China agreement on joint marine seismic undertaking in the sea constitutional – Rumulo /
DFA hails PGMA’s successful state visit to China; Signed agreements to boost trade and investment
between RP and China” SAF-AGR-524-04, September 2004, Press Release, Department of Foreign
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seismic survey covers some parts of the Spratly archipelago. Vietnam has officially
stated that the agreement has been concluded without consulting other parties. It has
“requested” China and the Philippines to inform Vietnam about the content of the
agreement. Vietnam also reiterated its claims to sovereignty over both the Spratly
and the Paracel archipelagos. Finally, it called on all other signatories to join Vietnam
in “strictly implementing the DOC”.48
In 2005 there were further developments. First, on 7 March it was announced
by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines that the Maritime and Ocean
Affairs Center, Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, would host the Third
Philippines-Vietnam Joint Oceanographic Marine Scientific Expedition in the South
China Sea (JOMSRE-SCS III) between 6-9 April 2005.49 On 11 March the Spokes-
man of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in response to a question on
China’s views on the reports that the two countries would conduct “joint marine
research” in the South China Sea. He expressed China’s “concern” about the joint
marine research and that the “relevant parties” would follow the “principles enshrined
in the Declaration on the Declaration on Conduct of parties in the South China Sea”
in their marine research.50 Second, on 14 March a “Tripartite Agreement for Joint
Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea” was
signed between the CNOOC, PETROVIETNAM, and the PNOC. The term of the
agreement is three years. The signing of the agreement “would not undermine the
basic position held by the Government of each party on the South China Sea issue”.
Affairs. From the website of the Department of Foreign Affairs (http://www.dfagov.ph/news/pr/
pr2004/sep/pr524.htm) (accessed on 29 September 2004).
48 Vietnam’s reaction to the agreement between China and the Philippines came on 9 September
2004 in response to a question raised by the correspondent of Agence France Press to the Spokes-
person of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam (“Answer to correspondent by Mr. Le Dzung,
the spokesman of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9th September 2004”. From the
website of theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam (http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/
ns041028222202) (accessed on 29 September 2004).
49 Information derived from “DFA-MOAC To host third joint scientific research expedition in the
South China Sea”, SAF-AGR-133-05 (17 March 2005), Press Release, Department for Foreign
Affairs. From the website of the Department of Foreign Affairs (http://www.dfa.gov.ph/news/pr/
pr2005/mar/pr133.htm) (accessed 17 March 2005). The Vietnamese counterpart was the Academy
of Science and Technology of Vietnam. See “Information on Vietnam-Philippines joint scientific
expedition in April 2005 in the East Sea. Answer to correspondent byMr. Le Dzung, the spokesman
of the VietnameseMinistry of Foreign Affairs on 15th March 2005”. From the website of theMinistry
of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam (http://www.mofa.gov.vn/tt_baochi/ pbnfn/ns050315170200/) (accessed
on 22 March 2005).
50 Information derived from “Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan’s comment on Philippines-
Vietnamese joint marine research in the South China Sea, 2005/03/11”. From the website of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China
(http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t186844.htm) (accessed on 11 March 2005).
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However, the parties expressed their “resolve to transform the South China Sea into
an area of peace, stability, cooperation and development”.51
3.3.4. Indonesia
Vietnam’s negoatiations with Indonesia in the 1990s did not bring about a
breakthrough in the negotiations on their border dispute. The two countries failed
to capitalize on the traditional good bilateral relations. Furthermore, the impact of
the Asian Financial Crisis on Indonesia brought other, more pressing, needs onto
the agenda for the Indonesia leaders. Thus, no progress was made in negotiating the
border disputes, yet stability was maintained. This state of affairs continued to prevail
into the early 2000s52 until a breakthrough was made in 2003; it led to the agreement
of June 2003 settling the border dispute between the two countries. However, the
pressing domestic issues to be dealt with by Indonesia have prevented the ratification
of the agreement and it has thus not yet entered into force.
3.3.5. Cambodia
The 1990s also witnessed the re-emergence of the border issues in Vietnam’s
relations with Cambodia. In particular the land border issue caused periods of tension
in bilateral relations, with leading Cambodian politicians openly accusing Vietnam
of border violations. Vietnam has repeatedly rejected such accusations. The initiation
of renewed talks on the border issues in the late 1990s led to no agreement by the
end of the decade. Doubt was first cast on the status of the agreements of 1982, 1983,
and 1985 by the Cambodian side. By the late 1990s, however, the agreements seem
to have become acceptable to both sides as the basis for further talks. The bilateral
talks progressed into the year 2000 and a Vietnam official stated that an agreement
would be reached by the end of that year.53 However, this did not materialize, and
for a few years talks were more sporadic. Eventually, the two countries managed
to make progress in the talks on the land border and on 10 October 2005 they signed
51 Information derived from “Tripartite Agreement for joint marine seismic undertaking in the
agreement area in the South China Sea. Answer to correspondent by Mr. Le Dzung, the spokesman
of the VietnameseMinistry of Foreign Affairs on 14th March 2005”. From the website of theMinistry
of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam (http://www.mofa.gov.vn/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns050314164241/) (accessed
on 22 March 2005).
52 For details on the nature of the dispute and talks up to 2000, see Nguyen,, “Les délimitations”,
loc. cit., n. 6, at 56-58.
53 For references to a settlement of the border issues between Vietnam and Cambodia by the end
of 2000, see “Vietnam, Cambodia meet on border issues”, 344 News Bulletin (1 November 2000)
(English language bulletin). From the website of Nhan Dan
(http://www.nhandan.org.vn/english/20001101/index.html and
http://www.nhandan.org.vn/english/20001101/bai-news1.html) (accessed on 15 December 2000);
and, “Viet Nam, Cambodia to solve border issue this year, affirms Vietnamese Deputy Prime
Minister” (3 November 2000). From the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam
(http://www.mofa.gov.vn:8080/…/302e3aad9ebfd3c7c725698c000552b2?) (20 December 2000).
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a Supplementary Treaty. Both countries completed their respective ratification pro-
cesses on 29 November 2005; following the exchange of ratification documents, the
Supplementary Treaty entered into force in 6 December 2005.54 Cambodia and
Vietnam expect their demarcation to be completed in December 2008.55
A closer look at the agreements of the 1980s display that in the agreement of
1982 the “historic waters” were defined as being located between the coast of Kien
Giang Province, Phu Quoc Island and the Tho Chu islands on the Vietnamese side,
and between the coast of Kampot Province and the Poulo Wai islands on the
Cambodian side. The agreement stipulated that the two countries would hold, “at
a suitable time”, negotiations to determine the maritime frontier in the “historic
waters”. Pending such a settlement the two countries would continue to regard the
Brevie Line drawn in 1939 as the diving line for the islands within the “historic
waters”, and the exploitation of the zone would be decided by “common agree-
ment”.56 In the 1985 Treaty on the Delimitation of the Vietnam-Kampuchea Frontier
the principle uti possidetis would be applied. Furthermore, the common land border
would be based on the administrative lines drawn on a 1:100,000-scale map in use
before 1954 or up to that year.57
To use maps printed in the 1950s presented the two countries with some prob-
lems: one was that the maps did not incorporate any geographical changes to have
occurred since then. Moreover, the acknowledgement that these two kinds of maps
(Bonne, and UTM) were of the same validity in delimitating and demarcating the
boundary line caused difficulties when the demarcation was to be carried out in areas
where there were divergences between these maps or between the maps and the
geographical conditions, particularly in the Mekong River delta where floods cause
annual changes. The 1985 Treaty delimitated most of the boundary line, but due to
the factors mentioned above, there were still some provisional elements that needed
further field surveys. The Supplementary Treaty of 2005 was a necessary step not
only to reconfirm the validity of the 1985 Treaty, but also to settle remaining delimita-
54 “New achievement in Vietnam-Cambodia relations”, From the website of Nhan Dan (http://
www.nhandan.org.vn/english/news/081205/domestic_new.htm) (accessed on 9 January 2006).
55 “New achievement in Vietnam-Cambodia relations”,
(http://www.nhandan.org.vn/english/news/081205/domestic_new.htm) (accessed on 9 January 2006);
and “Vietnam and Cambodia discuss master plan on border demarcation”.
(http://www.nhandan.org.vn/english/news/231205/domestic_vn.htm) (accessed on 9 January 2006).
Both from the website of Nhan Dan.
56 BBC/FE 7074 A3/7-8, Kittichaisaree, op. cit., n. 2, at 180-181. Interestingly enough, the “full
text” of the Agreement transmitted by the official Cambodian news agency (SPK) on July 8 omitted
the sentence: “Patrolling and surveillance in these historical waters will be jointly conducted by
the two sides”, which was included in Article 3 of the version published by the Vietnamese News
Agency and reproduced in Kittichaisaree’s study (BBC/FE/7074 A3/8, 7076/A3/7; and Kittichaisaree,
op. cit., n. 2, at 180-181).
57 For reports from Vietnam and the PRK announcing the signing of the Treaty and for details,
see BBC/FE/8143 A3/1-3. See also Quang, loc.cit., n. 3, at 8-9.
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tion issues and to move the demarcation process ahead.58 Following the ratification
of the Supplementary Treaty the two countries have agreed to push ahead with the
demarcation process with the goal of completing it by the end of 2008.59
4. BROADER TRENDS IN THEMANAGEMENT OF VIETNAM’S BORDER
DISPUTES
From the above analysis it can be noted that the resolution of the Cambodian
conflict in October 1991 was a watershed in the management of Vietnamese border
disputes with other South-east Asian countries. Prior to this development Vietnam
had settled its border dispute with only one country: Laos. As noted above the
agreements reached with Cambodia in the 1980s have not resolved the border dis-
putes, as is seen in the continued differences and renewed attempts at negotiations
in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Since the settlement of the Cambodian conflict,
Vietnam agreed in 1992 on a JDA with Malaysia over areas of overlapping claims
in an area of the Gulf of Thailand. Then, Vietnam and Thailand agreed on maritime
boundaries between the two countries in the Gulf of Thailand in 1997. The agreements
with Thailand have also paved the way for talks between Vietnam, Thailand, and
Malaysia relating to the area of the Gulf of Thailand where the claims of the three
countries overlap. Furthermore, the 1995 agreement with the Philippines on a ‘code
of conduct’ to be observed in the South China Sea is another notable example of
progress after the resolution of the Cambodian conflict.
In the case of the management of the border issues between China and Vietnam
the normalization of bilateral relations certainly facilitates the management of the
disputes. However, the most interesting feature is the fact that the full normalization
took place without resolution of the border issues. This can best be understood in
the light of the major efforts that both countries have invested in managing and
resolving the border issues since full normalization. In other words, full normalization
would not have been possible if resolving the border issues had been a pre-condition
for full normalization.60
58 Nguyen, Hong Thao and Hoang Hai Oanh, “Legal aspects of the Supplementary Treaty to the
1985 Treaty on Boundary Delimitation between Vietnam and Cambodia”, 12 (137) Vietnam Law
& Legal Forum (January 2006), at 17-20.
59 “Vietnam and Cambodia discuss master plan on border demarcation”. From the website of Nhan
Dan (http://www.nhandan.org.vn/english/news/231205/domestic_vn.htm) (accessed on 9 January
2006).
60 For more detailed analyses of the normalization process per se and the way in which the border
disputes were addressed during this process, see Amer, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach, op. cit.,
n. 27, at 7-8; Sino-Vietnamese relations is derived from Amer, Ramses, “Sino-Vietnamese normaliza-
tion in the light of the crisis of the late 1970s”, 67 Pacific Affairs (Fall 1994), at 365-366 and 376-
382; Amer, Ramses, “Sino-Vietnamese relations: past, present and future”, in Thayer, Carlyle A.
and Ramses Amer (eds.), Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition (Singapore: Institute for Southeast
Asian Studies; and NewYork: St Martin’s Press, 1999), at 73-77 and 105-108; and Amer, “Assessing
Sino-Vietnamese”, loc. cit., 31, at 320-328.
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Overall, Vietnam has made considerable progress in managing and resolving its
border disputes. Some bilateral disputes still remain unresolved, yet these are managed
through various measures such as a JDA, a code of conduct, and talks. The multi-
lateral dispute over the Spratlys is more complicated due to the nature of the disputes.
Thus far Vietnam has made the greatest progress in its bilateral agreements with the
Philippines and China, respectively, when it comes to managing disputes in the area.
Vietnam also contributes to the policy towards the South China Sea and the Associ-
ation’s attempts at promoting peace and stability in the area. Differences such as
those between Vietnam and China relating to the Paracels, and also with regard to
areas to the east of the Vietnamese coast and the west of the Spratlys, are likely to
persist. However, both sides have made considerable progress in containing tension
in recent years and have agreed on a number of measures to avoid and contain
possible sources of tension.61
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Since the early 1990s, Vietnam has emerged as an active partner in settling border
disputes by peaceful means in the region. During a period spanning only slightly
longer than a decade, Vietnam has completed talks on six land and maritime disputes
with the following countries: Malaysia, Thailand, China, Indonesia, and Cambodia.
This is an impressive success rate in terms of the settlement of border disputes in
the context of South-east Asia. Through these agreements, Vietnam has contributed
to the development of international law such as the application of the uti possidetis
principle, the equitable principle, the application of the single line for maritime
delimitation, and in terms of the effects on islands of the maritime delimitation.
Could the progress in managing the border disputes be attributed only to Vietnam?
The answer is no; credit has, though, to be given to Vietnam for striving to manage
peacefully its border disputes with neighbouring countries. The policies implemented
by Vietnam have positively contributed to the peaceful management of the disputes.
Vietnam has also persisted in pursuing such policies in the context of those disputes
that have yet to be settled.
Of course, the agreements with Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Thailand, respectively, have been reached because these countries
have also opted to pursue policies promoting negotiations on their border disputes
with Vietnam. Thus, the peaceful management of Vietnam’s border disputes is a result
of the common interest between Vietnam and the neighbouring countries concerned
to pursue such policies. It also reflects the vast improvement in overall relations
between Vietnam and China, as well as among Vietnam and the member-states of
ASEAN during the 1990s, i.e., after the formal resolution of the Cambodian conflict
and the full normalization of relations between China and Vietnam in late 1991.
61 Amer, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach, op. cit., n. 27, at 45-46.
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Despite the positive developments the remaining disputes are a challenge. Vietnam
and Cambodia must complete the demarcation of their land border and resolve their
maritime disputes. Between Vietnam and China the demarcation of the land border
must be completed. The two countries also need fully to implement the agreements
reached relating to the Tonkin Gulf. Furthermore, Vietnam and China must continue
bilateral talks on “maritime issues” (South China Sea/East Sea) and continue to strive
for management of potential tension in the area; they need to refrain from any action
that might cause tension. Vietnam and Indonesia need to complete the ratification
process and proceed towards making their maritime agreements effective, i.e., these
should enter into force. Vietnam must also pursue trilateral talks with Malaysia and
Thailand on the area of trilateral dispute in the Gulf of Thailand. Finally, Vietnam
and other concerned parties must continue to contribute to the peaceful management
of the multilateral dispute over the Spratly archipelago in the South China Sea. The
impact of the Tripartite Agreement among the national oil companies of China, the
Philippines, and Vietnam on the South China Sea situation will have to be assessed









Maritime Claims under Chinese Law – Relevant International Convention –
Application of International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code
NEW NATIONAL ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. SHANGHAI RIJIN-TOP
EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL FORWARDING CO. LTD.
Shanghai Maritime Court of PRC (SMC), 21 April 2005
Civil Judgment (2004) TMC (Chu) No. 492
Facts
On 15 September 2003, the defendant issued a Bill of Lading (B/L) numbered
as DNB030909. Shipper: Auto Best Co. Ltd.; Consignee and Notify Party: Danny’s
Automotive Company; Cargo: Spare Tools and Accessories; No. of Pieces: 1,183
(Container GATU8063730); Port of Lading: Ning Bo, China; Destination:
Johannesburg; Shipment: KOTA WAJAR 087; Freight to Collect.
According to a Marine Cargo Transportation Insurance Contract (No. 2199080)
between the plaintiff and a company named Prologistics, claimed by the plaintiff
as the agent of Danny’s Automotive Company, Prologistics appeared as an insured
* Edited by B.S. Chimni and Joydeep Narayan Choudhuri. The years for which the State Practice
has been collated are 2004 and 2005. However, in some instances, prior state practice has been
included. This editorial decision was taken for two reasons: first, that readers may find useful the
state practice of previous years; second, that often this previous state practice is available only in
later years. The responsibility for the content of a contribution is that of each national contributor
to the State Practice Section. The original footnote form has been retained in each contribution.
1 Contributed by Yun Zhao, Assistant Professor, City University of Hong Kong.
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party in the Contract. The plaintiff initiated the suit based on his subrogation rights,
which were valued in toto at USD 67,874.76.
On 21 October 2003, the container GATU8063730 was confirmed as being totally
lost in a fire on board the ship the Sea Elegance. The report by the Maritime Security
Bureau of South Africa testified that a container with 20 tons of Calcium Hypochlorite
(hereinafter CH) was neither declared nor labelled as dangerous cargo in Singapore,
was not loaded appropriately, and it eventually exploded. The CH container was
loaded onto the bottom floor of the larboard, beside a container of HO. In the same
cabin, there were containers of plastics, rubber- and paper-based cargoes; the adjacent
cabin was the engine room. In the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code
(hereinafter IMDG), CH is listed as dangerous goods (No. 1748, level 5.1). According
to the regulations issued by the United Nations Maritime Organization on IMDG,
this kind of dangerous shipping unit shall be loaded on the deck cabin, avoiding
excessive sunlight and heat sources, and the packages should be stacked reasonably
allowing adequate ventilation. The International Salvage Union and the International
Group of P&I suggested that the CH can only be loaded on the deck and the chemical
cargoes shall be packed in drums each containing no more than 45 kilograms. If the
air temperature is higher than 35° Celsius, the shipper should take measures to lower
the temperature of the container of No. 1748 cargoes in IMDG, or each container
should not contain over 14 tons of those goods. From the investigation it has been
evident that in temperatures of over 35° Celsius, the CH will become unstable and
can possibly result in a fire or in an explosion. The experts reached a consensus that
the explosion and fire on the Sea Elegance were caused by the unstable CH in the
circumstance of an air temperature of over 35° Celsius.
The Judgment
The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s request by citing Articles 51 and 269 of the
Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, as well as Article 54 of the Civil
Procedure Code of the People’s Republic of China.
The accident was caused by the negligence of the CH’s consignor. He failed to
declare and to label the container as dangerous goods as defined in the IMDGC,
which caused the improper loading and eventually resulted in fire and explosion.
The consignors/shippers should have been more aware of the features of the goods
than was the carrier. They were obligated to remind the carrier to pay attention to
the character of the cargo and to take measures to prevent, and if necessary deal with,
possible accidents. If a shipper failed to fulfil this obligation, he would be found
responsible for any damage. In this case, the carrier loaded the cargoes unwittingly,
so he and his employees were not negligent as regards the cause of the fire accident.
Even if the loss of the goods was because of the inappropriate loading by the
employees of the carrier, the plaintiff would not be entitled to damages for there
is a special rule in the legislations. According to the law as per Article 51 of the
Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, unless caused by the actual fault
of the carrier, the carrier will not be liable for the loss of or damage to the goods
incurred during the period of the carrier’s responsibility arising or resulting from
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a fire. The evidence provided by the plaintiff did not prove the existence of the actual
fault of the carrier himself, so the carrier was exempted from the responsibility for
the damages caused in the fire. The plaintiff did not justify his request for damages
on the basis of inappropriate loading.
Application of the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 – Application for recognition and enforcement
VYSANTHI SHIPPING COMPANY LTD. v. CHINA GRAINS, OILS &
FEEDSTUFFS CO. LTD. AND OTHERS
Tianjin Maritime Court of PRC (TMC), 29 October 2004
Civil Order in Writing (2004) TMC (Que) No.1
Facts
The dispute between the applicant and the first defendant on the B/L of the
Joanna V Ship issued on 28 June 1996 had been heard by the London Court of
International Arbitration (LCIA) and an award was issued on 14 March 2001. Accord-
ing to the award, the applicant should obtain USD 367,136.86 in general average
contribution (GAC) and USD 28,500 in damages of resorting. The applicant should
also obtain interest at seven per cent per annum on the above amount. The interest
on damages of resorting (USD 28,500) would be calculated from 1 August 1996.
The commencement time for calculating the GAC interest would, however, depend
on the results of the negotiation between the applicant and the first defendant. If their
negotiation failed, the arbitration court would decide the date. The end dates of the
interest of both damages would be the day when the first defendant made the de facto
payment to the applicant. On 20 June 2001, the LCIAmade the second award, stating
that the date of commencement for calculating the interest of the resorting damages
should be 12 July 1996. In the same award, it was stated that the arbitration fees
for the two arbitration procedures would be paid by the first defendant. On 13
February 2002, the third award was made to confirm that the cost of the whole dispute
should be paid by the first defendant.
On 28 March 2002, the first defendant and the second defendant brought an action
before the Commercial Court of the Queen’s Bench Division, applying for the setting
aside of the above awards. On 10 July 2002, the court ruled that the defendants should
perform as the award decided. On 17 January 2004, the Tianjin Maritime Court
received the applicant’s application for recognizing and enforcing the above three
awards.
The Judgment
The court did not recognize and enforce the three awards brought forward by
the applicant. These awards were made by the LCIA on 14 March 2001, 20 June
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2001, and 13 February 2002, respectively. The applicant would pay the litigation
fee (RMB 500).
The United Kingdom and the People’s Republic of China are both parties to the
1958 New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. In line with the Convention and the relevant provisions in the law of People’s
Republic of China, arbitral awards made in the United Kingdom shall be recognized
and enforced in the People’s Republic of China. The Civil Procedure Law of the
People’s Republic of China rules in Article 219 and states as follows: “The time
limit for the submission of an application for execution shall be one year, if both
or one of the parties are citizens; it shall be six months if both parties are legal
persons or other organizations.” The Tianjin Maritime Court received the written
application on 17 January 2004. Although the date when the awards were received
by the parties was not clear and the time period for the performance of the awards
was also not clear, the fact that the defendants brought the action before the British
court on 28 March 2002 clearly proved that the first and second defendants, as well
as the applicant, received the awards before that day. The application for recognition
and enforcement had been overdue. The judgment of the British court was that the
circumstances did not consist of a reasonable excuse for extending and/or breaking
off the calculation of the six-month time limit during which one can successfully
apply for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
Application of the 1993 Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits
– Reimbursement under Letter of Credit
INDUSTRIAL BANK OF KOREA v. QINGDAO HUATIAN HANDTRUCK CO.
LTD. & TIANJIN BRANCH OF THE INDUSTRIAL BANK OF KOREA CO.
LTD.2
Shandong Higher People’s Court, 15 December 2005
(2005) Lu Min Si Zhong Zi No. 71
Facts
‘A’, the Industrial Bank of Korea, issued an Irrevocable Documentary Credit
numbered M04Z9403NU30011, whose beneficiary was ‘D’, the Qingdao Huatian
Handtruck Co. Ltd. On the Documentary Credit it was stated that the expiry date/place
was 10 May 2005/China, the amount was USD 23,900 payable at any bank, the
deadline of payment was 90 days after sight, and the latest shipment date was 30
April 2004. The Documentary Credit also required documents such as the commercial
invoice, the full set of the clean on board marine bill of lading, the packing list, the
certificate of origin, etc. The period for the presentation of documents was within
2 Source: <http://www.ccmt.org.cn/ss/writ/judgementDetial.php?sId=1845>.
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ten days after the date of issuance, and did not exceed the expiry date of the Docu-
mentary Credit. The documents mentioned above were submitted together with a
sight draft of USD 23,900 to ‘A’ on 14 April 2004. However, on 27 April 2004,
‘A’ refused to pay, and the reason stated in its telegram was that the draft was a
sight draft, not payable 90 days after sight. On 10 May 2004, a draft payable 90 days
after sight was sent to ‘A’, but ‘A’ again refused to reimburse by telefax; the reason
given was that the period for presentation of documents had expired. After several
unsuccessful approaches and negotiations, on 5 November 2004, ‘A’ replied, “Though
there are factors not satisfying the requirements to pay, we are willing to reimburse
half of the amount (i.e., USD 11,950). If you agree, please acknowledge us by
SWIFT.” Both parties, however, failed to reach an agreement on the payment.
The Judgment
Pursuant to Section 1(1) of Article 153 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s
Republic of China, the appellate court held that the appeal is dismissed, and the
original judgment is affirmed. The litigation costs for the appeal case are RMB 5588,
and they shall be paid by ‘A’.
Since ‘A’ and the Tianjing Branch of the Industrial Bank of Korea Co. Ltd.
(hereinafter “B”) are a Korean corporation and its branch, the present case is a
commercial case concerning foreign interests. Therefore, the provisions of the Civil
Procedure Involving Foreign Interests should be applied. Since both the beneficiary’s
domicile and the issuing bank’s domicile are the place of performance of the contract
of documentary credit, D’s domicile is also one of the places of performance. There-
fore, the trial court has jurisdiction in the present case as the contract’s place of
performance is under the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Further, the parties to
the case have reached an agreement to apply the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (1993 edition, hereinafter “UCP500”) as the applicable law.
The main issue in the present case is whether A’s reason for refusing to reimburse
was valid. According to the provisions stipulated in the chapter of the “Documents”
of the UCP500, drafts are not included in the definition of “documents”. Therefore,
unless there are special stipulations in the Documentary Credit clause, drafts are
generally not documents in the sense of Documentary Credits. However, in the present
case, there were special clauses on drafts. Since the Documentary credit is the contract
between the issuing bank and the beneficiary, the parties should be bound by the
clauses of the contract. Therefore, D’s first draft did not appear on its face to be
in compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit; it constitutes an alteration
to the original contract, and ‘A’ had the right to refuse to accept it. In this sense,
A’s reason for refusing to pay was valid. However, since the draft is not a kind of
“document”, its presentation should not be limited by the aforementioned deadline.
Therefore, A’s reason for the second refusal to pay was not valid, and the trial court
should support D’s claims to USD 23,900 and the interest accrued.
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NATIONAL LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS3
Special Marine Reserves
Interim Measures for the Administration of Special Marine Reserves
In November 2005, Interim Measures for the Administration of Special Marine
Reserves were promulgated in accordance with Article 23 of theMarine Environment
Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (as revised in 1999) which stipu-
lates:
Wherever there exist special geographical conditions or ecosystem, or special need for
exploitation and utilization of biological and non-biological resources, special marine
reserves should be established for special administration with effective protection measures
and scientific exploitation mode.
The scope of application of this Decree is limited to the sea areas under the juris-
diction of the People’s Republic of China.4
Fishery Administrative Cruising within Exclusive Economic Zones
Provisions on the Administration of Fishery Administrative Cruising within
Exclusive Economic Zones
Fishery administrative cruising started in the year 2000 in China upon the pro-
mulgation of the “Provisions on the Administration of Fishery Administrative Cruising
within Exclusive Economic Zones (No. 8 [2000] of the BFMFPS).” Change of
circumstances as well as the accumulation of experience in fishery administrative
cruising in the following years called for a revision of the 2000 Provisions.
The change of circumstances includes the conclusion of fishery agreements with
Japan and Korea (coming into force on 1 June 2000 and 30 June 2001, respectively).
A substantial revision of the Provisions on the Administration of Fishery Administra-
tive Cruising appears in Article 21, which extends the fishery administrative cruising
to the high seas. It also confirms, in light of the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement
and the Sino-Korean Fishery Agreement, administrative cruising in areas such as
sea waters subject to temporary measures, transitional sea areas or condominium
sea areas.
3 Contributed by Zhang Xinjun, School of Law, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
4 For the text of the Chinese version of the Decree No. 24 (2005) of the State Oceanic Administra-
tion promulgated on 16 November 2005, see the official website of the State Oceanic Administration
of the People’s Republic of China < http://www.soa.gov.cn/bbs/060117.doc > (accessed 15 June
2006).
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Excerpt from Provisions on the Administration of Fishery Administrative
Cruising within Exclusive Economic Zones5
[No. 83 (2005) of China Fishery Administration Commanding Centre]
[Date of Promulgation: 14 November 2005]
[Effective date: 14 November 2005]
Article 1. The present Provisions are formulated in accordance with the Fishery
Law of the People’s Republic of China and other laws and regulations in order to
regulate and strengthen the administration of fishery administrative cruising, and to
maintain the normal fishery production order as well as to maintain the marine rights
and interests of the state in exclusive economic zones.
Article 2. The “fishery administrative cruising within exclusive economic zones”
as mentioned in the present Provisions refers to the law enforcement whereby the
fishery law enforcement authority, under the relevant laws and regulations of the
state, sends out fishery administrative ships for carrying out supervision and inspection
over and imposes an administrative penalty upon Chinese and foreign ships and
persons that engage in fishery activities such as fishery production and survey of
biological resources within the exclusive economic zones of China.
Article 8. The main tasks for the fishery administrative cruising within exclusive
economic zones shall be:
(1) Investigating and regulating foreign ships that illegally enter into the exclusive
economic zones of China for fishery activities;
(2) Carrying out supervision and on-the-spot regulation of foreign ships that are
allowed to engage in fishery industry or surveys of biological resources within the
exclusive economic zones of China;
(3) Carrying out supervision over the implementation of bilateral or multilateral
fishery agreements of domestic and foreign fishing ships within the jointly managed
fishing areas as determined by the agreements concluded between China and the
relevant countries, and carrying out on-the-spot regulation of domestic fishing ships,
investigating and administrating illegal fishery acts;
(4) Observing and recording the activities of domestic and foreign fishing ships;
(5) Assisting the settlement of fishery disputes or maritime casualties between
domestic and foreign fishing ships;
(6) Participating in the salvation of fishing ships to which maritime safety acci-
dents occur, and
(7) Fulfilling other tasks as assigned by the CFACC and the fishery bureau for
sea areas.
5 Unofficial translation. The Chinese version appears in Zhong Guo Shui Chan (China Fishery)
No. 2 (2006), pp. 17-19.
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Article 15. The visiting and inspection of foreign ships shall be conducted by
following the prescribed visiting and inspection procedures. The investigation and
regulation of foreign ships that violate the law shall be conducted in pursuance of
the Interim Provisions on the Administration of Fishery Activities of Foreign Persons
and Ships on Sea Areas Subject to the Jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China
(Order No. 18 [1999] of the Ministry of Agriculture) and the Notice on Specific
Handling Procedures for Fishery Cases Involving Foreign Persons and Ships (No.
11 [1999] of the Bureau of Fishery Management and Fishing Port Superintendence
of the People’s Republic of China).
Article 21. The fishery administrative cruising in the high seas, sea waters subject
to temporary measures, transitional sea areas or condominium sea areas as prescribed
by the fishery agreements concluded between China and other countries shall be
conducted in accordance with the present Provisions.
Article 22. The power to interpret the present Provisions shall remain with the
Bureau of Fishery Management and Fishing Port Superintendence of the People’s
Republic of China.
Article 23. The present Provisions shall come into force as of the date of promul-
gation, and the original Notice of the BFMFPS on Printing and Distributing the
Provisions on the Administration of Fishery Administrative Cruising within Exclusive
Economic Zones (No. 8 [2000] of the BFMFPS) shall be simultaneously repealed.
Revising Implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism Projects under
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change
Measures for Operation andManagement of the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) Projects
On 31May 2004, the People’s Republic of China promulgated the decree “Interim
Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects”
(Interim Measures).6 The “Interim Measures” were modified by the “Measures for
Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects,” promulgated
on 12 October 2005. Although modification was limited to the minimum extent, a
substantial change made in the new regulation is “benefit sharing” under Article 24.
Under the “Interim Measures”, the Chinese Government would retain the benefit
from project owners in selling Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). However, the
manner of “benefit sharing” was not specified. The new Article 24 sets up criteria
for collecting fixed portions of revenue from different types of CDM projects.
6 The full text of the “Interim Measures” appears in the “State Practice of Asian Countries in the
Field of International Law” section of the Asian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 11 (2003-2004).
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Excerpt fromMeasures for Operation and Management of Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) Projects7
[Order No. 37 (2005) Ministry Order of National Development and Reform
Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and Ministry of Finance]
[Date of Promulgation: 12 October 2005]
[Effective Date: 12 October 2005]
Article 24. Whereas emission reduction resource is owned by the Government
of China and the emission reductions generated by a specific CDM project belong
to the project owner, revenue from the transfer of CERs shall be owned jointly by
the Government of China and the project owner, with the allocation ratio defined
as below:
(1) the Government of China takes 65 per cent CER transfer benefit from HFC
and PFC projects;
(2) the Government of China takes 30 per cent CER transfer benefit from the
N2O project;
(3) the Government of China takes two per cent CER transfer benefit from CDM
projects in priority areas defined in Article 4 and forestation projects.
The revenue collected from CER transfer benefits of CDM projects will be used
in supporting activities on climate change. The detailed regulations on the collecting
and using of the revenue will be formulated by the Ministry of Finance jointly with
the NDRC and other relevant departments.
(4) The Article does not apply to the projects already approved by the Government
of China before 12 October 2005.
Immunity of Properties of Foreign Central Banks against Judicial Compulsory
Measures
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Immunity of Judicial Compulsory
Measures against the Properties of Foreign Central Banks
China has long maintained the position of supporting the doctrine of State
immunity which bars a national court from adjudicating or enforcing claims against
foreign States and their properties. The Chinese judicial practice is also consistent
with that position. The Chinese court does not adjudicate or enforce claims relevant
to properties of foreign central banks. Nevertheless, there has as yet been no legis-
lation on the matter.
7 The Chinese text of the updated regulation can be viewed on the official website of the NDRC’s
(National Development and Reform Commission) Office of National Coordination Committee on
Climate Change at <http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/UpFile/File538.PDF> (accessed 28 March 2006).
The English version can also be viewed on the same official website <http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/
english/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=100> (accessed 28 March 2006).
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The request for legislation came from Hong Kong, a Special Administrative
Region (SAR) of China since 1997. Before that, Britain’s State Immunity Act applied
in Hong Kong. It granted to foreign central banks immunity from adjudication and
enforcement for their properties in Hong Kong. When the British administration
terminated on 1 July 1997, the British law no longer applied; some foreign central
banks in Hong Kong thus expressed their concerns that there was no statutory
protection for their properties from adjudication and enforcement. It is under such
circumstances and upon receiving the request from the Hong Kong SAR Government
in 2000 that the Central Government of China passed the present legislation.
Text of Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Immunity of Judicial
Compulsory Measures against the Properties of Foreign Central Banks8
[Adopted at the 18th session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 25 October 2005, Order
of the President, No. 41 (2005)]
[Date of Promulgation: 25 October 2005]
[Effective date: 25 October 2005]
Article 1. The People’s Republic of China grants to foreign central banks the
immunity of judicial compulsory measures of protection and execution to their
properties, unless the foreign central banks or the Governments of the countries to
which the foreign central banks belong abandon this immunity in written form, or
those properties are especially used for protection and execution.
Article 2. The term “foreign central banks” as mentioned in the Measures refers
to the central banks of foreign countries and regional economic integration organiza-
tions, or those financial administrative organs performing the functions of central
banks.
The term “properties of foreign central banks” as mentioned in the Measures
refers to the cash, bills, bank deposits, securities, foreign exchange reserves, and gold
reserves, as well as the real estate and other properties of foreign central banks.
Article 3. Where any foreign country does not grant the immunity to the properties
of the central bank of the People’s Republic of China or the properties of financial
administrative organs of special administrative regions of the People’s Republic of
China, or grants an immunity which is lower than that as prescribed in this Law,
the People’s Republic of China shall handle it according to the principle of reci-
procity.
Article 4. This Law shall come into force as of the date of promulgation.
8 Unofficial translation. The Chinese version appears in the Gazette of the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (2005, No. 8), published by




Implementation of domestic law on Prevention of Terrorism – Constitutional
Validity of the Prevention of Terrorism Act – Scope and definition of ‘Terrorism’
– Terrorism and Human Rights – Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and
1373 (2001)
PEOPLE’S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES ANDANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA
Supreme Court of India, 16 December 2003
AIR 2004 Supreme Court 456
Facts
The Petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (hereinafter POTA) contending that (a) the
provisions of POTA fell under Entry 1 (Public Order) of List II (State List) of the
Indian Constitution10 and accordingly the Indian Parliament lacked the legislative
competence; (b) that terrorist activity and its regulation (essentially as a ‘public order’
concept) was within the realm of a State(s), and therefore State(s) only had the
competence to enact legislation. The primary issue was whether acts of terrorism
aimed at weakening the sovereignty and integrity of the country could be equated
with mere breaches of public order or public safety.
The Judgment
“Terrorist acts”, the Court noted, were
[M]eant to destabilize the nation by challenging its sovereignty and integrity, to raze the
constitutional principles that we hold dear, to create a psyche of fear and anarchism among
common people, to tear apart secular fabric, to overthrow democratically elected Govern-
ment, to promote prejudice and bigotry, to demoralize the security forces, to thwart the
economic progress and development and so on … This cannot be equated with usual law
and order problems within a State.
9 Contributed by V.G. Hegde, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi.
10 Article 246 of the Indian Constitution provides for the distribution of legislative powers between
Union and States. The various matters of legislation have been enumerated in three lists: List I or
the Union List; List II or the State List; List III or the Concurrent List. The Union Parliament has
exclusive powers of legislation with respect to subjects or items in List I. The State Legislatures
have exclusive powers to legislate on subjects or items in List II. The legislative power on items
in List III is concurrent.
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Referring to the character of terrorism as “inter-state, inter-national or cross-
border”, the Court stated that it was not “a regular criminal justice endeavour”.
“Terrorism”, it noted, “is definitely a criminal act, but it is much more than mere
criminality”.
Recognizing terrorism as a challenge to the whole community of civilized nations,
the Court noted that terrorist activities in one country might take on a transnational
character, carrying out attacks across one border, receiving funding from private
parties or a Government across another, and procuring arms from multiple sources.
Referring to domestic and international aspects of terrorism, the Court noted:
Terrorism in a single country can readily become a threat to regional peace and security
owing to its spillover effects. It is, therefore, difficult in the present context to draw sharp
distinctions between domestic and international terrorism. Many happenings in the recent
past caused the international community to focus on the issue of terrorism with renewed
intensity. The Security Council unanimously passed resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373
(2001); the General Assembly adopted resolution 56/1 by consensus, and convened a
special session. All these resolutions and declarations, inter alia, call uponMember States
to take necessary steps to ‘prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts’. India is
a party to all these resolutions. Anti-terrorism activities [at] the global level are mainly
carried out through bilateral and multilateral co-operation among nations. It has thus
become our international obligation also to pass necessary laws to fight terrorism.
The Court also referred to the Report of the PolicyWorking Group on the United
Nations and Terrorism which urged the global community to concentrate on a triple
strategy to fight terrorism. These strategies, as noted by the Court, were (a) to
dissuade disaffected groups from embracing terrorism; (b) to deny groups or indi-
viduals the means to carry out acts of terrorism, and (c) to sustain broad-based
international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. Based on these, the Court
averred:
Therefore, the anti-terrorism laws should be capable of dissuading individuals or groups
from resorting to terrorism, denying the opportunities for the commission of acts of
terrorism by creating [an] inhospitable environment for terrorism and also leading the
struggle against terrorism. Anti-terrorism law is not only a penal statute but also focuses
on pre-emptive rather than defensive State action.
On the issue of balancing the protection and promotion of human rights, on the
one hand, with the combating of terrorism within the Constitutional mandate, the
Court stated:
The protection and promotion of human rights under the rule of law [are] essential in
the prevention of terrorism. Here comes the role of law and Court’s responsibility. If
human rights are violated in the process of combating terrorism, it will be self-defeating.
Terrorism often thrives where human rights are violated, which adds to the need to
strengthen action to combat violations of human rights. The lack of hope for justice
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provides [the] breeding grounds for terrorism. Terrorism itself should also be understood
as an assault on basic rights. In all cases, the fight against terrorism must be respectful
to human rights. Our Constitution laid down clear limitations on State actions within the
context of the fight against terrorism. To maintain this delicate balance by protecting ‘core’
Human Rights is the responsibility of [the] Court in a matter like this. The constitutional
soundness of [the] POTA needs to be judged by keeping these aspects in mind.
The Court also had to deal with the legality and constitutional validity of the
POTA provisions relating to the forfeiture of property of any person prosecuted and
ultimately convicted.11 On this issue, the Court noted that:
Funding and financing play a vital role in fostering and promoting terrorism, and it is
only with such funds that terrorists are able to recruit persons for their activities and make
payments to them and their family to obtain arms and ammunition for furthering terrorist
activities and to sustain the campaign of terrorism. Therefore, seizure, forfeiture and
attachment of properties are essential in order to contain terrorism and are not unrelated
to the same. Indeed, it is relevant to notice a resolution passed by the United Nations
Security Council (Resolution No. 1373 dated 28 September 2001) which emphasized the
need to curb terrorist activities by freezing and forfeiture of funds and financial assets
employed to further terrorist activities. It will also be interesting to notice […] the United
Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism but
at the same time it is not necessary to go into those details in the present context. The
scheme of the provisions indicates that the principles of natural justice are duly observed
and they do not confer any arbitrary power, and forfeiture can only be made by an order
of the Court against which an appeal is also provided to the High Court and the rights
of [the] bona fide transferee are not affected. Therefore, for the present, it is not necessary
to pronounce on the constitutional validity of these provisions and we proceed on the
basis that they are valid.
The Court upheld the constitutional validity of the POTA and the provisions which
were specifically challenged.
11 The constitutional validity of several provisions of the POTA were challenged which inter alia,
included the powers of the investigating officers, the word ‘abet’ in the context of a terrorist act,
the issue of knowledge or mens rea.
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Issues relating to Environment Protection and Right to Development – Applica-
tion of Precautionary Principle in the context of Large Dams – Sustainable
Development – Disaster Management
N.D. JAYAL AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India, 9 September 2003
AIR 2004 Supreme Court 867
Facts
The petitioners were seeking the intervention of the court concerning the safety12
and environmental aspects of the Tehri Dam,13 a dam being built in a seismic-prone
zone in the Himalayan region. The proposal to build a dam was conceived in the
1960s; several Committees of Experts on various technical issues investigated environ-
mental, seismic and rehabilitation issues. At one stage, the Government of India had
stayed the operation of the dam on environmental considerations. Finally, while
granting a conditional clearance to the project in 1990, the Government had sought:
(a) environmental safeguard measures planned and implemented pari passu with
progress of work on the project; (b) the detailed surveys and studies to be carried
out according to the proposed schedule and details made available to the Department
for assessment; (c) the catchment area treatment programme and the rehabilitation
plans be so drawn up as to be completed ahead of the filling of the reservoir, and
(d) the Department should be kept informed of progress on various works period-
ically.14
The Judgment
The Court, while refusing to re-open discussion on the safety aspects of the dam,
dealt with matters pertaining to the preservation of the ecology and development.
The Court referring to its earlier cases15 observed:
12 Petitioners had sought to conduct a Three-Dimensional (3D) Non-Linear Test to evaluate the
earthquake susceptibility of the dam against the Maximum Credible Earthquake. However, the Court
refused to go into this question as the safety aspects had been considered in an earlier case by the
Supreme Court in 1992, namely, Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangarsh Samiti v. State of Uttar Pradesh.
13 The Tehri Dam, located in the Himalayan region, was constructed at the confluence of the
Bhagirathi and Bhailangana rivers in the neighbourhood of the Garhwal town in the State of
Uttaranchal, resulting in the relocation of an entire town.
14 These four conditions had been laid down by the Supreme Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan
v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3751. Specifically on this project, the following conditions related
to the completion or compilation of data and an action plan relating to: (a) catchment area treatment;
(b) command area development; (c) flora and fauna; (d) water quality maintenance; (e) Bhagirathi
Basin Management Authority; (f) Disaster Management, and (g) rehabilitation.
15 Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2715 andM.C. Mehta v. Union
of India, AIR 2002 SC 1696.
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[T]he balance between environmental protection and developmental activities could only
be maintained by strictly following the principle of ‘sustainable development’. This is
a development strategy that caters to the needs of the present without negotiating the
ability of upcoming generations to satisfy their needs. The strict observance of sustainable
development will put us on a path that ensures development while protecting the environ-
ment, a path that works for all peoples and for all generations. It is a guarantee to the
present and a [bequest] to the future that all environmental related developmental activities
should benefit more people while maintaining the environmental balance. This could be
ensured only by the strict adherence to sustainable development without which life of
coming generations will be in jeopardy.
The Court, while recognizing the right to a clean environment as a fundamental
right under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, addressed the question of placing
the right to development within the same legal reasoning. Thus, the Court observed:
The right to development cannot be treated as a mere right to economic betterment or
cannot be limited to a misnomer for simple construction activities. The right to develop-
ment encompasses much more than economic well-being and includes within its definition
the guarantee of fundamental human rights. The ‘development’ is not related only to the
growth of GNP. In the classic work ‘Development As Freedom’, the Nobel prize winner
Amartya Sen pointed out that ‘the issue of development cannot be separated from the
conceptual framework of human rights’. This idea is also part of the UN Declaration on
the Right to Development. The right to development includes the whole spectrum of civil,
cultural, economic, political and social process[es], for the improvement of peoples’ well-
being and realization of their full potential. It is an integral part of human rights. Of
course, construction of a dam or a mega project is definitely an attempt to achieve the
goal of wholesome development. Such works could very well be treated as an integral
component for development.
The Court examined each of the components of the conditional clearance such
as (a) catchment area treatment; (b) command area development; (c) flora and fauna;
(d) water quality maintenance; (e) Bhagirathi Basin Management Authority; (f)
Disaster Management, and (g) rehabilitation. After examining these aspects, the
majority decision of the Court pointed out that the petitioners had disputed “the extent
of compliance only and not that there is no compliance at all”. The majority decision
found that there was compliance, although with certain lapses. According to the Court,
these lapses in compliance could be prevented by the setting up of monitoring
agencies. Dharmadhikari, J., while dissenting with these conclusions, particularly
on the safety aspects of the dam, observed:
On the safety aspect of the Dam, particularly when the location of the Dam is in a highly
earthquake-prone zone in the valleys of Himalayas, all additional safeguards are required
to be undertaken on the ‘precautionary principle’ as contained in the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development taken in the United Nations Conference held in January
1992 to which India is a party. The precautionary principle in the Rio Declaration reads:
146 Asian Yearbook of International Law
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States accordingly to their capabilities. Where there are threats of a series
of reversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost effective measures to prevent environment degradation.”
Dharmadhikari, J. further observed:
The precautionary principle accepted by India being a party and signatory to international
agreement and understandings in the field of environment has become part of domestic
law, i.e., the Environmental Protection Act. The Governmental authorities in India cannot
be permitted to set up a plea of scientific uncertainty of [the] 3-D Non-Linear Analysis
of the Dam. On the safety aspect, the pleas like res judicata based on [an] earlier decision
of this Court cannot be allowed to be raised when further developments and events in
the course of the Project require further precautions to be taken before filling the Dam
to the optimum capacity. It is not the case of the respondents that [the] 3-D Non-Linear
Analysis of the Dam cannot be undertaken with the assistance of foreign Experts on the
subject. To take care of all eventualities of damage to [the] Dam by earthquake [the] 3-D
Non-Linear Analysis of the Dam suggested by four Experts as a matter of abundant caution
must be undertaken. It is only after [the] 3-D Non-Linear Analysis of the Dam is com-
pleted and the opinion of the Experts on the safety aspect is again sought that further
impoundment of the Dam should be allowed. InM.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Trapezium
Matter) (1997 (2) SCC 353), this Court has applied the ‘Polluter pays principle’ and the
‘Precautionary principle’ of international law as the law of the land of this country, India
being party to the United Nations Conference and signatory to International Declarations
and Agreements.
While dealing with issues of protection of environment, natural resources and
rehabilitation, Dharmadhikari, J. concluded:
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in the United Nations Conference
held in June 1992 to which India was a party and signatory and on which the Environment
Protection Act, its Rules and Policies are modelled obligates the Authorities of India by
the norms fixed in International and Domestic Law that the environmental and natural
resources of people under operation, domination and occupation shall be protected.
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Scope and Application of Bilateral Double Taxation Avoidance Convention
between India and Mauritius – In the event of Conflict Provisions of Bilateral
Tax Treaty to prevail over Income-tax Act (section 90) – Treaty-making power
of the State
UNION OF INDIA v. AZADI BACHAO ANDOLAN
Supreme Court of India, 10 October 2003
AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1107
Facts
The Petitioners challenged two Circulars16 issued by the Government of India
pursuant to which certain instructions were issued to income-tax authorities concerning
assessment of income-tax cases pertaining to Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs)
based inMauritius, involving the interpretation of the Indo-Mauritius Double Taxation
Avoidance Convention, 1983 (hereinafter ‘DTAC’). These FIIs, relying on these
Circulars, invested large amounts of capital in shares in Indian companies with the
expectation of making profits through the sale of such shares without being subjected
to tax in India.17 In 2000, Indian income-tax authorities issued Show Cause notices
to some FIIs functioning in India yet registered in Mauritius, calling upon them to
show cause as to why they should not be taxed for profits and for dividends accrued
to them in India. These companies were registered or incorporated in Mauritius and
their main purpose was to invest in the Indian share market without being liable to
be taxed. The Petitioners, inter alia, argued that these companies were controlled
and managed from countries other than India or Mauritius and as such they were
not “residents”18 of Mauritius so as to derive the benefits of the DTAC.19 The
16 Circular No. 682 dated 30 March 1994 clarifying that the capital gains of any resident of
Mauritius acquired by the alienation of shares of an Indian company shall be taxable only in
Mauritius according to Mauritius taxation laws and will not be liable to tax in India. The other
Circular was No. 789 dated 13 April 2000 further clarifying the legal position of the taxability of
capital gains and dividends in India.
17 Section 90 of the Indian Income-Tax Act dealt with the relationship between DTAC and the
Income Tax Act. In other words, it, inter alia, covered the Agreements concluded by the Government
of India with the Government of any country outside India (a) for the granting of relief in respect
of income tax payable in the other country; (b) for the avoidance of double taxation of income;
(c) for exchange of information for prevention of the evasion or avoidance of income tax; (d) for
recovery of income tax as per the laws of either country; and to make necessary provisions as may
be necessary for implementing the agreement. The other important feature of section 90 was that
DATC provisions prevailed over the provisions of the Income Tax Act for granting relief of tax
or as the case may be avoidance of double taxation to the extent they were more beneficial to the
assessee.
18 According to Article 4 of the DTAC, a “resident” of one State should be any person who, under
the laws of that State, was liable to taxation therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of
management or any other criterion of a similar nature.
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Court had to consider the scope and application of Section 90 of the Indian Income-
Tax Act in relation to the DTAC with Mauritius.
The Judgment
The Court dealt with the issue of exercise of fiscal jurisdiction by States and
the complexities involved in moderating such a jurisdiction through bilateral tax
treaties. The Court, in fact, outlined the rationale behind concluding tax treaties. The
Court stated:
Every country seeks to tax the income generated within its territory on the basis of one
or more connecting factors such as the location of the source, residence of the taxable
entity, maintenance of a permanent establishment and so on. A country might choose
to emphasise one or the other of the aforesaid factors for exercising fiscal jurisdiction
to tax the entity. Depending on which of the factors is considered to be the connecting
factor in different countries, the same income of the same entity might become liable
to taxation in different countries. This would give rise to harsh consequences and impair
economic development. In order to avoid such an anomalous and incongruous situation,
the Governments of different countries enter into bilateral treaties, conventions or agree-
ments for granting relief against double taxation. Such treaties, conventions or agreements
are called double taxation avoidance treaties, conventions or agreements.
The Court first dealt with the Constitutional sources of executive authority in
concluding a treaty. While noting that the power of entering into a treaty is an
inherent part of the sovereign power of the State, in the Indian context, the Court
stated:
Our Constitution makes no provision making legislation a condition for entry into an
international treaty in time either of war or peace. The executive power of the Union
is vested in the President and is exercisable in accordance with the Constitution. The
Executive is qua the State competent to represent the State in all matters international
and may by agreement, convention or treaty incur obligations which in international law
are binding upon the State. But the obligations arising under the agreement or treaties
19 The Delhi High Court had concurred with the arguments of the petitioners and accordingly had
quashed the Circulars. Briefly, the findings of the High Court were, inter alia, (a) certificate of
residence issued by authorities of Mauritius as insufficient evidence as regards the status of the
resident and beneficial ownership; (b) the income-tax officer, in his quasi-judicial function, be entitled
to lift the corporate veil in order to see whether the company is actually a resident of Mauritius
or not and whether the company was paying income tax in Mauritius or not; (c) conclusiveness
of a certificate of residence issued by the Mauritius Tax Authorities contemplated neither under
the DTAC nor under the Indian Income Tax Act; (d) “Treaty-shopping” by which the resident of
a third country took advantage of the provisions of the Agreement was illegal and thus necessarily
forbidden; (e) avoidance of double taxation had been a term of art and meant accordingly as that
a person had to pay tax in at least one country; avoidance of double taxation would not mean that
a person did not have to pay tax in any country whatsoever.
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are not by their own force binding upon Indian nationals. The power to legislate in respect
of treaties lies with the Parliament under entries 10 and 14 of List I of the Seventh
Schedule. But making of law under that authority is necessary when the treaty or agree-
ment operates to restrict the rights of citizens or others or modifies the law of the State.
If the rights of the citizens of others which are justificable are not affected, no legislative
measure is needed to give effect to the agreement or treaty.20
On the issue of implementation of tax treaties and section 90 of the Indian
Income-Tax Act, the Court, while providing justification for such a provision in
Income-Tax law, noted:
When it comes to fiscal treaties dealing with double taxation avoidance, different countries
have varying procedures. In the United States, such a treaty becomes a part of municipal
law upon ratification by the Senate. In the United Kingdom, such a treaty would have
to be endorsed by an order made by the Queen in Council. Since in India such a treaty
would have to be translated into an Act of Parliament, a procedure which would be time-
consuming and cumbersome, a special procedure was evolved by enacting Section 90
of the Act.
Considering the legislative history of Section 90, the Court further noted that
“Since tax treaties are intended to grant tax relief and not put residents of a contract-
ing country at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other taxpayers, Section 90 of the Income-tax
Act has been amended to clarify that any beneficial provision in the law will not
be denied to a resident of a contracting country merely because the corresponding
provision in the tax treaty is less beneficial”. Surveying the case laws of various High
Courts within India, the Court concluded that the judicial consensus in India had
been that Section 90 was specifically intended to enable and empower the Central
Government to issue a notification for the implementation of the terms of a double
taxation avoidance agreement. When that happens, the Court further concluded, the
provisions of such an agreement, with respect to cases where they apply, would
operate even if inconsistent with the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The Court,
while referring to the contention of the respondents that according to Article 265
of the Constitution no tax could be levied or collected except by authority of law,
pointed out that Section 90 was brought onto the Statute book precisely to enable
the executive to negotiate a DTAC and quickly implement it.21
20 See in this connection Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel and Others v. Union of India and another
(1970) 3. SCC 400 (as cited by the Court)
21 While on this issue, the Court considered in detail the whole matter of delegated power of
legislation and as to why a delegatee of legislative power in all cases should have no power to grant
exemption. The Court also dealt with the issue of enabling powers of the tax authorities to issue
notifications, circulars, etc. under Section 119.
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Implementation of Certain Provisions of The International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978
(STCW78) – Interpretation of Amendments to theMerchant Shipping Act, 1958
specifically relating to the obtaining of Certificate of Service in consonance with
the STCW 78
NARESH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA
Supreme Court of India, 5 April 2004
AIR 2004 Supreme Court 2026
Facts
The issue involved the recognition of Certificates of Service (CoS) and Certi-
ficates of Competence (CoC) obtained by the officers of the Indian Navy while they
were in service, without examination, for the purposes of the Merchant Navy accord-
ing to the requirements of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. Section 80 of the
Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 which provided this recognition was repealed in 1986
to give effect to the standards of Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 1978. This Certificate was a requirement
under the STCW 1978. The STCW 1978 was amended in 1995 to become known
as STCW 1995. The STCW 1995 provided that existing holders of the certificate
should complete approved training assessment and obtain a fresh Certificate of
Competence. Pursuant to this, the Government of India issued necessary notifications
implementing the requirements of STCW 1995. The short question that arose before
the Court concerned whether the Certificate of Service issued under Section 80 of
the Merchant Shipping Act (now repealed) could continue to be treated as a Certificate
under the Convention after the 1978 Convention, as amended by STCW 1995 which
subsequently came into force.
The Judgment
The Court, while looking at the setting of the STCW 1978, noted the current
status of the Convention vis-à-vis India. It stated:
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers 1978 (STCW 78) came into force globally. India was one of the signatories
to the Convention and ratified the Convention on 16 February, 1986. The object of the
Convention is to have uniform standards of training and certification. Thus, Article VI
of the 1978 Convention enjoins that Certificates be issued for masters, officers or ratings.
It provides that these shall be issued to those candidates who meet the requirements for
service, age, medical fitness, training, qualification and examinations in accordance with
the appropriate provisions. The 1978 Convention was amended in 1995 and is known
as STCW 1995. This 1995 Convention extensively amended the 1978 Convention, but
Article I to XVII of the 1978 Convention remained unamended. Consequently, the
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Merchant Shipping (STCW) Rules, 1998 were also framed. Rule 11, inter alia, requires
that existing CoS holders who intend to become holders of the CoC shall be required
to complete approved training assessment. Similarly, Rule 15 requires that every Master
on a seagoing of 500 gross tonnage or more shall hold an appropriate Certificate of
Competency in Form 3.
The Court did not agree with the contention of the Petitioners that Section 5 of
the amended Merchant Navy Act, 1958 saved some of the effects of the repealed
Section 80 (which recognized the Navy officers’ Certificate of Service) of the Mer-
chant Shipping Act, 1958. The Court, examining the status of Section 80, stated,
No doubt Section 80 of the Act was holding the field before it was amended but it has
been eclipsed with the emergence of the 1978 Convention as amended by the 1995
Convention. With the emergence of the 1995 Convention there is no provision for inde-
finite continuance of CoS in respect of the officers of the Merchant Ships. As already
noticed, the petitioners are now serving in [the] Merchant Navy. India, being a signatory
to the 1995 Convention, has to ensure uniform standards, as prescribed by the Convention.
On an Undertaking by the Director-General of Shipping, the Government of India,
on working out the procedural details of the implementation mechanism consistent
with the STCW, the Court disposed of the petition.
Definition of ‘Terrorism’- Relationship between Terrorist Activity and Crime
– Surveying of the Attempts made by the Untied Nations and Other Bodies to
Define ‘terrorism’
MADAN SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR
Supreme Court of India, 2 April 2004
AIR 2004 Supreme Court 3317
Facts
Twenty persons faced trial for the alleged commission of various offences
punishable under the Indian Penal Code, Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Preven-
tion) Act, 1987 (TADA) and the Arms Act. One of the main contentions of the
Appellants was that there was no evidence to show that the accused persons were
terrorists or extremists or that the activities or actions alleged were encompassed
by the provisions of the TADA Act to be described as terrorist acts.
The Judgment
The Court, after dealing with the factual scenario in the case, considered the
definitional issues concerning ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist activity’. The Court, inter
alia, noted that “A ‘terrorist’ activity does not merely arise by causing disturbance
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of law and order or of public order. The fallout of the intended activity is to be one
that it travels beyond the capacity of the ordinary law enforcement agencies to tackle
it under the ordinary penal law. It is in essence a deliberate and systematic use of
coercive intimidation”. Further, the Court, while distinguishing between criminal
activity and terrorism, stated:
Finding a definition of “terrorism” has haunted countries for decades. A first attempt to
arrive at an internationally acceptable definition was made under the League of Nations,
but the one which the convention drafted in 1937 never came into existence. The UN
member States still have not agreed upon a definition apparently on account of what at
times [is] reveal[ed] to be State sponsored terrorism, both at national and international
levels. Terminology consensus would, however, be necessary for a single comprehensive
convention on terrorism which some countries favour in place of the present 12 piecemeal
conventions and protocols. The lack of agreement on a definition of terrorism has been
a major obstacle to meaningful international counter-measures. Cynics have often com-
mented at national and international levels that one State’s “terrorist” is another State’s
“freedom fighter” and that too with the blessings of those in power. Crime became a
highly politicised affair; greed compounded by corruption and violence enabled unscrupu-
lousness, and hypocrisy reigns supreme supported by duplicity and deceitful behaviour
in public life to amass and usurp public power to perpetuate personal aggrandizement,
pretending to be for the common good. If terrorism is defined strictly in terms of attacks
on non-military installations and soldiers residences could not be included in the statistics.
In order to cut through the Gordian definitional knot, terrorism expert A. Schmid suggested
in 1992 in a report for the then UN Crime Branch that it might be a good idea to take
the existing consensus on what constitutes a “war crime” as a point of departure. If the
core of war crimes – deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage-taking and the killing of
prisoners – is extended to peacetime, we could simply define acts of terrorism veritably
as “peacetime equivalents of war crimes”.
The Court, inter alia, while referring to various definitions of ‘terrorism’, specific-
ally to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/210 onMeasures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, concluded:
Terrorism is one of the manifestations of increased lawlessness and the cult of violence.
Violence and crime constitute a threat to an established order and are a revolt against
a civilized and orderly society. “Terrorism”, though, has not been separately defined under
TADA, but there is sufficient indication in Section 3 itself to identify what it is by an
all inclusive and comprehensive phraseology adopted in engrafting the said provision,
which serves the double purpose as a definition and punishing provision; nor is it possible
to give a precise definition of “terrorism” or lay down what constitutes “terrorism”. It
may be possible to describe it as use of violence when its most important result is not
merely the physical and mental damage of the victim but the prolonged psychological
effect it produces or has the potential of producing on the society as a whole. There may
be death, injury, or destruction of property or even deprivation of individual liberty in
the process, but the extent and reach of the intended terrorist activity travels beyond the
State Practice 153
effect of an ordinary crime capable of being punished under the ordinary penal law of
the land and its main objective is to overawe the Government or disturb the harmony
of the society or “terrorise” people and the society and not only those directly assaulted,
with a view to disturb the even tempo, peace and tranquillity of the society and create
a sense of fear and insecurity.
The Court concluded that the appeals were sans merit and deserved dismissal.
Scope of Application of Internet Domain Names and Passing off Action in
Trademark Law – International Regime on Internet Domain Names – Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) andWorld Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO)
SATYAM INFOWAY LTD v. SIFYNET SOLUTIONS PVT. LTD
Supreme Court of India, 6 May 2004
AIR 2004 Supreme Court 3541
Facts
The principal question, as noted by the Court, was whether Internet domain names
were subject to the legal norms applicable to other Intellectual Property Rights such
as trademarks. The Appellant, incorporated in 1995, had registered several domain
names with the word ‘sify’ in June 1999 with the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the WIPO. According to the Appellant, the word
‘sify’ was invented by using elements of its corporate name Satyam Infoway, accord-
ingly claiming a wide reputation and goodwill. The Respondent, on the other hand,
used the word ‘siffynet’ for his Internet marketing business in 2001. The Respondent,
the Court noted, claimed itself to have obtained registration of this name with ICANN
in 2001.
The Appellant filed a suit in the civil court on the basis that the Respondent was
passing off its business and services by using the Appellant’s business name and
domain name. The civil court, upon an application by the Appellant, granted a
temporary injunction on the grounds that the Appellant was the prior user of the trade
name ‘sify’ and that confusion would be caused in the mind of the general public
by such deceptive similarity. The balance of convenience, the civil court found, was
in favour of the Appellant. The Respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court
and the same was allowed by the High Court after reconsidering the issue of ‘balance
of convenience’. The High Court also referred to the business carried out by the
Respondent and noted that it was different from the one carried out by the Appellant;
accordingly there was no question of customers being misled or confused. The
impugned order by the High Court, as noted by the Supreme Court, primarily pro-
ceeded on the basis that the principles relating to passing off actions in connection
with trademarks are applicable to domain names. It was contended that a domain
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name could not be confused with “property names” such as Trademarks. Domain
names, it was argued, constituted merely an address on the Internet. It was also
submitted that registration of a domain name with ICANN did not confer any intel-
lectual property right, that it was a contract with a registration authority allowing
communication to reach the owner’s computer via Internet links channelled through
the registration authority’s server and that it was akin to the registration of company
name which was a unique identification of a company, but of itself conferred no
intellectual property rights.
The Judgment
The Court, after examining the definitional aspects of ‘trade mark’, ‘mark’,
‘goods’ and ‘services’, sought to place the aspects of ‘domain name’ as a ‘property
right’. The Court noted that:
With the increase of commercial activity on the Internet, a domain name is also used
as a business identifier. Therefore, the domain name not only serves as an address for
Internet communication but also identifies the specific Internet site. In the commercial
field, such domain name owner provides information/services which are associated with
such domain name … Consequently, a domain name as an address must, of necessity,
be peculiar and unique and where a domain name is used in connection with a business,
the value of maintaining an exclusive identity becomes critical.
The Court further examined the relationship between passing off, i.e., to pass
off to the public the goods and services of others as that of his own, and trademark
law. While passing off claims were made in a given case, the important question,
according to Court, was: Who invented the mark first? The prior user, the Court
further noted, would succeed depending upon the fact that (a) it would not be essential
to prove ‘long user’ to establish reputation in a passing off action; and (b) it would,
rather, be important to prove the volume of sales and extent of advertisement. The
other element that must be established in a passing off action would be the factor
of ‘misrepresentation to the public’. The Court, while noting that the ‘intention’ to
misrepresent was important, stated that the relevant factor which needed to be estab-
lished was the likelihood of confusion in the minds of the public (the term ‘public’
to mean actual or potential customers or users).
On the question of a passing off action resulting in loss or the likelihood of it,
the Court stated:
The use of the same or similar domain name may lead to a diversion of users which could
result from such users[’] mistakenly accessing one domain name instead of another. This
may occur in e-commerce with its rapid progress and instant (and theoretically limitless)
accessibility to users and potential customers and particularly so in areas of specific
overlap. Ordinary consumers/users seeking to locate the functions available under one
domain name may be confused if they accidentally arrived at a different but similar web
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site which offers no such services. Such users could well conclude that the first domain
name owner had misrepresented its goods or services through its promotional activities
and the first domain owner should thereby lose their customer. It is apparent therefore
that a domain name may have all the characteristics of a trademark and could found an
action for passing off.
The Court further noted that there was an operational distinction between a
trademark and a domain name at the international level. The Court stated:
A trademark is protected by the laws of a country where such trademark may be registered.
Consequently, a trade mark may have multiple registrations in many countries throughout
the world. On the other hand, since the Internet allows for access without any geographical
limitation, a domain name is potentially accessible irrespective of the geographical location
of the consumers. The outcome of this potential for universal connectivity is not only
that a domain name would require world wide exclusivity but also that national laws might
be inadequate to effectively protect a domain name. The lacuna necessitated international
regulation of the domain name system (DNS). This international regulation was effected
throughWIPO and ICANN. India is one of the 171 States of the world which are members
of WIPO. WIPO was established as a vehicle for promoting the protection, dissemination
and use of intellectual property throughout the world. Services provided by WIPO to its
member States include the provision of a forum for the development and implementation
of intellectual property policies internationally through treaties and other policy instru-
ments.
Referring to UniformDomain NameDisputes Resolution Policy (UDNDRPolicy)
by ICANN (established in October 1999), the Court noted that this dispute resolution
mechanism did not have same consequences under the Indian TradeMarks Act, 1999,
although it at least evidenced the recognized user of the mark. The Court further
noted that the UDNDR policy was instructive as to the kind of rights which a domain
name owner might have upon registration with ICANN accredited Registrars. While
outlining the main contours of ICANN dispute resolution mechanism, the Court noted:
As far as India is concerned, there is no legislation which explicitly refers to dispute
resolution in connection with domain names. But although the operation of the Trade
Marks Act, 1999 itself is not extra-territorial and may not allow for adequate protection
of domain names, this does not mean that names are not to be legally protected to the
extent possible under the laws relating to passing off.
The Court, in the final analysis, coming to the merits of the case and basing its
reasoning with regard to the passing off action on the goodwill, commercial loss and
similarity (both visual and phonetic) that a trader had in his name as being similar
to in an action for infringement of a trade mark, decided the matter in favour of the
Appellant.
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Scope and application Environment Protection Act, 1986 – Stockholm Declara-
tion of 1972 and the Development of Indian Laws on Environment – Balancing
of Environment Protection and the Socio-economic Needs
ESSAR OIL LTD. v. HALAR UTKARSH SAMITI AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India, 19 January 2004
AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1834
Facts
The issue related to the laying down of pipelines to pump crude oil from a single
buoy mooring in the Gulf across a portion of the Jamnagar Marine National Park
and Marine Sanctuary located along the lower lip of the Gulf of Katchch in the State
of Gujarat. The Court had to decide the legality, as challenged through several public
interest petitions, of the laying of the pipelines in accordance with the provisions
of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and the
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. While interpreting the provisions of these
enactments, the Court, in its obiter, referred to the effect of the StockholmDeclaration
of 1972 and other related international environmental legal provisions in shaping
the Indian law on the subject, in particular Section 29 of the Wildlife (Protection)
Act, 1972 which inter alia, provided that:
No person shall destroy, exploit or remove any wildlife from a sanctuary or destroy or
damage the habitat of any wild animal or deprive any wild animal of its habitat within
such sanctuary except under and in accordance with permit granted by the Chief Wildlife
Warden and no such permit shall be granted unless the State Government, being satisfied
that such destruction, exploitation or removal of wildlife from the sanctuary is necessary
for the improvement and better management of wildlife therein, authorizes the issue of
such permit
The Judgment
The Court, while interpreting Section 29 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972,
noted that this interpretation must be done keeping in mind the Stockholm Declaration
of 1972. The Court observed:
Indeed, in the wake of the Stockholm Declaration in 1972, as far as this country is
concerned, provisions to protect the environment were incorporated in the Constitution
by an amendment in 1976. Article 48A of the Constitution now provides that the “State
shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and
wildlife of the country”. It is also one of the fundamental duties of every citizen of the
country under Art. 51A (g) “to protect and improve the natural environment including
forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures”.
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The Court outlined various Principles of the Stockholm Declaration to sustain
humanity and its environment. While emphasizing the need to balance economic and
social needs, on the one hand, with environment considerations, on the other, the
Court stated:
Indeed, the very existence of humanity and the rapid increase in the population together
with consequential demands to sustain the population has resulted in the concreting of
open lands, cutting down of forests, the filling up of lakes and pollution of water resources
and the very air which we breathe. However, there need not necessarily be a deadlock
between development on the one hand and the environment on the other. The objective
of all laws on environment should be to create harmony between the two since neither
one can be sacrificed at the altar of the other.
The Court interpreted Section 29 of theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 and sought
to answer the question as to whether it could be stated that the laying of pipelines
through a sanctuary necessarily results in the destruction of wildlife. The Court,
considering the legal position in England and other countries, noted that it would
ultimately be a question of fact to be determined by experts in each case and accord-
ingly asked the State Government to obtain an environmental impact report from
expert bodies. It also sought an environmental management plan. The Court also
laid emphasis on transparency and the sharing of information with those who were
affected by this decision.
Interpretation of Section 45 and Section 8 of the Indian Arbitration and Concili-
ation Act, 1996 – Extent of Judicial Intervention to refer the matter to Arbitra-
tion – Legality of Arbitration Agreement –Whether Courts should take a prima
facie view while deciding the Legality – Application and Interpretation of
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
SHIN-ETSU CHEMICAL CO. LTD. v. M/S AKSH OPTIFIBRE LTD.
Supreme Court of India, 12 August 2005
AIR 2005 Supreme Court 3767
Facts
The parties concluded an agreement in November 2000 with an arbitration clause
which, inter alia, provided that the governing law would be Japanese Law and the
arbitration would be held in Tokyo, Japan in accordance with the Rules of Concili-
ation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. It was also agreed
that the award of arbitration should be final and binding on both of the parties. The
Appellant terminated the agreement in December 2002. The Respondent, thereafter,
instituted a suit claiming a decree of declaration and injunction against the Appellant
for cancellation of the agreement and a declaration that the long-term sale and
purchase agreement of November 2000 including the arbitration clause were un-
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conscionable, unfair and unreasonable and against the public policy; the same was
entered into under undue influence and was, therefore, void ab initio, inoperative,
incapable of performance and could not be given effect. The Appellant, invoking
Section 822 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 pleaded before
the court that the Respondent should be directed to submit before the arbitration
proceedings in Tokyo. The Trial Court concurred with the Appellant and remitted
the parties to arbitration. The High Court, on an appeal, took a different view and
pointed out that the matter should have been examined under Section 4523 as well,
and remitted the matter back to the trial court for reconsideration. The legal question
before the Court was with regard to the nature of adjudication contemplated by
Section 45 when the objection about the agreement being “null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed”, that is, whether the judicial authority while exercis-
ing power under Section 45 should decide the objection on a prima facie view of
the matter and render a prima facie finding or a final finding on merits on affording
parties such opportunity as the justice of the case may demand having regard to the
facts of the case.
The Judgment
According to the Court, the entire issue arose on account of the nature of legis-
lative consolidation under the Indian law on the subject which now dealt, in a single
text, with domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration, and enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards. The Court noted that
Before enactment of the Act there were separate statutes governing international arbitration
and domestic arbitration, namely, the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937
(6 of 1937), The Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940) and The Foreign Awards (Recognition
and Enforcement) Act, 1961 (45 of 1961). These statutes have been repealed as provided
in Section 85 of the Act.
The Court further noted that “The 1996 Act was enacted considering the international
scenario as is evident from its Preamble”. Quoting the Preamble of the Indian Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation Act, 1996 which, inter alia, referred to UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985, UNCITRALConciliation Rules,
22 Section 8 is essentially a provision to desist parties from going to the court on any pretext. It
read, inter alia: “A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the
subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his
first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration”.
23 Section 45 fell within the ambit of ‘enforcement of arbitral awards’; the ‘agreement’ referred
to in this section is in relation to enforcement. Section 45 reads: “Notwithstanding anything contained
in Part I or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), a judicial authority, when seized of
an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement referred to in Section
44, shall, at the request of one of the parties or any person claiming through or under him, refer
the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed”.
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1980, and the “desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the
specific needs of international commercial arbitration practice”, the Court noted the
entire enforcement scheme in the context of present case. It stated:
The enforcement of foreign awards has been dealt with in Part II of the Act which has
two Chapters, Chapter I dealing with New York Convention Awards and Chapter II dealing
with Geneva Convention Awards. In this matter we are concerned with Chapter I which
comprises of Sections 44 to 52. Section 44 defines foreign award. It is not in dispute that
the present case falls under the ambit of Section 44. Section 45 has already been extracted
above. Conditions for enforcement of foreign awards are stipulated in Section 48 under
which enforcement may be refused at the request of the party against whom it is invoked
only if that party furnishes to the court proof as postulated in Clauses (a) and (e). In
addition, the enforcement of the award may also be refused on the grounds stipulated
in Section 48 (2) of the Act. Section 49 provides that where the court is satisfied that
the foreign award is enforceable under Chapter I, the award shall be deemed to be a decree
of the court. Section 50 provides as to against which orders an appeal shall lie.
The Court, noting that the judicial interference had been limited to a narrower
circumference than under the old arbitration laws, continued with the examination
of standard of review in relation to Section 45 – a prima facie finding or a final
finding? The Court noted the similarity of language between Section 45 and other
international conventions on the subject, such as the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses in Commercial Matters (1923) (Art. IV, Para. 1), the New York Convention
(Art. II, Para. 3) as well as UNCITRAL Model Law (Art. VIII). The Court, while
referring to cases in other national jurisdictions, further noted that:
Apart from the fact that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not a complete
adaptation of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the scheme/provisions of the Hong Kong
Arbitration Ordinance are different from the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Therefore, it may not be appropriate to follow the decisions interpreting the provisions
of the UNCITRAL Model Law or the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance.
The Court confirmed the decision of the High Court in remanding the application
under Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for a fresh decision
by the trial court.
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Influx of Illegal Migrants in large numbers – Does the Influx of a Large Popula-
tion amount to ‘aggression’ under International Law? – Definition of ‘Aggress-
ion’ and its Historical Overview in the Indian Context – Treatment of Aliens
under International Law
SARBANANDA SONOWAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India, 12 July 2005
AIR 2005 Supreme Court 2920
Facts
The Writ Petition filed before the Supreme Court by way of public interest
litigation was for declaring certain provisions of the Illegal Migrants (Determination
by Tribunals) Act, (Act No. 39 of 1983),24 1983 (hereinafter, the ‘IMDT Act’) as
ultra vires the Constitution of India, null and void; and the consequent declaration
that the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Rules made thereunder should apply to the
State of Assam.
The Judgment
The Court considered various status reports on the influx of migrants into the
State of Assam and also the status reports on the implementation of the IMDT Act.
The consequences of such influx were also considered by the Court. The Court, taking
into account the entire issue in its historical context, considered the implementation
of various accords concluded between, on one side, the Government of India and
the Government of Assam, and on the other the agitating/affected parties. The legal
effects of such accords and their implications on the demography of Assam were
also considered by the Court. The Court also considered the plea that the foremost
duty of the Central Government was to defend the borders of the country, prevent
any trespass and make the life of the citizens safe and secure.25 Referring to various
international legal scholars, the Charter of the United Nations, the Work of the
International Law Commission, and the UN Special Committee on Aggression, the
Court noted that “a consensus was arrived at and an agreed definition was approved
24 The IMDT Act was passed by the Indian Parliament in 1983. It was made applicable only to
the State of Assam. The scope of this enactment was to determine whether a person who entered
India after 25 March 1971, without valid passport or travel documents, was or was not an illegal
migrant. The Foreigners Act of 1946 which actually governed such cases of the entry of illegal
migrants was not made applicable to the State of Assam.
25 The Court is referring to Article 355 of the Constitution of India which, inter alia, states: “[The]
duty of the Union to protect States against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure
that the Government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitu-
tion”.
State Practice 161
by the United Nations General Assembly on 12 April, 1974 vide Resolution No. 3314
(XXIX)”. The Court further noted:
The Soviet Union pressed for inclusion of “ideological aggression” and also “the promotion
of the propaganda of Fascist-Nazi views, racial and national exclusiveness, hatred and
contempt for other peoples”. Iran pressed for inclusion of “indirect aggression, of interven-
tion in another State’s internal or foreign affairs”, including “direct or indirect incitement
to civil war, threats to internal security, and incitement to revolt by the supply of arms
or by other means”. Many States wanted the definition to include “economic aggression”.
Shri M. Jaipal of India advocated that in view of “modern techniques of coercion” the
definition of aggression should have included “economic pressures” and “interventionary
and subversive operations”.
The Court also referred to the Statement of India’s Representative to the Sixth
Committee on the definition of Aggression which emphasized the need for a compre-
hensive definition. This Statement, the Court noted, also referred to the “unique type
of bloodless aggression from a vast and incessant flow of millions of human beings
forced to flee into another State” impairing thereby the economic and political well-
being of the receiving victim State and threatening its very existence.
On the issue of the deportation of aliens, the Court noted that they also possessed
several rights, and that the procedure for their identification and deportation should
be detailed and elaborate in order to ensure fairness to them. The Court further noted:
The power to refuse admission is regarded as an incident of the State’s territorial sover-
eignty. International Law does not prohibit the expulsion en masse of aliens. Reference
has also been made to Article 13 of the International Covenant of 1966 on Civil and
Political Rights which provides that an alien lawfully in the territory of a State party to
the Covenant may be expelled only pursuant to a decision reached by law, and except
where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, is to be allowed to submit
the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by and to be represented
for the purpose before the competent authority. It is important to note that this Covenant
of 1966 would apply provided an alien is lawfully in India, namely, with a valid passport,
visa, etc. and not to those who have entered illegally or unlawfully.
The Court held, inter alia, that the provisions of the IMDT Act were ultra vires
the Constitution of India.
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OTHER RELEVANT STATE PRACTICE
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism26
Indian Statement in the Sixth Committee of the 60th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly Resolution on Agenda Item 108:Measures to Elimin-
ate International Terrorism on 6 October 2005
India noted that it attached highest importance to this agenda item. It also noted
with satisfaction the report of the UN Secretary General on this item, which contained
information submitted by States, and international organizations describing their
activities relating to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism.
India further noted that the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 49/60 in 1994, was the first
significant step taken by the United Nations in the fight against terrorism. It was
the first comprehensive standard-setting instrument at the international level unequi-
vocally to condemn all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and
unjustifiable whenever and by whomever committed. It obliged States to refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in the territories of
other States, or from acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their territories
directed towards the commission of such acts.
The Declaration, India pointed out, made clear that no considerations of political
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature could justify
criminal acts intended or calculated to promote a state of terror in the general public.
Unfortunately, according to India, the Declaration continued to be flouted by some
States that provided moral, material, financial and logistical sponsorship and support
as well as provided arms to terrorists. It was of paramount importance to ensure that
the Declaration was implemented sincerely by all States and that the standards it
had set were effectively put into operation.
Referring to steps taken by India in strengthening international cooperation to
combat terrorism, the Indian Statement further noted:
We have entered into several bilateral treaties in the areas of combating organized crime,
narcotic drug offences, extradition and treaties of mutual assistance in criminal matters.
These treaties facilitate the exchange of operational information and development of joint
programmes to combat organized crime and terrorism. They also facilitate the transfer
of fugitive offenders, suspected terrorists, etc., so that they can stand trial in the State
in which the offence is committed. The mutual legal assistance treaties facilitate prose-
cution of offences, location of fugitives, and the transfer of witnesses and exhibits, all
26 For the Indian Statements generally see http://meaindia.nic.in and http:// www.un.int/India/
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of which play a vital role in the punishment of crime and prosecution of offenders. India
is a party to twelve international sectoral conventions on terrorism that have been con-
cluded under the aegis of the United Nations. We are also studying carefully the Conven-
tion for the suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism with a view to consider becoming
party to the Convention.
While emphasizing the need to conclude the negotiations on a Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism during this Session, India stated:
Since the draft Convention under consideration does not raise any legal problems and
the delay in its conclusion and adoption is by and large associated with the lack of political
will of the few, demonstration of the political will is the need of the hour. As we are
all aware, the question of the definition of an offence is a matter of precise legal language
and is already reflected in the text of the draft Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism now under consideration by this Committee. The objective of the Convention
is to provide legal provisions which can be adopted in the criminal law instrument that
would facilitate judicial cooperation, mutual assistance and extradition. The General
Assembly has the central role in this process. If it abdicates its role, the Security Council,
as in the past, will continue to deal with this issue in a partial piecemeal manner, governed
by the political imperatives of the moment. That is not good for the development of law
which needs to be broad-based and transparent. We all know the existence of a broadest
possible agreement on all the draft provisions of the Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism. However, the inclusion and exclusion of certain elements in Article
18 of the draft Convention remains a major outstanding issue. The Secretary-General’s
Report on the present agenda item indicates that, so far, the terrorism issue has been
covered by 27 legal instruments. Making legal instruments to enrich a legal field is an
ongoing process, be it in terrorism, human rights or in humanitarian law. It is impractical
and inefficient to address an issue as complex as terrorism in one document. What is
important is the timeliness. When the whole world waits for this Convention, we have
to show flexibility and demonstrate political will. The August 2005 informal consultations
gave a hope that we are near a compromise solution, which would enable agreement on
the important Article 18 of the Convention. However, the issues which do not fit into
the configuration of the present Convention, while important, are required to be handled
separately in an appropriate format.
Indian Statement in Explanation of Vote on Declaration on Human Cloning27
Agenda item 150: International Convention Against the Reproductive Cloning
of Human Beings on 8 March 2005
India, while expressing its regrets that the Sixth Committee had been unable to
recommend to the plenary a text that was acceptable to all member States on a matter
27 See for the Indian Statement http://meaindia.nic.in or http://www.un.int/india/
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of paramount importance such as “The International Convention Against the Repro-
ductive Cloning of Human Beings”, pointed out that it had voted against the political
declaration as some of the provisions of the Declaration could be interpreted as a
call for a total ban on all forms of human cloning. India noted that it was:
[T]otally opposed to reproductive cloning owing to the doubtful nature of its safety,
success, utility and ethical acceptability. However, we consider the merits of therapeutic
cloning on a case by case basis within the bioethical guidelines laid down with the
approval of the National Bioethical Committee. The Declaration voted upon today is non-
binding and does not reflect agreement among the wider membership of the General
Assembly. Our approach to therapeutic cloning, thus, remains unchanged.
Children and Armed Conflict28
Indian Statement on Children and ArmedConflict at the United Nations Security
Council on 23 February 2005
India noted that children had become increasingly involved, both as targets of
violence and as combatants, in conflicts. During the last few years, it further noted,
more than 500,000 children, recruited in 87 countries, with around 300,000 actively
participating in combat, had been involved in conflict in some form or another.
Terming this as one of the “soft” challenges to international peace and security,
India further noted the proposed action that could be initiated:
However, the Council can impose sanctions under Article 41 only if it has established,
under Article 39, that there is a sufficient danger to international peace and security to
justify them. Only States are Parties to Conventions, non-state actors are not bound by
them. More important, most armed groups obey no laws, national or international. In some
cases of internal conflict, non-state actors or rival political groupings may make offers
of adhering to such instruments precisely to gain legitimacy or a political locus standi.
Further, can a violation by a State of the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child be construed as a threat to international peace and security? A body of standards
for monitoring, including instruments which do not command universal acceptance, cannot
be imposed on Member States. A Member State while otherwise committed to the norms
and commitments on the promotion and protection of rights of children would be right
in maintaining that it would not be bound by any instrument to which it is not a Party.
The use of children in armed conflict has been aggravated by the proliferation of small
arms and light weapons worldwide. These weapons are inexpensive, durable, small,
lightweight, easy to maintain and small enough for them to handle. Illegal arms trafficking
and poor monitoring of the legal trade make it easy for them to access such weapons.
We are disappointed to note that the report does not call for the adoption of more legally
28 Ibid.
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binding commitments by Member States such as those on Marking and Tracing of Small
Arms and Light Weapons and preventing the sale of arms to non-State groups.
While according national authorities primacy in gathering, vetting and compiling
information at the country level as well as in the actions undertaken by UN field
teams, India pointed out that it had:
[S]upported the concept of child protection advisors in UN peace-keeping operations as
a means to complement the important work of the Special Representative of the Secretary
General (SRSG) himself. We would, however, be deeply hesitant to involve the develop-
ment agencies in developing countries from divesting or diluting their responsibilities
in promoting and enhancing development cooperation and technical support. We have
taken note of the proposal to constitute a Task Force onMonitoring and Reporting (TFMR)
in countries where children and armed conflict is an issue. It has been proposed that the
Task Force would involve “key members of the Child Protection Networks,” including
“UN and NGO actors who have the experience and are most directly concerned with
monitoring and reporting.” Who would select this ‘cohesive group’ from among the key
members of the Child Protection Networks? It is also not clear to us why this Task Force
would be more useful than the existing Child Protection Networks. In our view, the Task
Force would only be effective if it can garner the trust and cooperation of all the main
stakeholders who are involved in bridging the gulf between initiatives and implementation.
We are surprised to note that even after four years of its existence, the Task Force on
the subject at UN headquarters has not been able to formulate and compile guidelines
on monitoring and reporting. The absence of such guidelines has, no doubt, led to the
uneven quality of reporting on compliance and progress in the different situations where
children are victims of armed conflict. Efforts towards ending the recruitment and use
of children in armed conflict can only be effectively addressed when the guidelines –
i.e. what the stakeholders have to monitor and report on – are clearly outlined to them.
Precise guidelines would not only help gather relevant information but also provide the
necessary basis for formulation of policy.We remain wary about the efficacy of establish-
ing “Neighbourhood Initiatives” to address children and armed conflict concerns at cross-
border and sub-regional levels. While lessons learnt in one country may be useful in
understanding some of the underlying factors behind the phenomenon, contextualising
the problem of children in armed conflict is as important as addressing the problem itself.
The specific political, social, historical and cultural contexts are unique to each conflict
and the reasons why children are recruited or lured to join armed groups in one country
may be entirely different from those in another.
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Sustainable Development29
Indian Statement on Agenda Item 52: Sustainable Development at the Second
Committee of the 60th Session of the UNGeneral Assembly on 2 November 2005
India noted that the World Summit on Sustainable Development held at
Johannesburg, while re-affirming the Rio Principles and the continued relevance of
Agenda 21, focused on concrete action for the implementation of Agenda 21 and
achieving sustainable development. The Summit also re-affirmed that addressing
poverty was central to the efforts of developing countries in achieving sustainable
development.
Noting that Climate Change was a global phenomenon and that developing
countries had hardly contributed to the problem, India stated that it was committed:
[T]o the international regime represented by the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol as the most appropriate tools to guide inter-
national efforts to protect global climate systems by reversing climate change in accordance
with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The main responsibility
for climate change does not lie with developing countries. Yet, it has severe adverse
impacts on precipitation patterns, ecosystems, agricultural potential, forests, water
resources, and coastal andmarine resources, besides increasing the range of several disease
vectors in the developing countries.
Linking Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) to Sustainable Development, India
further stated:
One of the major constraints faced by developing countries in the implementation of the
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) targets is the availability of necessary
technologies. We need to look at this aspect if developing countries are to meet the targets.
The IPR issue was successfully addressed with regard to HIV/AIDS. There is similar
need for it to be addressed with regard to technologies for energy efficiency and for clean
energy as well as for other areas of interest to developing countries. A network of R&D
institutes from developed and developing countries could also be established to engage
in research in new technologies, particularly those that would be of interest to developing
countries. All collaborative R&Dwork done through the network could be made available
to developing countries free of charge. Bio-diversity, the variety of life forms, is the
foundation for maintaining the life-sustaining systems of this planet and fundamental to
the fulfilment of human needs. At the Johannesburg Summit, we collectively agreed to
significantly reduce by 2010 the current loss of biological diversity. There was also an
acknowledgement that the achievement of this target would require the provision of new
and additional financial, technological and technical resources to developing countries.
Sharing benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources is another area that
29 For the Indian Statement see http://meaindia.nic.in and http://www.un.int/India/
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requires attention. In this context, we welcome the decision of the Johannesburg Summit
to negotiate, within the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, an inter-
national regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising
from the utilisation of genetic resources. We welcome the decision taken at the seventh
meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity to
mandate the Ad hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit Sharing to
negotiate an international regime in implementation of this decision. We hope that, as
a practical modality for benefit sharing, this regime will be able to include provisions
for mandatory disclosure of the country of origin of genetic resources and prior informed
consent in the IPR applications. India strongly supports sui generis systems for the
protection of traditional knowledge that have been developed over millennia and ensure
that the holders of traditional knowledge fully share in the benefits arising from the
commercial utilization of this knowledge.
On desertification, India stated:
In the context of the UNConvention to Combat Desertification, we welcome the inclusion
of land-degradation, desertification and deforestation as a focal area for financing by the
Global Environment Facility. The effectiveness of these arrangements, however, would
depend largely on allocation of additional resources to this focal area for financing the
needs of affected countries.
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism30
Indian Statement at Informal Consultations of the Sixth Committee on the Draft
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism on 25 July 2005
India welcomed the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, initiated by the Russian Federation, and looked forward
to its early entry into force. India noted that a vast majority of Member States had
supported the adoption of the comprehensive Convention at the earliest. We urge
all member States to capitalize on the newmomentum at the UN and conclude swiftly
the draft comprehensive Convention on international terrorism. This will complement
the broad legal framework set out in Security Council resolutions and the thirteen
UN counter-terrorism Conventions.
30 For the Indian Statement generally see http://meaindia.nic.in
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International Trade and Development31
Indian Statement on Agenda Item 50: International Trade and Development
at the Second Committee of the 60th UN General Assembly on 31 October 2005
Referring to the Report of the Secretary-General, India noted:
[D]eveloping countries are often denied a level playing field to compete in global trade
because developed countries use a variety of tariffs, quotas and subsidies to restrict access
to their own markets and shelter their products. The international trading system is full
of inequities – developing countries face non-tariff barriers and higher tariffs to their
exports; tariffs escalate as the level of processing increases discouraging industrialisation
in the developing countries. Besides, it is estimated that non-tariff barriers cost developing
countries over USD 100 billion, almost twice the current level of Official Development
Assistance. What is needed is to ‘un-level’ the playing fields in favour of developing
countries, which has hitherto been favourable to developed economies, in order to make
the multilateral trading system equitable. This would be in line with the call made as
early as 1964 at the UNCTAD that “any definition must provide for elimination of all
forms of discrimination, even those arising from so-called equal treatment. Treatment
must be fair and fairness is not equality; fairness is the inequality needed to enable
exploited peoples to attain an acceptable standard of living”. The Secretary-General has
also reminded us of the need for appropriate balance between national policy space and
international disciplines and commitments, enshrined in the Sao Paulo Consensus. For
defending livelihoods, sovereignty of the state is important and disciplines that erode the
autonomy of policy space need to be reformed. The realisation of the development
dimensions of the Doha Work Programme, especially a strong special and differential
treatment component in the outcomes of negotiations in all areas – agriculture, NAMA
and services – is a categorical imperative.
Referring to Multilateral Trade Negotiations in preparation for the WTO Hong
Kong Ministerial, India stated:
Progress in the trade negotiations has been disappointing, considering the hopes raised
after the July Framework Agreement. Time-lines have not been met for advancing techni-
cal work substantially, most notably to achieve a “first approximation” of the results
targeted for the Hong KongMinisterial – full modalities in agriculture and non-agricultural
market access by end July 2005. A ‘First Approximation’ proved elusive; the attempts
did not even approximate to an approximation. It is widely accepted that agriculture holds
the key for unlocking progress in other areas of negotiations. The key issues of the formula
for tariff reduction, flexibility for developing countries and the treatment of unbound tariffs
remain unsettled in NAMA. There has been no significant movement in the post summer
negotiations. Hence a clear political direction to break the current impasse is a categorical
31 For the Indian Statement generally see http://meaindia. nic.in and http:// www.un.int/india/
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imperative. As pointed out by the Secretary-General, ambitious steps forward in delivering
on the promises made at Doha are needed, especially by developed countries.
India further stated:
The anticipated gains from agricultural reform and trade liberalisation by developed
countries have till now eluded the developing countries. Out of the estimated contribution
of USD 165 billion annually to global welfare gains by completely removing trade barriers
in agriculture, the developing countries would only receive about a quarter. Moreover,
agriculture is not only about trade – it has vital development ramifications. Food security
and rural livelihood are of immense economic relevance and have a socio-political
dimension in many developing countries. Demands for reduction of de minimis payments
by countries go back on the July Framework Agreement and is unacceptable to developing
countries with subsistence farming and predominantly resource poor farmers. Countries
that demand such reductions should be aware of the perilous impact it would have on
the food and livelihood security of millions of subsistence farmers in developing countries
and in terms of the opportunities for development they would deny to developing countries.
The operationalisation of proportionality and progressivity, the issue of flexibilities
including the treatment of special products and the special safeguard mechanism for
developing countries are, therefore, crucial. The Secretary-General has stressed the need
for more equitable and fair conditions and for providing adequate development flexibility
for nurturing the vital agriculture sector in developing countries, for agriculture trade to
contribute to the achievement of MDGs, and for operationally effective and meaningful
special and differential treatment for developing countries. We agree with the Secretary-
General. The fundamental objective of any Government is to defend the livelihood of
ordinary people and a multilateral system that impinges adversely on it cannot long endure.
Earlier this month, over 100,000 farmers rallied in India demanding that agriculture be
taken out of the WTO.
On Services negotiations, India pointed out:
Significant results in the services negotiations remain essential to achieve a balanced
outcome of the Doha Round. The Secretary-General notes that effective and commercially
meaningful access in Mode 4 for developing countries’ services suppliers is the area where
the largest gain is expected and would contribute to the achievement of MDGs. It could
be a win-win situation; restricting the movement of professionals across the world is
unnatural and, ultimately, to the detriment of developed countries themselves. In order
to protect the interests of developing countries, it is crucial that the basic GATS architect-
ure and the agreed negotiating modalities and procedures are respected in the negotiations.
It is equally important to provide for global horizontal disciplines which can protect
negotiated gains in market access from arbitrary restrictions.
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Referring to TRIPS, India stated:
An important development issue concerns the amendment in the TRIPS Agreement to
give effect to the General Council decision of August 2003 on ‘TRIPS and Public Health’
meant to address the problems faced by countries in accessing medicines at affordable
prices when combating serious public health problems. The deadline set for devising a
permanent solution by amending Article 31(f) has been extended several times. Developing
countries, in order to receive a fair recompense for their biogenetic resources, have also
been seeking amendments to the TRIPS Agreement to fully align it with the Convention
on Biological Diversity and, in this context, to have the requirements of disclosure, prior
informed consent and equitable benefit sharing incorporated in the TRIPS provisions on
patents. On the issue of preference erosion, India believes that the main responsibility
lies with the developed economies through implementation of their commitment to lower
preferential rates to zero and, more importantly, through enhancing the utilization of GSP
schemes by rationalizing the rules of origin. Notwithstanding the constraints of being
a developing country, India would soon be finalising a bilateral package of preferential
market access for LDCs into the Indian market. We welcome the ‘Aid for Trade’ initiative




Hæmophilia – Civil liability of State – Moral damages – Material damages
SABERI v. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, TREATMENT ANDMEDICAL TRAINING,
IRAN’S BLOOD TRANSFUSION ORGANIZATION AND IRAN’S BLOOD
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS COMPANY
Judgment of Branch 1060 of the Tehran Court, 15 July 2004
Facts
In 1983, two consignments of blood products were bought from a French com-
pany. Consumers of these products were infected with HIV and Hepatitis C because
the products were contaminated with these diseases. On 2 November 2003, Counsel
for Claimants (974 hæmophilia patients or their heirs) sued the Ministry of Health,
Treatment and Medical Training, Iran’s Blood Transfusion Organization and Iran’s
Blood Research Analysis Company under the Civil Liability Act, 1960 (hereinafter
referred to as “CLA”) and claimed both moral and material damages incurred by
32 Contributed by Jamal Seifi and Alireza Ebrahim-Gol, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran.
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the victims. The Court ordered the defendants to pay both moral and material
damages. An appeal was sought from this decision, but it was rejected. Appeal to
the Supreme Court was also unsuccessful.
The Judgment
The judgment of the court is comprised of three parts, as follows:
A. Principle of civil liability of the defendant;
B. Amount of material damages and the mode of assessment of material
damages, and
C. Moral damages and the criteria for moral damages.
Concerning the first, the Court based its judgment on the decision in the parallel
criminal proceedings in this case and the reports of the General Inspectorate Organiza-
tion and the Forensic Medicine Organization. The court also took into account the
active role played by the Government and its affiliated organizations in the different
social, economic and health concerns of its citizens in the present era and the various
measures adopted by the Government in this regard. This active role carried the
associated risk of Government actions resulting in damage to the citizens. Therefore,
ethics, justice and legal logic require citizens to be compensated by the Government
when its actions result in damages to the citizens, especially when the damage is
highly burdensome.
The Ministry of Health had failed to declare the source of contamination and
had subsequently rejected the factum of omission despite its confirmation by the
accused in the related criminal case. Furthermore, the Blood Transfusion Organization,
as a Governmental body, had the exclusive responsibility for the gathering and
production of blood products, the distribution of the blood products, and the super-
vision of their quality. However, it had not obtained the licence for the production
of the blood products; thus, it violated the law relating to their production.
These omissions and violations of law by Governmental bodies resulted in the
irreparable moral and material damages incurred by claimants and, therefore, the
Court found the defendants liable under Articles 1, 8, 11, and 14 of the CLA.
Regarding the second issue, the Court made a comparative study of precedents
in cases involving infected persons demanding damages. The Court examined pre-
cedents from various countries such as Canada, Denmark, Brazil, Belgium, Italy,
Bulgaria, India, Spain, Finland, Japan, Ireland, England, Sweden, Germany, France,
South Africa, and Australia. The Court then classified the Claimants into four groups
and awarded separate amounts of compensation for each group. The groups were:
1. Deceased patients infected with HIV;
2. Patients infected with HIV;
3. Patients infected with Hepatitis C, and
4. Persons who had become patients as a result of contact with hæmophilia and
other consumers of these products.
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In respect of the final issue, the Court held that the Claimants’ becoming infected
with hazardous viruses such as HIV and Hepatitis C had led to their suffering from
undefined fears, phobia, permanent anxiety, and feelings of insecurity. These, in turn,
had affected their mentality and social interaction with other individuals and even
members of their family, thus impairing their social reputation, and leading to the
deprivation of their social rights such as the right to marriage, education and medical
treatment. In these circumstances, any legal and social protection for these persons
could lead to increasing their life expectancy and nourishing a positive spirit in them.
In determining the moral damages, the Court took into account factors such as
age, gender, social status, especially professional status, marital status, parental status,
education, divorce as a consequence of the infection, loss of marriage opportunities,
depression, social pressures, length of illness and possibility of its recurrence, loss
of job as a result of the infection, death of patients, and simultaneous infection with
both viruses.
In awarding the moral damages, the Court considered obligations under Articles
164, 167, and 40 of Iran’s Constitution and Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, and the latter part
of Article 11 of the CLA and paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights which was ratified by Iran in 1975 and considered as
law under Article 9 of Iran’s Civil Code.
Article 11 of the CLA provides:
In case Government officials, municipalities and their affiliated institutions in performance
of their duties deliberately or recklessly cause damage to other person, they are themselves
responsible. But in case the damages incurred are not attributable to them and [are] related
to their negligence, the Government branches and affiliated institutions concerned will
be liable.
The Court concluded that since the role of the Government in this case should
be categorized as jure gestionis and not jure imperii; based on the general principle
of law that no damage must remain uncompensated for, the Claimants were entitled
to moral damages. The Court categorized the Claimants as those who were infected
with Hepatitis C and those who were infected with HIV; it awarded separate amounts
of compensation for each. Moreover, the Court, based on Articles 3-6 of the CLA
and the latter part of Article 11, obliged the defendants to issue a formal apology
in two widely circulated newspapers and correspondence with each of the Claimants.
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NATIONAL LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS
Elimination of Child Labour
Council of Ministers Bye-Law in the Execution of the Prohibition and Prompt
Action for Eliminating the Worst Form of Child Labour Act (PEWFCL)
In accordance with its international obligations under the ILO Convention for
the Prohibition and Prompt Action for Eliminating the Worst Form of Child Labour,
the Iranian Parliament passed an Act called the PEWFCL on 17 May 2004.
Subsequently, the Iranian Council of Ministers issued a bye-law for the execution
of this Act.
In its first Article, it enumerates the worst form of child labour in 36 items.
Article 2 provides that those who violate this bye-law will be sentenced to imprison-
ment from 91 days to one year, and will be subjected to the payment of compensation
and cancellation of their work permit.
Combating human traffic
Human Traffic Combat Act (HTCA)
The Iranian Parliament, in pursuance of Iran’s international obligations regarding
combating human trafficking, passed a law called the HTCA on 19 July 2004. In
its first Article, this Act gives a definition of “human trafficking”; in the second
article, it defines acts which are constructive human trafficking. Article 3 provides
that in the event that the act of the offender is amongst those that are enumerated
in Iran’s Islamic Penal Code, s/he will be convicted according to that law. Otherwise,
s/he will be convicted to imprisonment for two to ten years and make payment of
compensation.
Respect for legitimate freedoms and citizens’ rights
Respect for Legitimate Freedoms and Observance of Citizens’ Rights Act
In pursuance of Iran’s international obligations under the human rights instru-
ments, the Iranian Parliament passed an Act on 5 May 2004 named the Respect for
Legitimate Freedoms and Observance of Citizens’ Rights Act.
Article 1 of this Act provides that the discovery, investigation, and prosecution
of crimes must be based on laws and with judicial orders, and it prohibits unnecessary
detentions. Other Articles referring to the general principle of law that each person
is presumed innocent unless the contrary is proved provide for the observance of
the rights of an accused and the complainant. Article 5 provides that the case must
be referred to a competent court within the due legal time limit.
During the process of investigation and interrogation, the eyes of the accused
must not be closed and officers responsible for the inquiry must not cover their faces
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or sit behind the accused, and must refrain from other acts which may humiliate the




Diplomatic Privileges of the Staff who is National of the Receiving State Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations
X v. STATE OF JAPAN
Tokyo District Court, Decision, 10 November 2004
1893 Hanrei Jihou [Judicial Reports] 160 [2005]
X is a Japanese citizen working at the Embassy of Sri Lanka in Tokyo. X was
employed by the Embassy as a staff clerk-typist in August 2002. X’s major responsib-
ilities are to serve as an interpreter, to work on translations, or to provide help for
arrangements to welcome leading figures when they come from Sri Lanka. Driving
a car is not part of X’s original work profile. One day, in compliance with the visiting
Minister of Land of Sri Lanka, and after obtaining the authorization of the Embassy
of Sri Lanka, X took theMinister and his family in X’s own car, showed them around
Tokyo city for shopping, and deposited them at the hotel where they were staying.
After that, on his way home from the hotel X caused a traffic accident in which a
motorcycle rider suffered severe cuts that took two months to heal completely. X,
who was prosecuted because of this traffic accident, claimed that, being on the staff
of a foreign Embassy, he should enjoy the privileges and immunities on the basis
of Article 38(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and therefore,
the public action in the case must be dismissed.
The Tokyo District Court dismissed the claim of the plaintiff and ordered him
to pay one hundred and fifty thousand yen as a fine to the plaintiff. Its reasoning
is as stated below.
Firstly, Article 38(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that “other members
of the staff of the mission and private servants who are nationals of or are permanent-
ly resident in the receiving State shall enjoy privileges and immunities only to the
extent admitted by the receiving State”. X is apparently “other members of the staff
of the mission” and “nationals of… the receiving State”. However, a problem remains
as regards the wording “the extent admitted by the receiving State”. In other words,
it is important to determine whether the Japanese Government, as the receiving State,
has indeed authorized privileges and immunities to other members of the staff of
33 Contributed by Tanaka Norio, Professor of International Law, Ryukoku University, Kyoto, Japan.
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the mission and nationals of the receiving State, or it has not. The Court found that
there were no such laws and regulations in Japan which authorize privileges and
immunities as mentioned above.
Secondly, according to the defence attorney, other members of the staff of the
mission and nationals of the receiving State shall enjoy immunities from criminal
jurisdiction concerning their acts performed in the course of their duties under custom
in conformity with customary international law. However, it is not only obscure as
to what is meant by “custom in conformity with customary international law”, but
there is also no evidence to show the establishment of such customary international
law.
On the contrary: according to international lawyers before the Court, the drafting
process of Article 38(2) of the Vienna Convention shows that there was no agreement
on the extent of privileges and immunities authorized to “other members of the staff
of the mission and private servants who are nationals of or permanently resident in
the receiving State”. Therefore, the Court found that the contention submitted by
the defence attorney cannot be accepted.
Nationality Clause of National Pension Law – Non-application of National
Pension Law to Korean Residents not having Japanese Nationality – Direct
Applicability of Article 2 (2) of International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights as a self-executing treaty – Article 26 of International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights
X et al. v. STATE OF JAPAN
Osaka District Court, Decision, 25 May 2005
1898 Hanrei Jihou [Judicial Reports] 75 [2005], 1188 Hanrei Taimu [Law Times
Reports] 254 [2005]
All of the plaintiffs are foreigners who have Korean nationality and reside in
Japan. The National Pension Act was not made applicable to foreigners who do not
have Japanese nationality. After Japan ratified the 1951 Convention on the Status
of Refugees, the nationality clause of the National Pension Act was abolished through
its amendment. However, Korean people were still excluded from the application
of the modified National Pension Law. They claimed that they are victims of discrimi-
nation because of the nationality clause of the National Pension Act and this is in
violation of Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution, Article 2(1), (2) and Article 9
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Article
26 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Firstly, the Osaka District Court dismissed the claim of the plaintiffs as regards
Article 14 of Japanese Constitution, which stipulates equality of all peoples under
law, by stating as follows:
Deciding applicable personal scope or contents of the National Pension Act, the legislative
body has discretionary power to some extent. Therefore, the use of power by that is not
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appropriate for judicial judgment, except as it lacks reasonableness and apparently seems
to be an egregious deviation or abuse of the discretionary power. Exclusion of Korean
people from application of National Pension Act is not necessarily discrimination which
is prohibited under [the] Japanese Constitution.
Secondly, the Court considered whether the National Pension Act including the
nationality clause is contrary to Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, or not. On this point, the Court at first noted as follows:
Article 9 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not
give a concrete right to individuals without any domestic law based on Article 9, for
demanding any particular benefits in social security. As far as Article 2 (1) of the
Covenant is concerned, the State Party shall not be immediately obliged to enact domestic
law implementing any provisions of the Covenant, but she has the discretionary power
for deciding when or what laws and regulations should be enacted.
However, if a domestic law has been enacted to put the Covenant’s provisions
into effect, any discrimination shall be prohibited under Article 2(2) of the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in all aspects of the
application of its domestic law. Article 2(2) is a self-executing provision regardless
of one of the provisions of the Covenant, and can be directly applied in a domestic
court, just as can Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
As shown above, the Court found that the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights can be applied directly in a domestic court of Japan, and
if a domestic law has been enacted for the purpose of implementing the Covenant,
any discrimination on the basis of nationality shall be prohibited in the stage of
application of the law concerned. However, the Court dismissed the claim of the
plaintiffs.
NATIONAL LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS34
Entry into force of the Law to implement the Geneva Conventions and Addi-
tional Protocols
On 28 February 2005 the Law concerning the Punishment of the Grave Violations
of International Humanitarian Law (Law No.115, 2004) entered into force some ten
months after its promulgation. This Law was enacted at the same Diet session in
2004 as the accession to the 1977 Geneva Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva
34 Contributed by Aoki Takashi, Faculty of Law, Seiwa University, Chiba, Japan.
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Conventions of 1949 was approved.35 An additional clause of the Law provides
that it comes into effect on the date of the entry into force of the Geneva Protocol
I for Japan.
Articles 3 to 6 of the Law lay down the following four criminal acts and the
corresponding penalties for them:
(a) A person who during his act of hostilities destroys such important cultural
property as specified by a Government ordinance is liable to imprisonment with hard
labour for seven years or less;
(b) A person who, with power of repatriation of prisoners of war, delays such
repatriation without good reason is liable to imprisonment with hard labour for seven
years or less;
(c) A person who transports nationals or residents of the occupied State for their
settlement in its occupied area is liable to imprisonment with hard labour for five
years or less;
(d) A person who, with powers to manage emigration, interferes without good
reason in civilians emigrating from the occupied area is liable to imprisonment with
hard labour for three years or less.
In accordance with Article 7, all these crimes are made punishable even when
they are committed outside Japan under Article 4bis of the Penal Code which provides
that “[i]n addition to those provided for in Articles 2 to 4, this Code shall also apply
to every person who has committed the crimes provided in Part 2 for which Japan
is under a treaty obligation to punish even when they are committed outside Japan”
[unofficial translation]. This clause was added in 1987 to implement the Hostage
Convention and the Convention for Protection of Internationally Protected Persons
to which Japan was about to become party. In the Diet deliberations, an additional
effect of the new article was referred to as the facilitation of the prompt participation
of Japan to the conventions which stipulate the obligation to punish the extraterritorial
crimes, by making it possible that any crime specified in Part 2 be punished by
applying the conventions to the acts committed outside Japan as requested by such
conventions.36
As to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, Japan acceded to them in 1953
in conformity with its declaration at the San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951,
yet no legislative action was found to be required to bring them into effect. However,
35 For the outline of the legislation and comment, see http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/law/lex/
rlr22/Legi.pdf, pp.155-7. The statement of the Foreign Ministry on the legislation can be found
at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/legistlation.html>.
36 Minutes of the Diet, the House of the Representatives, Committee on Judicial Affairs, No.3, 15
May 1987, the 108th Session of National Diet, at 29
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now extraterritorial crimes to be punished under the Geneva Conventions have been
added to the application of Article 4bis of the Penal Code.37
OTHER RELEVANT STATE PRACTICE38
Bilateral Talks with China concerning the Seabed Development in the East China
Sea
In May 2004, it was reported in the press that China had commenced construction
of installations for the commercial production of natural gas from the offshore field
Chunxiao located a few miles west of the Japanese-claimed median line in the East
China Sea. The distance between the baselines of the two countries is less than 400
nautical miles. The Japanese legislation prescribes the limit of maritime areas in
relation to neighbouring States as the median line.39 China has conducted extensive
exploration in the waters around the line since the mid-1990s,40 and reportedly
discovered six gas fields, including Chunxiao and Duangqiao, near the median line.
Some of them have already been in the commercial production stage.
In June 2004, the news led the Japanese Government to express its grave concern
and to request for information on the geological facts and Chinese activities. The
Government stated, inter alia, that the sites where commercial drillings were about
to begin under the Chinese licence and the gas deposit in the sites might well extend
into the Japanese side of the median line. In the next month, Japanese companies
conducted a series of physical explorations of the seabed area in the Japanese side
of that line under the licence issued by the Japanese Government; the results clarified
the probable unity of the deposits. China had, reportedly, protested the Japanese action
as a violation of Chinese sovereignty and interest, and mobilized their naval fleet
to the waters near the gas fields.
Since October 2004, both Governments have had three rounds of consultations
concerning the disagreement on the East China Sea and other matters. The second
and the third meetings were held in May and September-October of 2005.
At the first consultation, China only explained the geological features, in general,
of the Chunxiao structure on which Japan had requested the detailed information,
and China stated that production in the structure would not affect the resources in
the Japanese waters. Concerning the other licensed sites, China stated that although
37 An additional clause to the code amended (Law No. 52, 1987) expressly enlarged the application
of the provision of Article 4 bis to the crimes to be punished under the Geneva Conventions even
when they were committed outside Japan.
38 Contributed by Aoki Takashi, Faculty of Law, Seiwa University, Chiba, Japan.
39 Arts. 1 and 2, Law on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf (Law No.74, 1996), <http: //www.un.
org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/JPN_1996_Law74.pdf. >
40 Japan has lodged a protest against the activities engaged in on the Japanese side of the median
line. In 2001, a framework of the mutual prior notification of marine research activities was establis-
hed for research taking place in the waters near the other country in the East China Sea, and notes
exchanged to bring it into effect.
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it had the right to place the site in the waters covered by Chinese sovereign rights,
it is abstaining from carrying out practical work on site.
The second meeting was reported to contribute to understanding each other.
However, the Japanese demand for information and suspension of Chinese develop-
ment work at Chunxiao Gas Field was not accepted by China. As regards the bound-
ary delimitation, it became clear that fundamental differences existed in both sides’
respective positions, including in the disputed area. It was agreed that a consultation
of legal experts should promptly be held. Whereas China proposed principles on joint
development, Japan pointed out its inherent difficulties. It was decided that each
country should examine the possibility to resolve the issue through joint development.
The third round results, as announced by the Japanese Foreign Ministry on the
web,41 need briefly to be stated.
(a) As regards the development of natural resources by the Chinese side: although
both sides shared the common recognition that this was a matter to be resolved
urgently, the Japanese side demanded that the Chinese side provide information and
discontinue the development work. However, the Chinese side responded that the
development had been conducted in the undisputed waters and that it could consider
the provision of information after an agreement in principle had been reached on
the joint development.
(b) To the Japanese proposal regarding the joint development and the demand
for suspension of Chinese development work, China replied that they would seriously
study the proposals and present their views at the next consultations.
(c) On the debate over the joint development, both sides shared the view that
any joint development to be carried out as an interim arrangement should not affect
future negotiations over maritime demarcation, and should be mutually beneficial.
(d) The legal experts exchanged their interpretations of international law applicable
to the case in the East China Sea. Although opinions differed, both sides deepened
their understanding of the other’s stance.
Although the issues between the parties are being identified gradually through
negotiations, even more intensive consultations seem to be required for them to reach
an equitable solution. For the legally justified resolution of this matter, additionally,
the political ramifications between the two countries have to be ameliorated, including
the increasing frictions over the ‘past history’,42 and the rivalry on the economic
and naval balance in the East Asia. Continuing observation is called upon on this
case.
41 See Japan-China Consultations on the East China Sea and Other Matters (30 September to
1 October, Tokyo), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/consult0509.html>
42 For the PrimeMinister’s statement on the point, see <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/
2005/8/0815.html>
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KOREA43
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Trade Agreement – Right to Property – Right to Freedom of Information
AGREEMENT FOR TRADE OF GARLIC BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
AND THE PEOPLE’’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
16-2(B) Korean Constitutional Court 568, 2002Hun-Ma579, 16 December 2004
Background
In order to settle the disputes regarding the South Korean measure restricting
the import of garlic produced in China and the termination of import by China of
South Korean mobile telephones, the Korean Government trade representative, with
the Chinese counterpart, signed on 31 July 2000 an agreement concerning the trade
of garlic between the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China to the
effect that the restriction upon the import of garlic produced in China that had already
been imposed by South Korea for the previous three years would be maintained. The
Government, thereupon, disclosed through a press release that the amount of garlic
to be imported from China was practically frozen for the three years to reach the
level of the amount imported in 1999, or less. However, in fact, the supplemental
document to the above agreement with China contained the additional agreement
stating that the “private enterprises of the Republic of Korea may freely import garlic
from the date of 1 January, 2003”, which the Government did not disclose. The
Complainants, who were cultivating garlic, filed the constitutional complaint in this
case claiming that their right to know and right to property had been infringed by
the above additional agreement and the failure to notify such additional agreement.
The Judgment
The Constitutional Court, in the opinion of all justices with the exception of the
separate concurring opinion of one justice, dismissed the constitutional complaint.
The summary of the judgments is stated below.
1. Summary of the Majority Opinion of Eight Justices
The measure restricting the import of garlic produced in China is merely to
provide a certain amount of extra time for countermeasure by temporarily protecting
the agricultural households that have failed to adjust themselves to the concrete
economic situation that confronts them, and not to secure a legal situation beneficial
43 Contributed by Professor Eric Yong-Joong Lee, at Dongguk University College of Law, Seoul,
Korea.
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to the agricultural households cultivating garlic by maintaining the import barrier
against the garlic produced in China for a long term or without a temporal limit.
Therefore, no legally justifiable expectation or interest whatsoever can be endowed
to the agricultural households cultivating garlic with respect to the renewal of the
above import restriction measure; neither may the property right of the agricultural
households cultivating garlic be deemed to be restricted by the Government’s decision
to not renew the import restriction measure. In addition, the opportunity to cultivate
garlic in an economically manageable way with constant profit is not an entity
guaranteed as a basic right. Thus, even if they should discontinue the cultivation of
garlic due to the exacerbation of the business situation, the freedom to choose an
occupation may not be deemed to have been affected thereby. Therefore, as there
is no question of an infringement of the basic rights of the Complainants such as
their property right, the constitutional complaint challenging the above agreement
is unjustified.
The Government’s obligation to disclose, which is derived from the right to know,
exists only upon the citizen’s act of active collection of information and especially
the request for disclosure of specific information unless there is an exceptional
situation. Therefore, in this case where there was no request for disclosure of informa-
tion, the Government was under no obligation to disclose in advance the import
liberalization measure part of the agreement concerning the trade of garlic between
the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China.
In addition, although an obligation to disclose corresponding to the right to know
may be recognized as an exception in the case of certain categories of treaties for
which there exists the obligation to disclose even without request for disclosure, the
above agreement with China may not be deemed as the final decision over the renewal
of the emergency import restriction measure even pursuant to the supplemental
document at issue in this case because such a decision should go through the process
of investigation and recommendation of the Trade Committee under the applicable
law. Thus, it may not be deemed that the Government as the matter of the Constitu-
tion should necessarily give such agreement the effect identical to that of domestic
law by way of promulgation.
As such, there is no obligation on the part of the Government to disclose the
supplemental agreement with respect to the import of garlic. Therefore, the constitu-
tional complaint challenging the failure to act that is based on the premise of the
Government’s obligation to disclose is unjustified.
2. Summary of the Separate Concurring Opinion of One Justice
The above agreement concerning the trade of garlic is equivalent to the so-called
public notice-type treaty, which under the domestic law has the status equivalent
to public notice and does not have the status of a statute. The authority of the execu-
tive branch of the Government to enter into such public notice-type treaties accom-
panies in its own nature a very broad discretion. Such discretion of the executive
branch is fundamentally strategic and tactical; further, it may not depart from
mutualism. Therefore, the constitutional complaint in this case should be dismissed,
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as the exercise of the authority by the Government and the content thereof with
respect to the conclusion of the public notice-type treaty may not be the subject matter
of review on a constitutional complaint unless there is a clear digression from or
abuse of the procedure determined by the Constitution and the statute.
Freedom of Renunciation of Nationality – Military Service
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NATIONALITY LAW ARTICLE 12,
PROVISION 1
Korean Constitutional Court, 26 August 2004 (No. 2002Hunba3)
Background
The Applicant was born in the United States and his parents were both Korean
nationals. The Applicant had dual nationality of Korea and America. Having reached
the age of 19, the Applicant applied for renunciation of Korean nationality.
The Minister from the Ministry of Justice decided that the Applicant was over
18 and had been inducted into the first national military service by the time he had
applied for renunciation; in accordance with Article 12 of the Nationality Law of
the Republic of Korea and under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 16 of the Regulations
for the Implementation of Nationality Law, the Applicant should not apply for
renunciation of Korean nationality unless his duty of military service had been
fulfilled or exempted lawfully. Therefore, the decision was for the dismissal of the
application for renunciation of Korean nationality. The Applicant applied to the Court
for retraction of the above-mentioned decision.
In the Court proceedings, the Applicant also requested the Court to decide whether
the Proviso in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Nationality Law of the Republic of
Korea was in violation of the Constitution. The Court rejected the submissions of
the Applicant. Then, the Applicant presented a petition to the Constitutional Court.
The Judgment
It is stipulated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 16 of the President Order on the
Implementation of the Nationality Law (hereinafter referred to as the “President’s
order”) that male citizens over the age of 18 with dual nationality who have been
inducted into the first national military service should not apply for renunciation of
Korean nationality unless their duty of military service had been fulfilled or exempted
lawfully.
In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Nationality Law of the
Republic of Korea, citizens of the age of 20, with dual nationality, shall select one
nationality before the age of twenty-two.
As for the duty of military service, the legal provisions provided that citizens
with dual nationality and in accordance with the circumstances provided in the
President Order shall select one nationality within two years after the removal of
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the circumstances. It is implied that some more provisions in relation to selection
of nationality shall be added under other specified circumstances. However, if there
are so far no relevant provisions applied to such circumstances, it makes a reservation
to authorize the concerned department to promulgate the order under the name of
the President, that is, if there are some circumstances related to the fulfilment of the
duty of the military service, the selection of nationality shall be made within two
years after the removal of the circumstances, but the provisions on the circumstances
shall be made by the authorized department under the name of the President’s order.
In this case, as there is no relevant provision directly applied to restrictions on
the selection of nationality for citizens with dual nationality and duty of military
service, the reservation has been made to authorize the concerned department to
promulgate the order under the name of the President to make the provisions on
nationality selection. Therefore, to make a judgment on whether the legal provisions
of this case are unconstitutional means to make a judgment as to whether the authoriz-
ing procedure is unconstitutional. This would be different from making a judgment
on whether the provisions of the President’s order on the Implementation of National-
ity Law are unconstitutional or not.
Article 75 of the Constitution of Republic of Korea provides that the President
shall provide a clearly defined scope in the President’s order. This would mean that
the basis of enabling legislation has been determined and, at the same time, the
authorization is limited in the clearly defined scope.
The Constitution of Republic of Korea clearly provides that National Defense
and Military Service are inevitable and intrinsic constitutional values and in accord-
ance with the Military Service Law it is the duty of every male citizen of the Republic
of Korea to perform military service. Therefore, any person with dual nationality,
one of them being Korean, shall not be exempted from the duty of Military Service.
In this case, it is the premise of the legal provisions that every Korean male
citizen, even those with dual nationality, shall fulfil the duty of military service. The
legislative purpose is to prevent the usage of the nationality selection system as means
of avoiding the obligation of military service. Therefore, the legal provisions in this
case do not violate the Constitution.
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NEPAL44
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Right to equality – Positive discrimination should not be used irrationally
ADV. SHYAM KRISHNA MASKEY AND OTHERS v. HIS MAJESTY’S
GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL, MINISTRY OF LAW, JUSTICE AND
PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS AND OTHERS
Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal on 6 December 2005
13 Supreme Court Bulletin 20
Introduction
The Supreme Court of Nepal has emphasized that the State should not discrim-
inate between men and women while giving effect to international law or implement-
ing domestic laws. The writ petitioner had brought a writ petition before the Supreme
Court of Nepal asking to declare null and void the eleventh amendment to the
National Code, 1963 of Chapter 12 sections 4(a)45 and 4(c)46 on Husband and Wife,
which allow a married woman to obtain partition out of the property of a husband
even after getting divorced. The writ petitioner had claimed that a married woman
would gain more property than a man when she divorces and remarries (as many
times as she does so). Under such a situation, according to the writ petitioner, the
woman could obtain a double right to partition whereas a man would be responsible
for sharing his property irrespective of the fact of the divorce. On the other hand,
men are responsible for providing alimony to a divorced wife until she remarries
or for a period of five years, whereas women having an income are not responsible
to provide alimony to a divorced husband even though the husband has no source
of income. The amended provisions of the National Code were introduced to give
44 Contributed by Surendra Bhandari, Executive Director, Law Associates Nepal, Kathmandu.
45 Section 4(a) of Husband andWife provides that, “When a husband and wife get divorced pursuant
to Section 1 of this chapter, the court shall decide the divorce only after the property of husband
is partitioned between them. If the husband who is getting divorce has not acquired ancestral
property, the court shall order a partition between the coparceners and out of the share of the
husband, grants partition to the wife who is getting divorced. Until partition is accomplished, the
wife should be provided monthly maintenance by the husband. If such woman does not remarry
or if she does not bear children after she remarries, the children from her former husband shall be
entitled to have a share in the property that she had obtained from her former husband. If there
are no children from her former husband, the former husband shall be entitled to her property after
her death”.
46 Id. Section 4(c) stipulates that if a man divorces who does not have property but does have an
income, in such a situation, the court shall provide from her former husband on the basis of his
income maintenance to the divorced woman until she remarries.
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effect to the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, 1979 (CEDAW). But unlike CEDAW, the amended provisions were discrim-
inatory to men. Therefore, according to the writ petitioner, the discriminatory provi-
sions had to be declared null and void.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the issues raised by the petitioner were
important in terms of law and justice. The Constitution guarantees that no discrimina-
tion shall be made against any citizen in the application of general laws on the ground
of sex. The tendency of enacting laws which discriminate between men and women
is against the rule of law. No son, daughter, husband or wife should be denied an
equal share to property. A legal provision which makes a man liable for providing
a share of property more than once to a woman or providing alimony to a wife having
equal or greater income in the case of divorce cannot be considered as fair, just and
reasonable.
The Supreme Court further noted that it is a special duty of the State to respect
and give effect to the provisions of the international human rights instruments,
including CEDAW to which Nepal is a party, without maintaining any discrimination
between men and women. The Court directed the Government to carry out a compre-
hensive study on the discriminatory provisions in the different Acts relating to family
law and property rights and to review their consistency with the Constitution of the
Kingdom of Nepal, 199047 for ending any form of discrimination between men and
women.
The Court noted that the legal provisions in question seem inconsistent with the
Constitution and related human rights instruments to which Nepal is a party and also
appear discriminatory. However, to declare them ultra vires on the basis of their
visible inconsistency with the Constitution and related human rights instruments was
not a viable remedy to the problem as it could immediately lead to multiple problems
in society. It would also be interfering with legislative wisdom and competency. It
would also affect the sub judice divorce cases in different courts. It would also create
discrimination against women since there were no legal provisions that could remove
discrimination against women. Therefore, while the Court considered the matter at
hand a very serious issue of public concern and importance, it held that it would
be unwise to test the constitutionality of the impugned legal provisions. Against this
background, the Court issued a directive to the Government to review the relevant
provisions through obtaining input from an expert body and to initiate a process of
enacting new laws or to amend the existing laws to make them consistent with the
Constitution and related international human rights instruments. The Court also
ordered the Government to submit a study report prepared by an expert committee
before the Inspection and Supervision Division of the Supreme Court of Nepal.
47 Recently, in January 2007, the 1990 Constitution has been withdrawn by an Interim Constitution
2007. However, provisions on non-discrimination and equality in the Interim Constitution are similar
to those in the 1990 Constitution.
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Gender Justice – International law prevails over domestic law in case of in-
consistency between domestic law and international law
LILY THAPA AND OTHERS v. PRIME MINISTER AND OTHERS
Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal on 15 December 2005
In this case, the Supreme Court of Nepal declared Section 2 of the Chapter on
Women’s Property Rights of the National Code, 1963 ultra vires of Articles 11(1)48
and 1749 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990, Article 2650 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, Articles 251
and 352 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) 1966, and Article1,53 2,54 3,55 and 1556 of CEDAW 1979.
The impugned Section 2 provides that unmarried, married or widowed women
who live separately from their family can on their own sell or transfer the whole
moveable property and half of the immovable property without obtaining the consent
48 Article 11(1) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 provides, ”All citizens shall
be equal before the law. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
49 Id. Art. 17 (1) provides, “All citizens shall, subject to the existing laws, have the right to acquire,
own, sell and otherwise dispose of, property.”
50 Art. 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 provides, “All persons
are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the
law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
51 Art. 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1996 provides,
“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in
the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
52 Id. Art. 3 provides, “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in
the present Covenant.”
53 Art. 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
1979 provides, “For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ’discrimination against women’
shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective
of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. ”
54 Id. Art. 2(a) provides, “States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms,
agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination
against women and, to this end, undertake: (a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and
women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein
and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle.”
55 Id. Art. 3 provides, “States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social,
economic, and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full
development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”
56 Id. Art. 15(1) provides, “States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law.”
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of the family members; they do, however, need to obtain the consent of their family
members (from parents in the case of unmarried women, the consent of the husband
for married women, and the consent of the adult children for a widow) to sell or
transfer the whole immovable property.
The question before the Supreme Court concerned whether or not the impugned
provision had acknowledged an independent personality and personhood of women.
Further, the writ petitioner had raised an issue: that when women are subjected to
the requirement of obtaining the consent of family members to selling or transferring
their personal property, this amounts to discrimination against women and violates
the provisions of the 1990 Constitution and various provisions of different inter-
national instruments including the ICCPR and CEDAW. Therefore, according to the
writ petitioner, the impugned provision had to be declared ultra vires.
The Court agreed with the submission of the petitioner and delivered a judgment
declaring the impugned Section 2 ultra vires to the Constitution, ICCPR, ICESCR
and CEDAW.
PolicyMatter – Court cannot intervene in policymatter but can test compatibil-
ity of domestic law with international law
ADV. PRAKASH MANI SHARMA AND OTHERS v. PRIME MINISTER AND
OTHERS
Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal on 15 December 2005
In this case, the Supreme Court of Nepal declined to intervene in the wisdom
of legislature, especially on the choice of options in formulation of a law. However,
the Court issued a directive order to His Majesty’s Government of Nepal to review
Section 16 of the Chapter on “Partition” in the National Code, 1963 in the light of
CEDAW, ICCPR and ECESCR.
Section 1 of Chapter on “Partition” in the National Code, 1963 provides that
each member of a family irrespective of sex and age shall have equal rights to
ancestral property. However, the impugned Section 16 provides that the property
received by a daughter from partition reverts (restitution in integrum) back to the
maternal family members when she marries. The writ petitioner had challenged the
impugned Section 16 claiming that it discriminated between men and women in the
context of the exercise of proprietary rights; for the impugned Section 16 makes the
proprietary right of women a contingent right whereas it prescribe no similar condi-
tions to the property rights of men. According to the writ petitioner, this provision
of domestic law (National Code, 1963) was inconsistent with Article 11 (equality
provision) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 and Articles 1, 2, 3,
15 and 1657 of CEDAW, Article 26 of ICCPR, and Articles 2 and 3 of ICESCR.
57 Id. Art. 16 provides, “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure,
on a basis of equality of men and women.”
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Unlike Lili Thapa’s case (discussed above), the Court declined to declare Section
16 of the Constitution ultra vires to international law, but issued a directive to the
Government to review the impugned Section 16 in the light of CEDAW, ICCPR
and ICESCR. It may be noted that both the decisions in the Lili Thapa case and the
Prakash Mani Sharma case were delivered by the same judges of the Supreme Court
of Nepal.
Abortion – Penalty higher for women than for men in cases of abortion is
discriminatory, and therefore, men should be penalized on the same level as
women are penalized
ADV. SAPANA PRADHAN MALLA AND OTHERS v. HIS MAJESTY’S
GOVERNMENT, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND OTHERS
Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal on 25 February 2005
14 Supreme Court Bulletin 4
In this case, the Supreme Court of Nepal found the existing system of penalty
for men and for women in cases of abortion discriminatory and inconsistent with
CEDAW, yet it did not order the Government to amend the discriminatory law by
bringing down the penalty for women to the level of the penalty for men. Rather,
it ordered the Government to penalize men at the higher level of penalty such as
that which is given to women. In this way, the Court on the one hand validated the
higher level of punishment and on the other denied the reproductive health rights
of women.
Section 28 of the Chapter on “Homicide” in the National Code, 1963 provides
that if a woman terminates her pregnancy on her own, she may be sentenced to up
to five years of imprisonment subject to the period of maturity of the pregnancy.
For example, if the pregnancy is of less than twenty-five weeks, she shall be
imprisoned for up to three years, and if the pregnancy is of more than twenty-five
weeks, she shall be imprisoned for up to five years. However, Sections 28 (A) and
32 of the same law provide up to three months’ imprisonment for less than twenty
five weeks’ pregnancy and up to six months’ imprisonment for pregnancy of more
than twenty five weeks to any other persons (both men and women) who terminate
pregnancy, except where it is terminated by the pregnant woman herself. Therefore,
according to the writ petitioner, these provisions were discriminatory not only between
men and women, but also among women.
The Court acknowledged that the provisions regarding the punishment of a
pregnant woman charged with abortion, on the one hand, and other men and women
accused of the same charge, on the other, seem different. However, the Court further
said that those provisions were added only later by the eleventh amendment of the
National Code. Therefore, they needed wider study, research, discussion, and delibera-
tion before any conclusion could be reached about their impact on inequality between
women and men, and on the state of unconstitutionality. In such a situation, the Court
had to give proper consideration to the competency and wisdom of the legislature.
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A declaration of these provisions as unconstitutional and void as per the demand
of the petitioner could therefore create a legal vacuum.
The writ petitioner had two major demands before the Court: first, to end the
discrimination between men and women regarding the penalty for abortion; the second
was to provide the reproductive health right to women by ending the system of
penalty to women for abortion. The Court found the impugned provisions discrimina-
tory yet declined to declare them null and void. On the contrary: the Court denied
the reproductive health right of women and also validated the higher level of punish-
ment by directing the Government to make the necessary amendments to the provi-
sions that provide a lower level of punishment for men, in order to increase for men
the level of punishment.
Passport – Executive orders and decisions cannot contravene the Constitution
and rules of international law to which Nepal is a party
PUNYAWATI PATHAK v. HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND OTHERS
Division Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal on 25 November 2005
The writ petitioners were two widowed women under 35 years of age. Before
they approached the Supreme Court of Nepal, they had approached the District
Administration Office (DAO), Kathmandu to obtain a passport. The DAO had,
however, refused to register their application on the ground that His Majesty’s
Government had already on 25 December 1995 made a mandatory decision which
required a woman below 35 years of age to submit a written affidavit from their
guardians permitting them to obtain a passport. After being denied, the petitioners
had approached the Supreme Court of Nepal asking it to declare the Cabinet decision
null and void.
Under no circumstances did the Passport Act prohibit men and women from
obtaining a passport except when they were under age (i.e., below sixteen years of
age). However, the Passport Regulations, 2002 required for minor and mentally
retarded persons an affidavit from their guardians. Neither the Act nor the Regulations
prohibited any woman from obtaining a passport after coming of age.
The writ petitioners claimed that the decision of His Majesty’s Government not
only violated the equality clause of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, but
had also curtailed their personal freedom and liberty, which violated Article 12(2)
of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990; Article 13(2)58 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, and different provisions of CEDAW. Therefore,
the Court was requested to quash the decision of His Majesty’s Government.
The Supreme Court, agreeing with the petitioners, said that Articles 11 and 12
of the 1990 Constitution, Passport Act, and Passport Regulations provide no authority
58 Art. 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 provides that “Everyone has
the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”
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to the Government to impose any restrictions or to lay down conditions discriminatory
betweenmen and women regarding the issuance of passports. Therefore, the impugned
decision of His Majesty’s Government was clearly outwith the ambit of the executive
power. The Court also noted that the decision of Government was an executive
decision and not a law, but it had superseded the existing laws. Therefore, the
Government had gone beyond its authority in curtailing the fundamental rights of
citizens, and had also discriminated between men and women. The impugned decision
had violated the equality clause of Article 11 and the rights to freedoms of Article
12 of the Constitution as well as the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 1966. Against this background, the Court quashed the discrimina-
tory decision of the Government. Further, the Court also issued an order ofmandamus
to the opponents to provide every Nepali woman with a passport without the require-
ment of the approval of her guardian.
Physical Punishment – Inhuman torture to child – Inconsistency with Constitu-
tion and rules of international law
DEVENDRA ALE v. HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT, COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS
Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal on 15 December 2005
The writ petitioner had challenged Section 7 of the Children Act, 1991 of Nepal
that allowed parents, family members, guardians and school teachers to reprimand
and mete out normal physical punishment to children as inconsistent with Article
14(4) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990; Article 759 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, and Article 1960 of the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (CRC).
Article 14(4) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 states that “No
person … shall be subjected to physical or mental torture, nor shall be given any
cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment…” Section 7 of the Children Act, 1991 also
protects children from torture. But the proviso to Section 7 of the Children Act
provides that reprimand or normal physical punishment from their parents, family
members, guardians or teachers to children shall not be considered as torture. The
writ petitioner claimed that the impugned proviso would afford impunity to certain
people who punish or torture children. The Human Development Report in South
59 Art. 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 provides, “No one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular,
no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”
60 Art. 19 (1) of the UN Convention on the Rights of Child, 1989 provides, “States Parties shall
take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child
from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment,
maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s)
or any other person who has the care of the child.”
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Asia, 1998 of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) had found that 14
per cent of the school children in Nepal had dropped out of school due to fear of
teachers. The National Report, 2002 submitted by Government of Nepal to the Child
Rights Committee of the United Nations had also admitted the fact of the tendency
of teachers to punish school children. Various countries including India and Pakistan
had banned physical punishment at school; in Nepal, however, the respondents had
made no efforts to control the torture or other inhuman treatment of school children.
Against the backdrop of these facts, the petitioners had sought the Supreme Court
to declare the impugned proviso null and void. Further, the petitioners had sought
an order of mandamus or other necessary orders to make the Government take
effective steps to control all kinds of torture and the inhuman and degrading treatment
of school children.
The Supreme Court of Nepal emphasized that the Constitution of the Kingdom
of Nepal, 1990 guarantees the right against torture as a fundamental right. Therefore,
if any law was found inconsistent with that constitutional guarantee, the law could
be declared void to the extent of that inconsistency. In addition, Section 9 of the
Treaty Act, 1990 of Nepal provides that the Government give effect to the obligations
of Nepal under international law by enacting necessary and appropriate laws. Further,
Section 9 of the Treaty Act provides that in case of inconsistency between domestic
laws and international treaties to which Nepal is a Party, the provisions of treaty law
shall prevail over the domestic laws. Thus, in the context of the restriction on
children’s being subjected to any type of torture and inhuman or degrading practices
under the CRC, the impugned proviso could not be found compatible with the
Constitution and the Convention. Therefore, the Court found that the proviso to
Section 7 of the Children Act, 1991 was inconsistent with Articles 14(4) and 25 (8)
of the Constitution and Article 19 of the CRC.
Racial Discrimination – Effective implementation of domestic law – Objectives
of the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
ADV. RATNA BAHADUR BAGCHAND AND OTHERS v. HIS MAJESTY’S
GOVERNMENT, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal on 21 April 2005
The writ petitioner had asked the Supreme Court of Nepal to order the re-
spondents to take necessary steps to make effective law and penalties for any act
of racial discrimination, especially as regards untouchability, which is pervasively
prevalent in Nepalese society. Although discrimination in respect of untouchability
is prohibited and penalized by law, discrimination based on untouchability is widely
rooted in Nepalese society. For example, Article 11(4)61 of the Constitution of the
61 Art. 14(4) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal provides, “No person shall, on the basis
of caste, be discriminated against as untouchable, be denied access to any public place, or be deprived
of the use of public utilities. Any contravention of this provision shall be punishable by law.”
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Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 prohibits all forms of discrimination including those based
on untouchability and declares any such activities punishable by law. Further, Section
10(A) of the Chapter on “Social Values” in the National Code, 1963 penalizes
untouchability. However, according to the writ petitioner, Section 10(A) did not give
effect to the Constitutional provision since the Constitution mandates that “any
contravention … shall be punishable by law” whereas Section 10(A) stipulates that
“…untouchability may be punishable”. It was because of this “may” concept incor-
porated in Section 10(A) that the objectives of the “shall” concept of the Constitution
and Articles 1,62 263 and 464 of the International Convention on Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 1966 to which Nepal was a Party had
been defeated. As a consequence, there was not a single case of conviction under
the impugned Section 10(A). Based on the provisions of the Constitution, and ICERD,
the writ petitioner had asked the Supreme Court of Nepal to order the Government
to make penalty for untouchability mandatory and effective.
The Supreme Court of Nepal observed that untouchability is a crime under Section
10(A) of the Chapter on “Social Values” in the National Code, 1963. Nevertheless,
it gives discretionary power to the Court while penalizing the offender according
to the seriousness of the crime. If the crime is serious, the Court can administer a
higher penalty and when the crime is less serious, the Court can administer a lesser
degree of penalty. It is because the nature of a crime is not always the same, thus
it is wrong to award the same punishment to all offenders. This provision provides
merely the flexibility to the Court to use judicial wisdom on the basis of the nature
and seriousness of the crime. It does not provide to the Court any authority to provide
immunity to an offender. The Court said that the petitioners had not mentioned any
examples in the past of such immunity and impunity provided by the court. Therefore,
62 Art. 1(1) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination,
1966 provides, “In this Convention, the term ’racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural
or any other field of public life.”
63 Id. Art. 2.1(d) provides, “States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue
by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its
forms and promoting understanding among all races, and, to this end: (d) each State Party shall
prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circum-
stances, racial discriminations by any persons, group or organization.”
64 Id. Art. 4(b) provides, “States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are
based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic
origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and
undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts
of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in Article 5 of this Convention, inter
alia: (b) shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda
activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such
organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law.”
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it was not logical and fair to term the impugned Section 10(A) erroneous on a
subjective basis.
The Supreme Court further observed that discriminatory practices of untouchabil-
itiy cannot be controlled only by making a provision that would provide higher and
stricter punishment to the offender. Nonetheless, to eliminate such practices, punish-
ment is necessary. It is, nevertheless, equally necessary to develop a social mindset
and opinion against untouchability and firmly establish the value in society that every
individual is equal as a birthright. Therefore, untouchability is a concept wrongly
and immorally practised in the Nepalese society, one that needs to be uprooted by
society itself. The Court said that the degree of punishment is a policy matter of the
Legislature and therefore the Court could not interfere in it. However, the Court issued
a directive order to the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, His
Majesty’s Government to make necessary laws and other arrangements consistent
with Article 11(4) and Articles 1, 2 and 4 of the International Covenant on Elimina-
tion of all kinds of Racial Discrimination, 1965 after carrying out a study and con-
sultation with key stakeholders including national-level civil society organizations.
PHILIPPINES65
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Legality of service contracts with foreign companies involving national mineral
resources – Obligations under bilateral investment agreements
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. et al. v. VICTOR RAMOS,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCES et al.
[G.R. No. 127882. 27 January 2004]
The Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional certain portions of the
Republic Act No. 7942 (otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995)
providing for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAAs) between the
Government and foreign-owned corporations. In this case, the Mining Act, its Imple-
menting Rules and Regulations, and the FTAA between the Republic of the
Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc. (WMCP) were assailed by an association
of ethnic and indigenous communities.
In holding that the Philippine Mining Act was invalid insofar as the said Act
authorizes FTAAs, the Court declared that although the statute employs the phrase
“financial and technical assistance agreements” in accordance with the 1987 Constitu-
65 Contributed by Harry Roque Jr., Faculty Member, College of Law, University of Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City.
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tion,66 it actually treats these agreements as ‘service contracts’ that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors in contravention of the fundamental law. Private
respondent WMCP, which is owned by WMC Resources International Pvt., Ltd.,
is a wholly owned subsidiary of Western Mining Corporation Holdings Limited, a
publicly listed major Australian mining and exploration company. According to
information provided by WMCP, it is a 100 per cent owned subsidiary of WMC
Limited and is, therefore, disqualified from undertaking any “exploration, develop-
ment, and utilization of natural resources” of Philippines.
Moreover, the Court found that the WMCP FTAA is indeed a service contract,
as it grants WMCP “the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize, process and dispose
of all mineral products and by-products that may be produced in the contract area.”
Its contractual stipulations, taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over
natural resources that properly belong to the state under the Constitution and are
intended for the sole benefit of its citizens. Consequently, the Court struck down
the WMCP FTAA.
In arguing against the annulment of the FTAA, WMCP invoked the Agreement
on the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Philippines and Australia,
which was signed in Manila on 25 January 1995 and which entered into force on
8 December 1995. Article 3(1) of the Agreement provides that “[e]ach Party shall
encourage and promote investments in its area by investors of the other Party and
shall admit such investments in accordance with its Constitution, Laws, regulations
and investment policies.” The Agreement, in Article 3(2), also provides that “[e]ach
Party shall ensure that investments are accorded fair and equitable treatment.”
WMCP argued that under the said Agreement, Philippines could not rely upon
the inadequacies of its own laws to deprive an Australian investor of fair and equitable
treatment through the invalidation of WMCP’s FTAA without similarly nullifying
the other service contracts entered into before the enactment of the Mining Act. An
invalidation of the FTAAwould constitute a breach of Philippines’ obligations under
the Agreement, which would in turn amount to a violation of the generally accepted
principle of pacta sunt servanda, which requires states to perform their treaty obliga-
tions in good faith.
The Court ruled againstWMCP’s assertion by declaring that assuming arguendo
that WMCP was indeed correct in its interpretation of the treaty, the annulment of
the FTAAwould not constitute a breach of the treaty invoked. According to the Court,
judicial decisions – including the decision herein invalidating the subject FTAA –
form part of the legal system of Philippines. The equal protection clause of the
Constitution would then require that the decision apply to all contracts belonging
66 Art. XII, § 2 reads: “…The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and condi-
tions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources...”
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to the same class. The decision would then uphold, and not violate, the fair and
equitable treatment stipulation contained in the agreement.
Effect of Treaty of Paris (ceding Spanish sovereignty over Philippines to the
United States of America) on citizenship
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. v. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER
[G.R. No. 161434. 3 March 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ v. RONALDALLANKELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.)
[G.R. No. 161634. 3 March 2004]
VICTORINOX. FORNIER v. HON. COMMISSIONONELECTIONS and RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE JR.)
[G.R. No. 161824. 3 March 2004]
In this case, the citizenship of Presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., or FPJ, was questioned before the Supreme Court in
several petitions. The petitioners alleged that FPJ made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen in
spite of both his parents’ being foreigners. They, therefore, argued that his certificate
of candidacy should be denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and that he be disqualified from the 2004 presidential
elections.
In order to resolve the issue of Poe’s citizenship, the Court looked into the history
of the concept of citizenship under Philippine law.
On 10 December 1898, Spain and the United States entered into the Treaty of
Paris. Article IX of the treaty provides:
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by
the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or
may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including
the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have
a right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory
they may preserve their allegiance to the crown of Spain by making, before a court of
record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
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they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory
in which they reside.
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.
According to the Court, the Treaty had the effect of depriving native inhabitants of
Philippines of their status as Spanish subjects upon ratification of the treaty. Although
they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens”
under American laws and were issued passports describing them to be citizens of
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The first comprehensive legislation by the US Congress on Philippines was the
Philippine Bill of 1902, which was also referred to as the Philippine Organic Act
of 1902. Under the Organic Act, a citizen of Philippines was one who was an in-
habitant of Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the eleventh day of April, 1899.
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act of the Jones Law virtually restated the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Under the former law, a native-born
inhabitant of Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of Philippines as of 11 April
1899 if he was a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, was residing in Philippines on
the said date, and has since that date not become a citizen of another country.
The Supreme Court held that under the aforementioned laws, FPJ’s paternal
grandfather Lorenzo Pou must be deemed a Filipino citizen. As Pou’s death certificate
indicated that he died on 11 September 1954 at the age of 84 years in San Carlos,
Pangasinan, it could, thus, be assumed that he was born sometime in the year 1870
when Philippines was still a colony of Spain. The Court also made use of the pre-
sumption that in the absence of evidence to the contrary; the place of residence of
a person at the time of his death was also his residence before his death. Pou was,
thus, a Filipino citizen, as he remained a Spanish subject on 11 April 1899, residing
in Philippines on the said date, and since that date has not become a citizen of another
country.
Pou consequently transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ’s father, Allan F.
Poe. FPJ then is a Filipino citizen himself since, under the 1935 Constitution, which
was in effect at the time FPJ was born, all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens,
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate, are Filipino citizens.
The Court disposed of the petitions by holding that FPJ therefore could not be deemed
guilty of making a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy.
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Primacy of municipal law over international agreements – Protection of trade-
marks and trade names
MIGHTY CORPORATION and LA CAMPANA FABRICA DE TABACO, INC.
v. E. & J. GALLO WINERY and THE ANDRESONS GROUP, INC.
[G.R. No. 154342. 14 July 2004]
The Respondents Gallo Winery, a foreign Corporation not doing business in
Philippines, and Andresons Group, Inc. – Gallo Winery’s exclusive wine importer
and distributor in the Philippines – sued the Petitioners Mighty Corporation and their
sister company, Tobacco Industries, for damages, trademark infringement and unfair
competition. The Respondents alleged that the Petitioners violated Article 6 of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and specific sections of
Republic Act 166 (otherwise known as the Trademark Law) on trademark infringe-
ment, unfair competition and false designation of origin. They claimed that petitioners
adopted the GALLO trademark to benefit from GalloWinery’s GALLO and ERNEST
& JULIA GALLO trademarks’ established reputation and popularity, thus causing
confusion, deception, and mistake on the part of the purchasing public.
Taking exception to the rulings of the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that the applicable laws were the Paris Convention and the
Trademark Law, and not the Intellectual Property Code, as Respondents had filed
the suit on 12 March 1993, at which time only the Convention and the Trademark
Law were in effect. The Intellectual Property Code took effect only on 1 January
1998, about five years after the filing of the complaint.
The Paris Convention is an international agreement binding on the Philippines
and the United States. Article 6 of the Convention prohibits “the registration or use
of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, imitation or translation, liable to
create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country
of registration or use to be well-known in that country as being already the mark
of a person entitled to the benefits of the Paris Convention and used for identical
or similar goods.” The Convention provides the following elements of trademark
infringement:
a) registration or use by another person of a trademark which is a reproduction,
imitation or translation liable to create confusion,
b) of a mark considered competent by the country of registration or well-known
in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of the
Paris Convention, and
c) such trademark is used for identical or similar goods.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Paris Convention protects well-known trade-
marks only (which are to be determined by domestic authorities), while the Trademark
Law protects all trademarks, whether well known or not, provided that they are in
actual commercial use in the Philippines. The Court declared that following universal
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acquiescence and comity, a municipal law would prevail in case of domestic legal
disputes involving any conflicting provisions between an international agreement
and a municipal law. Between the Paris Convention (an international agreement) and
the Trademark law (a municipal law), therefore, the latter will prevail.
Furthermore, under both the Paris Convention and the Trademark Law, the
protection of a registered trademark is limited only to goods identical or similar to
those in respect of which such trademark is registered and only when there is likeli-
hood of confusion. Under both, estoppel or laches may defeat the registrant’s other-
wise valid cause of action, and the time element in commencing infringement cases
is material in ascertaining the registrant’s express or implied consent to another’s
use of its trademark or a colourable imitation thereof.
The Court found that the actual commercial use of the GALLO wine trademark
by the Respondents was subsequent to its registration in 1971 as well as to Tobacco
Industries’ commercial use of the GALLO cigarette trademark in 1973. It ruled that
respondents never enjoyed the exclusive right to use the GALLO wine trademark
to the prejudice of Tobacco Industries and its successors-in-interest, either under the
Paris Convention or the Trademark Law.
It was also noted that the GALLO trademark registration certificates in the
Philippines and in other countries expressly state that they cover wines only, without
any evidence or indication that registrant Gallo Winery expanded or intended to
expand its business to cigarettes. By strict application of Section 20 of the Trademark
Law, therefore, Gallo Winery’s exclusive right to use the GALLO trademark should
be limited to wines, such being the only product indicated in its registration certifi-
cates.
The Court concluded that the Petitioners were not liable for trademark infringe-
ment, unfair competition or damages. The court also found no likelihood of confusion,
mistake or deceit as to the identity or source of Petitioners’ and Respondents’ respect-
ive goods and businesses. The word “GALLO” was used as a family surname for
the Gallo Winery’s wines, while “GALLO” for Petitioners’ cigarettes referred to
the Spanish word for rooster. The various different features – such as colour schemes,
art works and other markings – of both products also preclude any similarity between
them. Lastly, wines and cigarettes do not belong to the same class of goods, nor are
they identical or competing products.
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Principle of equality under human rights – Existence of a positive obligation
of states parties to eradicate discrimination
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INC. v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
[G.R. No. 148208. 15 December 2004]
Almost eight years after the Republic Act No. 765367 abolishing the old Central
Bank of the Philippines and creating the new Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP),
the Petitioner Central Bank Employees Association, Inc., assailed the constitutionality
of the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of which Act provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority – In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary
Board shall:
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the
selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such
system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the
Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and
subject to the Board’s approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the
Bangko Sentral’s human resource development program: Provided, that theMonetary
Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles
provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided,
however, that compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall
under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed
under Republic Act No. 6758.
The Petitioner alleged that the proviso establishes an unconstitutional classification
of the employees of the BSP. The proviso divides BSP employees into two classes,
namely: the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standard-
ization Law (SSL);68 and the rank-and-file not exempted from the coverage of the
SSL.
The proviso was assailed as not being based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences, but solely on the salary grade of the BSP personnel’s position.
It was also questioned as not being germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP. The classification was, therefore, unreasonable,
arbitrary, and in contravention of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court found that under present standards of equal protection the
questioned proviso is valid. The exemption of certain officers from the SSL was
intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent
67 Republic Act No. 7653, The New Central Bank Act, 14 June 1993.
68 Republic Act no. 6758, An Act prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification
System in the Government and for Other Purposes. 1 August 1989.
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officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file.
If the application of the proviso did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between
the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination
or distinction has a rational basis and is not arbitrary in the legislative sense. A statute
valid at one time may, however, become void at another time because of altered
circumstances.
The Court took judicial notice of the fact that after the enactment of the new
BSP charter in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), the development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Social Security
System (SSS), as well as those of other Government financial institutions (GFIs),
from 1995 to 2004. The amended charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS exempted
all the personnel of the latter GFIs from the coverage of the SSL. The rank-and-file
employees of seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically
denied to their rank-and-file counterparts in the BSP.Within the class of rank-and-file
personnel of GFIs, therefore, the BSP rank-and-file employees were discriminated
against.
The Court concluded that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file
employees from their counterparts in the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny,
as no substantial distinctions exist between the two to justify denying the exemption
to the BSP rank-and-file. Philippine legal history further shows that GFIs have long
been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other Governmental
entities.
The Court also drew on the principle of equality under International Law, which
has long been recognized and embodied in numerous regional and international
instruments and conventions.69 Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights70 proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection
of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection
of human rights.
The Court also noted that the equality provisions in these instruments do not
merely function as traditional “first generation” rights commonly viewed as concerned
69 The decision cites the following international human rights instruments that contain general
international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (ICERD); the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The regional instruments looked
into by the Court were the American Convention on Human Rights; the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights; the European Convention on Human Rights; the European Social Charter of
1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights and the Arab
Charter on Human Rights of 1994.
70 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution
217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. Available at: http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. Last visited
30 May 2006.
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only with constraining rather than requiring State action; rather, they impose a positive
obligation on States parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination. Article 26 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires “guarantee[s]” of
“equal and effective protection against discrimination” while Articles 1 and 14 of
the American and European Conventions oblige States Parties “to ensure ... the full
and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] ... without any discrimination” and to
“secure without discrimination” the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed. With regard
to employment, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention
of discrimination are laid down in the International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights and in very large number of Conventions administered by the
International Labour Organization, a United Nations body. Many other international
and regional human rights instruments also have specific provisions relating to
employment.
The Court held that a classification may be struck down if it has the purpose
or effect of violating the right to equal protection and adopted the international law
consensus on the principle that discrimination may occur indirectly,71 and pronounced
that the two-tier analysis made in this case of the challenged provision, and its
resulting conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in consonance
with the progressive trend of law in other jurisdictions and in international law.
Treaty-making process – Ratification and signature – Duty of executive depart-
ment to submit treaties to legislature for ratification
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY represented byHON. ALBERTOROMULO, and the DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, represented by HON. BLAS OPLE
[G.R. No. 158088, 6 July 2005]
In this case, the Supreme Court resolved the question of whether the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit
to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine
Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President. The
petition, which was filed by a Senator of the Philippines (Pimentel), a member of
the House of Representatives, and a number of human rights advocacy groups and
law students, was denied and the issue ruled in the negative.
71 The decision cites the Human Rights Committee’s declaration, inspired by the definitions of
discrimination adopted by the CERD and the CEDAW, that:
“... ‘discrimination’ as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons,
on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.”
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The Petitioners argued that the executive department was duty bound to transmit
the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion
with respect to ratification of treaties. Invoking the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, they also submit that Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome
Statute under treaty law and customary international law, and should refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of signing the Rome Statute unless
they have made their intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.
In interpreting Article 7, § 21 of the 1987 Constitution,72 the Supreme Court
held that contrary to the Petitioners’ submission, ratification is a function of the
President as the head of state and not of the Senate. Citing Executive Order No. 459
(EO 459) issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on 25 November 1997, the Court also
pronounced guidelines for the negotiation and ratification of international agreements.
EO 459 mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative,
the same shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department
then prepares the ratification papers and forwards the signed copy of the treaty to
the President for ratification. Only after the President has ratified the treaty does the
Department submit the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the
concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs complies with the
provisions of the treaty to render it effective.
The Court underscored the distinction between the signing of the treaty and the
ratification as two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. The
signature, which is usually performed by the state’s authorized representative in the
diplomatic mission, is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument
and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. Ratification, on the other hand, is
the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken
by the head of the state or of the Government.
The Court ruled against the Petitioners’ submission that Philippines is bound
under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed. The
signature neither binds the state nor signifies its final consent to the treaty. The
President, being accountable to the people, has the responsibility and the duty care-
fully to study the contents of any treaty signed by the state’s authorized represent-
atives and ensure that it is not inimical to the interests of the state and its people. The
President retains the discretion on whether or not to ratify the treaty even after its
signing by the Philippine representative. The Court declared that the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate the defeat or even restraint of this
power of the head of states, as to rule otherwise would be to render the requirement
of ratification of treaties pointless and futile. The pronouncement that Philippines
is under no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, however, was accompanied by the
caveat that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial
or whimsical reasons.
72 “… [N]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate…”
State Practice 203
NATIONAL LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS
Violence against Women and Children
An Act defining Violence againstWomen and their Children (VACW), providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, prescribing Penalties thereof, and for Other
Purposes
Republic Act No. 9262
Signed into law on 8 March 2004, Republic Act No. 9262 (also referred to as
the Anti-VAWC law) addresses the realities of Philippine domestic life and recognizes
the need to protect the family and its members, particularly women and children,
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Under this Act, the
Philippine Government binds itself to undertake efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the various other international
human rights instruments to which the Philippines is a party.
The Act criminalizes “violence against women and their children,” which it
defines as “any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had
a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against
her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering,
or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.”
Section 5 of the Act contains an extensive enumeration of the various acts through
which violence against women and children is committed, namely:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to
restrict or restricting the woman’s or her child’s freedom of movement or conduct
by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm,
or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but is not
limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling
or restricting the woman’s or her child’s movement or conduct:
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(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of
custody or access to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due to her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman’s
children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity or controlling the victim’s own money or properties, or solely
controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose
of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any
sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical
harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his
immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or
her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or
her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals
or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access
to the woman’s child/children.
The Anti-VAWC Law also covers a wide range of offensive acts that have
historically been committed against women and children, but have evaded effective
prosecution and punishment. Among its provisions include definitions of physical,
sexual, and psychological violence, battery, as well as economic abuse and depriva-
tion, and a recognition of battered women’s syndrome “scientifically defined pattern
of psychological and behavioural symptoms found in women living in battering
relationships” as a defence. Its protection extends not only to women in relationships
formalized by marriage, but also to those in “dating relationships”.
The Anti-VAWC law also provides for the issuance of protection orders, which
may be filed by the offended parties, their relatives, as well as concerned public and
social welfare officers, and enforced by law enforcement agencies, for the purpose
of preventing further acts of violence against women and their children who have
become victims of the criminalized acts. The protection order also provides for other
necessary measures which serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further
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harm, of minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the
opportunity and ability of the victim independently to regain control over her life.
The law also empowers the various local law enforcement and social welfare
authorities to deal with instances of violence against women and children, and
provides for comprehensive training, information, education programmes, and other
institutional assistance and support programmes.
Quarantine and International Health Surveillance
An Act Strengthening the Regulatory Capacity of the Department of Health
in Quarantine and International Health Surveillance Repealing for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 123 of 1947, As Amended
Republic Act No. 9271
The Quarantine Act of 2004, signed on 19 March 2004, grants the Bureau of
Quarantine under the Department of Health (DOH), a nationwide scope of function
and international commitment in accord with the International Health Regulations
(IHR) of the World Health Organization (WHO). The Act imposes upon the Bureau
the responsibility for conducting examinations of incoming and outgoing vessels and
aircraft, their cargoes, passengers, crews, and all personal effects, and the issuance
of quarantine certificates, bills of health or other equivalent documents at ports of
entry and exit in Philippines, as well as for conducting the necessary surveillance
over their sanitary conditions. The Bureau also has authority over both domestic and
foreign incoming and outgoing vessels and, including those of the army and navy,
their anchorage, and over aircraft and airports, insofar as necessary for the proper
enforcement of the provisions of the Act.
The Act emerged as a response to various international epidemics that affected
a number of Southeast Asian states, and grants the bureau broad powers to prevent
the introduction, transmission or spread of “public health emergencies of international
concern” from foreign countries into the Philippines or from one of its domestic
seaports and airports to another.
The law authorizes the authorities to undertake necessary intervention strategies,
such as health education and advisories, inspections, fumigation, disinfection, pest
extermination, vaccination for international travel, medical examination of aliens/
foreigners for immigration purposes, and the destruction of animals or articles found
to be infected or contaminated as sources of infection to human beings in coordination
with other concerned quarantine agencies, such as veterinary and plant quarantine,
and other measures as adjudged to be necessary.
Some of the law’s core prevention measures include the imposition of mandatory
immunization and preventive treatment for all persons arriving at Philippine ports
of entry, and the isolation of persons examined to have been infected or exposed
to infection aboard vessels or in hospitals and quarantine stations. The law also
authorizes the Director of the Bureau, in cooperation with the Bureau of Customs,
to prohibit the entry of cargo into the Philippines in the event of any public health
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emergency of international concern in a foreign country where there is imminent
danger of the introduction of hazardous cargoes or materials into the Philippines.
An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System
in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution,
and for Other Purposes
Republic Act No. 9285
Signed into law on 2 April 2004, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004
binds the Philippine Government to actively promote the freedom of parties to a
dispute to make their own arrangements and resolve their disputes. The Act encour-
ages and actively promotes the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an
alternative procedure for the resolution of appropriate cases and an important means
to achieve speedy and impartial justice and to reduce court dockets. That private
sector participation plays an active role in the settlement of disputes through ADR
is recognized in the Act, which is without prejudice to the introduction by the
Supreme Court of any ADR system, such as mediation, conciliation, arbitration, in
the near future.
The Act imposes strict principles and guidelines of confidentiality on the handling
of information obtained from mediation proceedings which it outlines in Section 9:
(a) Information obtained through mediation shall be privileged and confidential.
(b) A party, a mediator, or a non-party participant may refuse to disclose and
may prevent any other person from disclosing a mediation communication.
(c) Confidential information shall not be subject to discovery and shall be inad-
missible in any adversarial proceeding, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. However,
evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does
not become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by reason of its use in
mediation.
(d) In such an adversarial proceeding, the following persons involved or previous-
ly involved in a mediation may not be compelled to disclose confidential information
obtained during the mediation: (1) the parties to the dispute; (2) the mediator or
mediators; (3) the counsel for the parties; (4) the non-party participants, (5) any
persons hired or engaged in connection with the mediation as secretary, stenographer,
clerk, or assistant; and (6) any other person who obtains or possesses confidential
information by reason of his/her profession.
(e) The protections of this Act shall continue to apply even if a mediator is found
to have failed to act impartially.
(f) A mediator may not be called to testify to provide information gathered in
mediation. A mediator who is wrongfully subpoenaed shall be reimbursed the full
cost of his/her attorney’s fees and related expenses.
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Chapter 4 of the Act on International Commercial Arbitration defines commercial
arbitration as arbitration covering matters arising from all relationships of a com-
mercial nature, whether contractual or not.73 It also adopts the Model Law on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law74 to govern international commercial arbitration in the
country. Significantly, the Act provides for the interpretation of the Model Law by
stating that resort be made to the travaux preparatories and the report of the Secretary
General of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.75
Chapter 5 of the Act deals with Domestic Arbitration and Republic Act No.
876,76 otherwise known as “The Arbitration Law” as the governing law applicable
to all domestic arbitrations – arbitrations not considered international in the sense
of Article 1(3) of the Model Law.
The Act similarly provides that the Arbitration of Construction Disputes shall
continue to be governed by Executive Order No. 1008,77 otherwise known as the
Construction Industry Arbitration Law. The Construction Industry Arbitration Com-
mission (the “Commission”) created by the said Executive Order shall continue to
exercise its original and exclusive jurisdiction over arbitrations of construction disputes
in spite of the arbitration being “commercial” pursuant to Section 21 of the Act. The
construction disputes which also fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Commission include those between or among parties to, or who are otherwise
bound by, an arbitration agreement, directly or by reference whether such parties
are project owner, contractor, subcontractor, fabricator, project manager, design
professional, consultant, quantity surveyor, bondsman or issuer of an insurance policy
in a construction project.78 The Commission shall continue to exercise original and
exclusive jurisdiction.
73 Under §21 of the Act, relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the
following transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services;
distribution agreements; construction of works; commercial representation or agency; factoring;
leasing; consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; joint venture
and other forms of industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea,
rail or road.
74 Adopted on 21 June 1985 (United Nations Document A/40/17), the Model Law was also recom-
mended for enactment by the General Assembly in Resolution No. 40/72 (approved on 11 December
1985).
75 “International Commercial Arbitration: Analytical Commentary on Draft Text.” Ref. No.a/CN.
9/264, 25 March 1985.
76 “An Act To Authorize The Making Of Arbitration And Submission Agreements, To Provide
For The Appointment Of Arbitrators And The Procedure For Arbitration In Civil Controversies,
And For Other Purposes,” 19 June 1953.
77 “Creating An Arbitration Machinery In The Construction Industry Of The Philippines,” 4 February
1985.
78 Chapter 6, § 35.
208 Asian Yearbook of International Law
OTHER RELEVANT STATE PRACTICE
Opinion of the Secretary of Justice
Opinion no. 045, s. 2004, 5 May 2004, “On whether the records custodians of
the Philippine telecommunications entities should comply with the subpoenas
duces tecum issued by the United States District Court of Hawaii, requiring such
records custodians to appear and bring with them documents and records, in
connection with the Grand Jury proceedings in Honolulu, Hawaii, initiated by
the US Department of Justice for alleged violations of the US Antitrust Laws.”
Commissioner Ronald Olivar Solis of the National Telecommunications Com-
mission requested advice on the issue of whether the records custodians of Philippine
telecommunications entities should comply with the subpoena duces tecum issued
by the United States District Court of Hawaii, in connection with Grand Jury proceed-
ings for alleged violations of US Anti-Trust Laws.
Acting Justice Secretary Ma. Merciditas Gutierrez stated that the RP-US Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) in Criminal Matters remains in force. The Treaty
obligates the contracting parties to provide mutual assistance, in accordance with
the provisions of the treaty, in connection with the prevention, investigation and
prosecution of criminal offences, and in proceedings related to criminal matters. It
provides that assistance shall include, inter alia, providing documents, records and
items of evidence.
It was noted that the principal incentive for many Governments to negotiate
MLATs with the United States was the desire to curtail US prosecutors, police agents,
and courts from having to resort to unilateral and extraterritorial means of collecting
evidence from abroad. This incentive would be rendered useless if procurement of
evidence through a subpoena duces tecum would be allowed.
The Secretary concluded that the procurement of documents, records and pieces
of evidence should, therefore, be done through the existing MLAT, subject to the
conditions and limitations spelled out in Article 39 thereof – which require due
consideration and the application of pertinent provisions of our Constitution and
existing municipal laws such as Presidential Decree no. 1718.79
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Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
RP-Hong Kong Agreement Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 342
2 February 2004
The Philippine Senate expressed its concurrence with the RP-HONG KONG
Agreement on Mutual Assistance on Legal and Criminal Matters, signed in 2001,
in a 2004 Senate Resolution. The treaty, which governs matters of judicial cooperation
between the two parties, covers a wide range of matters including the service of
documents, the obtaining of evidence, the conduct of searches and seizures and the
effecting of witness testimonies. It excludes extradition, however, and merely allows
cooperation between the two countries in the tasks of “identifying and locating
persons” and “effecting the temporary transfer of persons in custody to appear as
witnesses”.
The Agreement carries safeguards such as the political offence exception (Article
IV, Limitations on Compliance, paragraphs 1.b, 1.c, and 1.d) and the double criminal-
ity requirement (id., paragraph 1.g). It also expressly designates the Department of
Justice as the executing authority in Philippines.
Negotiated by both parties from as early as 1998, the agreement allows the two
Governments to cooperate and provide mutual assistance in the investigation and
prosecution of criminal offences and in proceedings related to criminal matters.
The Governments of the two countries pledge to help each other in identifying
and locating persons, serving documents, obtaining evidence, articles or documents,
executing requests for search and seizure, and facilitating the appearance of witnesses.
The agreement also enables the two parties to effect the temporary transfer of persons
in custody to appear as witnesses; to obtain judicial or official records; to trace,
restrain, forfeit and confiscate the proceeds and instruments of criminal activities;
to recover pecuniary penalties for offences; and to deliver property as well as provide
information, documents and records.
Extradition
RP-China Extradition Treaty
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 343
2 February 2004
The Senate expressed its concurrence with the new extradition treaty the
Philippines signed with the People’s Republic of China in 2001. The treaty enshrines
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the double criminality principle – which requires offences to be “punishable under
the laws of both parties” for them to be extraditable – under Article 2, paragraph 1.
The article similarly carries a list of the crimes for which a person can be extradited.
Article 4 of the treaty, however, acknowledges the political offence exception,
which prevents a state from using extradition as a weapon to bring back political
rebels and dissenters within its coercive power. The treaty also incorporates a Rule
of Specialty under Article 16. Under this article, a person extradited by the Philippines
to China for a specified offence can be tried by China only for that offence and for
no other. This rule ensures that the requesting state will not be able to defeat the
“political offence exception” by requesting extradition for a common crime, and
subsequently turning around and charging the extraditee for a different offence.
The treaty also provides for the non-extradition of a party’s own nationals under
Article 3, paragraph 1, and includes a surrender provision obligating the two parties
to arrest and surrender fugitives from the requesting state.
Organic Pollutants
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 676
2 February 2004
The Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants (POPs) forms a
framework – based on the precautionary principle80 – which seeks to guarantee the
safe reduction and elimination of the production and use of POPs. The Convention
initially covers twelve priority POPs, formed intentionally or unintentionally through
industry and waste combustion, with the intent to cover other substances in the long
run as well. It defines the substances in question, while leaving open the possibility
of adding new ones, and also defines the rules governing the production, importing
and exporting of those substances.
The twelve priority POPs covered by the Convention are aldrin, chlordane,
dichlorodiphenyltrichlorethane (DDT), dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, mirex, toxaphene,
polychlorobiphenyls (PCBs), hexachlorobenzene, dioxins and furanes.
Initially, the Convention aims at prohibiting the production and use of nine POPs
and minimizing the production and use of a tenth substance. In the case of the last
80 The precautionary principle states that “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certaintyshall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation.” Preamble to the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Princs. 15, 7, 3, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1) (1992), available at <http:// www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?
DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163>.
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two POPs, the objective is to minimize the occurrences of their unintentional pro-
duction and release into the environment. The rules laid down in the Convention
do not apply to quantities of a chemical to be used for laboratory-scale research.
The Convention also allows for certain exemptions from the provisions on the
elimination or minimization of production or use of these substances and,
consequently, from the rules on imports and exports. Such exemptions are specific
to each POP and are defined, case by case, in the Annexes to the Convention.
The Convention provides for ending imports and exports of banned POPs.
However, chemicals classified as POPs may be imported for environmentally sound
disposal of existing POPs (destruction of waste, etc.) or in the case of a grant of an
exemption authorizing production and use of the substances in question. Exports are
similarly authorized for the environmentally sound disposal of existing POPs (de-
struction of waste, etc.), in the case of a grant of an exemption authorizing production
and use of the substances in question, and in exports to States which have not signed
the Convention but provide annual certification to the exporting party in expressing
compliance with the objectives of the Convention.
The Parties to the Convention are also required to develop a national, regional
or sub-regional action plan for implementing the Convention which they must submit
to the Conference of parties, the principal body assigned the task of implementing
the Convention. The plan must include an evaluation of releases and an evaluation
of the efficacy of the existing laws and policies on management of such releases,
as well as strategies for meeting the objectives of the Convention. The Convention
includes general guidelines on best available techniques and best environmental
practices for preventing or minimizing releases, and provides for measures to reduce
or eliminate releases containing POPs from stockpiles and wastes.
The Convention was adopted by 150 Governments during a conference held in
Stockholm from 22 to 23 May 2001. The Convention entered into force soon after
the Philippine Senate’s concurrence on 17 May 2004.
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
RP-Swiss Confederation Treaty onMutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 743
2 February 2004
The Senate concurred with a Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters between the Philippines and the Swiss Confederation signed on 9 July 2002,
similar to that entered into with Hong Kong SAR.
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Other Agreements Concurred by the Philippine Senate in 2004
The Philippine Senate has also concurred with various health and agricultural-
related agreements in 2004, namely: the Agreement Between the Philippines and
the International Plant Generic Resources Institute Acting in Administration of the
International Network for the Improvement of Banana and Plantain (INIBAP) Relating
to the INIBAP Office for Asia and the Pacific,81 the Agreement on the Establishment
of the International Vaccine Institute,82 and the Agreement on the Establishment
of the International Network for Bamboo and Rattan.83
Tobacco Control
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)84
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 195
25 April 2005
The Philippine Senate expressed its concurrence with the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), the first treaty negotiated under the
auspices of the World Health Organization. TheWHO FCTC has been widely hailed
as marking a paradigm shift in developing a regulatory strategy to address addictive
substances. In contrast to previous drug control treaties, theWHO FCTC now asserts
the importance of demand reduction strategies as well as supply issues.
The WHO FCTC developed as a response to the globalization of the tobacco
epidemic, which was facilitated through a variety of complex factors with cross-border
effects, including trade liberalization, direct foreign investment, global marketing,
transnational tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and the international
movement of contraband and counterfeit cigarettes.
The Convention employs both price and tax related mechanisms, as well as non-
price measures, to reduce the supply and demand of tobacco in national markets.
The non-price measures imposed by the Convention85 to reduce the demand for
tobacco include measures to ensure protection from exposure to tobacco smoke;
regulation of the contents of tobacco products; regulation of tobacco product dis-
closures; packaging and labelling of tobacco products; education, communication,
training and public awareness; tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and
demand-reduction measures concerning tobacco dependence and cessation. The core
81 P.S. Res. No. 739 – 2 February 2004.
82 P.S. Res. No. 740 – 2 February 2004.
83 P.S. Res. No. 741 – 2 February 2004.
84 Available at: http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHO_FCTC_english.pdf. Last visited 30
May 2006.
85 Arts. 6 to 14.
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supply reduction measures include regulations against illicit trade in tobacco products
and sales to and by minors and provision of support for economically viable alter-
native activities.
The Convention includes provisions that address liability and outline mechanisms
for scientific and technical cooperation and information exchange.86
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean87
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 242
17 May 2005
After four years of complex negotiations between the coastal States of theWestern
and Central Pacific and other States fishing in that region, the Convention on the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean was opened for signature in Honolulu on 5 September 2000.
The Convention is one of the first regional fisheries agreements to be adopted since
the conclusion of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995. The Philippines, which
was among the states that participated in the Multilateral High-Level Conference
on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western
and Central Pacific, expressed its concurrence with the Convention in 2005.
The Convention aims to ensure, through effective management, the long-term
conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the western and
central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. For this purpose, the
Convention establishes a Commission for the Conservation andManagement of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in theWestern and Central Pacific Ocean – with the Contract-
ing Parties being designated as ipso factomembers of the Commission. In accordance
with the provisions of Article 36, the Convention entered into force on 19 June 2004,
six months after the deposit of the thirteenth instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession.
Convention applies to all species of highly migratory fish stocks (all fish stocks
of the species listed in Annex I of the 1982 Convention occurring in the Convention
Area88 and such other species of fish as the Commission may determine), with the
86 Arts. 20 to 22.
87 Available at http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/westpac.htm. Last visited 30 May 2006.
88 The Convention Area, as defined in article 3 of the Convention, comprises all waters of the Pacific
Ocean bounded to the south and to the east by a line drawn from the south coast of Australia due
south along the 141° meridian of east longitude to its intersection with the 55° parallel of south
latitude; thence due east along the 55° parallel of south latitude to its intersection with the 150°
meridian of east longitude; thence due south along the 150° meridian of east longitude to its
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exception of sauries, within the Convention area. The conservation and management
measures under the Convention are to be applied throughout the range of the stocks,
or to specific areas within the Convention Area, as determined by the Commission.
The Convention remains open for accession89 by the States referred to in Article
34, paragraph 1, and by any entity referred to in Article 305, Paragraph 1(c), (d)
and (e) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea situated in the
Convention Area. The Contracting Parties may also, by consensus, invite other States
and regional economic integration organizations whose nationals and fishing vessels
wish to conduct fishing for highly migratory fish stocks within the Convention Area
to accede to the Convention.
Forced or Compulsory Labour
ILO Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (Forced Labour
Convention)90
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 195
17 May 2005
The Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (N. 29) requires the suppression of forced or
compulsory labour in all its forms. The Convention defines forced labour as “all work
or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and
for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”. “Forced labour”,
however, does not include such obligations as military service; work or service which
is part of normal civic obligations; work or service exacted as a consequence of a
conviction in a court of law, under certain conditions; work exacted in cases of
emergencies such as wars, fires, earthquakes, etc.; and minor communal services
as defined. The Convention requires the Contracting Parties to impose and strictly
enforce “really adequate” penal sanctions in cases of illegal exaction of forced or
compulsory labour that take place within their territories.91
Countries that have ratified the Forced Labour Convention undertake “to suppress
the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible
period”.92 The Convention has been the most widely ratified of all the Fundamental
ILO Conventions, since it was adopted in Geneva on 28 June 1930. It entered into
intersection with the 60° parallel of south latitude; thence due east along the 60° parallel of south
latitude to its intersection with the 130° meridian of west longitude; thence due north along the
130° meridian of west longitude to its intersection with the 4° parallel of south latitude; thence due
west along the 4° parallel of south latitude to its intersection with the 150° meridian of west
longitude; thence due north along the 150° meridian of west longitude.
89 In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 35,




force generally on 1 May 1932, and entered into force within Philippines on 15 July
2005, upon registration of its ratification with the International Labour Office. Out
of the 178 ILO Member States, Philippines became the 168th Member State to have
ratified the instrument as of 2005.
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JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Fundamental Rights – Death of détenue in Police custody in consequence of
alleged torture – Acquired right to enforcement – Locus standi of the widow
to prosecute such right – Time bar – Interpretation of statutes
SRIYANI SILVA (WIFE OF JAGATH KUMARA-DECEASED) v. IDDALMA-
GODA, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, POLICE STATION, PAYAGALAANDOTHERS
Supreme Court, 10 December 2002
S N Silva, CJ., Bandaranayake, J. and Edussuriya, J.
[2003] 1 Sri Lanka Law Reports 14
This case was an application filed by the wife of a deceased detainee pleading
for a declaration that her husband’s fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
11,94 13(1)95 and 13(2)96 of the Constitution had been violated. The question
before the Court was “whether the wife or a third party of a deceased person has
a right to institute proceedings in this Court in terms of the provisions of the Constitu-
tion, seeking relief for the alleged infringement of a deceased person’s fundamental
rights.”
The Respondents argued that under the provisions of the Constitution,97 only
a person whose rights have been infringed can make an application to vindicate those
rights. “Therefore a relative of a person, whose death was caused by torture, would
to be able to obtain redress through the fundamental rights jurisdiction enshrined
93 Contributed by Camena Guneratne, Senior Lecturer, Department of Legal Studies, Open University
of Sri Lanka.
94 No person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
95 “No person shall be arrested except according to procedure established by law. Any person
arrested shall be informed of the reason for his arrest.”
96 “Every person held in custody, detained or otherwise deprived of personal liberty shall be brought
before the judge of the nearest competent court according to procedure established bylaw, and shall
not be further held in custody, detained or deprived of personal liberty except upon and in terms
of the order of such judge made in accordance with procedure established by law.”
97 The relevant provision is Article 126 (2) of the Constitution which reads “Where any person
alleges that any such fundamental right or language right relating to such person has been infringed
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in our Constitution.” The Court, by a majority of two to one rejected this argument
based on the principle “there is no right without a remedy.” Bandaranayake, J.,
pointed out that the Constitution guaranteed a person, inter alia, protection from
torture, and from arbitrary arrest and detention. Consequently, the deceased detainee
who was arrested, detained and allegedly tortured and who subsequently died had
acquired a right to seek redress from the Court for the alleged violation of his rights.
She went on to say
It could never be contended that the right ceased and would become ineffective due to
the intervention of the death of the person, especially in circumstances where the death
is itself the consequence of injuries that constitute the infringement. If such an interpreta-
tion is not given it would result in a preposterous situation in which a person who is
tortured and survives could vindicate his rights in proceedings before this Court, but if
the torture is so intensive that it results in death, the rights cannot be [so vindicated].
In my view a strict literal construction should not be resorted to where it produces such
an absurd result. … Hence, when there is causal link between the death of a person and
the process, which constitutes the infringement of such person’s fundamental rights, anyone
having a legitimate interest could prosecute that right in a proceeding instituted in terms
of Article 126(2) of the Constitution.
However, in a dissenting judgement, Edussuriya J., while referring to the International
Convention on Torture, held that it could not have retrospective application in Sri
Lanka. He stated that Article 126(2) is unambiguous and does not permit anyone
other than the person whose rights have been infringed from seeking redress. He
noted that Counsel for the Petitioner had drawn the attention of the Court to the fact
that Sri Lanka had ratified the International Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment and is obliged to grant
redress to victims of torture, and had argued that in the event of the death of such
a victim the dependants are entitled to compensation, and Article 126 should be
construed accordingly.
Edussuriya, J. took the view that the Convention had been ratified in 1994, while
the Constitution had been promulgated in 1978. He stated “[i]t certainly cannot be
said that one can read into Article 126(2) of the Constitution of 1978 a legislative
intention in 1978 to grant relief to a widow of a person whose fundamental rights
have been infringed because Sri Lanka ratified the International Convention Against
Torture sixteen years later in 1994, containing a provision to grant relief to dependants
of victims of torture in the event of the death of the victim as a result of torture.”98
or is about to be infringed by executive or administrative action, he may himself or by an attorney-at-
law on his behalf, within one month thereof, in accordance with such rules of court as may be in
force, apply to the Supreme Court by way of petition in writing addressed to such Court praying
for relief or redress in respect of such infringement. Such application may be proceeded with only
[when] leave to proceed first had [been] obtained from the Supreme Court, which leave may be
granted or refused, as the case may be by not less than two Judges.”
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Right to Housing – International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
INTER-RELIGIOUS PEACE FOUNDATIONANDCENTRE FOR SOCIETYAND
RELIGION v. DIRECTOR GENERAL, URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
AND OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, POLICE STATION WATTALA
Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka
23 February 2004
HRC/803/01/7(i)
The Petitioners in this case were a group of people occupying small houses or
tenements given to them or to their predecessor in title by the then Member of
Parliament for the Wattala area.99 They claimed that the Member of Parliament gave
them an assurance that their ownership would be regularised in due course. However,
they further claimed that at the present time, due to political reasons, they faced
eviction from the land. The petition was based on three grounds: that the relevant
procedure laid down in the law100 had not been followed; that they had rights to
the land under the doctrine of legitimate expectation, and that the principles of natural
justice had been violated in that they had not been given an opportunity to be heard.
While the Commission addressed these issues under Sri Lankan law, it also
referred to Sri Lanka’s obligations under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), in the context of the right to housing. The
Commission pointed out that as a Party to the Covenant, Sri Lanka undertook to “take
steps, to the maximum of its available resources, to achieve progressively the full
realisation of the rights recognised in the Covenant.” It noted that General Comment
3 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), while
acknowledging the constraints to realization due to the availability of resources also
imposed obligations which are of immediate effect. Furthermore, General Comment
9 of CESCR required Parties to use all means at their disposal to give effects to the
rights. General Comment 3 also requires States to provide the “minimum essential
levels of each right.” The Commission also cited General Comment 4 of CESCR
on the right to housing. Therefore, the Sri Lankan Government is bound to take active
steps to the maximum of its available resources to achieve the full realization of the
rights.
98 In a subsequent decision (Sriyani Silva v. Iddalmagoda, Officer-in-Charge, Police Station,
Payagala and Others [2003] 2 Sri L R 63), in which the substantive issues were considered, the
Court held that the rights of the deceased had been infringed and that such rights had devolved
upon or accrued upon the Petitioner and their minor child, who were awarded damages.
99 Locus standi before the Commission is more liberal than before the courts. Under Section 14
of the Act any person may bring a motion or complaint before the Commission on behalf of any
other aggrieved person or persons.
100 The Urban Development Authority (Special Provisions) Act No. 44 of 1984.
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The Commission went on to hold:
As illustrated above, the recognition of the existence of minimum essential levels of each
right means State parties cannot use the lack of adequate resources as justification for
the realisation of Covenant rights. In this particular instance, by forcibly evicting the
resident of Oliyamulla, the Sri Lankan State has violated its obligations under the ICESCR.
It is, therefore, imperative that the Sri Lankan State recognise the right to housing and
the need to recognise minimum essential levels of each right including the right to housing.
The Commission held that the Urban Development Authority had violated Sri
Lanka’s obligations under the ICESCR.
NATIONAL LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS
Citizenship (Amendment) Act No. 16 of 2003
The Citizenship Act of 1948 was discriminatory of women in that it did not permit
a Sri Lankan woman married to a non-Sri Lankan man to pass on her nationality
to her children, while permitting a Sri Lankan man married to a non-Sri Lankan
woman to do so. Effectively, Sri Lankan nationality could be passed down only
through the father.
Women’s rights activists had campaigned for many years for this law to be
amended, and the issue was also raised by the Committee on the Convention for the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 2002 when Sri Lanka
presented its combined Third and Fourth Report. In its Concluding Comments, the
Committee expressed its concern at “the nationality law which precludes Sri Lankan
women from passing nationality to their children on an equal footing with men.”101
The Committee urged the State party “to review all existing laws and amend discrim-
inatory provisions so that they are compatible with the Convention and the Constitu-
tion.”102
In 2003, the provisions regarding citizenship by descent were amended to elimin-
ate the discrimination against women. Part II of the original Act entitled “Citizenship
by descent” provided that a person born in or outside Ceylon (as it then was) could
acquire citizenship if at the time of his/her birth, his/her father was a citizen of
Ceylon. The amending law has amended that provision so that he/she may obtain
citizenship “if either of his parents is or was a citizen of Sri Lanka.”
101 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights – Concluding Observations of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Sri Lanka – 07/05/2002 – A/57/38 (Part I)
– Paragraph 274.
102 Ibid., Paragraph 275.
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Acquisition of citizenship through the mother has also been given retrospective
application. A new provision, Section 5A, provides that a person born after the
appointed date (15 November 1948) but before the date of commencement of the
amending Act, and (1) whose mother only was a citizen of Sri Lanka or (2) neither
of whose parents was a citizen at the time of his/her birth but one of them
subsequently acquired citizenship, may apply for citizenship.
In other provisions of the Act too, the word “father” wherever it occurs has been
substituted with the word “parents” or the words “father or mother”.
TAJIKISTAN103
NATIONAL LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS
State Guarantees – Equal Rights for Men and Women – Equal Opportunities
in the Exercise of Such Rights
Law on State Guarantees of Equal Rights for Men and Women and Equal
Opportunities in the Exercise of Such Rights
Adopted 1 March 2005
The Law on State Guarantees of Equal Rights for Men and Women and Equal
Opportunities in the Exercise of Such Rights was enacted in Tajikistan to comply
with its obligations following the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The preamble of the law stipulates
that the legislation primarily focuses on securing constitutional guarantees for men
and women in the social, political, cultural, and any other area, and is directed to
prevent discrimination on the basis of gender.
General provisions provide terminological definitions of categories such as gender,
gender policy, equality, gender equality, equal opportunities, and discrimination. The
law defines equality as equality in the rights, obligations and accountability of both
men and women before the law. As for the equality of opportunities: the law under
this term entails the guarantee of conditions for the exercise of rights by men and
women in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Tajikistan and international
standards adhered to by Tajikistan. Discrimination is any distinction, exclusion or
limitation on the basis of gender that is aimed at the abatement or nullification of
the equality of men and women in the political, economic, social, cultural or any
other spheres. Discrimination of men and women is prohibited.104 Violation of this
103 Contributed by Tahmina Karimova, Intern, International Criminal Court, The Hague.
104 Article 3 of the Law on State Guarantees of Equal Rights for Men and Women and Equal
Opportunities in the Exercise of Such Rights accessed at legal database “Pravo i consultant”.
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principle which is laid down as the foundation of gender equality, e.g., violation
through enforcing state policy and other actions that place men and women in unequal
positions, is considered discrimination and shall be eliminated in accordance with
the provisions set by the law.105 The provisions of the law further spell out that
special measures envisaged to protect the health of both men and women, and special
protection afforded to women in relation to pregnancy and childbirth as well as other
measures to implement the law, shall not constitute discrimination.
State authorities are obligated within their competence to ensure equal opportun-
ities for both men and women in the following areas:106
- execute gender education of state officials by means of human resources
training;
- promote and facilitate the exercise of equal opportunities by both men and
women inter alia through adoption of legal instruments, and establishment
of procedures and other specific measures including the elimination of causes
and conditions preventing men and women from exercising the right to
equality;
- develop and implement special programmes directed at the elimination of
discrimination based on gender;
- introduce into state programmes measures aiming at ensuring constitutional
rights and guarantees and reinforcing the stability of society, and measures
to ensure gender equality.
The state guarantees equal participation of men and women in state governance. The
state ensures equal representation of men and women in the legislature, executive,
and judiciary through legal, administrative, and other mechanisms.107
The law, in addition to the general guarantees formulated in the form of prin-
ciples, provides additional sets of guarantees under different sets of rights. Article
6, in particular, regulates equal opportunities rights in the area of education. All
educational and academic institutions are obligated to:
- ensure equal conditions for men and women to pursue general, vocational
and professional education, all types of professional training and refresher
courses;
- incorporate special gender courses to promote research in the area of gender
equality, and assist citizens in their gender education;
- employ educational programmes and materials that exclude discrimination
on the basis of gender;
105 Ibid.
106 Supra n. 99, Article 4.
107 Supra n. 99, Article 5.
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- set up preferential conditions of admission to secondary and higher pro-
fessional education institutions for girls from mountainous regions and rural
areas.
Chapter II of the law sets out provisions in Articles 8 and 9 on state guarantees of
the equal opportunities of men and women in the exercise of their electoral rights.
The provision of law in this regard states that the “electoral system of Tajikistan
ensures equal electoral rights and guarantees and equal participation of both men
and women in the political process”. Equal opportunities guarantees for men and
women in the formation of electoral commissions are set out in Article 9.
Chapter III standardizes state guarantees in the area of state civil service. The
law provides that no direct and indirect restrictions or privileges on the basis of gender
shall be permitted for entry into the state civil service system and for the length of
such service.108 Furthermore, Article 10 stipulates that heads of state bodies and
relevant state officials shall ensure equal access for all citizens to the state civil
service in accordance with their abilities and professional qualification notwithstanding
the gender of the candidate for the position. Vacancies shall be taken up following
recruitment on equal conditions of participation for men and women. The provision
concludes that vacancy announcements shall not be made solely for persons of either
sex.
State guarantees on equal opportunities of men and women in social and economic
spheres are laid down in Chapter IV. State agencies, municipalities, and heads of
organizations of all forms of property are obliged to ensure that men and women
have equal access to economic resources including immovable and movable properties,
land, financial actives, and credits, and guarantee freedom of entrepreneurship and
other types of activities in accordance with the laws of Tajikistan.109
In order to promote gender equality in labour relations, employers (head of a
state agency or head of an organization) shall ensure
- equal opportunities for men and women regarding labour contracts;
- equal access of men and women to vacancies;
- equal remuneration for men and women having the same position or equal
remuneration for men and women who perform work of equal value;
- safe labour conditions.110
Article 14 provides that in the case of a legal action on the ground of alleged
sex discrimination against an employer by an employee, trade union or other public
association, the burden of proof regarding the absence of malice (intention) lies with
108 Supra n.99, Article 10.
109 Supra n. 99, Article 12.
110 Supra n. 99, Article 13.
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the employer. In the case of a massive employee redundancy, the number of sus-
pended employees of one gender shall be proportional to the general number of the
staff involved in the specific object in question.111 Collective labour contracts should
include measures providing equal rights and opportunities for men and women and
should contribute towards improving conditions for men and women to combine their
professional and family lives.112 The monitoring mechanisms in this regard are
vested in trade unions, other representatives of employees, union of employers, and
relevant state authorities.
Admittance to work, promotion, re-training, the setting-up of the work schedule,
and dismissal shall be carried out in accordance with the requirements of the law
on equal rights and opportunities for men and women and with due consideration
of their family situation. Employers are obligated to have a system of retraining for
employees of both genders related to vacations permitted by laws, the birth and
bringing up of a child, military service, and other state service-related assign-
ments.113
Article 17 stipulates the implementation of the monitoring of equal rights and
opportunities in the area of economic and social life. In accordance with the provision
of this article, an authorized body shall organize continuous monitoring of the imple-
mentation of equal rights and opportunities for men and women. The monitoring
shall be organized, inter alia, for the purposes of the systematic analysis of the
exercise of equal rights and opportunities for men and women in social and labour
areas, the forecasting of changes to the current situation in order to evaluate whether
measures are needed to prevent and impede facts of gender-based discrimination,
and for the purpose of the development of proposals on state social programmes in
the area of concern. Results of the monitoring shall be reflected in the mass
media.114
Chapter V provides for a general monitoring mechanism to ensure the imple-
mentation of equal rights and opportunities for both men and women. The Govern-
ment defines the following measures within its mandate to ensure the exercise of
equal rights and opportunities:
- the establishment of a state body on gender development in Tajikistan;
- the development of a unified state policy aimed at the achievement of the
social equality of men and women in all areas of state and public lives, and
to ensure the implementation of such a policy;
- the development of target (subject area) programmes and their implementation
to promote the equality of men and women;
111 Supra n. 99, Article 15.
112 Supra n. 99, Article 16.
113 Supra n. 99, Article 7.
114 Supra n. 99, Article 17.
State Practice 223
- the direction and control of executive bodies and municipalities on the pro-
tection and exercise of equal rights of men and women, the appointment of
women in authoritative positions, and the education of the young generation
of key staff from among women.115
The participation of trade unions and public associations in the implementation
of equal rights and opportunities is confined to the process of decision making in
economic and social spheres, and to the representation and protection of the rights
of men and women in accordance with Article 20 of the law. The general monitoring
of precise and unified implementation of laws and other normative instruments
ensuring equal rights and opportunities for men and women in exercise of such rights
is vested in the Office of General Prosecution of Tajikistan.116
Fight against Corruption
Law on the Fight against Corruption
Adopted 25 July 2005
The introductory part of the Law on the Fight against Corruption lays down that
the law sets out a legal framework aimed at the protection of human rights and
freedoms, ensuring public interest, national security, good governance, integrity, and
impartiality in the state and public service; it also sets out the legal and administrative
framework for preventing, investigating, and reducing the consequences of violations
related to corruption. In addition, the law envisages the types of violations and
punitive measures related to corruption. This is the second anti-corruption law adopted
by Tajikistan. The previous legal instrument failed to incorporate some important
principles set by international standards in the fight against corruption.
Under the new law, corruption is defined as the (in)actions of persons authorized
to fulfil Governmental functions or equivalent persons using their position and related
opportunities to gain material and non-material benefits and advantages not envisaged
by law, and other advantages for himself or herself or another person, as well as
promising, offering or giving the aforementioned persons (public officials or
equivalent persons) advantages in order that the public official or the person abuse
his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining an advantage for
individuals or legal entities.117 The new definition of corruption has attempted to
integrate practically all international standards concerning the definition of “cor-
ruption”. Furthermore, under the new law, the definition of corruption includes, in
addition to “material gains” (as stipulated by the previous law), “non-material gains”
and “benefits”, “promises and offers”, thus introducing the concept of “trade of
115 Supra n. 99, Article 18.
116 Supra n. 99, Article 21.
117 Article 1 of the Law on the Fight against Corruption, accessed at legal database “Pravo i
Consultant”.
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influence” as opposed to the previous legal standards in the area. The law also
provides a comprehensive definition of a “state official”.118 The new law also
criminalizes the bribery of legal entities and of foreign or international public offi-
cials.119
Under the new law, state authorities predominantly involved in the fight against
corruption are the office of prosecution, internal affairs, security, military service,
border control, drug control, and tax and customs agencies. The Office of the Prose-
cutor has the coordinating role among the state authorities.120 Furthermore, the
Prosecution is mandated with the implementation of analytical activities and statistical
monitoring of anti-corruption activities in Tajikistan.
Article 6 provides for the protection of those who cooperate with state agencies
in the detection of corruption. While international standards in this area specifically
mention two categories of witnesses and whistleblowers, Tajik legislation in this
regard provides for the concept of “persons cooperating” as an addition.
The Law on the Fight against Corruption imposes special requirements and
restrictions on those who hold a state office as a measure to prevent abuse of official
status or use of influence for personal, group or other unrelated purposes deriving
from an official status.121 Therefore, in accordance with the law, state officials
declare their income to tax authorities on an annual basis. A person may not be
selected, appointed or hold a state office if:
- he or she is sentenced for a deliberate crime (unless such a crime has been
expunged or cancelled in accordance with the law);
- he or she is declared incapable or limitedly capable by decision of a court;
- he or she is declared incapable due to lack of education, professional skills
and necessary experience if such criteria be deemed necessary by the laws
of Tajikistan;
- he or she is in direct subordination to or reporting to posts held by close
relatives;
- he or she is a citizen of a foreign country unless such an arrangement is
provided by an international agreement adhered to by Tajikistan.122
A person holding a state or public office must follow additional restrictions. He
or she may not:
118 Ibid.
119 Supra n. 112, Article 3.
120 Supra n. 112, Article 5.
121 Supra n. 112, Article 7.
122 Supra n. 112, Article 9.
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- occupy another paid post apart from those related to academic, artistic and
teaching jobs;
- participate in entrepreneurial activities personally or through third parties;
- make use of financial, technical, material and other state or public means
and resources, as well as corporate information, for purposes not related to
the occupying post;
- accept rewards for services provided within functional duties, gifts and the
provision of out-of-office services to senior staff with the exception of sym-
bolic presents and souvenirs provided in the course of an official event;
- undertake tours and health-related travels at the expense of individuals and
legal entities both domestic and foreign with the exception of travels sup-
ported by close relatives and travels provided for by international treaties
and agreements concluded among relevant Tajik and foreign state authorities;
- perform the orders and requests of political parties, public associations,
religious organizations and use official position for their interests;
- communicate regionalism or prejudice contrary to the interest of the work
or favour organizations, public associations or a specific individual;
- receive honorariums for publications and speeches at official events trans-
mitted by radio and television that are part of the service performed in the
official post.123
A further provision stipulates that violation of aforementioned restrictions shall
be subject to legal responsibility provided in Chapter III which reflects issues of viola-
tions related to corruption and accountability for such offences. In this regard, the
law distinguishes two types of offences: 1) offences creating conditions for corruption,
and 2) administrative offences related to corruption. The offences relevant to the
first category and committed by individuals authorized to perform state functions
are as follows:124
- use of official status to resolve issues related to personal interests, close
relatives and third persons;
- impede or illegally interfere in law enforcement or controlling activities in
a specific territory in relation to specific objects or persons;
- participation in the capacity of chargé d’affaires of individuals and legal
entities in relation to cases of an agency he or she is being employed by,
or subordinate to or supervised by;
- participation in gambling or games of material character with senior, junior
or other work-related staff;
- entrepreneurship, participation in entrepreneurial organizations or in their
governing bodies;
123 Supra n. 112, Article 10.
124 Supra n. 112, Article 11.
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- provision of advantages (protectionism) not envisaged by laws in appointment
and promotion in state service, in education, academic or any other similar
activity;
- violation of public complaint procedure set by the laws of Tajikistan, dis-
regard of advantages, subventions or rotation provided by laws in resolving
such complaints;
- delegation of authority in the area of state regulation or control of
entrepreneurship to individuals or legal entities engaged in such an activity.
Administrative offences related to corruption are reflected in Article 12 of the
law and present a very comprehensive list of actions that do not contain criminal
elements and, therefore, are considered violations of an administrative nature. Article
14 of the Law refers to the Criminal Code of Tajikistan as regards the definition
of the crimes of corruption and liability for the commission of such crimes.
The last substantive part of the law, Chapter V, deals with the confiscation of
property and annulment of normative acts. In accordance with Article 15, the property
and value of services received as a result of a violation related to corruption are
subject to confiscation in accordance with the relevant laws and rules of Tajikistan.
As for normative acts adopted as a result of violation related to corruption, they are
required to be annulled by the decision of an official or collegial body authorized,
or by court or by the objection of the prosecutor.
OTHER RELEVANT STATE PRACTICE
State Military Policy
Military Doctrine of Tajikistan
Adopted 3 October 2005
The Military Doctrine of Tajikistan is a compilation of the official views that
determine the military, political, strategic and economic bases for military security
in Tajikistan.125 The document spells out that the present doctrine is a transitional
outcome, since it determines directions at the stage of democratic state building,
transitional economy, re-organization of the military system, and the dynamic trans-
formation of international relations. The Military Doctrine develops and concretizes
the concept of the national security of Tajikistan.
The political and military foundations of the Doctrine are set out in Chapter II.
This part of the Doctrine acknowledges the danger an armed conflict may pose
Tajikistan and the Central Asian region as a whole. Hence, taking into consideration
125 Chapter I of the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Tajikistan accessed at legal database
“Pravo i Consultant”.
State Practice 227
this perspective, this part of the Doctrine determines the following fundamental
principles:
- It is indispensable to abide by principles of peaceful coexistence, use political
means to find solutions to regional and international disputes and conflicts,
respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries, not interfere
in internal affairs, and maintain the integrity of state borders;
- It is crucial to avoid wars, and to refrain from usage of armed violence and
the threat of use of force for achievement of political, economic and other
goals;
- It is important to condemn acts of terrorism, political extremism, separatism,
and drug trafficking.
The Doctrine further stipulates that military power remains significant for the
protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Tajikistan from international
terrorism, political extremism, separatism, and drug smuggling. In addition, military
power is a means to prevent interference by other states in the internal affairs of
Tajikistan. Therefore, Tajikistan reserves a right to ensure the security of its interests
and the right of self-defence and collective defence in the case of the threat or use
of force against Tajikistan and its allies in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.
Section I of the Doctrine provides the political principles and means to ensure
state security. In ensuring its security, Tajikistan will give priority to political,
diplomatic and other peaceful means. Tajikistan refrains from animosity and the threat
or use of force in its policy towards other states, and abstains from territorial claims
as regards neighbouring states. According to the Doctrine, Tajikistan promotes further
development of the rules of international law, supports the development and adoption
of complex means and actions on military and technical issues by all states, and
promotes the prevention of armed conflicts in the potential areas of violence outbreak.
Aiming at the preservation of national and international security and the preven-
tion of different types of threats, Tajikistan will strive for:
- de-escalation of the arms race in the region and debarment of its transporta-
tion to outer space;
- a ban on the placement and nuclear testing in its territory;
- dismantling of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons;
- a ban on the export of (transfer) materials and equipment facilitating the
creation and proliferation of any type of weapon of mass destruction and
means of its delivery;
- the steady reduction of the armed forces to the level necessary for defence
by all states, in particular, Central Asian states;
- mutual respect, transparency, and preparedness in military activities and on
this basis, create effective measures of trust and control;
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- timely information sharing among countries of the Central Asian Region,
the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Security Organization in preventing
trans-national conflicts, and fighting with drug criminality, international
terrorism, and extremism in all its forms and manifestation;
- the transformation and integration of existing military and political unions
into more effective structures of collective security.
The policy of Tajikistan in the area of diminution and restriction of weapons
as an element of international security is built upon the following principles:
- Priority is given to ensure the security interests of Tajikistan with due con-
sideration for the security of other countries;
- Support to strategic stability in countries neighbouring Tajikistan and its
strategic partners.
Tajikistan cooperates with all countries to strengthen international and national
stability and security. It struggles for the prevention of armed conflicts in the region
by means of integration into a system of collective security and the coordination of
international efforts in this area. Peace and stability shall be achieved by peaceful
means. On a regional basis, peace and stability shall be pursued on the level of states
members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, and states parties to the Commonwealth of Independent States. On
a global level, Tajikistan will strive for peace and security with all those countries
which are members of the United Nations Organization. These efforts shall be
directed, in particular, at strengthening the world community in its fight against new
challenges and threats to security from terrorism, drug dealing, and religious
extremism.
Cooperation in the prevention of armed conflicts shall be carried out with all
countries of the world community where the policies of cooperating states do not
contravene the interests of Tajikistan and do not breach the UN Charter or its prin-
ciples.
Section III of the Military Doctrine provides a background for the causes of
potential and existing conflicts, factors and current challenges to security in relation
to the Central Asian Region. The text, inter alia, states:
[D]espite the positive changes in the world in some separate regions, in particular, in
the Central Asian region, social, political, economic, territorial, regional, and ethnic
tensions are increasing; there are cases of international terrorism, religious extremism,
proliferation of drugs and illegal migration that are the main causes of military insecurity
not only for Tajikistan but also for all countries in general. Accumulation of these contra-
dictions may bring about conflicts and local wars that directly concern the national interests
of Tajikistan and its security.
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Factors contributing towards military danger include or may include:
- disparate economic development of states in the region in the period of
transition to the new market economy relations and the acceleration of the
social and economic stratification process of population;
- maintenance and growth of regional, ethnic and religious contradictions
destabilizing situations both inside the country and in the Central Asian
Region in general;
- internal armed conflicts;
- the growth of the drug business, international terrorism, extremism, and illegal
migration;
- the tendencies of separate counties to establish their exceptional military and
political influence in the Central Asian region and their inclination to resolve
conflict situations by forceful means;
- the creation of massive violent/armed groups and military bases in the coun-
tries bordering with Tajikistan;
- territorial claims to Tajikistan.
A separate section is dedicated to the political aims of Tajikistan and provides
a set of rules applicable to the use of force in conflict situations.
According to the document, the political aim of Tajikistan is to maintain and
safeguard the constitutional rights of its citizens, protect its population, sovereignty,
territorial integrity of the country, and the re-establishment and development of peace
and friendly relations with all countries of the world.
In the case of violence or an armed conflict between the countries of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States or internal conflicts in these countries, Tajikistan
will strive firsthand to achieve cease-fires and to resolve conflicts by diplomatic or
other non-military means. Armed force can be used only in very exceptional cases
on the basis of special decisions undertaken by the Council of Head of States of the
Commonwealth of Independent States or the Collective Security Council of the
Collective Security Treaty in order to support stability and create the conditions for
the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Tajikistan recognizes the legality of the use of
force for the following objectives:
- collective defence within the framework of bilateral or multilateral treaties
with other countries;
- the maintenance and building of peace in accordance with the decisions of
the UN Security Council and other structures of collective security, if not
in contradiction with the vital interests of Tajikistan.
The use of the armed forces and other military structures of Tajikistan shall be
carried out in exceptional cases as defined by the Constitution of Tajikistan and other
laws in force or by the decision of the parliament.
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Furthermore, the Doctrine defines the characteristics of contemporary armed
conflicts, e.g., armed conflicts nowadays are defined by their military and political
aims, means of achievement of objectives and scope of military actions. The Doctrine
provides that an armed conflict may be in the form of a military incident, armed
action or other armed conflicts of limited scope, and may be as a result of an attempt
to resolve economic, national, ethnic, religious, or other contradictions by means
of armed force. The Doctrine further specifies that a cross-border conflict constitutes
a special type of an armed conflict. An armed conflict is characterized by the follow-
ing:
- the vulnerability of the population;
- the involvement of irregular armed structures;
- the vast usage of sabotage and terrorist methods;
- a complex moral and psychological environment in which armed forces are
operating;
- the forced diversion of significant forces, provision of security means for
areas and dislocation of armed forces;
- the danger of the transformation of a local armed conflict into an international
one.
Moreover, the document sets rules on the dislocation, types, and nature of armed
forces of Tajikistan, as well as providing principles by which the armed forces of
Tajikistan are ruled.
The Doctrine elaborates the tasks of the State in the area of state defence as well
as envisioning the purpose and missions of the armed forces of Tajikistan. These
features are reflected in the relevant provisions of chapters dedicated to defence
construction, training of armed forces, means and methods of defence, military
leadership and cooperation on military issues. The concluding section of theMilitary
Doctrine provides that cooperation of Tajikistan in this area is built upon collaboration
with other countries for the prevention of armed conflicts and maintenance of the
peace and security as well as the defence of the country, and such cooperation shall
be carried out in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
Humanitarian Cooperation
Declaration of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries on Human-
itarian Cooperation
Adopted 8 May 2005
On 8 May 2005, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Armenia, the Russian Federation,
Byelorussia, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, andUkraine
signed a joint declaration on humanitarian cooperation in areas including culture,
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national traditions, languages, science, education, archives, information, communica-
tion, sports, tourism, and youth development. Cooperation and development in the
aforementioned areas are deemed by the Declaration as the main component of the
integration process in the territory of Commonwealth of Independent States. Human-
itarian cooperation shall be organized based on good practice and the principles of
relevant international organizations, including UNESCO. The document underlines
the determination of CIS countries to further develop modules and mechanisms of
cooperation in these areas through the conclusion of a general agreement.

PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL TREATIES*
Editorial introduction
This section records the participation of Asian states in open, multilateral law-making
treaties which mostly aim at world-wide adherence. It updates the treaty sections of earlier
Volumes until 31 December 2006. For treaties on maritime issues administered by the
International Maritime Organization, data were available only as at 31 December 2005.
New data are preceded by a reference to the most recent previous entry in the
multilateral treaties section of the Asian Yearbook of International Law. In the event that
no new data are available, the title of the treaty is listed with a reference to the last
Volume containing data on the treaty involved.
For the purpose of this section, states broadly situated west of Iran, north of Mongolia,
east of Papua New Guinea and south of Indonesia will not be covered. The Editors wish
to express their gratitude to all international organizations that have so kindly made
available information on the status of various categories of treaties.
Note:
· Where no other reference to specific sources is made, data are derived fromMultilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, http://untreaty.un.org. The Editors thank
the United Nations Treaty Section for the permission to use the on-line United Nations
Treaty Collection.
· Reservations and declarations made upon signature or ratification are not included.
· Sig. = Signature; Cons. = Consent to be bound; Eff. date = Effective date; E.i.f. = Entry
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Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1959: see Vol. 6 p. 234.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 244)
State Sig. Cons.
Pakistan 30 Dec 1958 14 Jul 2005
CULTURAL MATTERS
Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials
of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character, 1948: see Vol. 7 pp. 322-323.
Convention concerning the International Exchange of Publications, 1958: see Vol. 6 p.
235.
Convention concerning the International Exchange of Official Publications and Government
Documents between States, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 235.
International Agreement for the Establishment of the University for Peace, 1980: seeVol.
6 p. 235.
Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher
Education in Asia and the Pacific, 1983: see Vol. 11 p. 244.
Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials, 1950
(Continued from Vol. 8 p. 174)
State Sig. Cons.
Kyrgyzstan 19 Jul 2005
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CULTURAL PROPERTY
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972:
see Vol. 10 p. 267.
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1954
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 245)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
State Sig. Cons.
Bangladesh 23 Jun 2006
Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1954
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 267)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
State Sig. Cons.
Bangladesh 23 Jun 2006
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 267)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
State Sig. Cons.
Afghanistan 8 Sep 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Vietnam 20 Sep 2005
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage
Paris, 17 October 2003
Entry into Force: 20 April 2006
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
State Sig. Cons.
Bhutan 12 Oct 2005
Cambodia 13 Jun 2006
China 2 Dec 2004
India 9 Sep 2005
Iran 23 Mar 2006
Japan 15 Jun 2006
Korea (Rep) 9 Feb 2005
Kyrgyzstan 6 Nov 2006
Mongolia 29 Jun 2005
Pakistan 7 Oct 2005
Philippines 7 Oct 2005
Vietnam 20 Sep 2005
DEVELOPMENT MATTERS
Charter of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre, 1982: see Vol. 7 pp. 323-324.
Agreement to Establish the South Centre, 1994: see Vol. 7 p. 324.
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Amendments to the Charter of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre, 1998: seeVol.
10 p. 267.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court: see Vol. 6 p. 238.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, 1965: see Vol. 11 p. 245.
ENVIRONMENT, FAUNA AND FLORA
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, as amended,
1954: see Vol. 6 p. 238.
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, 1969: see Vol. 9 p. 284.
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat,
1971: see Vol. 10 p. 269.
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, 1972, as amended: see Vol. 7 p. 325.
Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by Substances
Other Than Oil, 1973: see Vol. 6 p. 239.
Protocol to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
1976: see Vol. 10 p. 269.
Protocol to amend the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially
as Waterfowl Habitat, 1982: see Vol. 6 p. 240.
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985: see Vol. 11 p. 246.
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987: see Vol. 11 p. 246.
Amendments to Articles 6 and 7 of the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 1987: see Vol. 10 p. 270.
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, 1989 see Vol. 11 p. 247.
UN Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious
Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 1994: see Vol. 11 p. 247.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 246)
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/9193 as at 31 December 2005)
State Denunciation E.i.f.
Malaysia 9 Jun 2004 9 Jun 2005
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International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 269)
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/9193 as at 31 December 2005)
State Denunciation E.i.f.
Brunei 31 Jan 2002 31 Jan 2003
Protocol Relating to the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, as amended, 1978
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 269)
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/9193 as at 31 December 2005)
State Cons. Excepted
(Deposit) annexes
India (for 11 Jun 2003
Annexes III,
IV and V)




Maldives 20 May 2005
Mongolia 15 Oct 2003 III and IV
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1990
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 247)
State Cons.
Laos 28 Jun 2006
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation,
1990
(Continued from Vol. 9 p. 285)
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/9193 as at 31 December 2005)
State Cons. E.i.f.
Bangladesh 23 Jul 2004 23 Oct 2004
Protocol to amend the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, 1992
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 271)
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/9193 as at 31 December 2005)
State Cons. E.i.f.
Malaysia 9 Jun 2004 9 Jun 2005
Maldives 20 May 2005 20 May 2006
State Cons. E.i.f.
Pakistan 2 Mar 2005 2 Mar 2006
Vietnam 17 Jun 2003 17 Jun 2004
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Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 247)
State Sig. Cons.
Timor-Leste 10 Oct 2006
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 270)
State Sig. Cons.
Timor-Leste 10 Oct 2006
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1992
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 247)
State Cons.
Laos 28 Jun 2006
Amendment to the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1995
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 271)
State Sig. Cons.
Indonesia 24 Oct 2005
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 248)
State Cons.
Indonesia 26 Jan 2006
Laos 28 Jun 2006
Pakistan 2 Sep 2005
State Cons.
Philippines 23 May 2006
Uzbekistan 31 Oct 2006
Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 248)
State Sig. Cons.
Iran 22 Aug 2005
Korea (DPR) 27 Apr 2005
Nepal 16 Sep 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Pakistan 11 Jan 2005
Singapore 12 Apr 2006
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Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1999
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 248)
State Cons.
Indonesia 26 Jan 2006
Kyrgyzstan 5 Oct 2005
Laos 28 Jun 2006
Pakistan 2 Sep 2005
State Cons.
Philippines 23 May 2006
Thailand 14 Nov 2006
Uzbekistan 31 Oct 2006
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
Montreal, 29 January 2000
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 248)
State Sig. Cons.
China 8 Aug 2000 8 Jun 2005
Kyrgyzstan 5 Oct 2005
Papua New Guinea 14 Oct 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Philippines 24 May 2000 5 Oct 2006
Thailand 10 Nov 2005
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazarduous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade
Rotterdam, 10 September 1998
Entry into Force: 24 February 2004
State Sig. Cons.
China 8 Aug 2000 8 Jun 2005
India 22 Mar 2005
Indonesia 11 Sep 1998
Iran 17 Feb 1999 26 Aug 2004
Japan 31 Aug 1999 15 Jun 2004
Korea (DPR) 6 Feb 2004
Korea (Rep) 7 Sep 1999 31 Jul 2006
Kyrgyzstan 11 Aug 1999 25 May 2000
Malaysia 4 Sep 2002
State Sig. Cons.
Maldives 17 Oct 2006
Mongolia 11 Sep 1998 8 Mar 2001
Pakistan 9 Sep 1999 14 Jul 2005
Philippines 11 Sep 1998 31 Jul 2006
Singapore 24 May 2005
Sri Lanka 19 Jan 2006
Tajikistan 28 Sep 1998
Thailand 19 Feb 2002
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
Stockholm, 22 May 2001
Entry into Force: 17 May 2004
State Sig. Cons.
Bangladesh 23 May 2001
Brunei 21 May 2002
Cambodia 23 May 2001 25 Aug 2006
China 23 May 2001 13 Aug 2004
India 14 May 2002 13 Jan 2006
Indonesia 23 May 2001
Iran 23 May 2001 6 Feb 2006
Japan 30 Aug 2002
Kazakhstan 23 May 2001
State Sig. Cons.
Korea (DPR) 26 Aug 2002
Korea (Rep) 4 Oct 2001
Kyrgyzstan 16 May 2002 12 Dec 2006
Laos 5 Mar 2002 28 Jun 2006
Malaysia 16 May 2002
Maldives 17 Oct 2006
Mongolia 17 May 2002 30 Apr 2004
Myanmar 19 Apr 2004
Nepal 5 Apr 2002
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State Sig. Cons.
Pakistan 6 Dec 2001
Papua New
Guinea 23 May 2001 7 Oct 2003
Philippines 23 May 2001 27 Feb 2004
Singapore 23 May 2001 24 May 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Sri Lanka 5 Sep 2001 22 Dec 2005
Tajikistan 21 May 2002
Thailand 22 May 2002 31 Jan 2005
Vietnam 23 May 2001 22 Jul 2002
FAMILY MATTERS
Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, 1956: see Vol. 11 p. 249.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations Towards Children, 1956:
see Vol.6 p. 244.
Convention on the Conflicts of Law Relating to the Form of Testamentary Dispositions,
1961: see Vol. 7 p. 327.
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of
Marriages, 1962: see Vol. 8 p. 178.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, 1973: see Vol. 6 p. 244.
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption, 1993
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 249)
(Status as provided by the Hague Conference on Private International Law)
State Sig. Cons.
China 30 Nov 2000 16 Sep 2005
FINANCE
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, 1965: see Vol. 7 p. 327.
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 1988
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 249)
(Status as at 31 December 2006, provided by the World Bank)
State Sig. Cons.
Maldives 19 May 2005
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HEALTH
Protocol Concerning the Office International d’Hygiène Publique, 1946: seeVol. 6 p. 245.
World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
Geneva, 21 May 2003
Entry into Force: 27 February 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Afghanist. 29 Jun 2004
Bangladesh 16 Jun 2003 14 Jun 2004
Bhutan 9 Dec 2003 23 Aug 2004
Cambodia 25 May 2004 15 Nov 2005
China 10 Nov 2003 11 Oct 2005
India 10 Sep 2003 5 Feb 2004
Iran 16 Jun 2003 6 Nov 2005
Japan 9 Mar 2004 8 Jun 2004
Kazakhstan 21 Jun 2004
Korea (DPR) 17 Jun 2003 27 Apr 2005
Korea (Rep) 21 Jul 2003 16 May 2005
Kyrgyzstan 18 Feb 2004 25 May 2006
Laos 29 Jun 2004 6 Sep 2006
Malaysia 23 Sep 2003 16 Sep 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Maldives 17 May 2004 20 May 2004
Mongolia 16 Jun 2003 27 Jan 2004
Myanmar 23 Oct 2003 21 Apr 2004
Nepal 3 Dec 2003 7 Nov 2006
Pakistan 18 May 2004 3 Nov 2004
Papua New
Guinea 22 Jun 2004 25 May 2006
Philippines 23 Sep 2003 6 Jun 2005
Singapore 29 Dec 2003 14 May 2004
Sri Lanka 23 Sep 2003 11 Nov 2003
Thailand 20 Jun 2003 8 Nov 2004
Timor-Leste 25 May 2004 22 Dec 2004
Vietnam 20 Jun 2003
HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1953: see Vol. 10 p. 273
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957: see Vol. 10 p. 274
Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960: see Vol. 7 p. 328.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1966:
see Vol. 8 p. 179.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1984: see Vol. 11 p. 2.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989: see Vol. 11 p. 251.
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, 1990: see Vol. 11 p. 251.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 250)
State Sig. Cons.
Indonesia 23 Feb 2006
Kazakhstan 2 Dec 2003 24 Jan 2006
State Sig. Cons.
Maldives 19 Sep 2006
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 250)
State Sig. Cons.
Indonesia 23 Feb 2006
Kazakhstan 2 Dec 2003 24 Jan 2006
State Sig. Cons.
Maldives 19 Sep 2006
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 250)
State Sig. Cons.
Maldives 19 Sep 2006
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 250)
State Sig. Cons.
Brunei 24 May 2006
International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, 1985
(Continued from Vol. 6 p. 248)
State Sig. Cons.
Kyrgyzstan 19 Jul 2005
Amendment to article 8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, 1992
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 274)
State Sig. Cons.
Iran 8 Nov 2005
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Form
of Discrimination against Women, 1999
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 251)
State Sig. Cons.
Korea (Rep) 18 Oct 2006
State Sig. Cons.
Maldives 13 Mar 2006
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Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 251)
State Sig. Cons.
Bhutan 15 Sep 2005
India 15 Nov 2004 30 Nov 2005
Laos 20 Sep 2006
State Sig. Cons.
Thailand 27 Feb 2006
Turkmenistan 29 Apr 2005
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 251)
State Sig. Cons.
Bhutan 15 Sep 2005
Brunei 21 Nov 2006
India 15 Nov 2004 16 Aug 2005
Japan 10 May 2002 24 Jan 2005
Laos 20 Sep 2006
State Sig. Cons.
Nepal 8 Sep 2000 20 Jan 2006
Sri Lanka 8 May 2002 22 Sep 2006
Thailand 11 Jan 2006
Turkmenistan 28 Mar 2005
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984
New York, 18 December 2002
Entry into force: 22 June 2006
State Sig. Cons.
Cambodia 14 Sep 2005
Maldives 14 Sep 2005 15 Feb 2006
State Sig. Cons.
Timor-Leste 16 Sep 2005
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT
International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, I-IV, 1949: see Vol. 11
p. 252.
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 252)
State Cons.
Timor-Leste 12 Apr 2005
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Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1977
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 252)
State Cons.
Timor-Leste 12 Apr 2005
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883 as amended 1979: see Vol.
11 p. 253.
Universal Copyright Convention, 1952: see Vol. 6 p. 251.
Protocols 1, 2 and 3 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention, 1952: see Vol. 6
p. 251.
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, 1961: see Vol. 11 p. 253.
Multilateral Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Copyright Royalties,
1979: see Vol. 6 p. 252.
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886
as amended 1979
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 252)
(Status as included in WIPO doc. 423(E) of 15 January 2007)
State Cons. Latest Act
to which State
is party
Brunei 30 Aug 2006 Paris
Nepal 11 Jan 2006 Paris
State Cons. Latest Act
to which State
is party
Uzbekistan 19 Apr 2005 Paris
Madrid Union Concerning the International Registration of Marks,
including the Madrid Agreement 1891 as amended in 1979,
and the Madrid Protocol 1989
(Status as included in WIPO doc. 423(E) of 15 January 2007)
State Cons. Madrid Cons. Madrid
Agreement Protocol
Bhutan 4 Aug 2000 4 Aug 2000
China 4 Oct 1989 1 Dec 1995
Iran 25 Dec 2003 25 Dec 2003
Japan 14 Mar 2000
Kazakhstan 25 Dec 1991
Korea (DPR) 10 Jun 1980 3 Oct 1996
Korea (Rep) 10 Apr 2003
State Cons. Madrid Cons. Madrid
Agreement Protocol
Kyrgyzstan 25 Dec 1991 17 Jun 2004
Mongolia 21 Apr 1985 16 Jun 2001
Singapore 31 Oct 2000
Tajikistan 25 Dec 1991
Turkmenistan 28 Sep 1999
Uzbekistan 25 Dec 1991 27 Dec 2006
Vietnam 8 Mar 1949 11 Jul 2006
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Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services
for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, 1957 as amended in 1979
(Status as included in WIPO doc. 423(E) of 15 January 2007)
State Cons. Latest Act
to which State
is party
China 9 Aug 1994 Geneva
Japan 20 Feb 1990 Geneva
Kazakhstan 24 Apr 2002 Geneva
Korea (DPR) 6 Jun 1997 Geneva
Korea (Rep) 8 Jan 1999 Geneva
Kyrgyzstan 10 Dec 1998 Geneva
State Cons. Latest Act
to which State
is party
Mongolia 16 Jun 2001 Geneva
Singapore 18 Mar 1999 Geneva
Tajikistan 25 Dec 1991 Geneva
Turkmenistan 7 Jun 2006 Geneva
Uzbekistan 12 Jan 2002 Geneva
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, 1967
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 252)
(Status as included in WIPO doc. 423(E) of 15 January 2007)
State Membership
Afghanistan 13 Dec 2005
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms
against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms, 1971
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 276)
State Sig. Cons.
Vietnam 6 Apr 2005
Patent Cooperation Treaty, 1970 as amended in 1979 and modified in 1984 and 2001
(Status as included in WIPO doc. 423(E) of 15 January 2007)
State Cons.
China 1 Jan 1994
India 7 Dec 1998
Indonesia 5 Sep 1997
Japan 1 Oct 1978
Kazakhstan 25 Dec 1991
Korea (DPR) 8 Jul 1980
Korea (Rep) 10 Aug 1984
Kyrgyzstan 25 Dec 1991
Laos 14 Jun 2006
Malaysia 16 Aug 2006
State Cons.
Mongolia 27 May 1991
Papua New Guinea 14 Jun 2003
Philippines 17 Aug 2001
Singapore 23 Feb 1995
Sri Lanka 26 Feb 1982
Tajikistan 26 Dec 1991
Turkmenistan 25 Dec 1991
Uzbekistan 25 Dec 1991
Vietnam 10 Mar 1993
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
Slavery Convention, 1926 as amended in 1953, see Vol. 7 p. 331.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948: seeVol. 8
p. 182.
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956, see Vol. 7 p. 331.
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963:
see Vol. 9 p. 289.
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, 1968: see Vol. 6 p. 254.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970: seeVol. 8 p. 289.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
1971: see Vol. 8 p. 290.
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
1973: see Vol. 7 p. 331.
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, 1989: see Vol. 11 p. 254.
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 1994: see Vol.
11 p. 255.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998: see Vol. 11 p. 255.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, 1973
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 254)
State Sig. Cons.
Bangladesh 20 May 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Cambodia 27 Jul 2006
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 254)
State Sig. Cons.
Bangladesh 20 May 2005
Cambodia 27 Jul 2006
State Sig. Cons.
Iran 20 Nov 2006
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 278)
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/9193 , as at 31 December 2005)
State Cons. E.i.f.
(Deposited)
Afghanistan 23 Sep 2003 22 Dec 2003
Bangladesh 9 Jun 2005 7 Sep 2005
Brunei 4 Dec 2003 3 Mar 2004
State Cons. E.i.f.
(Deposited)
Kazakhstan 24 Nov 2003 22 Feb 2004
Korea (Rep) 14 May 2003 12 Aug 2003
Myanmar 19 Sep 2003 18 Dec 2003
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State Cons. E.i.f.
(Deposited)
Philippines 6 Jan 2004 5 Apr 2004
Singapore 3 Feb 2004 3 May 2004
State Cons. E.i.f.
(Deposited)
Tajikistan 12 Aug 2005 10 Nov 2005
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 277)
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/9193, as at 31 December 2005)
State Cons. E.i.f.
(Deposited)
Afghanistan 23 Sep 2003 22 Dec 2003
Bangladesh 9 Jun 2005 7 Sep 2005
Brunei 4 Dec 2003 3 Mar 2004
Kazakhstan 24 Nov 2003 22 Feb 2004
State Cons. E.i.f.
(Deposited)
Korea (Rep) 10 Jun 2003 8 Sep 2003
Mongolia 22 Nov 2005 20 Feb 2006
Tajikistan 12 Aug 2005 10 Nov 2005
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1988
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 254)
(Status as at 31 December 2006 provided by the ICAO Secretariat)
State Cons. Eff. date.
Bangladesh 27 Jun 2005 27 Jul 2005
Bhutan 20 Aug 2005 25 Sep 2005
State Cons. Eff. date.
Malaysia 8 Sep 2006 8 Oct 2006
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 1991
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 278)
(Status as at 31 December 2006 provided by the ICAO Secretariat)
State Sig. Cons.
Bangladesh 16 Aug 2005 15 Oct 2005
Bhutan 26 Aug 2005 25 Oct 2005
Tajikistan 18 Jul 2006 16 Sep 2006
State Sig. Cons.
Thailand 25 Jan 2006 26 Mar 2006
Turkmenistan 14 Jan 2005 16 Mar 2005
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 255)
State Sig. Rat.
Bangladesh 15 Oct 2005
Cambodia 31 Jul 2006
State Sig. Rat.
Indonesia 29 Jun 2006
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International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 255)
State Sig. Rat.
Bangladesh 26 Aug 2005
Cambodia 11 Nov 2001 12 Dec 2005
China 13 Nov 2001 19 Apr 2006
State Sig. Rat.
Indonesia 24 Sep 2001 29 Jun 2006
Myanmar 12 Nov 2001 16 Aug 2006
Turkmenistan 7 Jan 2005
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
New York, 15 November 2000
Entry into Force: 29 September 2003
State Sig. Rat.
Afghanistan 14 Dec 2000 24 Sep 2003
Cambodia 11 Nov 2001 12 Dec 2005
China 12 Dec 2000 23 Sep 2003
India 12 Dec 2002
Indonesia 12 Dec 2000
Iran 12 Dec 2000
Japan 12 Dec 2000
Kazakhstan 13 Dec 2000
Korea (Rep) 13 Dec 2000 2 Oct 2003
Kyrgyzstan 13 Dec 2000
Laos 26 Sep 2003
Malaysia 26 Sep 2002 24 Sep 2004
State Sig. Rat.
Myanmar 30 Mar 2004
Nepal 12 Dec 2002
Pakistan 14 Dec 2000
Philippines 14 Dec 2000 28 May 2002
Singapore 13 Dec 2000
Sri Lanka 13 Dec 2000 22 Sep 2006
Tajikistan 12 Dec 2000 8 Jul 2002
Thailand 13 Dec 2000
Turkmenistan 28 Mar 2005
Uzbekistan 13 Dec 2000 9 Dec 2003
Vietnam 13 Dec 2000
INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION
(see also: Privileges and Immunities)
Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International
Organizations of a Universal Character, 1975: see Vol. 6 p. 257.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States, 1965: see Vol. 6 p. 257.
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, 1974: seeVol. 6
p. 257.
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980: see Vol. 11
p. 256.
UN Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in International
Trade, 1991: see Vol. 6 p. 257.
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JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION
Convention Relating to Civil Procedure, 1954: see Vol. 6 p. 258.
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1970:
see Vol. 9 p. 292.
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents,
1961
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 256)
(Status as at 31 December 2006 provided by the Hague Conference on Private International
Law)
State Sig. Cons.
Korea (Rep) 25 Oct 2006
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1965
(Continued from Vol. 9 p. 291)
(Status as at 31 December 2006 provided by the Hague Conference on Private International
Law)
State Sig. Cons.
India 23 Nov 2006
LABOUR
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (ILO
Conv. 87): see Vol. 9 p. 292.
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (ILO Conv. 98): see Vol.
10 p. 280.
Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (ILO Conv. 100): see Vol. 10 p. 281.
Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (ILO Conv. 122): see Vol. 8 p. 186.
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (ILO Conv. 29)
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 280)
(Status as at 31 December 2006 as provided by the ILO)
State Ratif. registered
Philippines 15 Jul 2005
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Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (ILO Conv. 105)
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 256)
(Status as at 31 December 2006 as provided by the ILO)
State Ratif. registered
Mongolia 15 Mar 2005
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (ILO Conv. 111)
(Continued from Vol. 8 p. 185)
(Status as at 31 December 2006 as provided by the ILO)
State Ratif. registered
China 12 Jan 2006
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (ILO Conv. 138)
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 257)
(Status as at 31 December 2006 as provided by the ILO)
State Ratif. Min. age
registered spec.
Laos 13 Jun 2005 14
Singapore 7 Nov 2005 15
State Ratif. Min. age
registered spec.
Pakistan 6 Jun 2006 14
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (ILO Conv. 182)
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 257)
(Status as at 31 December 2006 as provided by the ILO)
State Ratif.
registered
Cambodia 14 Mar 2006
Laos 13 Jun 2005
State Ratif.
registered
Tajikistan 8 Jun 2005
NARCOTIC DRUGS
Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs,
concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925 and 19
February 1925 and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 27 November 1931 and at Geneva on
26 June 1936, 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 261.
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in, and
Use of, Prepared Opium and amended by Protocol, 1925, amended 1946: see Vol. 6
p. 261.
International Opium Convention, 1925, amended by Protocol 1946: see Vol. 7 p. 334.
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking, 1931, amended by Protocol,
1946: see Vol. 6 p. 261.
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Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic
Drugs, 1931, and amended by Protocol, 1946: see Vol. 7 p. 334.
Protocol bringing under International Control Drugs outside the Scope of the Convention
of 1931, as amended by the Protocol of 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 1936, amended
1946: see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production
of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, 1953: see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971: see Vol. 9 p. 294.
Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1972: see Continued from
Vol. 11 p. 257.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
(Continued from Vol. 7 p. 334)
State Sig. Cons.
Cambodia 7 Jul 2005
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as Amended by Protocol 1972
(Continued from Vol. 9 p. 294)
State Sig. Cons.
Bhutan 24 Aug 2005
Cambodia 7 Jul 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Myanmar 22 Aug 2003
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, 1988
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 258)
State Sig. Cons .
Cambodia 7 Jul 2005
NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954: see Vol. 6 p. 264.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning
Acquisition of Nationality, 1961: see Vol. 6 p. 265.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning Acquisition
of Nationality, 1963: see Vol. 8 p. 187.
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NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 265.
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention (and the Paris
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy), 1980: see Vol. 6
p. 265.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 1986: see Vol. 9 p. 295.
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
1986: see Vol. 9 p. 295.
Protocol to amend the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1997: seeVol. 8
p. 188.
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 1997: seeVol. 8 p. 189.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 258)
(Status as at 31 December 2006, provided by IAEA)
State Sig. Cons.
(deposit)
Bangladesh 11 May 2005
Cambodia 4 Aug 2006
State Sig. Cons.
(deposit)
Kazakhstan 2 Sep 2005
Turkmenistan 7 Jan 2005
Convention on Nuclear Safety, 1994
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 258)
(Status as at 31 December 2006, provided by IAEA)
State Sig. Cons.
(deposit)
India 30 Sep 1994 31 Mar 2005
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 258)
(Status as at 31 December 2006, provided by IAEA)
State Sig. Cons.
(deposit)
China 13 Sep 2006
State Sig. Cons.
(deposit)
Kyrgyzstan 18 Dec 2006
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OUTER SPACE
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of the States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967: see Vol. 6 p. 266.
Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies,
1979: see Vol. 10 p. 284.
Convention on Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space, 1974: see Vol. 10 p.
284.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1946: see Vol. 10
p. 284.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, 1947: seeVol. 7
p. 338.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1961: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Convention on Special Missions, 1969: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on Special Missions concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, 1969: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 259)
State Sig. Cons.
Singapore 1 Apr 2005
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 259)
State Sig. Cons.
Cambodia 10 Mar 2006
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property
New York, 2 December 2004
Entry into Force: not yet
State Sig. Cons.
China 14 Sep 2005
Singapore 1 Apr 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Sri Lanka 4 May 2006
Timor-Leste 16 Sep 2005
254 Asian Yearbook of International Law
REFUGEES
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 259)
State Sig. Cons.
Afghanistan 30 Aug 2005
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 260)
State Sig. Cons.
Afghanistan 30 Aug 2005
ROAD TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT
Convention on Road Traffic, 1968
(Continued from Vol. 7 p. 338)
State Sig. Cons.
Kyrgyzstan 30 Aug 2006
Convention on Road Signs and Signals, 1968
(Continued from Vol. 7 p. 338)
State Sig. Cons.
Kyrgyzstan 30 Aug 2006
SEA
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Convention on the High Seas, 1958: see Vol. 7 p. 339.
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 1958:
see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1958:
see Vol. 6 p. 272.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: see Vol. 10 p. 285.
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Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 1994
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 285)
State Sig. Cons.
Vietnam 16 Nov 1994 27 Apr 2006
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (…) relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 260)
State Sig. Cons.
Japan 19 Nov 1996 7 Aug 2006
SEA TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT
Convention Regarding the Measurement and Registration of Vessels employed in Inland
Navigation, 1956: see Vol. 6 p. 273.
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960: see Vol. 6 p. 273.
International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969: see Vol. 6 p. 274.
Special Trade Passenger Ships Agreement, 1971, see Vol. 6 p. 275.
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 as
amended: see Vol. 10 p. 286.
International Convention for Safe Containers, as amended 1972: see Vol. 10 p. 286.
Protocol on Space Requirements for Special Trade Passenger Ships, 1973: see Vol. 6
p. 275.
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended: see Vol. 6
p. 286.
Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 1974: see Vol. 6 p. 276.
UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978: see Vol. 6 p. 276.
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965 as amended
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 286)
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/9193 as at 31 December 2005)
State Cons. E.i.f.
Indonesia 4 Nov 2002 3 Jan 2003
State Cons. E.i.f.
Japan 2 Sep 2005 1 Nov 2005
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International Convention on Load Lines, 1966
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 286)
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/9193 as at 31 December 2005)
State Cons. E.i.f.
Mongolia 3 Mar 2003 3 Jun 2003
Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended 1978
(Continued from Vol. 6 p. 276)
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/9193 as at 31 December 2005)
State Cons. Excepted
(Deposit) annexes
Bangladesh 18 Dec 2002
India (for
Annexes III,
IV and V) 11 Jun 2003




(for Annex IV)28 Nov 2003
Maldives 20 May 2005 III and IV
Mongolia 15 Oct 2003
Protocol Relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1988
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 286)
(Status as included in IMO doc. J/9193 as at 31 December 2005)
State Cons. E.i.f.
(Deposit)
Bangladesh 18 Dec 2002 18 Mar 2003
SOCIAL MATTERS
International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 1904, amended
by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 1910, amended
by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications, 1910, amended
by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, 1921:
see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, 1921, amended
by Protocol in 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and Traffic in Obscene
Publications, 1923: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of, and Traffic in, Obscene Publications,
1923, amended by Protocol in 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age, 1933:
see Vol. 6 p. 277.
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Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age, 1933, amended
by Protocol, 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation
of the Prostitution of Others, 1950
(Continued and corrected from Vol. 11 p. 261)
State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 17 Nov 2004 24 Jan 2006
Final Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons
and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 1950
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 261)
State Sig. Cons
Cambodia 27 Sep 2004
Kazakhstan 17 Nov 2004 5 Sep 2006
State Sig. Cons
Uzbekistan 27 Nov 2004
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, 1976: see Vol. 8 p. 192.
Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), 1976
(as amended): see Vol. 8 p. 193.
Amendment to Article 11, Paragraph 2(a), of the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Tele-
community, 1981: see Vol. 8 p. 193.
Amendments to articles 3(5) and 9(8) of the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Tele-
community, 1991: see Vol. 9 p. 298.
Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development, 1977:
see Vol. 10 p. 287.
Amendments to the Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting
Development, 1999: see Vol. 10 p. 288.
Amendments to the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity
New Delhi, 23 October 2002
Entry into force: not yet
State Cons.
Afghanistan 5 Jan 2005
Bhutan 14 Jul 2004
Brunei 26 Nov 2003
China 27 Feb 2006
Indonesia 30 Dec 2004
Iran 21 Jul 2006
Korea (DPR) 14 Jul 2003
Korea (Rep) 23 Sep 2003
State Cons.
Laos 2 Oct 2003
Malaysia 28 Apr 2003
Myanmar 10 Sep 2003
Singapore 7 Mar 2005
Sri Lanka 27 Aug 2003
Thailand 31 Jan 2005
Vietnam 19 Sep 2003
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TREATIES
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations
or Between International Organizations, 1986: see Vol. 6 p. 280.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 288)
State Sig. Cons.
Maldives 14 Sep 2005
WEAPONS
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Warfare, 1925: see Vol. 6 p. 281.
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 281.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968: see Vol. 11 p. 262.
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons
of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,
1971: see Vol. 6 p. 282.
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
which may be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, and
Protocols, 1980: see Vol. 11 p. 263.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1972
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 262)
(Status at 31 December 2006, http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf)
State Sig. Cons.
Kyrgyzstan 12 Oct 2004
State Sig. Cons.
Tajikistan 27 Jun 2005
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use
of Environmental Modification Techniques, 1976
(Continued from Vol. 8 p. 194)
State Sig. Cons.
China 8 Jun 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 25 Apr 2005
Participation in Multilateral Treaties 259
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1993
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 263)
State Sig. Cons.
Bhutan 24 Apr 97 18 Aug 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Cambodia 15 Jan 1993 19 Jul 2005
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1996
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 263)
State Sig. Cons.
Vietnam 24 Sep 96 10 Mar 2006
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 263)
State Sig. Cons.
Bhutan 18 Aug 2005
State Sig. Cons.
Brunei 4 Dec 1997 24 Apr 2006
Amendment of Article 1 of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 2001
Entry into Force: 18 May 2004
State Sig. Cons.
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AFGHANISTAN
Role of foreign forces
According to data available in mid-2004 there was a 20,000-man US-led combat
force and a 6,500-strong NATO-led peace-keeping force (“International Security
Assistance Force”, later re-established as a NATO mission in August 2003) in the
country (see also 10 Asian YIL 335-336), while NATO on 29 June 2004 pledged
to increase its force by 1,500 (Afghanistan had been asking for even more). (IHT
01-07-04)
In February 2005 NATO and the US agreed to merge their separate missions, giving
NATO command of an operation combining “counter-terrorism” and “peacekeeping”
activities. The NATO Secretary General said that this implied that NATO would
be in Afghanistan for a long time.
Yet uncertainty appeared to remain about how the merged mission would function,
especially whether the NATO forces or the US would be in charge of “counter-
terrorism” operations (called by the US “Operation Enduring Freedom”). The NATO
mission on its part was supposed to participate in training a new Afghan army and
to assist in achieving its reform and modernization, as well as extending security
and stability outside Kabul. Under the arrangement the country would be divided
into four zones, with Germany commanding the north; Italy and Spain, the east;
Britain, the south, and the US, the east. (IHT 11-02-05)




The Fifth Meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers with those of China, Japan
and South Korea (“ASEAN Ministerial Meeting + 3”) was held on 1 July 2004 at
Jakarta. The meeting discussed, inter alia, the possibility of the formation of an East
Asia Community that was to result from an intensified cooperation of ASEAN+3.
It “recognized the potential value of an East Asia Summit at an appropriate time”.
This was followed by the announcement, at the tenth ASEAN Summit in November
2004 at Vientiane, that an ASEAN consensus had been reached on the launch of
a first East Asian Summit (EAS) towards the end of 2005 in Malaysia. Consensus
was achieved after Indonesia formally accepted the idea of transforming the
ASEAN+3 framework into the EAS, with the possibility of additional countries being
invited to join the new grouping.
Subsequently, a “retreat meeting” of the ASEAN foreign ministers, held in April
2005 at Cebu in the Philippines, agreed on the prospective EAS to be of an “in-
clusive” nature. It seemed that consensus was yet to be achieved on a number of
issues, such as which other countries should be invited to join the EAS apart from
ASEAN+3. In any case other countries would be eligible for invitation only if they
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fulfil three conditions: being a full ASEAN dialogue partner, having a substantive
level of relationship with ASEAN, and willing to adhere to the 1976 Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation. The agreement achieved at Cebu was to be formally affirmed by
the formal Foreign Ministers Meeting at Vientiane later in the year (July 2005).
Japan, supported by Indonesia, endorsed the idea of inviting Australia, New Zealand
and India to join. (IHT 13-04-05)
ASEAN Chairmanship and Myanmar
Increasing concern had arisen within ASEAN about the prospect of Myanmar’s
assuming the rotating Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006, in view of the absence of
the promised political reforms in that country. Strict maintenance of the non-inter-
vention principle and of “constructive engagement” was considered to hold potential
damage to the reputation and credibility of ASEAN with key “dialogue partners”
such as the US and the EU.
Malaysia, which had actively sponsored Myanmar’s admission into ASEAN in 1997,
in particular, was reported to have been explicit in its opposition to its Chairmanship,
and in late March 2005 the prime minister of Singapore delivered a message to
Myanmar to the effect that while political development and democratization in
Myanmar were a matter only Myanmar could decide, “in an interdependent world
developments in one country could impact on ASEAN as a whole”. On the other
hand, Thailand was reported as avoiding aligning itself with demands to block
Myanmar’s Chairmanship because of Thailand’s significant business ties.
The message was mooted for discussion at an informal ASEAN foreign ministers
meeting in the Philippines on 10 April 2005. Rumours referred to a divide between
the older members, on the one hand, and those such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam,
which joined ASEAN at the same time as Myanmar, on the other. (IHT 01-04-05)
ASYLUM
See: Refugees
BORDERS, BORDER DISPUTES AND BORDER INCIDENTS
Afghanistan – Tajikistan
Under agreements signed on 16 October 2004 between Tajikistan and Russia the
latter was to hand over complete control of the Tajik-Afghan border by 2006. (IHT
18-10-04)
China – India
See: Inter-state relations: China-India
China – Japan
See: Exclusive Economic Zone: China-Japan
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China – Kyrgyzstan
It was reported in September 2004 that the two countries had signed an agreement
on the demarcation of their common border. Under the agreement, territory that had
been a matter of dispute between China and the former Soviet Union was awarded
to Kyrgyzstan. (FEER 30–09-04)
China – Russia
An agreement was signed on 14 October 2004 during a visit by the Russian presi-
dent to Beijing, settling the last border dispute that had remained between China and
Russia. It concerned a stretch of river and islands along the most north-easterly tip
of China. While no details of the agreement were released at the time, it turned out
later that with regard to the disputed three river islands one was allocated to China,
one to Russia, while the third and largest was divided, with a half to each nation.
Consequently, the agreement included the cession by Russia to China of the western
half of Bolshoi Ussuriiskii Island (Chin.:Heixiazi) and the adjacent Tarabarov Island
(Chin.: Yinshe), both located between the Amur (Heilong Jiang) and Ussuri (Wusuli
Jiang) rivers where these two rivers converge near the city of Khabarovsk. (IHT
15-10-04, 22/23-01-05)
Border negotiations between China and the former Soviet Union had been resumed
in the late 1980s after having been frozen as a result of military clashes between
the two countries at about a hundred miles’ distance south of the above-mentioned
location, atDamansky (Chin.: Zhen Bao) Island on theUssuri River in the late 1960s.
On 16 May 1991 an agreement was reached on the alignment of the eastern section
of the boundary line with some exceptions relating to the stretch from the Sino-
Russian-Korean triangular border point on the Tumen (Tuman) River to the Sino-
Russian-Mongolian triangular border point (see Asian YIL Vol.1:275, Vol.7:400).
This excluded the so-called “three islands issue” which constituted the subject of
the October 2004 agreement. Another agreement followed on 3 September 1994,
dealing with the western section of the boundary (see Asian YIL Vol.4:418,
Vol.6:347).
After various problems regarding the demarcation issue, a joint declaration in 1997
(see 8 Asian YIL 258) announced the successful completion of Sino-Russian eastern
border demarcation work. Accordingly, two Protocols were concluded on 9 December
1999 sanctioning the demarcation of the boundary line in each of the sections to the
extent covered by the 1991 and 1994 agreements.
Finally, the agreement of October 2004 completed the regulation of the whole Sino-
Russian boundary. The instruments of ratification were exchanged at Vladivostok
on 2 June 2005.
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DIVIDED STATES: CHINA
See also: Embargo; Inter-state relations (China-Japan, China-Japan-US)
US military representatives in Taiwan
It was reported that the US would assign military officers to its de facto embassy
in Taiwan, the so-called American Institute in Taiwan, for the first time in 25 years,
reversing a long-standing policy of using civilian contractors. (IHT 22-12-04)
Anti-secession Act
As part of its efforts towards reunification the National People’s Congress of China
enacted an Anti-Secession Act on 14 March 2005. (For text see 11 Asian YIL 347)
In commenting on the law the Chinese prime minister recalled that the US Congress
passed similar resolutions in 1861 with the intent to stave off civil war. (IHT 15-03-
05)
Whereas Article 8 of the Law contains the “non-peaceful means” clause, Article 7
affirms that “the state stands for the achievement of peaceful reunification through
consultations and negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait”, while these consultations and negotiations “may be conducted in steps
and phases and with flexible and varied modalities”. (IHT 30-03-05)
Mainland – Taiwan contacts
The chairman of the leading Taiwan opposition party (the Kuomintang, which
governed China before the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949) visited
China in late April 2005. Discussions with the Chinese president led to a common
opinion in favour of reviving the rapprochement begun in 1992.
The resulting joint communiqué of 29 April 2005 read, inter alia: “The parties
reached a common understanding on upholding the ’92 consensus, opposing
Taiwanese independence and striving for peace and stability in the Taiwan Sea.”
(cf. 3 Asian YIL 366, 491) According to the communiqué the two sides would work
to open China’s market more broadly to Taiwanese goods, sign a formal peace
agreement, and establish military-to-military ties. The two sides would allow Taiwan
to join some international bodies, such as the WHO. (IHT 27-04, 01-05-05)
Another Taiwan politician, the leader of the “People First” Party, which favours
an eventual reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, visited the mainland in May
2005. In a meeting with the Chinese president on 12 May agreement was reached
on a slightly changed linguistic formula to describe relations between the mainland
and Taiwan as “[the] two sides of the Strait, one China”. The phrase was immediately
rejected by the Taiwanese president. (IHT 03-05, 13-05-05)
EAST ASIA COMMUNITY
See: Association of South East Asian Nations
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ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Sea port project under the auspices of the Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri
Lanka- Thailand Economic Grouping (BIMST-EC)
In the framework of BIMST-EC (www.bimst-ec.org) a project was set up for the
building of a deep-sea port in Dawei in south Myanmar, which would be connected
to Kanchanaburi in Thailand by a new highway. This would considerably shorten
between India and Thailand cargo transport that at present has to go around the
Malayan peninsula. (AToL 12-04-05)
EMBARGO
EU embargo against China on arms sales and US views on its lifting
On 17 December 2004 the European Union reaffirmed its intention to “continue
to work” toward lifting the embargo that was imposed after the 1989 Tianenmen
Square incident (on the basis of a non-binding resolution) and to decide on the issue
during the following six months. France later urged the other EU states to act accord-
ingly, but some EU states were backing US objections to the lifting. According to
these objections a lifting could lead to increased Chinese intimidation of Taiwan,
undermine stability in East Asia, and even threaten US troops in the region, as well
as harming efforts to improve human rights in China.
On 2 February 2005 the US House of Representatives approved a resolution
condemning the EU plans for lifting the embargo. The resolution stated that lifting
of the embargo would be “inconsistent with the concept of mutual security interests
that lies at the heart of US laws for trans-Atlantic defense cooperation”. The resolution
also noted that China had been engaged in an extensive military build-up, including
the deployment of a great number of ballistic missiles near the Taiwan Straits, and
alleged that China’s military-industrial complex was involved in the transfer of
military technology to Iran. Concerning Taiwan the resolution stated that “[t]he EU
is directly undermining the security of one of Asia’s most vibrant democracies –
our close ally Taiwan”.
During his European visit the US president on 22 February 2005 noted “deep
concern” in the US that a lifting of the embargo would change the balance of relations
between China and Taiwan and would imply transfer of technology, allowing China
to modernize its military and upset the military balance of power in Asia. The US
Secretary of State furthermore on 15 March 2005 expressed the hope that the recently
adopted Chinese Anti-Secession Law (see supra at 267) would dissuade Europe from
resuming arms sales to China.
The EU plans included the strengthening of an existing, formally not legally binding
1998 EU code of conduct in order to prevent a flood of arms into China. The code
lists criteria on which export licencing decisions should be based. It also called on
member states to ensure that the weapons sold would not be used for internal
repression, would not prolong or provoke armed conflicts, and would not be used
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“aggressively against another country to assert by force a territorial claim”. (IHT
08-10-04, 04-02, 09-02, 23-02, 09-03, 16-03-05)
The European plans to lift the embargo appeared to collapse in late March 2005
after months of intense lobbying by the US and a negative reaction to the recent
Chinese Anti-Secession Act (see supra at 267). (IHT 23-03-05)
Besides, Japan too expressed its concern in January 2005. It later expressed its
strong objection to the lifting when the prime minister met the French president on
27 March 2005.and did so once again later to the EU presidency. (IHT 28-03, 03-05-
05; JT 15-01-05)
US embargo on use of mapping technology
The US Defense Department denied the use of advanced mapping technology by
its Australian licence holder in the latter’s search for mineral deposits in China. The
“Falcon technology” was originally designed as a navigation system for US sub-
marines to avoid undersea mountain ranges. It has been called “the holy grail of the
exploration industry”. (IHT 2/3-04-05)
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Ban on commercial whaling
The International Whaling Commission voted on 21 June 2005 to uphold the current
ban on commercial whaling dating from 1986, contrary to Japanese wishes. The 66-
member Commission voted against a Japanese proposal for regulated commercial
whaling which needed a three-quarters majority to pass.
However, Japan said it would, inter alia, increase its annual catch of minke whales
from 440 to 935. This is done under a six-year “research” whaling programme,
extending a previous one started in 1987. (IHT 22-06-05, JT 22-06, 23-06-05)
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
China – Japan
(see also 11 Asian YIL 288)
The two countries disagree on the boundary line between their exclusive economic
zones in the East China Sea in an area where the sub-soil is thought to contain huge
quantities of oil and gas, although there is as yet no proof of existing or profitable
natural gas veins.
In February 2001 the two sides agreed on a mutual prior notification system. Under
this agreement each party must inform the other before entering waters near the other
country if these are in an area in which that country “takes interest”.
In April 2002 China resumed its surveys in the disputed areas while meeting the
notification obligation. Japan protested, however, when in August 2003 China reached
agreement with a number of Chinese and Western companies on the development
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of the gas fields and granted concessions (“Chunxiao” gas field) in areas on the
Japanese side of the Japan-claimed boundary line (the “intermediate line”) and when
drilling started in 2004 near the boundary line claimed by Japan. The latter held itself
entitled to claim its share if resources in the Chinese EEZ are found to straddle the
boundary line.
While protesting, Japan asked China to provide drilling data, but in vain. Japan
itself in July 2004 started considering to allow companies to drill on Japan’s side
of its claimed boundary, in its turn giving rise to Chinese protests to the effect that
the Japanese actions were infringing upon China’s interests and sovereignty, and to
Chinese calls for Japan to negotiate a settlement instead of acting unilaterally.
On 13 April 2005 Japan announced that it would grant exploratory drilling rights
in waters claimed by China, and would review oil company applications for explora-
tion drilling. (IHT 24-02, 14-04-05; JT 07-07, 09-07, 18-10. 19-10, 27-10, 19-12-04,
17-01, 29-03, 02-04, 31-05-05)
Dozens of Taiwanese fishing boats massed in the East China Sea on 9 June 2005
to protest Japan’s claim to an EEZ close to Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands claimed by
both Japan and China (as well as by Taiwan). The boats were expelled by the Japan-
ese, after which China lodged a complaint claiming that the expulsion of the fishing
boats violated China’s sovereignty. (AToL 10-06, 11-06-05)
EXTRADITION
The Fujimori case
Having failed to obtain the extradition of its former president from Japan (see 11
Asian YIL 289) Peru made a second request in October 2004 on the basis of cor-
ruption charges and alleged irregular payments. (Mainichi Shimbun 17–10-04, JT
17-10-04)
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
US assistance to Asian countries
It was reported in September 2004 that the US Senate Appropriations Committee
voted in the 2005 Foreign Operations Bill to provide assistance to Indonesia, Cam-
bodia and Thailand for various security and democracy qua human rights purposes.
(FEER 30-09-04)
FOREIGN FORCES IN ASIA
See also: Afghanistan; Military cooperation
Kyrgyzstan
Since the war in Afghanistan, there had been 1,000 US and 800 NATO troops
deployed in Kyrgyzstan in support of that war. Yet it was reported that the foreign
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minister disclosed in February 2005 that Kyrgyzstan had rejected requests by the
US and NATO to deploy surveillance aircraft in the country and that Kyrgyzstan
was increasingly looking north and east in its foreign policy priorities, referring to
the Collective Security Treaty and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. (IHT 03-
03-05)
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Chinese bid for US oil company
One of the largest Chinese state-controlled oil companies, the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), made a bid for the US Californian oil company
Unocal on 23 June 2005, two months after Unocal had agreed to be sold to (US)
Chevron. Twenty-seven per cent of Unocal’s proven oil reserves and seventy-three
per cent of its proven natural gas reserves are in Asia. The US Treasury Secretary
announced that a review on national security grounds would be likely. (IHT 24-06-05)
HUMANITARIAN AID
Food aid to North Korea
It was reported in late 2004 that Japan planned to give five billion Yen-worth of
food and medical aid by the end of 2004 as part of a promise made during a visit
by the Japanese prime minister to Pyongyang in May 2004 (see 11 Asian YIL 301).
(JT)
The US government announced in June 2005 that it would provide 50,000 tons
of food to North Korea. The donation was made in response to an appeal by the
World Food Programme and was unrelated to the efforts to persuade North Korea
to return to the six-party talks on its nuclear programme.
In 2003 the US provided 100,000 tons of food aid to North Korea, and 50,000 in
2004. (IHT 23-06-05)
Thai position towards foreign humanitarian aid
In the aftermath of the Tsunami disaster of December 2004 Thailand in January
2005 declined a Japanese aid offer of $20 million, saying it had come to grips with




An Indonesian government delegation and representatives of the Free AcehMove-
ment (GAM: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) met in Helsinki, Finland, on 28-29 January
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2005. The talks were held under the auspices of the Crisis Management Initiative
(CMI) group under the leadership of the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari
(see www.cmi.fi). The realization of the meeting between the two parties was faci-
litated by the Tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004, which pressed the parties to
work together in overcoming the catastrophe. A further meeting took place in Febru-
ary, and a third in April 2005. (IHT 24-01, 27-01-05; Kompas 11-04-05)
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Indonesia – East Timor: international or municipal adjudication
(See also: Inter-state relations: East Timor – Indonesia)
It was reported in December 2004 that the Indonesian government had rejected
UN plans for the establishment of a Commission of Experts to review Indonesian
efforts to try persons responsible for alleged human rights abuses in East Timor in
1999 and, eventually, to recommend the establishment of an international tribunal.
Indonesia classified the idea as redundant in view of Indonesian-East Timorese plans
to set up a bilateral Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF).
The East Timorese government first seemed to share a negative view on a Commis-
sion of Experts when the East Timorese foreign minister said, inter alia: “We prefer
focusing on a better relationship between Indonesia and East Timor. The current
situation is far more important than what happened in the past”. However, the East
Timorese president later said that his government accepted a UN commission that
could complement the CTF.
The UN-sponsored Special Crimes Unit set up in Dili for the detection of suspected
Indonesian soldiers and Timorese militiamen had jailed seventy-four suspects, yet
it was powerless in respect of the extradition of Indonesian military officers. Mean-
while, Indonesian courts had charged eighteen persons, of whom twelve were
acquitted and five had their sentences overturned on appeal. (Tempo 16-08-04; JP
24-12-04, 10-03-05)
Cambodia
A donor conference in late March 2005 pledged the funds necessary for the estab-
lishment of the projected tribunal for the adjudication of Khmer Rouge crimes (see
10 Asian YIL 357).
The tribunal agreement with the UN of 2003 (via www.cambodia.gov.kh) was
ratified by Cambodia in October 2004. The agreed tribunal structure is that of “Extra-
ordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Com-
mitted during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea”. It includes, inter alia, a balance
between a numerical majority of Cambodian judges and a numerical minority of
international judges, with a “super-majority” mechanism of the necessary vote of
at least one international judge. (IHT 2/3-04-05)
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS
See also: Inter-state relations (ASEAN-China); World Trade Organization
Japan – Mexico
The Japan-Mexican agreement of 17 September 2004 was Japan’s first comprehen-
sive bilateral free trade agreement after that with Singapore of January 2002. It was
expected that it would provide momentum to efforts to conclude similar agreements
with South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. (JT 19-09-04)
Japan – Malaysia
The Japanese and Malaysian prime ministers reached agreement in May 2005 on
a bilateral free trade agreement, the first for Malaysia, including the abolition of most
tariffs in 2015. Significantly, custom duties on most finished motor vehicles would
be removed gradually, but within a shorter period for larger cars than those for smaller
cars. Signature was scheduled for later in the year.
The Japanese government in late December 2004 approved a basic plan of pro-
moting (bilateral) free trade agreements with priority to agreements with Asian
countries in accordance with the efforts toward an (East) Asian Community. (JT 22-
12-04, 26-05-05)
Japan – Philippines
On the sidelines of the ASEAN summit meeting at Vientiane in late November
2004 the two countries agreed to cut tariffs on various goods starting in 2006, thus
opening the way for a later economic cooperation accord. (IHT 30-11-04)
Singapore – Korea (South)
On the same occasion the two countries concluded negotiations on a free-trade
agreement that would serve as a model for similar agreements between South Korea
and other Southeast Asian countries. (IHT 30-11-04)
INTER-STATE RELATIONS: GENERAL ASPECTS
Afghanistan – US
The president of Afghanistan announced on 13 April 2005 that he would send a
formal request to the US president seeking a long-term, strategic relationship between
the two countries, including economic assistance as well as security guarantees and
military cooperation. He referred to the US as the foreign power that had restored
sovereignty to the Afghan people and that was already at the forefront of assistance
to rebuild Afghanistan’s security and economy, and defined the intended strategic
security as enabling Afghanistan to defend itself and to continue to prosper, and stop
the possibility of interferences in Afghanistan. (IHT 14-04-05)
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ASEAN – China
On the occasion of the ASEAN summit meeting in November 2004 at Vientiane
the ASEAN member states and China signed a free-trade agreement.
Under the agreement tariff and non-tariff barriers will be reduced and a mechanism
to settle disputes was set up. The six more economically advanced ASEAN member
states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and
China would begin cutting tariffs on 1 July 2005 with the aim of reducing duties
on 4,000 categories of goods to between 5 per cent and zero by 2010, while the other
member states will have until 2015 to comply with the target. Meanwhile each party
to the agreement may nominate up to 400 goods as “sensitive goods” for which the
tariffs will not be reduced below 20 per cent until 2012.
At the meeting China also signed a strategic declaration committing China to good
behaviour in Southeast Asia, including the contentious area of the South China Sea.
(WSWS 20-12-04; IHT 29-11, 30-11-04)
Asian-African Conference, “New Asian-African Strategic Partnership”
The fiftieth anniversary of the 1955 Asian African Conference was commemorated
on 22-24 April 2005 by representatives of ninety Asian and African countries at
Bandung, Indonesia, the place where the original conference of twenty-nine countries
was held. The gathering resulted in the signing of an accord of “New Asian-African
Strategic Partnership”.
The participants agreed to meet again in South Africa in 2009, hoping that the
Asian-African Summit would become a regular event. (IHT 25-04-05)
[Many of the countries that attended the Bandung summit in 1955 convened in
Belgrade in 1961 at the initiative of Yugoslavia and Egypt to create the Non-aligned
Movement.]
China – European Union
See: Embargo
China – India
China and India signed an agreement for a “strategic partnership for peace and
prosperity” on 11 April 2005, during a visit to India by the Chinese prime minister.
Furthermore, the two countries signed a series of agreements on improving economic
ties and on resolving the decades-old dispute over their 3,500-kilometre Himalayan
border. The latter did not contain a definitive settlement and was more a kind of
(three-stage) roadmap, merely emphasizing that the two countries would make
“meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions”. It
stressed, however, that the border issue would not be permitted to sour broader
relations between the two countries. (IHT 12-04-05)
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China – Japan
Japanese visa for former Taiwan president
Japan in December 2004 issued a tourist visa to the former Taiwan president Lee
Teng-hui despite renewed Chinese appeals for Japan not to do so, adding a major
irritant to Japan’s already-tense relations with China. China opposes contact between
Taiwan leaders, and former leaders, and other countries. However, the Japanese prime
minister said that as the person concerned wanted to travel as a private citizen, there
was no reason to turn down his visa application. (IHT 22-12-04)
Anti-Japanese demonstrations
Relations between the two countries deteriorated sharply in March 2005, caused
by a combination of several factors, such as a dispute about the delineation of the
border line between their exclusive economic zone in the East China Sea (Sea of
Japan) (see supra at 269), the presentation in recent Japanese history textbooks of
Japan’s role in the Second World War including Japan’s failure to atone for its war
crimes in World War II (see infra), and the Japanese participation in US plans
concerning the defence of Taiwan (see infra: China-Japan-US, and at 283).
On the weekends of 9-10 and 16-17 April 2005 further waves of mass protest
erupted in several places in China although the government tried to ease the tensions
with Japan. In Guangzhou where demonstrators gathered near the Japanese consulate,
police blocked them from getting close to the building. In Shanghai and Shenyang
protesters also marched on and attacked the Japanese consulate. In Beijing where
demonstrators tried to storm the residence of the Japanese ambassador, riot police
broke up the confrontation.
The Japanese foreign minister summoned the Chinese ambassador and protested
at the demonstrations. He demanded an apology from China and also compensation.
The ambassador did not apologize, but said that the Chinese government condemned
the demonstrations. The Chinese foreign ministry issued a statement chiding the
protesters though avoiding apologies, while the spokesman actually said that Japan
was to blame for the anti-Japanese violence and stressed that Japan should expect
no apology. It was reported that China later did pay compensation for the damage
caused at the Japanese embassy and the ambassador’s residence.
The Japanese foreign minister visited China on 18 April in an effort to ease friction
between the two countries. In discussing steps to improve relations the Japanese side
proposed setting up a group of experts to study the history of Sino-Japanese relations.
On his renewed demand for an apology and compensation for the damage done, the
Chinese minister was reported to have said that “the Chinese government has never
done anything for which it has to apologize to the Japanese people”. On the other
hand, he said Japan was to blame for “a series of things that have hurt the feelings
of the Chinese people” over issues such as relations with Taiwan and “the subject
of history”. However, the Chinese authorities did call for a stop of the riots, and China
seemed to soften its stance toward Japan when it declared on 22 April it would no
longer tolerate anti-Japanese protests, warning that “unauthorized marches” were
illegal and that the police would take strong measures against those vandalizing
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property. The Chinese president and the Japanese prime minister met at the fringes
of the Commemorative Bandung Summit (see supra) to ease existing strains (see
infra: Japan - Asia). (IHT 11-04, 12-04, 18-04, 21-04, 23/24-04, 25-04-05, JT 10-04,
11-04, 13-04, 18-04, 17-06-05)
In May 2005 the Chinese deputy prime minister, who visited Japan mainly for trade
purposes, unexpectedly and abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with the Japanese
prime minister that she had requested, a few hours before it was to take place. It
was initially suggested that this might have been related to urgent matters in China,
but the following day the spokesman of the Chinese foreign ministry said that China
was extremely dissatisfied that during the stay of the Chinese minister in Japan
suggestions were raised in Japanese circles on the possibility of the Japanese prime
minister’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni shrine and that “clearly, in these circum-
stances there was not the necessary atmosphere for a meeting between the two
leaders”. (IHT 24-05, 25-05-05, JT 24-05, 25-05-05)
China – Japan / US
Japan and the US issued a joint statement on 20 February 2005, which contained
a list of “common strategic objectives” among which was “encouraging the peaceful
resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait”. It also recognized Taiwan as a
“mutual security concern”. China issued a denunciation of the declaration, opposing
it since it concerned Taiwan as part of China and meddled in the internal affairs of
China and hurt Chinese sovereignty.
The statement represented a departure from the previous military cooperation
statement of 1997, which called for the two countries to work together in the “area
surrounding Japan” (see 7 Asian YIL 458). The Taiwanese chief representative in
Japan said the new policy statement represented a very important gain for Taiwan.
A 1960 US-Japanese security pact simply called for joint cooperation on “Far East”
regional security. (IHT 21-02-05, AToL 23-02-05)
China – Korea (Republic of)
A dispute emerged between the two countries about the position and boundaries
of the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo that ruled much of present-day North
Korea and Manchuria from 37 BC to 668 AD when it was conquered by the unifying
southern kingdom of Shilla (which, together with Koguryo and Paekje, constituted
Korea’s three founding kingdoms).
Koguryo is seen by Koreans as the forerunner of their nation, but around late July
or early August 2004 the Chinese foreign ministry deleted references to Koguryo
from the Korean history section of its website. Besides an official Chinese study
group issued academic papers bolstering the position that Koguryo was in fact merely
a Chinese vassal state. The population of North-east China consists of, among others,
about two million ethnic Koreans.
On 24 August 2004 the South Korean foreign ministry announced a five-point
“understanding”, which referred to the Koguryo question as a pending issue between
the two countries and which apparently implied the absence of Chinese intention
to claim the kingdom as part of its history. The understanding also called for efforts
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to prevent the dispute from turning into a political issue, and for academic exchanges
on the matter. North Korea remained silent on the dispute.
UNESCO accepted applications of both North Korea and China to have Koguryo
tombs, murals and other cultural items on each side of the Yula (Amok) River
registered as World Heritage sites of their own country. It avoided, however, indica-
ting the national parentage of the ancient kingdom. (IHT 25-08-04, AToL 11-08-04)
China – Russia
During a visit by the Russian president in mid-October 2004 the two countries
signed 13 agreements, including a boundary treaty (see supra at 266), but no mention
was made of a prospective oil pipeline from Siberia to China (see 11 Asian YIL 326,
and infra at 294).
Among the agreements was a joint declaration supporting a common position against
terrorism. The declaration explicitly mentioned the rebels in Chechnya and in Xinjiang
province as “part of international terrorism” who “should become a target of the joint
antiterrorist struggle by the international community”. (IHT 15-10-04)
China – US
See also: Divided states, Embargo; supra (China-Japan-US), Monetary matters
During a visit by the US national security adviser to China in early July 2004 the
Chinese leadership warned that continued US sales of high-tech weapons to Taiwan
would increase the chances of conflict and was contrary to a Sino-US agreement
that the weapons sales would be gradually phased out. On her part the US official
emphasized that the US did not support Taiwan independence but that the weapons
sales were an obligation under the (US) Taiwan Relations Act. (IHT 09-07-04)
China – Vatican
Upon the election of a new Roman Catholic Pope in April 2005 China reiterated
its position that the Vatican and China could establish formal relations only if the
Vatican dissolved its diplomatic links with the authorities in Taiwan and promised
not to interfere in China’s internal affairs.
Starting in early 2004 there had been several indirect, unofficial and exploratory
meetings in Rome and Beijing between representatives of both sides, indicating
increased willingness to yield on the differences. Relations reached a low point in
2000 when the Pope canonized 120 Chinese Catholics as martyrs on 1 October, the
anniversary of the Chinese Communist revolution.
The official (state-controlled) Chinese Catholic church accepts the Pope as a spiritual
leader but not as the organizational head of the Chinese church, and consequently
the latter condition denies a formal role for the Vatican in the appointment of clergy.
In Vietnam the government appoints the bishops on the recommendation of the Pope.
(IHT 21-04, 17-05-05)
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East Timor – Indonesia
In March 2005 the two countries reached agreement on setting up a Commission
of Truth and Friendship (CTF) to deal with human rights atrocities committed by
pro-Indonesian militia in the wake of the 1999 vote for independence in East Timor.
The Commission is to function for a two-year period and would have neither political
nor judicial power. It would only make recommendations to the responsible national
institutions, such as parliaments, as a basis for decision-making. It was to consist
of five Indonesian and five Timorese members, appointed by the respective govern-
ments. (JP 10-03-05)
India – EU
India and the EU signed a “strategic partnership” agreement on 8 November 2004,
aimed at tightening economic and political ties. (IHT 09-11-04)
India – Pakistan
In April 2005 the Pakistani president (who was born in Delhi) visited India and
met the Indian prime minister (who was born in the present-day Pakistani province
of Punjab) amid signs of warming relations between the two countries. (IHT 18-04-05)
India – US
During her visit to India in March 2005 the US Secretary of State warned India
about US concerns over plans for a gas pipeline running between India and Iran (see:
Oil and gas, infra at 295). The pipeline would extend 2,775 kilometres, a quarter
of which through Pakistani territory, and was tentatively scheduled for completion
by 2009. (IHT 17-03-05)
In late June 2005 the two countries signed a ten-year defence agreement, titled
“New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship”. India was thus the only
country to have concluded a strategic defence partnership with both the US and
Russia. (AToL 01-07-05)
Iran – Iraq
The two countries re-established diplomatic relations in September 2004, but many
issues, including a peace treaty following the 1980-1988 war, had yet remained
unresolved.
In May 2005 the Iranian foreign minister visited Iraq. On that occasion he assured
his counterpart that Iran would not interfere in its neighbour’s affairs: “Iraqis are
in charge of their own affairs. Any interference would be an insult to the Iraqi
people.” (IHT 18-05-05)
Iran – UK
In connection with the 21 June 2004 incident when UK boats were arrested on
the Shatt-al-Arab for entering Iranian territorial waters (see 11 Asian YIL 298-299)
the British crewmen insisted that they were “forcibly escorted” over the border. The
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UK foreign secretary urged Iran on 1 July to return navigational equipment taken
from the sailors. (IHT 02-07-04)
Iran – US
It was reported that the US had been conducting secret reconnaissance missions
inside Iran at least since summer 2004 aiming at identifying targets that could be
destroyed by precision strikes and short-term commando raids. While the US Defense
Department rejected the report, the US president said in an interview on 17 January
2005 he could not rule out a resort to military action if the US failed to persuade
Iran to abandon a nuclear energy programme that the US considered a cover for
developing nuclear weapons. (IHT 19-01-05)
The newly elected president of Iran said in his first press conference, inter alia:
“Our nation is continuing on the path of progress and on this path has no significant
need for the United States.
… We would like to have relations with any country that does not have hostile
relations (sic) toward us. …” (IHT 27-06-05)
Iran – UK / US
The US president in his “State of the Union” address on 2 February 2005 accused
Iran of being “the world’s primary state sponsor of terror, pursuing nuclear weapons
while depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve.” The spokesman
of Iran’s foreign ministry responded by saying that the remarks were “ a repetition
of his former groundless claims and accusations”.
The US accusation was echoed by the UK prime minister, who several days later




The Japanese ministry of education on 5 April 2005 approved one hundred and
three textbooks for use in junior high schools, including a revised edition of a con-
tentious history book criticized for glossing over Japan’s wartime aggression. The
Japanese foreign ministry emphasized that the officially approved books did not
necessarily reflect Japanese policy. [In 2001 the first edition of one of the books
raised tensions with China and South Korea, see 10 Asian YIL 373.]
On the same day the Chinese embassy in Japan filed a protest for the alleged
alteration of historical facts, damaging public sentiment of Asian nations who had
been victims of Japanese aggression. (JT 06-04-05)
Japanese apologies
Using the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Asian-African Conference at
Bandung (see supra at 274) and speaking to the representatives of more than hundred
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countries, the Japanese prime minister on 22 April 2005 made a public apology for
Japan’s aggression in the Second World War:
“In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage
and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. …
Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility. … With feelings of deep
remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind, Japan has resolutely maintained
… its principle of resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to use of force.”
[The last time a Japanese prime minister made such a declaration was in 1991 in
a speech in Singapore.] (IHT 23/24-04-05, JT 23-04-05)
Japan – Korea (North)
There was continuous squabbling between the two countries on the matter of actual
or alleged abductions of Japanese nationals by North Korea in past years and the
abductees’ whereabouts. In 2002 North Korea had admitted to the abductions and
had apologized for the abduction of thirteen persons in the period between 1977 till
1982. They said eight of them had died and the other five were returned to Japan
in 2002 (see 11 Asian YIL 300) The Japanese list, however, comprised seventeen
names.
In July 2004 Japan demanded a report, earlier promised by North Korea, about
eight allegedly deceased abductees and two others who, according to the North Korean
side, had never been in North Korea. North Korea provided medical records pertaining
to two of the eight persons. In December 2004 the Japanese prime minister declared
that the North Korean explanations were unsatisfactory. In the case of Yokota Meguni,
abducted from Japan in 1977 as a 13-year old schoolgirl, it was said that the cremated
human remains presented as evidence of her death did in fact not belong to the person
concerned, although doubts later arose about the correctness of the methods used
in the DNA analysis. Later, North Korea said the talks on the fate of Japanese
abductees were no longer meaningful as Japan was criticizing the results of North
Korean investigations.
By way of sanction in retaliation of the unsatisfactory and incomplete settlement
of the issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese nationals Japan in early 2005
introduced an insurance obligation for certain categories of North Korean ships calling
at Japanese ports (see the Mangyongbong incident, 11 Asian YIL 301). (JT 23-07,
03-11-04, 01-01, 02-03-05, AToL 23-06-05)
Separate from that of the abductees, there was the issue of a group of four Japanese
former members of the “Red Army Faction”, who had been involved in the hijacking
of a Japan Airlines plane on 31 March 1970. They were living in North Korea and
Japan had repeatedly demanded their extradition. They themselves expressed their
wish to return to Japan; the North Korean government did not raise objections (Of
the initial nine hijackers three had since died and two others had returned to Japan
earlier). (JT 06-07-04)
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Japan – Korea (South)
The South Korean president and the Japanese prime minister met on 20 June 2005.
They failed to resolve their differences over Japan’s militaristic past and remained
far apart on how to chart their future together in Northeast Asia. The meeting ended
with two low-level agreements. They would conduct a second joint study of interpreta-
tions of history and Japan would study a Korean suggestion that Japan build a national
memorial for the war dead without including Yasukuni’s war criminals.
[A joint history study group had actually already been agreed in principle at a summit
meeting of the two countries’ presidents in October 2001.] (IHT 21-06-05)
Korea (North) – US
In late October 2004 the US together with its allies conducted joint exercises in
the Sea of Japan, named “Team Samurai” and the twelfth in the framework of the
Proliferation Security Initiative, a programme designed to block illicit cargoes from
an unnamed country (see 11 Asian YIL 287). North Korea in a letter to the UN
Secretary-General warned that the exercise “constitutes a breach of the UN Charter,
international law and order and a dangerous act that could entail global instability”.
(IHT 24-08, 29-10-04)
Meanwhile, the US Secretary of State in January 2005 referred to North Korea
as an “outpost of tyranny”. (IHT 11-02-05)
Pakistan – US
The US announced inMarch 2005 that it would sell F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan.
This had no connection with the issue of the thirty-two F-16 planes which were
ordered and paid fifteen years earlier but were never delivered (see Asian YIL
Vol.1:271, Vol.2:286, Vol.4:508). These planes were sold to third countries and
Pakistan was reimbursed the amount paid. (IHT 18-04-05, AToL 29-03-05)
(NON-)INTERVENTION
See: Association of South East Asian Nations (Chairmanship of Myanmar), Inter-state
relations (Iran-Iraq)
IRAQ WAR
South Korean military contribution
It was reported that South Korea planned to send an additional 3,000 troops to join
the 660 already in Iraq. The first deployment was comprised of military engineers
and doctors, but this time it was said that the government planned to send combat
troops, making the South Korean contingent the third largest behind the US and
Britain. (IHT 01-07-04)
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Japanese military contribution
It was reported that Japan had decided to keep its forces stationed in Iraq as
participants in the multi-national force (see 11 Asian YIL 306) following the hand-
over of formal sovereignty to an Iraqi government. (JT 06-07-04)
Japan and the question of the legitimacy of the war
In an interview on 15 September 2004 the UN Secretary-General said that per-
mission from the UN Security Council was needed for the war in Iraq and that
consequently from the point of view of the UN Charter the war was illegal.
Resolution 1441 of the UN Security Council, adopted in November 2002, contained
the warning of “serious consequences” if Iraq were found to be in breach of earlier
resolutions. According to the UN Secretary-General it had been “up to the Security
Council to approve or determine what those consequences should be”.
In contrast to this comment the governments of the countries that supported the
US-led war, insisted that the war was justified under international law. According
to them, despite the absence of a UN resolution explicitly permitting the invasion,
the action was justified because Iraq had failed to comply with previous resolutions
requiring the country to disarm and, specifically, to abandon its programs for
acquiring weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles.
The Japanese chief cabinet secretary, the main Japanese spokesman, said that the
Secretary-General’s remarks had been “unclear” and that Japanese officials would
make inquiries about his “real meaning”. The Japanese troops sent to Iraq in Decem-
ber 2003 on a non-combat, humanitarian mission, constituted the first Japanese
military deployment since the Second World War in a country where fighting was
under way. On 9 December 2004 the Japanese government decided to extend the
mission of the Japanese troops beyond its expiration that month. The Japanese prime
minister motivated the decision by saying: “Japan’s foreign policy is based on the
Japan-US alliance and international cooperation.. As an ally, we need to carry out
as much as possible humanitarian activity that is suitable for Japan, and it is also
necessary as a country to attach importance to international cooperation that meets
our national interests.”
Japan also indicated that it was not yet convinced of the absence of weapons of
mass destruction. Upon an admission by the US Secretary of State at a hearing of
the US Senate that WMD were unlikely to be found in Iraq the Japanese Chief
Cabinet Secretary said that it was unclear if the US Secretary was saying the US
had failed to discover WMD despite its all-out search, or that US intelligence about
Iraq’s WMD programme was flawed from the start. Since it was the US that had
been conducting the investigation in Iraq, it was not possible for Japan to say on
its own if such weapons existed: “It is not appropriate to give clear comments of
our view at this stage”. Also, one day before the first anniversary of the beginning
of the war the prime minister said “I still believe [weapons of mass destruction] exist.
I believe it was a right war.” (IHT 17-09, 10-12-04, JT 15-09, 16-09-04)
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JAPAN’S MILITARY ROLE
See also: Iraq War
New military policy
In a break with its pacifist tradition Japan on 10 December 2004 announced plans
(the National Defence Programme Outline) to shift its military focus to guarding
against North Korean missiles or Chinese incursions on Japan’s southernmost islands,
remotely located off Kyushu and Okinawa. In another break with the past, the plan
called for selectively ending Japan’s long-standing ban on arms exports. The export
of components to the US would be part of the joint development of a missile defence
system with the US. Paradoxically the plans implied a budget reduction. Japan is
able to keep its defence spending low because of its security alliance with the US.
China immediately expressed its concern about the Japanese policy alteration. (IHT
11/12-12-04; JT 16-01-05; JT 12-12-04)
Overseas military operation
The Japanese relief efforts in Indonesia after the Tsunami disaster of December
2004 were classified as the largest Japanese overseas military operation since World
War II. (IHT 28-01-05)
JURISDICTION
See: Insurgents
LAW OF THE SEA
Submarine passage through territorial waters
A Chinese nuclear-powered submarine on 10 November 2004 passed through
Japanese territorial waters between two Japanese islands, about 400 kilometres
southwest from Okinawa near the Sakishima Islands, failing to identify itself by
raising its national flag as required by international law, and without surfacing. The
following day it had returned to international waters west of Okinawa.
Japan lodged a protest and demanded an apology for the two-hour intrusion. China
later admitted the incident and called it “regrettable”, blaming “technical errors”.
(IHT 11/12-12-04; JT 12-11, 13-11, 17-11-04; AToL 17-11-04)
MIGRANT WORKERS
Foreign workers in and from Southeast Asia
About 400,000 undocumented Indonesian workers in Malaysia were facing prison
and lash penalties if they had not left the country by a twice-extended deadline of
1 March 2005.
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Malaysia had a workforce of around eleven million and, in addition, half a million
legal and, initially, an estimated one million illegal foreign workers (estimates differ)
of whom roughly half had left the country following an amnesty. Most of the foreign
workers inMalaysia were from Indonesia, next to large numbers from the Philippines,
Bangladesh and India. In its efforts to keep illegal workers away Malaysia had built
a concrete wall along part of its border with Thailand, and since 2002 it had arrested
more than 18,000 illegal foreigners. With regard to Indonesians it was considered
questionable whether it would be possible to break time-honoured migration patterns
from Indonesia (Sumatra) across the strait to the Malay Peninsula.
In Singapore there were approximately 150,000 foreign domestic servants, mostly
from Indonesia.
The Philippines is second to Indonesia as labour supplier within ASEAN, while
Thailand was described as both a supplier of labour, mainly to Northeast Asia and
the Gulf, and a recipient of more than one million mostly illegal (“undocumented”)
workers from Myanmar and Cambodia.
Japan announced in early April 2005 it would increase its intake of foreign workers




Central Asia – Russia
See also: Borders
Under an agreement of 16 October 2004 Russia obtained a permanent military base
in Tajikistan, after having obtained a similar facility in Kyrgyzstan in 2003. The
Russian moves followed an increased US military profile in Central Asia since the
11 September attacks in the US, which served its operations in Afghanistan..
In exchange Russia agreed to forgive part of existing Tajik debts to Russia and
pledges for some $2 billion in investments over the next five years. (IHT 18-10-04)
India – Sri Lanka
It was reported in late October 2004 that the two countries had finalized a draft
bilateral defence cooperation agreement. The proposed agreement was described as
general in nature, falling in the category of a standard agreement, formalizing existing
cooperation and providing a framework for cooperation in the future. (AtoL 27-10-04)
[Previously an agreement of 1987 aimed at resolving the ethnic conflict at Sri Lanka,
leading to Indian troops being deployed in northwest Sri Lanka in the period October
1987 - March 1990.]
Chronicle 285
Indonesia – US
The US Congress, concerned about Indonesia’s human rights record, curbed military
ties in 1992, and cut them back further in 2000 because of the East Timor dispute.
In early 2005 it was reported that the US had moved to restart US training of
Indonesian officers, which includes modern warfare methods, the American system
of civilian control over the military, accountability and human rights issues (other
Asian military receiving this training programme included those of Thailand, Malaysia,
India and Pakistan).
However, US Congressional approval was needed for actual resumption. This
approval was made conditional upon Indonesian cooperation in an FBI investigation
into the killing in 2002 of two American schoolteachers in the Indonesian province
of Papua. Such cooperation was allegedly blocked by the Indonesian army, while
there were suspicions of involvement by elements of the Indonesian military.
While dispatching spare parts for the aged Indonesian fleet of military transport
planes the US did not yet plan to remove its ban on the sale of weapons. (IHT 08-02-
05)
MINORITIES
Muslims in Southern Thailand
A riot erupted in the southern Thai province of Naratiwat on 25 October 2004 (the
“Tak Bai riot”) when a crowd gathered outside a police station to demand the release
of six men arrested on suspicion of stealing weapons from a military base earlier
in the year and distributing them to Islamic militants. After the riot 78 persons died,
most of them by suffocation, when the army and police loaded 1,300 persons arrested
in the course of the violence into overloaded army trucks. Besides, six persons were
reportedly shot and killed by the army.
The casualties were the latest of more than 300 who had died in violence in south
Thailand in 2004. The prime minister described those involved in the riots as support-
ing separatism. Among the international response Malaysia and Indonesia called for
an inquiry.
[Thailand’s three southern, mainly Muslim, provinces once formed the Sultanate of
Pattani. In the early 20th century the three sultanates of Kedah, Perlis and Terengganu,
presently part of Malaysia, were annexed by the British, yet Pattani, which remained
part of Thailand, was not. Muslims account for ten per cent of the 63 million popula-
tion of Thailand.] (IHT 27-10, 28-10-04)
MONETARY MATTERS
Asian monetary arrangements
On the fringes of the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Istanbul
in May 2005 Asian finance ministers took another step toward creating a set of
confidence-building measures that might eventually develop into some sort of Asian
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monetary fund (cf. the abortive efforts in 1997, 8 Asian YIL 294). The finance
ministers of thirteen Asian countries agreed to enhance the modest mechanism that
was first set up in Chiang Mai in 2000 (see 9 Asian YIL 409) and that allows
countries to swap their foreign reserves to ease liquidity problems on a bilateral basis.
The bilateral basis was to be transformed into a single multilateral process by increas-
ing the size of the swaps and developing a surveillance mechanism similar to that
currently applied by the IMF. The process was started by a system of bilateral mutual
swap agreements among South Korea, Japan and China. (IHT 13-05-05, JT 29-05-05)
US warning on Chinese currency
The US semi-annual Currency Report warned China to move to a more flexible
exchange rate for its currency within six months or, alternatively, be formally desig-
nated by the US Treasury Department under US law as a currency manipulating
country. Such finding would trigger bilateral negotiations on the exchange rate and
possible retaliatory action.
The report read, inter alia: “The fixed exchange rate that China now maintains
is a substantial distortion to world markets, blocking the price mechanism and
impeding adjustment of international imbalances”. (IHT 18-05-05)
IMF voting system
It was reported that, in an effort to keep (Asian) states tied to the IMF system of
international currency regulation (“preserving the centrality of the IMF in the global
financial system”), the US was pushing a change of the IMF voting system by
enhancing the voting power of Asian states with rising economic power. (AToL 11-
06-05)
NUCLEAR ENERGY ISSUES
Joint nuclear fusion reactor project
An “International Thermo-nuclear Experimental Reactor” (ITER) project to emulate
the sun’s nuclear fusion had been set up in 1992 and was to be jointly funded by
the US, Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, and the EU.
There were competing bids from France and Japan to host the reactor. Japan was
backed by the US and South Korea, France by China and Russia. Later Japan con-
sented to give up its bid in return of substantial compensation by a much lower
financial contribution, the construction of the project’s main research facility in Japan
and twenty per cent of the jobs at the head office including the top post of the
organization. The consortium also promised Japan that any subsequent fusion reactor
would be built there. It was reported that China and South Korea were not happy
with the concessions granted to Japan that were seen as preferential treatment. (IHT
03-05, 23-06, 28-06, 29-06-05, JT 26-06-05)
[Nuclear fusion is the process by which the atomic nuclei are forced together, re-
leasing huge amounts of energy, as with the sun or the hydrogen bomb. In contra-
distinction to nuclear fission, it does not produce radioactive waste.]
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Review of Non-Proliferation Treaty
A conference on the review of the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was held
in May 2005 yet did not produce a new action plan. (IHT 28/29-05-05)
Iran
See also: Inter-state relations (Iran-US)
Western objections against Iran’s nuclear ambitions
Iran announced on 13 July 2004 that it would resume negotiations with the three
EU countries over its disputed nuclear program. Iran was angered in June 2004 when
it was rebuked for poor cooperation by a tough IAEA resolution (see 11 Asian YIL
317). It accused the European countries of not fulfilling their promise to close Iran’s
nuclear dossier and, in response, had resumed its programme of building centrifuges
(though not its enrichment programme), considering its suspension under an October
2003 agreement as a temporary one (see 11 Asian YIL 316). It referred to its con-
tracts with Russia on the building of several nuclear reactors for the production of
electricity.
Talks between officials from the three EU countries and Iran late July in Paris
produced “no substantial progress”. The EU countries wanted Iran to stop its activity
on the nuclear fuel cycle as the US suspected Iran of using a civilian nuclear pro-
gramme as a cover for a secret nuclear weapons project. (IHT 14-07, 28-07, 02-08,
23-08-04)
News reports early September 2004 referred to an IAEA report which mentioned
the Iranian intention to terminate the suspension of its enrichment processes and to
re-start the conversion of forty tons of raw uranium in mineral form (“yellow cake”)
into uranium hexafluoride. [Spun in centrifuges uranium hexafluoride produces
enriched uranium that in turn can be used to generate power or make nuclear war-
heads, depending on the degree of enrichment. The phrase “nuclear fuel cycle” refers
to everything frommining uranium ore to reprocessing nuclear waste]. (IHT 02-09-04)
On 12 September 2004 Iran said that abandonment of uranium enrichment and
of carrying out the nuclear fuel cycle, a technology it already possessed, was out
of the question, calling enrichment a legitimate right of all IAEA members. It was,
however, ready to give any sort of guarantees within the framework of the “additional
protocol” (see 11 Asian YIL 316) that it would only make peaceful use of nuclear
energy. (IHT 13-09-04)
On his part the IAEA director-general called on Iran to fully suspend its enrichment
programme and to do its utmost to build the required confidence until the agency
was able to assure the world that Iran had no covert weapons program. The European
strategy was said to consist of, essentially, trying to persuade Iran to give up nuclear
fuel-making capabilities in exchange for a guarantee that it would be enabled to run
a peaceful nuclear programme. On the other hand the US held that Iran had forfeited
its right to any nuclear programme by concealing its enrichment for nearly two
decades. (IHT 14-09, 17-09, 18/19-09-04)
On 18 September 2004 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution
(GOV/2004/79) which, in its preambular paragraphs, noted the Director General’s
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assessment of the Agency’s “steady progress towards understanding Iran’s nuclear
programmes”, and “recognise[d] the right of states to the development and practical
application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes … consistent with their Treaty
obligations, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries”. In
its first operative paragraph the resolution “strongly urge[d]” Iran, inter alia, “to take
all steps within its power to clarify the outstanding issues before the Board’s 25
November meeting, specifically including the sources and reasons for enriched
uranium contamination, and the import, manufacture, and use of centrifuges”. This
demand referred, inter alia, to the discovery, by the agency, of contamination by
highly enriched uranium at two sites in Iran that, as an IAEA report said, “may not
have resulted from the enrichment of uranium at these locations” but had come from
imported equipment.
With regard to the enrichment procedure the resolution in its preambular part
“not[ed] with serious concern” that Iran had not suspended “all enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities” as notified to the IAEA on 29 December 2003 and 24
February 2004 (see 11 Asian YIL 316).
[“Reprocessing” is the conversion of uranium into uranium hexafluoride and consti-
tutes a stage preceding enrichment. “Enrichment” expressis verbis refers to the
concentrating of the 235 isotope in the gas with high-speed centrifuges, which may
result in “low-enriched uranium”, a 3.5 per cent concentration for use in nuclear
power plants. On the other hand, “high-enrichment” results in high concentrations
of the isotope necessary for a nuclear weapon. Iran reportedly possessed less than
thousand centrifuges. Reprocessing did not explicitly fall under the Iranian suspension
commitment, and enrichment per se is not prohibited by the Non-proliferation Treaty.]
In paragraph 3 of its operative part the resolution “stresses that such suspension
would provide the Board with additional confidence in Iran’s future activities”. It
therefore “consider[ed] it necessary, to promote confidence, that Iran immediately
suspend all enrichment-related activities, including the manufacture or import of
centrifuge components, the assembly and testing of centrifuges”. The resolution in
its operative paragraph 4 also “[c]all[ed] again on Iran, as a further confidence-
building measure, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to start construction of a
research reactor moderated by heavy water”.
Iran rejected the call for further suspension of enrichment-related activities and
on 21 September announced it had started the conversion process. Besides, there
were voices from the Iranian parliament calling for non-ratification of the additional
protocol and even for withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (IHT 02-09,
20-09, 22-09-04)
In October 2004 the three EUmembers France, Germany and the UK (the “EU-3”)
made an offer to Iran consisting of technology for the building of light-water reactor
systems in exchange for an indefinite suspension of the latter’s uranium enrichment
programme and related activities such as reprocessing uranium and the building of
a heavy-water research reactor. The offer also included the resumption of talks on
a trade pact (with an eye to Iran’s entry into theWTO), guarantees of Russian nuclear
fuel, and assistance on a range of “political and security issues” such as treating the
Iranian resistance group “People’s Mujahadeen” as a “terrorist organization”. Iran
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considered the offer, and then rejected it, urging a “more balanced” proposal. (IHT
22-10, 25-10-04)
A preliminary draft agreement was after all worked out on 7 November (IHT 09-11-
04) to which Iran responded on 11 November. Iran wanted the suspension to be
limited to six months and to still be allowed to conduct certain enrichment activities
(see infra). (IHT 13/14-11-04) On 14 November Iran informed the IAEA that it was
prepared to suspend its uranium enrichment activities as part of a deal with the EU
and that the suspension would remain in place as long as the talks with the EU
regarding a final solution would last. These talks were later estimated to be completed
within a few months after their projected start in January 2005. Iran repeated its
emphasis on the temporary character of its freeze on uranium enrichment as late as
the end of January 2005. The tentative agreement was confirmed by the European
side although it kept awaiting further official Iranian approval. There was also (see
supra) the Iranian request for an exemption from the suspension of its enrichment
programme for a limited number (twenty) of centrifuges for research purposes. It
linked its demand with its consent for IAEA monitoring of the centrifuges.
The agreement between Iran and the EU-3 related exclusively to uranium enrichment
and was not concerned with the different process of production of plutonium by
heavy-water reactors. Plutonium is often preferred over enriched uranium for compact
warheads. It was said that the EU-3 gave priority to the uranium issue as more
pressing compared with that of plutonium production, then considered to be years
away. On the other hand it seemed that the main US concern was the site at Arak
(see 11 Asian YIL 314), where Iran had started work on a 40-megawatt heavy water
reactor that, in US eyes, was likely to have the purpose of the production of plutonium
for nuclear weapons. The reactors use natural uranium rather than its enriched form.
(IHT 15-11, 16-11, 22-11, 23-11, 25-11, 26-11, 27/28-11, 01-12-04; 01-02-05)
The IAEA Governing Board met on 25 November 2004. The EU-3 circulated a
draft resolution which qualified as “essential” that Iran keep all parts of its enrichment
programme suspended in order to have its case resolved “within the framework of
the Agency”. Iran rejected the text. On its part the US raised the objection that the
text did not contain a “trigger” clause that would automatically refer the case to the
UN Security Council if Iran resumed any enrichment-related activity. The board on
29 November 2004 finally adopted by consensus a mildly worded resolution
(GOV/2004/90) (via www.iaea.org/Publications) whereupon the US accused Iran
of deceit and the IAEA board of irresponsibility.
The resolution “welcomes the fact that Iran has decided to continue and extend
its suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities”, classifying the
suspension as “a voluntary, non-legally-binding, confidence-building measure”. The
resolution noted Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy programs by “[r]ecog-
nizing the right of states to the development and practical application of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power”, although it criti-
cized Iran for failing to cooperate fully with the Agency and seemed to have left
open the possibility that Iran might have an “undeclared” nuclear programme that
could be used to make nuclear weapons by “[reaffirming] its strong concern that
Iran’s policy of concealment up to October 2003 has resulted in many breaches of
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Iran’s obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement”. The compromise
on the resolution was reached after Iran in a letter to the IAEA had stated rather
ambiguously that in exchange it would give up its demand for partial exemption;
the ambiguity was affirmed when the head of the Iranian delegation afterwards refused
to confirm explicitly that Iran had indeed so agreed. (IHT 25-11, 26-11, 29-11, 30-11-
04) On the other hand, the Iranian negotiator later said in a newspaper interview that
taking the issue to the UN Security Council for eventual sanctions would turn the
issue into a “North-South question”. (IHT 26/27-02-05)
After the above developments the IAEA started trying to get access to two military
sites where, according to various intelligence reports and allegations by the Iranian
opposition group Mujahadeen Khalq, Iran might conduct activities related to the
pursuit of nuclear weapons, such as the research on and the development and pro-
duction of ammunition, missiles and high explosives that could, among other things,
be used to detonate nuclear weapons (“dual use” equipment). The two sites were
Parchin, southeast of Tehran and Lavisan II, in the north-eastern section of Tehran.
The procurement records on which the suspicions were based contained equipment
that had plausible uses for both nuclear and non-nuclear programmes. Military
facilities, however, fall outside the scope of the Agency’s monitoring competence,
which is limited to civilian programmes. The complex was not considered a nuclear-
related site and, consequently, the Agency could only ask for access on a voluntary
basis. Iran agreed to access to part of the Parchin site in January 2005 (IHT 03-12-04,
06-01-05) but refused a new request for access to another part in early March 2005.
(IHT 02-03-05)
The EU-3 restarted negotiations with Iran in December 2004 on a longer-term
arrangement. In February 2005 Iran rejected a European demand that it stop building
a heavy-water nuclear reactor (see above for this process) near the city of Arak, in
exchange for assistance in building a less threatening light-water reactor.
Meanwhile, US pressure on Iran appeared to have grown sharply and there were
reports of pilotless US drones flying over Iran. However, in March 2005 the US
agreed on a joint approach with Europe and announced that it would drop objections
to Iran’s eventual membership of the WTO and allow some sales of civilian aircraft
parts as an economic incentive. In return the Europeans agreed to take the Iranian
issue to the UN Security Council if negotiations failed. The incentives were meant
to make Iran give up its enrichment activities to which it was entitled under current
law.
While it was said that the talks would be to determine “that Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme can only be used for peaceful purposes”, this precisely underlined the
difficulty of the task. It was considered not practically possible to monitor those
activities reliably enough to ensure that they do not lead to the production of bomb-
grade uranium. The US was also described as having “taken the position that a
country like Iran is too dangerous to be allowed the technology to produce nuclear
material for electricity, even if the treaty itself does not explicitly ban it.” (IHT 14-12-
04, 22/23-01, 14-02, 04-03, 12/13-03, 23-03-05)
The “EU3” states and Iran met again on 23 March 2005 to review their three
months’ negotiations toward a permanent settlement. Iran said that if there had been
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tangible and specific progress in the talks, it would continue the talks for three more
months, but that it would consider breaking off if the conclusion about their results
were negative. At the meeting the Iranian side presented proposals including enhanced
monitoring and the technical guarantees designed to allow Iran to engage in uranium
enrichment, but the Europeans rejected that approach. The two sides basically repeated
their fixed positions with regard to the November 2004 preliminary agreement when
Iran had pledged to give “objective guarantees”, but the two sides disagreed on its
meaning. According to the European interpretation Iran would have to permanently
stop enrichment, whereas Iran emphasized its sovereign right to conduct all nuclear
activities that are not bomb-related. At the review conference of the NPT the Iranian
foreign minister repeated Iran’s willingness to provide guarantees of its peaceful
intent, but harshly criticized the demands being made which were “arbitrary and self-
serving criteria and thresholds regarding proliferation-proof and proliferation-prone
technologies”. (IHT 23-03, 24-03, 04-05-05)
The two sides met again when an EU-Iran working group began talks in April 2005.
The Iranian side said that “Iran will definitely resume a part of its enrichment
activities but we are still discussing its conditions and the time of restarting the
activities.” On 11 May 2005 the EU-3 responded by writing a letter, warning that
any resumption of nuclear work “would bring the negotiating process to an end”
and “would be a clear breach” of earlier agreements. According to unofficial sources
the compromises proposed by Iran included the right to run a small plant for uranium
enrichment and the option of adding a great number of centrifuges to produce enriched
uranium fuel on an industrial scale. The compromise would also include turning the
Natanz uranium enrichment plant into a joint venture under multinational ownership.
(IHT 21-04, 13-05-05) According to the Iranian side it had proposed reaching a
complete enrichment cycle in four phases over two years in order for the West to
grow confident that Iran was not attempting to build nuclear weapons. In exchange
Iran would expect a major package of incentives involving its security and economic
development (Before the Islamic Revolution the US had offered some 23 nuclear
power plants, Germany was building the Bushehr plant, and France had signed a
contract about the supply of nuclear fuel.) (19-05-05)
The Iranian parliament on 15 May 2005 added weight to the Iranian position by
approving a bill that read, inter alia, “The government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran is required to pursue peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the cycle of
nuclear fuel.” (16-05-05)
At the negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran in late May 2005 Iran agreed to
postpone the resumption of its nuclear activities in anticipation of detailed European
proposals by early August on the implementation of the provisional agreement of
14 November 2004. (IHT 19-05, 26-05-05)
Meanwhile another idea was raised involving Iranian-Russian cooperation. Accord-
ing to this idea Iran would be allowed to resume the production of the intermediate
uranium hexafluoride gas which would then be shipped to Russia for further enrich-
ment there after which the enriched material would be brought back to Iran for use.
(IHT 25-05-05)
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The Russian-built nuclear plant at Bushehr
The two countries on 27 February 2005 concluded an agreement under which Russia
would supply nuclear fuel for the nuclear plant at Bushehr (see 5 Asian YIL 477)
while Iran would return the spent fuel after use, thus preventing it from reprocessing
the material into plutonium. (IHT 26/27-02, 28-02-05)
North Korea
North Korea on 24 July 2004 rejected a US offer made in June 2004 consisting
of a gradual lifting of sanctions and the offer of economic aid from neighbouring
countries in return for a rapid dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme. The offer required the dismantlement and submission to intrusive (IAEA)
inspections before the implementation of the economic concessions. North Korea
on the other hand insisted on returning to a “freeze” like the one in effect between
1994 and 2002. (IHT 26-07-04)
A new round of six-nation talks was in fact planned for September or October 2004
but North Korea seemed to prefer to wait and see the results of the upcoming US
presidential election. Besides it announced on 16 September 2004 that it would not
attend further talks until the disclosures about nuclear experiments in South Korea
(see infra) had been fully explained. (IHT 24-08, 17-09-04)
In April 2005 the US suggested discussing the option of referring the North Korean
issue to the UN Security Council if North Korea refused to return to the talks, but
this was rejected by South Korea as “inappropriate”. The US was considering a UN
resolution empowering all states to intercept shipments into or out of North Korea
that might contain nuclear materials or components, effectively amounting to a
quarantine of North Korea. The latter had always said that it would consider sanctions
to be a declaration of war. (IHT 21-04, 26-04-05)
In a comment of 10 May 2005 the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said that
China’s strategy remains basically unchanged and that it had urged North Korea to
return to the six-party talks as being the right channel for addressing the pending
issues, instead of referring the case to the UN Security Council. China ruled out
applying economic or political sanctions. He emphasized, in response to US insistence
to cut off fuel shipments to North Korea to signal displeasure, that Chinese oil and
food shipments were part of its normal trade and should be separated from the nuclear
problem. (IHT 11-05-05)
In December 2004 the IAEA director general said in an interview that he assumed
North Korea had by then completed the conversion of its stockpile of spent nuclear
fuel that was previously monitored by the IAEA, thus having at its disposal fuel for
four to six nuclear bombs. His assessment was based on the Agency’s knowledge
of North Korea’s abilities and the amount of time that had passed since North Korea
had ejected the IAEA inspectors and had begun removing the 8,000 spent nuclear
fuel rods (see 11 Asian YIL 318-319). (IHT 07-12-04) The reactor was restarted
in February 2003 (see 11 Asian YIL 319). The North Korean side on 11 May 2005
confirmed suspicions that it had unloaded the spent fuel rods, which after a few weeks
of cooling could be reprocessed to produce plutonium. (IHT 19-04, 12-05-05)
Chronicle 293
On 10 February 2005 the North Korean government declared publicly for the first
time that North Korea had “manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defence” and
that it would “bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal”. The statement also said: “We
are compelled to suspend our participation in the talks for an indefinite period” and
that North Korea would return only when “there are ample conditions and atmosphere
to expect positive results from the talks”. Yet analysts were not certain about the
real meaning of the North Korean declaration, coming as it did from “a country prone
to making dramatic statements aimed at intimidating its interlocutors”. The South
Korean foreign minister said that North Korea might be bluffing, and the minister
of unification noted that North Korea had made similar assertions at least ten times
since 2003. He said: “We see it as a claim to own nuclear weapons, not an official
statement of being a nuclear weapons state”. This, however, seemed to contradict
a South Korean Defence White Paper, according to which North Korea might have
assembled one or two nuclear weapons and was believed to have conducted an aerial
blast test, which could precede an actual nuclear weapons test. (IHT 11-02, 16-02-05)
On 31 March 2005 North Korea issued a statement, repeating its declaration of
being a nuclear power and demanded that talks on reducing weapons on the Korean
Peninsula occur between North Korea and the US on equal terms. According to
unconfirmed reports in April North Korea had taken the position that the US must
pledge to respect North Korean sovereignty and territorial integrity before the issue
of a freeze of its nuclear programme could be discussed. This was said to be a
hardening shift of policy since the previous year.
On its part the US rejected preconditions for resuming negotiations. In May 2005
it deployed so-called “stealth” fighter planes to South Korea which the US Defense
Department said were meant to assure the safety of US troops in the “uncertain
environment created by North Korea’s unwillingness to participate in the six-party
talks”. However, according to newspaper reports US officials visited the North Korean
UN delegation on 13May, passing on the message that the US had no plans to invade
North Korea and urging it to return to the negotiating table. (IHT 11-04, 31-05, 06-06-
05-05)
The attitudes of the several countries involved in the North Korean issue were also
discussed at a hearing of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 2005.
The top US negotiators with North Korea, an assistant secretary of state and a special
envoy said they harboured increasing doubts that North Korea was ready to give
up its nuclear weapons programme in return for security guarantees and economic
incentives. The assistant secretary of state said, inter alia, that “I agree with you
that China has been reluctant to use the full range of leverage that we believe China
has”. He noted that China’s and South Korea’s trade and investment with North Korea
had actually gone up in recent years. He also acknowledged that without support
from these two countries it would be very difficult to impose economic or political
penalties on North Korea. (IHT 16-06-05)
On 17 June 2005 the North Korean leader told the visiting South Korean minister
of unification that if the US firmly recognized North Korea as a partner and respects
it, the latter could return to the six-party talks as early as July 2005. He also said
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that if the nuclear crisis was resolved, North Korea was prepared to rejoin the NPT
and allow international nuclear inspectors into the country. (IHT 18/19-06-05)
South Korea
South Korea issued a statement on 23 August 2004 admitting that a group of
government scientists had, without government knowledge, enriched a small quantity
of uranium in 2000 to a level beyond that needed for civilian purposes but not pure
enough for a nuclear weapon.
South Korea began a nuclear weapon programme in the 1970s that was abandoned
in the late 1970s under US pressure. It has signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty and an Additional Protocol (see 11 Asian YIL 315). It is also bound by a
thirteen-year-old bilateral treaty with North Korea (see 2 Asian YIL 411). (IHT 03-09,
04/05-09, 06-09-04)
On 9 September 2004 the South Korean government disclosed that in the early
1980s (1979 to 1981) South Korean scientists had conducted an experiment in
plutonium extraction at a state-run research facility. (IHT 10-09-04) These experiments
had been covered up and were not reported to the IAEA in accordance with South
Korea’s obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (which went into force for
South Korea in 1975, cf. 6 Asian YIL 282). However, at the IAEA board meeting
in November 2004 South Korea stated that it had adopted a new policy of trans-
parency and pledged to never develop or own nuclear weapons. The IAEA Director
General considered the failure to report the activities in accordance with the applicable
safeguards agreement to be “of serious concern” but the Agency also said that the
quantities of nuclear material had been insignificant and that there was no indication
that the experiments had continued. (IHT 27/28-11-04)
OIL AND GAS
See also: Exclusive economic zone; Inter-state relations (China – Russia); Territorial
claims and disputes
China – Japan
China was laying a 450-500 km gas line to offshore deposits, but Japan complained
that China would consequently tap into a 246 billion cubic-metre gas field that is
allegedly partly Japanese (see Exclusive economic zone, supra at 269). Talks in
October 2004 resulted in a stalemate. (IHT 4/5-09, 04-11-04)
China / Japan – Russia
On the issue of whether an oil pipeline from Siberia to the east would go to Daqing
in North-Eastern China or to Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan (see 11 Asian YIL 326),
Russia apparently took a decision in favour of Nakodhka, partly, possibly, as a result
of a Japanese offer of financial assistance. However, subsequent inconsistent and
contradictory reports from Russia said the new pipeline would deliver oil to China
first and only later to Japan, although according to some reports this oil would be
transported not by a special China spur pipeline, but by rail from the Russian pipeline
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terminal at Skorovodino which is located much further to the north and east of the
initially planned Angarsk – Daqing route. (IHT 04-11-04, AToL 29-04-05, JT 21-04,
29-04-05)
China – Kazakhstan
It was reported that under an agreement of 1997 a pipeline was projected from
the Kazakh oil terminal of Atasu to the Chinese railway station of Alashankou,
crossing Russian territory. Building would start in 2005. (AToL 09-02-05)
China – Vietnam
A partnership of oil companies from Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and the US
announced in October 2004 the discovery of a new offshore oilfield at the Yen Tu
field, about 70 kilometres east of the port of Haiphong, and west of Hainan Island.
The Chinese foreign ministry reacted by raising concerns, invoking the 2002
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. In 2003 China and
Vietnam had agreed to keep the status quo in the region and abide by the Declaration.
The Chinese reaction called on Vietnam to “cease to adopt any unilateral action that
would complicate or give rise to further expansion of the disputes”, and called on
oil companies to “cease to do anything that would impair China’s sovereign rights
and maritime rights and interests”. (AToL 27-10-04)
India – Iran - Pakistan
See also: Inter-state relations (India-US)
India had been busy securing oil and natural gas supplies. Among the materialized
deals three government-controlled Indian energy companies, among which Oil &
Natural Gas Corp. (ONGC), had concluded a $40 billion deal on 7 January 2005
to buy liquefied natural gas from Iran over the next 25 years and invest in gas fields
in that country. Iran also granted ONGC a twenty per cent stake in its Yadavaran
oil field. Further, plans existed for a gas pipeline to be built from Iran through
Pakistan to India. The pipeline would originate in the South Pars gas field in Iran
and traverse southwest Pakistan to the Indian border. (IHT 17-01-05)
India – Myanmar - Bangladesh
It was reported that agreement in principle was reached among the three countries
in January 2005 on the construction and operation of a pipeline to transport gas from
Myanmar across Bangladesh to India. The pipeline would run from Rakhine and
Arakan state in North Myanmar through the Indian states of Nizoram and Tripura,
into Bangaladesh and crossing back into India. (IHT 19-04-05; AToL 12-04-05)
Iran – China - Japan
An agreement was concluded in October 2004 under which Iran committed itself
to supply China with natural gas over thirty years and granted a fifty per cent stake
in the Yadavaran oil field to the Chinese company Sinopec.
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Equally, in 2004 Iran granted a development contract for the Azadegan oil field
to the Japanese company Inpex. (IHT 20-04-05)
North Korea
It was reported that the Anglo-Irish oil company Animex had signed a 20-year




The passage is 600 miles long and just over a mile wide at one point. It is used
annually by approximately 50,000 ships, which carry a third of the goods involved
in international commerce and half of the crude oil transported by sea.
In spite of a 27 per cent global decline in the number of pirate attacks in 2004
(according to the annual report by the International Maritime Bureau of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce), the number of raids in the Malacca Strait increased
from 28 in 2003 to 37 in 2004. There was evidence of involvement of the Free Aceh
Movement (see supra, Insurgents) in many of these raids. Piracy in Asia as a whole,
though still accounting for roughly half of all cases worldwide, fell from 262 in 2000
to 171 in 2004.
In one case in March 2003 the pirates were less interested in robbery than in taking
turns steering the ship down the congested waterway, giving rise to the possible
scenario of an attack for the purposely grounding of a very large carrier at a very
narrow part of the strait, thereby closing the waterway indefinitely. (IHT 23-02-05,
JT 16-03-05)
REFUGEES
US legislation in support of North Korean refugees
The US House of Representatives passed the “North Korean Human Rights Act
of 2004” in July 2004, aiming at, inter alia, supporting North Korean refugees.
North Korean asylum seekers in China
Forty-four North Koreans who entered the Canadian embassy in Beijing in Septem-
ber 2004 had been allowed in December 2004 to leave China for a third country.
A group of North Koreans entered the premises of the Japanese School at Beijing
on 1 September 2004. They were later moved to the main compound of the Japanese
embassy and part of them later left China for a third country. Most of the hundreds
of North Koreans who had sought asylum in embassies, schools and other foreign
offices in Beijing over the past three years eventually had gone to South Korea,
usually through a third country.
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Under a Sino-North Korean treaty China is obligated to send North Korean asylum
seekers home, but it had not done so in cases that had become public. China rejected
appeals to treat these people as refugees, classifying them as economic migrants and
illegal border-crossers instead. Most of the asylum seekers had been allowed to leave
China within a few days. (inter alia, JT 02-09, 06-09, 03-12-04)
North Korean asylum seekers in Vietnam
Vietnam had denied that it was involved in the secret airlift of more than 460 North
Korean refugees to South Korea in July 2004, but North Korea criticized Vietnam
by name, accusing it of conspiracy.
It was reported in December 2004 that North Koreans had entered the French
embassy and the Swedish diplomatic mission at Hanoi. (IHT 24/25/26-12-04)
Japanese policy on refugees
Japan in January 2005 deported two Kurds to Turkey although they were recognized
as refugees by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (the Kazankiran
case). The Japanese Ministry of Justice held the opinion that a UNHCR decree
classifying a person as refugee (so-called “mandate refugees”) is not binding and
that the conditions under which the UNHCR granted refugee mandate differed from
the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. The designation as refugee by the
UNHCR was considered the expression of the Office’s opinion that the person was
in need of humanitarian support.
The deportation meant that Japan did not consider the persons to be in danger of
persecution in their home country, the criterion contained in the 1951 Convention.
Yet, the UNHCR described the deportation as “contrary to Japan’s obligations under
international law”.
On 25 January 2005 the Minister of Justice announced the possible deportation
of another five Kurdish “mandate refugees”, to a third country.
According to the ministry Japan in 2004 granted refugee status to 15 persons among
whom fourteen fromMyanmar, against twenty in 2003. There were 426 applications
in 2004, among which from Myanmar, Turkey and Bangladesh. Unofficial sources
differed slightly. . (JT 19-01, 21-01, 26-01, 25-02-05)
RIVERS
See also: Borders
India – Pakistan: the Baglihar Dam
A dispute had arisen concerning the building of a dam by India on the Chenab
River, one of five rivers that were the object of the Indo-Pakistani Indus Water Treaty
of 1960. Pakistan contended that the Indian plans, dating from 1992 violated the
Treaty since the dam would severely reduce water supplies to Pakistan, adversely
affecting agricultural lands.
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The Treaty classifies disagreements between the parties into three categories:
“questions”, “differences” and “disputes”, to be dealt with by the Permanent Indus
Commission, a Neutral Expert and a Court of Arbitration, respectively.
Pakistan had asked the World Bank to intervene in the conflict, which the Bank
refused to effect as it is not a guarantor of the treaty. The Bank is admittedly a
signatory of the treaty, but only for certain specific purposes, many of which had
already been completed. One of the remaining responsibilities of the World Bank
was the appointment of a Neutral Expert, the only thing the Bank could do on request
of a party to the Treaty, after failure of a settlement by the Commission. (AToL 09-
02-05)
SANCTIONS
US sanctions against Chinese companies
(See also infra: US sanctions against Iran)
The US invoked trade sanctions against the North China Industries Corp. (Norinco)
on 19 September 2003 for weapons proliferation, although immediately waived them
for a year. In September 2004 it was decided to continue the waiver until March
2005. The sanctions would block up to $12 billion in annual Chinese exports to the
US. (FEER 30-09-04)
It was reported that in implementing sanctions against Chinese companies the US
did also formally apply them to the subsidiaries of these companies but did not harm
them as these subsidiaries, while fulfilling the conditions for the sanctions, did little
or no business with the US. On the other hand it was said that in many cases the
sanctions were not being applied to the parent company as the latter is liable under
the (US) sanctions law only if it has “knowingly” assisted the subsidiary, implying
a burden of proof that the US is not always willing to undertake. It was suspected
that the reason might be unwillingness to hurt the financial interests of American
firms that do business with the parent company. (IHT 26/27-02-05)
US sanctions relating to Chinese currency rate
See: Monetary matters
US sanctions against Iran
The US imposed penalties in January 2005 on some large Chinese companies for
aiding Iranian efforts to improve its ballistic missiles by exporting certain technology
the nature of which was kept classified. The penalties barred the companies from
doing business with the US government and also prevent them from obtaining export
licences that would allow them to purchase controlled technologies from US com-
panies. The previous set of US penalties on Chinese sales to Iran was announced
in July 2003 (see also 11 Asian YIL 330) (IHT 19-01-05)





Demolition of chemical weapons
Two Sino-Japanese joint studies in 2003 and 2004 led to a joint project for the
search and demolition of an estimated 700,000 chemical projectiles that had been
abandoned by the Japanese army in China after the end of the war. The project started
in September 2004 and had led to the recovery of more than 1,000 wartime weapons
in North China.
It was the fifth such mission undertaken by Japan since 2000. China had started
asking Japan to carry out clean-up operation in 1990, to which Japan formally agreed
in 1995 after having ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. (JT 25-09-04)
SOUTH ASIA ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC)
Cancellation of summit meeting
A SAARC summit meeting that was due to be held in early February 2005 at Dhaka
was cancelled because India declined to attend for “security considerations”. However,
according to news reports the real reason lay in the existing tensions between India
and the Bangladeshi government over various issues, such as the refusal to sell natural
gas to India, the Ganges waters, Bangladeshi illegal immigration to India, trans-border
smuggling of goods and the use of Bangladesh as a scapegoat for insurgency and
security problems in India’s north-eastern states. (IHT 08-02-05)
SPECIFIC TERRITORIES WITHIN A STATE: KASHMIR
See also: Inter-state relations (India-Pakistan)
Indo-Pakistani efforts
The two countries in November 2004 proceeded with their discussions on prime-
minister level concerning Kashmir. There had been some flare-up resulting from
remarks made by the Pakistani president in which he raised the possibility of parts
of Kashmir being made independent, or placed under joint Indian-Pakistani control,
or put under the administration of the UN. Nevertheless, India announced that it would
begin pulling about 20,000 troops out of Kashmir.
The prime ministerial meeting gave rise, inter alia, to an agreement under which
the two countries would reopen branches of state banks in each other’s country. These
branches were closed as a result of the 1965 Kashmir War. (IHT 17-11, 26-11-04)
In early 2005 the two countries reached agreement on re-establishing a bus service
between the two parts of the disputed territory of Kashmir, which the Indian foreign
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minister called “the mother of all confidence-building measures”, crediting “people
power” for the warming of relations. (IHT 26/27-02-05)
TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND DISPUTES
See also: Exclusive Economic Zone
China – Philippines
The two countries agreed in September 2004 to make a “pre-exploration study”
on potential oil deposits in the South China Sea as part of a three-year research
project. Research agreements like this were permitted by the 2002 Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (see 11 Asian YIL 281), in contra-
distinction to actual exploration.
Under the Declaration the building of installations and structures on or near the
atolls are banned until the territorial conflicts have been settled. However, most
claimant states had already violated the Code by having military garrisons or tourism
facilities or monitoring stations under the guise of "bird-watching towers" or “weather
huts”.
[Paragraph 6 of the Declaration reads: “Pending a comprehensive and durable settle-
ment of the disputes, the Parties concerned may explore or undertake cooperative




East Timor – Indonesia
It was reported that the East Timorese foreign minister had acknowledged during
a meeting on border issues with Indonesian authorities in August 2004 that Batek
Island, located north of the East Timorese enclave Oecusi, is not East Timorese
territory. This acknowledgement was contrary to earlier claims. (Tempo 19-08-04)
Indonesia – Malaysia
A dispute had erupted in 2005 over a sea(-bed) territory near the northwest corner
of the Island of Borneo. The Indonesian foreign minister said that Indonesia based
its claim to the area on the country’s status as an archipelagic state.
In March 2005 the Indonesian president and the Malaysian prime minister agreed
to avoid open conflict and to have it solved on the basis of technical talks between
the foreign ministers. The dialogue took place in March and was to be resumed in
early May.
Tension between the two states emerged when the Malaysian state-owned oil
company Petronas granted contracts to Shell Oil in February 2005 for the exploration
of two deep-water blocks (Malaysian N6 block) that overlap the maritime area of
(Indonesian) Ambalat. Shell had previously held a concession from the Indonesian
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government for exploration and exploitation in the same area. These rights were
transferred to ENI (Italy) in 2001.
As tension mounted anti-Malaysian rallies took place in various Indonesian cities,
while Indonesia started to construct a lighthouse in the area. (JP 8-3, 24-03-05, Tempo
14-03-05)
Japan – Korea
In 2004 a gas exploration project had started southwest ofDokdo (Takeshima) Island
east of the Korean peninsula. A second oil and gas exploration was to start north
of Dokdo in 2005 by a Korean-Australian consortium while a third, South Korean
state-led, project was starting a survey of marine and mineral resources around Dokdo.
In 1905 Dokdo was the first Korean territory annexed during the Japanese conquest.
The Japanese claim on the island was, therefore, seen by the South Korean National
Security Council as a denial of the history of Korean national liberation, as well as
a justification of aggression (see Asian YIL Vol.6:460, Vol.7:482). (IHT 06-05-05)
Japan – Russia
With reference to the dispute between the two countries concerning four Kurile
Islands (see Asian YILVol.1:346, Vol.2:376, Vol.3:448, Vol.4:512, Vol.5:499,
Vol.6:461, Vol.7:482, Vol.8:310) the Russian president promised in December 2004
to return the two smallest Kurile islands to Japan, but the Japanese prime minister
was holding out for all four islands. (IHT 22/23-01-05)
TERRORISM
See: Inter-state relations (China - Russia, Iran – US), Piracy
UNITED NATIONS
Response to Japanese endeavours toward permanent membership of Security
Council
Japan was among several states that were candidates for permanent membership
in case of an eventual restructuring and expansion of the UN Security Council. Japan
has the second largest economy of the world and is one of the largest financial
contributors to the UN (For an indication of the yearly regular contributions of Asian
countries, see 5 Asian YIL 502).
It was reported in early April 2005 that a grass-roots campaign in China had been
started for a petition to prevent Japan from being elected. Although the Chinese
authorities did not explicitly endorse the petition, there were instances of supportive
comments. Initially China remained officially neutral although the foreign ministry
spokesman seemed to have said that the effort reflected rising alarm about Japan’s
treatment of history, and that China believed the UN overhaul should mainly focus
on increasing the power of developing countries rather than rich, industrialized ones.
On 12 April 2005, however, the Chinese prime minister explicitly said that Japan
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was not ready for a permanent seat until it faced up to its history of aggression and
won its neighbours’ trust.
North and South Korea also opposed Japan’s candidacy. They argued that Japan
had not done as much as Germany to atone for its past misconduct and that it could
not become a leading member of the international community unless it addressed
the legacy of mistrust among its neighbours. It was not clear to what extent the
Korean position resulted from the designation, by a Japanese prefectural assembly,
of the date of 27 February as “Takeshima Day”, referring to the disputed island. (IHT
01-04, 13-04-05, JT 02-04-05)
On the other hand the US announced on 16 June 2005 that it would propose the
addition of the Security Council membership with two permanent members, one of
which would be Japan. In defending Japanese membership it was noted that Japan
was second to the US only in its financial contribution to the UN and was a major
provider of military supplies for peacekeeping operations. (IHT 17-06-05)
Other attitudes towards revision of Security Council membership
Through the speaking of a State Councillor in October 2004 China expressed its
support for the bid by India for a permanent seat in the Security Council. Thus, four
out of the five current permanent members (with the exception of the US) supported
India’s claim.
Pakistan opposed India’s claim and insisted that the question of Kashmir should
first be resolved.
A group of like-minded “Uniting for Consensus” countries, among which South
Korea and Pakistan, opposed any increase in the number of permanent members and,
instead, backed an increase in non-permanent members. (AToL 26-10-04, 14-04-05)
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO)
Cambodia’s and Nepal’s entry
The Cambodian legislature on 31 August 2004 gave final approval to Cambodia’s
entry into the WTO. This step was more or less forced by the impending termination
of the Multi-Fibre Agreement on 1 January 2005 which included the proviso that
quotas would remain in place for exports from countries that are not members of
WTO (this is to be distinguished from the proviso of so-called safeguard quotas which
would apply if, after the expiration of MFA, imports soar in particular categories
of garments or textiles).
Cambodia became the second country (after Nepal in April 2004) to enter the WTO
under new procedures to help least developed countries join it more quickly. (IHT
01-09-04)
China – US / EU
China warned on 8 September 2004 that it had the right to challenge any limitation
of its textile exports to the US when all global, 30-year-old quotas on textile and
apparel would be lifted on 1 January 2005. The elimination of the quota system was
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a key demand of developing states in talks leading to the establishment of the WTO.
Anticipating a Western backlash to a very strong increase in Chinese textile imports,
China had already decided to introduce export duties on 1 January 2005 with respect
to many textile products in an effort to pre-empt retaliation. Consequently, China,
at least initially, rejected suggestions by the US in the first half of 2005 that China
should accept voluntarily restrictions or caps on the amount of clothing it exports
to the US (cf. the so-called “voluntary” restrictions of Japanese auto exports in the
1980s and 1990s, see Asian YIL Vol.1:321, Vol.3:409). However, the US textile
industry started to petition the US government, claiming that China was giving its
industries unfair subsidies and was profiting from currency manipulation and was
therefore breaking the WTO rules. On 4 April 2005 the US Commerce Department
announced it would start an investigation into the need to re-impose trade quotas.
On 13 May 2005 the US Department of Commerce announced that it would impose
“safeguard measures” in the form of new quotas on China-made garments. The quotas
would take effect fifteen days after the start of the WTO-required 30-day period of
formal consultations at the WTO if China failed to take action to meet the objections
raised. The Chinese government called the quotas a “betrayal of the fundamental
spirit of trade liberalization espoused by the WTO” and “reserves the right to adopt
further measures under the WTO framework”. It said the Western governments had
failed to prepare their domestic manufacturers for the removal of quotas on 1 January
2005 and, instead, had kept most of their quotas until the last moment. Yet, on 20
May 2005 China decided to raise the export tariffs on many of its textile and apparel
exports in an attempt to ease Western concerns. However, later dissatisfaction with
the attitude of the US and the EU led to the complete lifting of tariffs on those
categories threatened by US and EU quotas. On the other hand the US was likely
to ultimately accept a deal such as the one made between China and Europe (see
infra).
With regard to the intended EU investigation into whether the surge of textile
imports from China had distorted markets, China said it would “resolutely oppose
any developed countries attempting to re-apply restrictions” on imports that would
limit Chinese exports. Following the US re-introduction of quotas the EU Trade
Commissioner on 17 May 2005 called for China to curb exports of two important
textile products. With regard to these two textile categories the EU would cut short
its 60-day preliminary investigation and would, instead, request immediate emergency
talks with China.
Apparently not satisfied by the Chinese offer of additional export tariffs, the EU
decided on 25 May to cut short the talks and to start formal consultations at the WTO.
Hoping to ease tensions China agreed on 10 June 2005 on voluntary limits of ten
per cent annually through 2008 to the growth of certain categories of its textile and
apparel exports to Europe.
(IHT 09-09, 14-12-04, 06-04, 26-04, 16-05, 18-05, 21/22-05, 26-05, 30-05, 31-05,
11/12-06, 18/19-06-05)
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[- The system of quotas limiting the international trade in textiles and apparel for
decades under the so-called Multi-Fibre Arrangement expired on 1 January 2005,
under an agreement worked out in 1993 as part of the creation of the WTO.
- China had agreed to a “safeguard clause” under its WTO accession agreement in
2001, allowing other WTO members, until the end of 2008, to safeguard their own
textile industries with trade restrictions in the event of a sustained surge in Chinese
imports causing irrevocable harm to local producers.]
The EU expressed its worries in early June 2005 about the sudden rise in imports
of Chinese shoes. In contradistinction to textiles, the Chinese accession agreement
did not contain special rules allowing the EU to allow safeguards in the case of shoes.
(IHT 09-06-05)
Iranian membership
By way of incentive for Iran to accept the West’s demands on the cessation of
its nuclear ambitions the US said it would drop its objection to Iran’s eventual
membership of the WTO. (IHT 12/13-03-05)
Iran had applied for membership in 1996. The WTO announced on 26 May 2005
that it would start talks to admit Iran as a member. (IHT 27-05-05)
WORLD WAR II
See also: Sino-Japanese War
Japanese court decisions on liability for forced labour during wartime
The Hiroshima High Court on 9 July 2004 overturned a ruling by the Hiroshima
District Court of July 2002 and for the first time in a series of lawsuits awarded
damages to the (Chinese) plaintiffs who had claimed to have been forced during the
war to work under severe conditions at a working site in Japan.
Mirroring the District Court’s decision the High Court considered that the de-
fendant’s (a Japanese construction firm) actions in forcibly bringing the plaintiffs
to Japan and making them work under severe conditions resulted from a dovetailing
of government policy and the company’s desire to make a profit. Whereas the lower
court ruled that damages could not be claimed because the plaintiffs’ rights to
compensation had expired under the statute of limitations, the High Court said:
“Forcibly taking people to Japan and making them work is a serious violation of
human rights, and the argument that brings up the statute of limitations runs counter
to (the course of) justice.”
Yet, regarding compensation for the illegal act of forcibly bringing the workers
to Japan, the High Court ruled that there was no reason to disregard the 20-year
statute of limitations and awarded no damages. (JT 10-07-04)
On 23 June 2005 it was the appeal court, the Tokyo High Court, which denied
compensation to the family (who took over the lawsuit after the original plaintiff’s
death) of a Chinese slave labourer, overturning a decision of the Tokyo District Court
of July 2001. This latter decision had ruled in favour of the claimant and had
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sentenced the Japanese state to pay compensation for negligence, being the first time
that a Japanese court held the state responsible for forcibly bringing persons to Japan
to work as forced labourers during the war.
The High Court ruled that the Japanese state bore no responsibility in terms of
paying damages because there was no mutual assurance between China and Japan
to pay state compensation; nor was there responsibility of the Japanese state for the
abduction and the slave labour because the (Meiji) Constitution, in effect at the time,
absolved the state from liability for damages. Furthermore, the Chinese plaintiffs
had no right to demand payment, due to the signing of the Sino-Japanese Joint
Communiqué in 1972 (containing the Japanese recognition of the People’s Republic’s
government), and the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978.
In a similar case before the Osaka High Court with the wartime employer (a
stainless steel producing company) and the Japanese government as defendants a
settlement was reached on 29 September 2004 between the plaintiffs and the
employer. The case would continue between the plaintiffs and the Japanese state,
which had invoked the statute of limitations.
It was reported that the Kyoto District Court ruled in January 2003 that the Japan-
ese government and the wartime employer had acted illegally in abducting the
plaintiffs to Japan and forcibly putting them to work without pay, yet rejecting the
claim to compensation on the basis of the statute of limitations.





India and International Law, BIMAL PATEL (ed.)
ISBN 9004145192 EUR 125.-/ US$179.- pp.
379+xii.
The aim of this collection of essays is to ex-
amine the contribution of India to the develop-
ment of international law. In addition to the
introductory chapter there are 15 substantive
chapters, arranged in no particular order, and
concluding material relating to India’s status
concerning multilateral treaties and human rights
provisions in UN documents and in the constitu-
tion and laws of India.
The first chapter, by Subhash Kashyap,
considers the Constitution of India and inter-
national law, examining those provisions of the
Constitution that relate to international law. It
provides a useful introduction to the subject.
The following chapter by Pemmaraju Screeni-
vasa Rao, member of the International Law
Commission, considers the position of India in
relation to certain areas of international law
concerning, for example, succession, recognition,
self-determination and the issue of international
terrorism. The chapter by Surindar Kaur Verma
examines the issue of the trade in services, India
and the WTO, while that by V.G. Hegde con-
siders the international patent system and India.
In the following chapter, Ravindra Pratap
addresses the questions of sovereign economic
freedom and the interests of other States. This
is an interesting subject and the survey of rel-
evant instruments is well done, yet the issue is
not directly related to the overall theme of the
collection (this may be said of a number of the
chapters in this anthology). Manoj Kumar Sinha
returns to the issue of the Indian Constitution
in his chapter, specifically the protection of
human rights and the Indian Constitution. Sinha
examines the role of the Indian Supreme Court,
providing a useful introduction to its workings
and the development of human rights juris-
prudence in India. On a related issue, B.C.
Nirmal examines the legal status of refugees in
India. The following chapter by Vishnu Dutt
Sharma surveys issues relating to international
criminal law.
The next two chapters examine issues re-
lating to international environmental law. The
chapter by M. Ghandi considers the issue of
state responsibility and international environ-
mental law. Ghandi argues that Indian policy on
environmental protection is significantly influ-
enced by the refusal of India to consider issues
concerning environmental protection in isolation
from development issues. The chapter by David
Ambrose discusses the issue of international
environmental law and India. Both chapters
examine the role of the Indian Supreme Court
in the area of environmental protection. The
chapter by C. Jayraj examines the law of outer
space and India, which has its own space pro-
gramme. Jayraj argues that India’s domestic
laws do not fully accord with its international
obligations in relation to launching state liability,
compensation for damage caused by space
objects, registration and insurance of space
objects, and procedures for the settling of
claims. The chapter concludes by outlining the
areas in which Indian law is deficient and the
necessary law reform. The chapter by Bimal
Patel examines the International Court of Justice
and India. The concern is to analyse the way in
which cases involving India have contributed
to the jurisprudence of the International Court.
In addition to examining the contentious cases
* Edited by Thio Li-ann, General Editor.
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involving Pakistan which related to the question
of jurisdiction, the chapter also considers India’s
position on a number of advisory opinions that
have come before the Court. Patel concludes
(perhaps not surprisingly) that India’s attitude
towards the International Court of Justice has
been conditioned by considerations of (per-
ceived) national (self-) interest. The final chapter
by Amal Ganguli looks at the law relating to the
enforcement of foreign awards in India.
As noted, the aim of this collection of
essays is to examine the contribution of India
to the development of international law. This is
certainly an important subject. India holds a
unique position in the international community
as the world’s largest democracy and second
most-populous country, with a developing mar-
ket economy, serious problems of poverty, and
possession of nuclear weapons. There is no
doubt that India has played an important role
in the development of international law, both in
its participation in international organizations
(notably the United Nations) and in its own state
practice: the interventions in Goa, East Pakistan
and Sri Lanka, and the dispute over Kashmir
being notable examples. This collection of
essays fails, however, to engage systematically
with this legacy, and while certain of the chap-
ters are valuable in outlining the perspective of
India on developments in international law, or
the way in which international norms have been
or should be transposed into domestic law, cer-
tain chapters fail to engage with the overall
theme of the book in any substantive way, if at
all. Those concerned to discover the position of
India on current developments in international
law, or the impact of international norms on the
market democracy now emerging in India, will
find valuable material in this collection; there
is, however, much more to be said on the issue.
STEVEN WHEATLEY
Senior Lecturer in International Law
University of Leeds
International Law in Korean Perspective,
CHOONG-HYUN PAIK (ed.), Seoul National Uni-
versity Press, Seoul, Korea, 2004, ISBN 89-521-
0598-2 93360, xxii + 473 pp, KoreanW17,000/
US$20.00.
Starting with an episode in 1876 when the
Korean negotiator had no knowledge of “full
powers” in his encounter with his Japanese
counterpart, and a second episode in 1998 when
the Korean delegationmade an important contri-
bution in the last phase of negotiating the juris-
diction of the International Criminal Court, the
editor, Professor Emeritus of Seoul National
University College of Law, offers a brief sketch
of the acceptance of international law in the
Republic of Korea over the last century. (It may
be recalled that in 1872 the Japanese negotiator
had had precisely the same experience in his
encounter with the United States Secretary of
State. More or less the same state of affairs
would have existed in other Asian countries in
those days.)
The long and arduous efforts of the Korean
pioneers of international law made a symbolic
achievement in the establishment of the Korean
Society of International Law in 1953 in the final
phase of the Korean War. The Society now
publishes its Korean Journal of International
Law on a quarterly basis. The International Law
Association’s Korean Branch was established
in 1964, and has since been publishing the
Korean Yearbook of International Law. In addi-
tion to these, Prof. Paik set up the Seoul Inter-
national Law Academy, a private research insti-
tute, which has been publishing the Seoul Jour-
nal of International Law twice a year since
1994. Almost all colleges or faculties of law in
Korea, now approximately 90 in number, offer
courses in international law; many have post-
graduate programmes in international law.
Against this backdrop, Prof. Paik thought
that it was “high time that one took stock of
international law study in Korea,” and has
collected seventeen articles discussing “Special
Issues of Particular Concern” in Chapter 1 (five
articles); “Law of the Sea” in Chapter 2 (three
articles); “International Economic Law” in
Chapter 3 (three articles); “International Crimi-
nal Law Affairs” in Chapter 4 (three articles),
and “Practice in the Domestic Courts” in Chap-
ter 5 (three articles).
The list of contributors reveals their striking
backgrounds in terms of legal education: of the
seventeen contributors, including the editor
himself, sixteen are graduates of the College of
Law, Seoul National University, whether they
proceeded to higher degrees in the United State
or the United Kingdom later on. Another notice-
able feature is that eleven currently have or have
had some practical experience in government
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agencies in their official or advisory capacities.
This fact would have given some practical per-
spective to their writings.
While the editor’s preface provides a con-
venient summary of each contribution in about
ten to 15 lines, this reviewer would rather select
certain articles or their chosen topics and make
comments in his own way.
The first point to make is that the contri-
butors generally seem to be independent and
free from ideological biases. Indeed, some do
not hesitate to criticize government policies or
domestic court decisions. This is a most wel-
come attitude for a fair analysis of problems.
Secondly, an impressive point is made in the
preface, as well as in one of the articles, that the
more “normative impact of international law”
should be made in “the domestic legal arena”.
At the same time the editor points out the need
for “a new methodology of international law that
will extricate [Korean international lawyers]
from the Eurocentric outlook of the present
approaches”. In a word, “Korean international
legal scholars are confronted with many
challenging tasks.”
Chapter 1 starts with the editor’s contribu-
tion that discusses the desired return of the
Korean cultural property, especially the “Oe
Kyujanggak Manuscripts”, taken by the French
army during the 1866 armed conflict. After a
review of the law of armed conflict in those
days, the author argues that the French are under
legal obligation to return them to Korea. The
unification of Korea is discussed by Seong-Ho
Jhe, who takes up the communiqué of June,
2000 adopted by the two leaders at their unpre-
cedented summit. He compares the South’s
confederation idea with the North’s “low stage
federation” proposal, extensively discussing their
similarities and differences. Chin-Sok Chung
deals with the role of the legislature in the con-
clusion of treaties, and shows that it is rather
modest in that the National Assembly may give
prior consent only to those kinds of treaties
specified in the Constitution, without the power
to modify them. The possible contribution of
Korea as a middle power to international law-
making is discussed by Suh-Yong Chung, who
proposes the training of able negotiators and
better inter-agency co-ordination as well as
focusing on emerging “soft” issues, such as the
environment, rather than the hard ones of inter-
national peace and security. The hard issue of
the UN Security Council is extensively dis-
cussed by Jae-Min Lee. He tests not only the
“ultra vires action” but also the “ultra vires
inaction” of the Security Council by examining
the roles of the Secretary General, the Member
States, the International Court of Justice, and the
Rule of Law while subjecting these to scrutiny.
In Chapter 2, Kak-Soo Shin takes up the
Korean-Japanese Continental Shelf Joint Devel-
opment Agreement and makes a critical analysis
of jurisdictional issues contained in it. The
author says that the unique “operator” system
under which the national law of the concession-
aire designated as operator applies in its sub-
zone has lacunae in a number of ways, and
suggests that they may be filled by reference to
the Antarctic Treaty, status of foreign forces
agreements, condominium, co-imperium and
unitization. In a well researched and reasoned
paper onmaritime boundaries in Northeast Asia,
Keun-Gwan Lee presents a critical discussion
of the method of delimitation. He criticizes
China’s neglect of international judicial de-
cisions on maritime boundaries in its relations
with Korea and Japan on the one hand, and the
“positivist” method of the ICJ and the arbitral
tribunals as seen in such decisions on the other.
On this second point, he proposes a “meta-
positivistic recognition of international law” on
the basis of the diversity of the international
society and heterogeneity of its members.
In discussing “like domestic products” in
Article 3(2) of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Won-Mog Choi in Chapter 3 makes
a detailed analysis of the concept of “like
products” in comparison with the “aim and
effect” theory. He strongly argues for a “trans-
parency and rationality” of criteria (e.g., customs
duties proportionate to the strength of alcohol)
and an increased judicial nature of the WTO
dispute settlement procedure, in view in part of
the growing non-tariff barriers. Seung Hwan
Choi succinctly describes the “garlic dispute”
between Korea and China and puts the relevant
issues into perspective. The Korean counter-
measure of raising the tariff on the bulk imports
of garlic as an emergency safeguard met the
retaliatory suspension of Korean exports of
electric appliances by China, which inflicted a
loss on Korea 55 times bigger than that on
China. Korea resorted to legal action in the
WTO, while China reacted through political
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retaliation, as it had not then been admitted to
the WTO.
In Chapter 4 on international criminal law,
Young-Sok Kim proudly introduces the Korean
contribution to the drafting of the jurisdictional
clause of the Rome Statute; Kim argues that the
gaps in the Korean penal code should be filled
to implement the Statute in Korea. Jae-Ho Sung
extensively discusses the controversial criminal
jurisdiction in the Korean-U.S. status of forces
agreement. Its detailed analysis in comparison
with the NATO, German and Japanese agree-
ments with the United States is followed by the
author’s argument that the Korean agreement
should be revised to ensure more extended juris-
diction for Korea, while the negligent practice
of the Korean authorities should also be
corrected. A Korea-U.S. extradition case in-
volving a Swiss national is discussed by Young-
Jin Jung. Criticizing the Seoul High Court de-
cision to extradite the alleged criminal, the
author suggests that under the Korean Extra-
dition Act the Minister of Justice could have
exercised his discretion so as to reject extra-
dition.
In the final Chapter, Tae-Hyun Choi deals
with the principle of restrictive sovereign im-
munity recently adopted by the Korean Supreme
Court. The relevant aspects of the problem are
fully discussed before the author concludes that
national legislation on this subject, as in Euro-
pean and American countries, would bring
greater judicial stability and predictability and
would plug loopholes more efficiently than
would the further accumulation of cases. Two
recent cases of the Constitutional Court in-
volving the relationship between international
law and municipal law are taken up and dis-
cussed succinctly by In-Seop Chung. The cases
in point are, firstly, the prohibition of outdoor
assembly and demonstration within 100 metres
of the premises of foreign diplomatic missions
in favour of the receiving State’s obligation to
ensure their inviolability under the Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations and the free-
dom of assembly and association under the
Constitution, and secondly, the KoreanMilitary
Service Act and the conscientious objector to
military service in relation to the freedom of
conscience under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. The author claims that
the Court has failed to pay due attention to
international law in its reasoning despite the
constitutional provision that international law
had the same effect as national law.
It may be pointed out in passing that some
papers have grammatical errors, for example,
“the” placed before “Chapter VII”, “Great
Britain”, “paragraph 2”, etc., and the erroneous
use of singular/plural forms of nouns. This is
not a major defect because the writers are not
native English speakers, yet it may possibly give
an adverse impression.
The reviewer regrets that he has been unable to
touch on all of the contributions in this limited
space. However, he is gratified to learn that
Korean international lawyers have been and are
extremely active, and have great potential for
contributing to the development of international
law in the years to come.
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